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Abstract		
 
 
 
Processes of ecological modernisation – where ecological protection 
becomes increasingly viable and attractive, whether through market forces or 
by state intervention and regulation – have received considerable attention 
within the academic literature. However, extant theory in this respect has 
focused almost wholly on the nation state level and has yet to account for the 
role played by local governments.  
 
This thesis seeks to address that deficiency by developing conceptual tools to 
study local government behaviour in order to understand why local 
governments contribute differently from one another to processes of 
ecological modernisation. A model of local environmental policy capacity is 
proposed (using insights from new theories of institutionalism, policy 
entrepreneurship and policy networks) and is applied to the ‘zero-carbon 
homes’ policy agenda of England in the period 2006 to 2015. This agenda is 
chosen because it both illustrates ecological modernisation and centres on a 
key field of responsibility for local government – local planning.  
 
Two local governments are chosen for in-depth study to assess the value of 
the model. Oxford City Council, on the one hand, which showed reluctance in 
contributing to the agenda, and Cambridge City Council, on the other, which 
has been more proactive. The research provides useful insights on reasons 
for the differences between the two cities, these reflecting, above all, the 
dialectical relationship between policy entrepreneurship and institutions. 
Empowered entrepreneurs operating within an institutional context conducive 
to both change, and with a focus on sustainability, are important conditions for 
action.  
 
The key contribution of the thesis lies in its revelations about the processes of 
ecological modernisation at a local level, and the argument that, if ecological 
modernisation theory is to be useful in explaining the processes of change in 
this regard – as it claims to be – then it needs also to take account of local 
government’s contributions.  
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‘Many years ago the great British explorer Edward Mallory, who was to die on Mount 
Everest, was asked why did he wanted climb it.  
 
 
He said, ‘because it is there’’ 
 
 
-  John. F. Kennedy, 1962. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction 
 
 
States around the world have begun to initiate legislative programs designed 
to mitigate and minimise the effects of climate change. Typically these seek to 
mandate or encourage the private sector to embrace new technological and 
design solutions in order to ‘green’ production and consumption. We can point 
to financial incentives for domestic renewable energy production and 
incentives for the purchase of electric cars for example, or the creation of new 
environmental ministries or emergence of new discourses of sustainable 
development. Contemporary discourses of environmental governance have 
used this transition to greener modes of production and consumption to stress 
a new, ecological phase of modernisation where we can have it both ways; 
continued economic growth can be accompanied by a concurrent reduction in 
emissions and negative environmental externalities.  The only route out of 
modernity’s environmental problem, ecological modernisation theorists argue, 
is further modernisation.  
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This thesis questions the way that local government has been theorised within 
our existing accounts of how that process occurs and suggests that greater 
appreciation is needed for the role they play as contributors in their own right.  
 
For much of the time between today and the earliest discussions on climate 
science, spearheaded by the likes of Rachel Carson with her book The Silent 
Spring (Carson 2000), James Lovelock with his Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 
2000) and The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (Meadows and Club of Rome 
1972) report, capitalism, industrialisation and growth were understood as the 
cause of the environmental problem, not its solution. The only way to mitigate 
the problem was said to be through de-industrialisation, an argument most 
forcefully presented in such works as Barry Commoner’s The Closing Circle 
(Commoner 1971) and Herman Daly’s Towards a Steady State Economy 
(Daly 1973). However, a number of countries –including the US, Scandinavia, 
Germany and Japan – had experienced an increase in output, but a relative 
(or in some cases an absolute) decrease in emissions (Janicke, Monch, 
Ranneberg, et al. 1989, Janicke, Monch, Ranneburg, et al. 1989, Mol 2000, p. 
45, Murphy 2000, p. 2). Economic growth had in these cases been de-
coupled from ecological degradation.  
 
It was thus becoming more contentious to argue that the link between 
modernity and environmental degradation was as clear cut as the de-
industrialists would say; actual institutional transformations were taking place 
that were redefining the relationship between industrial society and the 
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environment that could ‘no longer be interpreted as mere window-dressing, as 
they were in the 1970s’ (Mol 1996, p. 303). Early ecological modernisation 
theorists began to question what this meant for our assumptions about the link 
between growth and environmental degradation. Institutions and actors were 
showing willingness to reform production processes in a way that allowed 
them to situate economic growth and the minimisation of negative 
environmental externalities in a positive sum relationship. Rather than an 
intrinsic flaw of modernity, ecological modernisation theorists argued that 
environmental degradation resulted instead from a design flaw in the 
institutional set up associated with contemporary modes of production and 
consumption (Mol and Janicke 2009). The implication was that environmental 
problems could be designed out, stimulating an ecological ‘switchover’. We 
could, in other words, have it all.  
 
Thus the normative ‘face’ of ecological modernisation theory (EMT) emerged. 
This idea that economies could grow in a way that led to a reduction in 
negative environmental externalities justified a new form of environmental 
politics that could sit within a neoliberal political-economy rather than threaten 
it, as prior normative thinking from de-industrialists had. Early advocates didn’t 
argue for unbridled economic growth and capitalist expansion, instead merely 
challenging the dominant understandings to give hope to the idea that 
environmental protection could be achieved alongside modernisation, rather 
than at the expense of it.  
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Alongside this normative dimension though emerged an analytical face to 
EMT that sought to provide an empirical skeleton for normative discussions. 
Whilst the de-coupling of growth from emissions was – and still is – by no 
means universal, it did raise the question of why it was occurring. An 
analytical theory of EM1 emerged out of attempts at answering this question. 
By studying extant examples of this decoupling process scholars started to 
offer prescriptions for how, why and when EM emerged as a trajectory. It is 
towards this face of the EM literature that this thesis is directed.  
 
Our understanding of the behaviour of national governments in stimulating or 
managing processes of ecological modernisation is rich (Weale 1992, Janicke 
1997, Janicke and Weidner 1997) but thus far EMT has failed to consider the 
role that local governments play. We know from elsewhere that local 
governments are playing an important role in localized responses to climate 
change (Bulkeley 2013) but extant attempts from with ecological 
modernisation theory (EMT) to explain the way that society is undergoing this 
transition fails to adequately consider the role of local authorities in broader, 
national climate change strategies.  
 
This thesis responds to this lack of attention by investigating how can we 
account for variation in the extent to which local authorities contribute to 
processes of sustainable development. Chapter two discusses the literature 
on ecological modernisation to highlight this gap more vividly. Here ecological 																																																									
1 Throughout this thesis EM theory is used to refer specifically to EM as an analytical framework rather than a 
normative-political agenda. It will be made clear where it is being used in this latter sense.  
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modernisation as a normative device and ecological modernisation theory as 
an analytical device are introduced in more detail. This thesis talks to the 
latter conceptualization of EM, but makes clear that the links between the two 
are strong and the success EM as a normative goal – a normative goal that 
has become a dominant discourse of environmental governance, no less – is 
contingent upon our analytical understanding of it. Understanding how 
governments legislate to minimize the impact of climate change and mitigate 
against its impact is important if we are to have confidence in the 
environmental legislation we put in place in the future.  
 
It is that observation that spurs the research; if EMT is able to account for the 
ecological development of industrial society, as it claims to, we need a theory 
of local government behaviour within in. Chapter two makes the case for why 
this is important, introducing literature from urban climate governance to show 
that in England and around the world local governments show ambition and 
willingness to take meaningful steps to contribute to processes of EM. It 
proceeds to argue that within ecological modernisation theory there has been 
an assumption that the implementation of policies and strategies directed 
towards EM by central government is a problem-free process. Within a highly 
centralized system such as the UK it is often down to local authorities to 
implement national strategies, so it is worthwhile broadening out the focus not 
only to the national policy design stage but to include local contributions. 
Ecological modernisation theory often has a tendency of black-boxing the 
state, downplaying the still crucial role it plays even as the market plays a 
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more hands on role in the provision of environmental goods and services. 
Local government is seldom discussed when analysing extant EM processes.  
 
The chapter therefore sets up the two overall aims and contributions of 
theses. The central aim and contribution of this thesis is to develop an 
analytical model that, on the basis of the findings of this and further studies, 
can be refined going forward to provide us with tools to explain the behaviour 
of local governments in processes of ecological modernisation. It does so 
through an in-depth study of the ecological modernisation of the English 
residential housing sector that was spearheaded by central government’s 
‘zero-carbon homes agenda’ between 2006 and 2015. The ZCH agenda was 
an ambitious national level programme to increase the sustainability of 
residential buildings in England (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have 
different planning systems, so are not the focus of this thesis) that was 
launched in 2006 but abolished in 2015 after a change in government. It was 
chosen as a site for analysis because it has undergone a process of 
ecological modernisation and covers an area of which local authorities 
typically have considerable influence – planning.   
 
This sets up the central research questions of this thesis:  
 
1. What is the nature of the contributions that English local authorities make in 
pursuit of ecological protection and sustainability in the residential housing 
sector? 
	17	
1.a. How, if at all, has the nature of these contributions changed over 
time? 
1.b. How widespread have the contributions of local authorities been in 
this regard? 
1. c. How much commonality and variance has there been in such 
contributions? 
2. How can we account for any differences in the contributions that local 
government make?  
 
The analytical model – a model of local environmental policy capacity – that is 
developed within this thesis to account for local government contributions is 
discussed in chapter four. This provides the conceptual toolkit from which 
empirical investigation proceeds and is developed using insight from previous 
attempts to study national policy preparedness amongst national governments 
in the context of ecological modernisation, but heavily bolstered with literature 
from new theories of institutionalism, theories of network governance and 
theories of policy entrepreneurship. It is designed to provide the tools not just 
to understand the variation in outcomes within the case of residential housing 
(thus answering research question number two) but also as a first step in the 
on-going process of theoretical work to develop a tool that can study 
outcomes across cases. In so doing the thesis thus responds to a key 
deficiency in ecological modernisation theory on the behaviour of local 
governments.  
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At the heart of the theoretical discussion underpinning the model is the idea 
that policy entrepreneurs underpin the emergence or demise of particular 
policies or strategies and that their behaviour is constrained or enabled by 
institutional factors. As a result the thesis draws heavily on the new theories of 
institutionalism – particularly its rational choice, historical and sociological 
institutionalist strands – to situate actors and institutions in a dialectical 
relationship, where actors are both constrained and enabled by extant 
institutional architectures and are also capable of influencing – but not 
guaranteed to do so – that institutional architecture by engaging in processes 
of institutional (re)design.  
 
Their ability to do this is influenced by more than institutional context alone; 
the ability of agents to act as institutional designers or reformers is 
constrained and enabled by the extent to which they are able to navigate 
existing policy networks and how much they are able to influence outcomes 
that emerge from the interaction of their members (which would include 
private bodies, public officials, political parties and civil society actors). As a 
result, the model draws influence from the literature on policy networks – 
particularly that which discusses the resourcefulness so of network actors and 
the way that those resources influence their relative power. As such, the 
relationship between institutions and agents should not just be understood as 
dialectic but also one that is mediated through policy networks. It is therefore 
important to study all three.  
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However, we must remain sensitive to the economic conditions that prevail 
locally. We will see from discussions in chapter two on ecological 
modernisation at the national level and in the private sector that a baseline of 
economic performance is needed in order for economic costs and ecological 
savings to be reconciled.  Within the model then this baseline economic 
performance is situated as a necessary though potentially insufficient 
condition. Precisely how economics influences outcomes is likely to vary on a 
case by case basis (and indeed towards the end of the thesis we see that in 
this case it has a Janus-face, serving as both a help and a hindrance under 
different circumstances).  
 
The completed model provides a useful tool to identify and map the 
complexity of local government policy making – especially in a system as 
centralized as that in England – and relate key individuals to their 
surroundings in order to explain how an outcome occurred. The hope is that 
the model developed in this work can be useful in the future to account for 
local contributions to state-led processes of ecological modernisation, 
especially where they are co-opted into the process on a voluntary basis (i.e. 
where local government has greater autonomy over whether to engage with 
national-level strategies). Recent developments in England have seen powers 
being devolved to local governments in a range of policy areas, where groups 
of local governments ‘bid’ for packages of devolved powers (Lowndes and 
Gardner 2016). It is pertinent therefore to have a better understanding of the 
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factors that affect the voluntary aspects of local environmental climate 
governance. 
 
The development of the model of local environmental policy capacity forms 
the basis of the theoretical contribution, but alongside this though is an 
empirical contribution: to explain and account for the role that local authorities 
have played in the zero-carbon homes (ZCH) agenda. The focus then in the 
thesis is on both the development and application of the model of local 
environmental policy capacity in order to address the gaps outlined in chapter 
two.  
 
As we will see in chapter three, the ZCH agenda is an attempt at the 
ecological modernisation of the residential housing sector directed primarily 
by state action.  It sought to mandate (through Building Regulations) and 
encourage (through the a quasi-voluntary Code for Sustainable Homes 
(CSH)) behavioural changes amongst house builders and landowners to 
adopt new technologies and design principles in pursuit of a more sustainable 
outcome. However, it does so with a keen eye to economic concerns.  
 
As chapter three also shows, planning is a policy area that has traditionally 
had a high degree of involvement from local authorities, who are tasked with 
drawing up local plans that outline the location, type and some technical 
aspects of housing to meet local needs. The chapter concludes with three 
observations: that residential housing has undergone a process of ecological 
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modernisation, that it is state led and that there appears to be high levels of 
local government involvement. On the basis of this it is argued that focusing 
on this policy area would be useful if the gaps in the literature on EMT when it 
comes to local government are to be addressed.  
 
Questions of the significance and originality of a piece of research are always 
important to consider. By the end of chapter four the argument will be clear 
that this thesis contributes in two ways. First, by providing the first steps 
towards a theoretical account for local contributions to processes of EM 
directed by central government. Second, by addressing the gaps in the 
emerging literature on the zero-carbon homes agenda, which, as we will see 
in chapters three and six, has yet to explore the behaviour of local 
government.  Both are important in their own right, but the theoretical 
contribution will have more lasting effects on the discipline, given the model’s 
potential to be deployed (and refined) elsewhere in future research. In some 
respect then this thesis is the first (but still important) step in a longer agenda 
to account for the full range of local contributions.  
 
The fifth chapter discussed the methodological approach adopted in this 
thesis. In this respect, a mixed-methodology is used. First, statistical analysis 
is conducted, paving the way for two comparative case studies of local 
behaviour. A dataset was constructed in order to categorise local legislation 
on sustainable construction – thus addressing research question number one 
– but this dataset was exploited further in order to undertake a preliminary 
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regression analysis analysing the influence of those aspects of the model of 
local environmental policy capacity that lent themselves to quantification. In 
reality this meant that the influence of economic framework conditions2 was 
measured through a binomial regression analysis in order to analyse the 
influence of these factors on the contributions of local authorities, ceteris 
paribus. Contrary to findings from the national level and private sectors, 
economics plays only a small role in accounting for differences in outcomes. 
Interestingly, though, wording of national legislation that devolves sustainable 
housing powers to local government does stress the importance of the 
viability of policy, stressing that it should have a minimum impact upon the 
supply of housing. This presents a paradox, whereby on the one hand 
ecological modernisation promises the mutual inter-relationship of economic 
growth and environmental protection, but – as is implied in this case – only 
those with a baseline of strong economic performance are permitted to take 
that leap. As we will discuss at length in sections 2.1. and 2.2.1, this seems to 
undermine central aspects of EMT’s claims of the positive sum relationship 
between growth and environmental protection.  
 
This study focuses on the behaviour of two local authorities that have shown 
differences in the way they have interacted with the zero-carbon homes 
agenda. Oxford and Cambridge City Councils were chosen because 
Cambridge had high levels of engagement with the agenda. Oxford on the 
other hand had early successes but had otherwise failed to keep sustainable 																																																									
2 Defined in this case in terms of housing market strength, for reasons discussed in chapter five. 
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homes on the agenda. In many other respects though they are broadly 
similar; they both have buoyant housing markets, similar sizes, similar high-
growth knowledge intensive industries and have a long history of comparison 
elsewhere. Given the centrality of economic concerns to planning in general 
and the zero carbon homes agenda in particular this kind of economic parity is 
important. 
 
Chapter five also discusses the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
that run through this thesis and which inform that nature of the analysis and 
contribution. The author approaches the study through a realist perspective, 
where a world ‘out there’ exists independently of our knowledge of it but our 
best hope as social scientists is to offer interpretations of that world, thus 
avoiding claims of universal truth. The ‘answers’ presented in this work are 
therefore interpretations, relying upon a robustly constructed analytical 
framework in order to clarify a complex social world. In terms of theory 
development, the study deploys an adaptive technique, whereby a number of 
orienting concepts to guide the first stages of research – especially useful 
when researching such complexity – but can be refined as new data emerges. 
The conceptual breadth of the model of environmental policy capacity made it 
useful in this regard. Whilst not claiming to appeal to rigorous hypothesis 
testing it nevertheless presents an informed interpretation of the process, 
traced using interviews, online documents and first hand statistical datasets.  
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Before any effort can be made to explain variations in the contributions made 
by local government in the zero-carbon homes agenda (the ‘why’ element of 
the thesis), the ‘who’ and ‘what’ aspects need addressing. Chapter six covers 
these, asking what the nature of the contributions are, how they have 
changed, how many local authorities embraced them and thus how much 
variation there was between local authorities (and thus answering research 
question number one). This chapter thus marks the empirical section of the 
thesis proper, building upon the background and contextual discussion in 
chapter three. 
 
What we find is that local authorities contributed in pursuit of ecological 
protection in the residential housing sector by supplementing national level 
Building Regulations. Between 2007 and 2015 they had powers to mandate 
specific CSH standards that, in effect, superseded those contained in national 
Building Regulations (but powers which became more difficult to adopt as 
growth dependent planning became more entrenched and, with it, the focus 
on the viability of development vis à vis regulatory standards). These are 
referred to as supplementary standard setting powers. We see towards the 
end of chapter six that roughly fifty-per cent of local authorities embraced 
these powers. A theme running through this chapter is that this supplementary 
standard setting power is one that has not previously been recognized within 
the literature on urban and local climate governance, where local government 
is often understood to regulate within strict boundaries prescribed by local 
government and not go beyond them.  
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Turning to the case studies, chapters seven and eight deploy the model in the 
cases of Cambridge and Oxford City Councils respectively. The various 
elements of the model and the inter-linkages between them are designed to 
cut through the complexity of the policy process. Using process tracing 
techniques, where the researcher seeks to build up a historical time-line of 
significant events and factors, these chapters build up an account of why they 
took the decisions they did. Oxford was an early innovator, but more recently 
has lost much of its original ambition. Cambridge on the other hand became 
progressively more innovative and ambitious as time went on. Key questions 
are asked in both cases: what are the dominant economic conditions; what 
rule changes have there been in recent years; what are the informal 
institutional practices within each council and how have these changed; who 
are the main network actors and what is their level of resourcefulness; who 
are the key policy entrepreneurs and how have they managed (or failed) to 
instigate change?  
 
These comparative differences are discussed in more detail in chapter nine, 
which strips away the contextually specific detail of each case and relates it 
more clearly to the various elements of environmental policy capacity. In so 
doing it offers both an assessment of the usefulness of the model and an 
answer to research question number two.  
 
The thesis concludes in chapter ten, where the focus is on outlining the main 
findings, which are broadly that yes, local authorities do contribute to 
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processes of ecological modernisation, they do so in large numbers and the 
extent to which and way in which they do so can be explained with reference 
to their local environmental policy capacities and thus the way that 
entrepreneurs navigate institutional landscapes through policy networks. The 
complexity of local government and the explanation for the outcomes 
witnessed in each of the case studies in this thesis were captured by an 
analytical model that could adequately cope, it is argued. Further application 
in future research can help to refine the model and iron out issues that may 
derive from case selection or this particular case study. For example, we are 
focusing here on one type of contribution to the EM process. Future research 
would need to explore (perhaps quantitatively) a broader range of 
contributions that they have played as contributors to EM in a range of 
contexts. Yet this study has run the model through a rigorous process and by 
doing so in an adaptive way has been able to accommodate the 
interdependency between its various components. The conclusion ends with 
suggestions for future research, the limitations of the study, implications for 
EM theory and implications for EM theory as a governing strategy.  
 
It is hoped that four things in particular will become clearer as this thesis 
develops, beyond simply answers to the research questions above. The first 
is that ambition exists amongst many local authorities. We should not forget 
this, for often they are well placed to respond to local economic circumstances 
in pursuit of ecological goals and as a result can be more adaptive than one-
size-fits-all strategies at the national level. If we want to offer up the kinds of 
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solutions needed in pursuit of ecological modernisation a devolution of powers 
may be a significant way forward. The second though is that it is not enough 
to assume that because a policy has been devolved it will sit well within all 
local authorities and if there is a degree of voluntarism in the uptake (as is the 
case in this thesis) then many will not be in a position to be able to embrace it, 
even if the political will is there. The third is that focus on local environmental 
policy capacity within this study raises questions about central claims of EMT, 
particularly those that situate economic growth and ecological protection in a 
positive-sum relationship. We will see that local contributions in this case are 
contingent upon an extant level of economic performance, thus limiting the 
extent to which this central claim is applicable. Despite claims that 
environmental protection can be an aid to economic growth, findings here 
suggest that economic growth is a precursor to environmental protection in 
the first place. This would seem to undermine what, as we will see in Section 
2.1. is a central claim of EMT. Only further research can elucidate the extent 
to which this is a pitfall of local contributions to EM, national state-led 
processes of EM or indeed specific only to this empirical area. Directions for 
this research are discussed length in the concluding sections of this work. The 
fourth is that model such as the one developed here can be taken, applied 
and refined to provide much greater insight into how local governments 
respond in these cases. This thesis has done considerable work to highlight a 
gap in the literature on ecological modernisation, develop a model that is 
sympathetic to ecological modernisation theory and apply it to a particular 
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case in order to both say something about that case but test the suitability of 
the model. Further work will take this as a springboard.  
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Chapter Two:  
 
Local Government and Ecological Modernisation: 
Towards A New Theory? 
 
 
 
 
The links between the normative and analytical dimensions of EMT are close. 
EM as a normative agenda is only as successful as its analytical counterpart, 
so interrogating existing theories of EM is a worthwhile endeavour. In this 
chapter, which does just that, it will become clear that there is a great deal of 
work still to be done. The importance of such work is clear; the more 
confidence we have in our analytical accounts for processes of environmental 
reform directed at EM the greater nuance we can add to our normative 
prescriptions and thus the greater confidence we can have of making 
meaningful change.  
 
This chapter outlines this analytical face (and, in doing so, discuses its 
normative cousin). The central argument there – and indeed the point from 
which this thesis is launched and the area to which it aims to contribute – is 
that the way the state is approached within extant discussion on the 
contributing factors to processes of EM is lacking, given that it says little about 
the role that local government plays as both implementers of and also 
contributors to processes of EM. If EMT claims to study the ecological 
development of contemporary society it ought to offer some insight here. It is 
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said within these discussions that EM is accompanied by a ‘hands-off’ state, 
one that ‘steers’ more than it ‘rows’ (Mol 1996) in order to incentivise 
behavioural changes amongst market or societal actors. The greater the 
extent to which markets are characterised by failure, it is said, the greater the 
balance will be tipped towards the latter (a point which, in itself, is also often 
downplayed in these discussions). Little concern is given though for sub-
national implementation or policy-making, which we know from the literature 
on urban climate governance (see in particular Bulkeley 2013) plays an 
important role. This thesis seeks to address that concern by theorizing the 
dynamics of local involvement in processes of EM and the purpose of this 
chapter is to show why that is a worthwhile endeavour. 
 
2.1. Ecological Modernisation Theory  
 
The literature on EM is a challenging one to summarize as a result of its large 
number of strands and subdivisions (Revell 2005, p. 345). Before unpacking 
these dimensions it is worth exploring their commonalities. At their root all 
these perspectives share two key assumptions.  
 
The first is that although environmental problems stem from the modernisation 
of contemporary society they represent challenges for societies rather than 
irreconcilable problems. Seen in this light environmental problems can be 
solved from within the machinery of capitalism and industrialisation through 
the conscious and unconscious restructuring and redesigning of production 
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processes (Revell 2007, p. 115). A core claim of EMT is thus that ‘the solution 
to environmental problems lies in the promotion of more and better 
modernisation, not in radically altering or rejecting modernisation’ (Revell 
2007, p. 115 emphasis added). 
 
The second, and most significant for contemporary discussions on 
environmental political and sociology, is related to the first. EM theorists 
suggest that the links between environmental protection and economic growth 
are positive-sum; that is, environmental protection and economic growth can 
exist co-currently and can be mutually supportive. Economic growth can 
enable forms of environmental protection whereby negative externalities 
previously associated with growth (emissions, pollution, etc) can be de-
coupled from the growth process itself, wherein that environmental protection 
can itself stimulate further economic growth.  
 
A central prescription of EM theory is that the restructuring processes of 
production around ecologically inspired principles is a long term condition for 
economic growth (Revell 2005, Weale 1992). The logic is simple: ‘advocates 
argue that environmental protection is a potential source of future growth for 
the economy as ti can stimulate innovation, provide new market opportunities 
for environmental products and services and lower clean-up costs’ (Revell 
2005, p. 346).   
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This is reflected in a growing perception by policy makers and industry actors 
that the two are no longer irreconcilable. As Revell (2005, p. 346) argues, 
‘there is a growing perception within business, public and political spheres 
that there is no necessary opposition between economic growth and 
environmental protection, that in fact environmental and economic goals are a 
positive-sum game’. Indeed, these assumptions underpinned the thinking of 
the New Labour Government that administered environmental policy for much 
of the time-period considered in this study. Given its emphasis on 
modernisation in general this is perhaps little surprise, but nevertheless, there 
was a central belief that, ‘the environment is a business opportunity…[that] 
there are economic benefits in reducing waste, avoiding pollution and using 
resources more efficiently…[and that] reducing pollution through better 
technology will almost always lower costs or raise product 
value/differentiation’ (DTI 2000, p. 7).  
 
It is worth bearing this point in mind because, as we will see towards the latter 
stages of this study, local interactions with processes of ecological 
modernisation seem to undermine the extent to which this co-concurrent 
relationship is feasible in practice in this context.  What we will see is that 
local contributions to processes of ecological modernisation in this context are 
contingent upon a base-line level of local economic performance; 
contributions to EM may contribute to economic growth, but paradoxically it 
would seem that here a particular level of economic strength must prevail for 
that to be a possibility.  
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Nevertheless, beyond these two assumptions, EMT exhibits two ‘faces’: first, 
as a normative political agenda (advocating both reformed industrial and 
political behaviour) and second, as an analytical theory. 
 
2.1.1. Ecological Modernisation As A Normative Agenda 	
The first face advocates a market led approach to the decoupling of growth 
from emissions (with state intervention where appropriate, as discussed 
below) using a variety of tools to economize the ecology and ecologize the 
economy . This has justified a normative-political agenda that has proved 
popular, given the ease with which a continued focus on industrialisation can 
be seemingly reconciled with growing calls for an environmental response. 
Where governments have endorsed the normative ideals of EM we can talk of 
the emergence of a new, dominant discourse of environmental governance. 
Across much of the developed world this emergence is taking hold, not least 
in the UK (Hajer 1995, Revell 2005).  
 
2.1.2. Ecological Modernisation as an Analytical Framework 
 
The second, analytical face of EMT provides a way of ‘dealing with the 
evidence that suggests that advanced industrial countries have made 
progress in dealing with some environmental problems’ (Murphy 2000, p. 4). 
Ecological modernisation studies then ‘reflect on how various institutions and 
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social actors attempt to integrate environmental concerns into their everyday 
functioning’ in order to understand and explain environmental reform (Mol et 
al, 2013). As examples of the decoupling of growth from emissions that we 
discussed in the introduction became more prevalent, environmental 
sociology and environmental politics became more focused not just on the 
normative possibility of EM but on explaining EM (Mol 1996, p. 303) in order 
‘to analyse those changes to the central institutions in modern society 
deemed necessary to solve the ecological crisis’ (Gibbs 2000, p. 12).  
 
There are strong links between the two in so much as the latter informs the 
former3. Mol talks of an ‘intense exchange of ideas between the normative 
programme of ecological modernization, which is in turn nurtured by the 
political programme of ecological modernisation…and its analytical theory’ 
(Mol 1996, p. 50). Similarly, Mol et al (2013) argue that ‘ecological 
modernization scholarship’s challenge is to provide the conceptual and 
change-oriented frameworks, and empirical examples and evidence from 
around the world, to enable scholars, policymakers, and citizens to 
understand, design and implement institutional and social arrangements that 
address those environmental challenges’ (p. 26). 
 
So how does it explain these changes? Broadly: 
 																																																									
3 This distinction is important and is an inherent characteristic of social theories, where it is not uncommon for them to 
have a ‘dual’ nature in so much as ‘on the one hand, they provide a conceptual framework for a descriptive analysis 
of social processes evolving in society [and] on the other hand…have normative overtones in pointing at the direction 
society…should be developing’ (Mol 1995, p. 48). 
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(i) capitalism is changing constantly and one of the main triggers are 
environmental concerns and interests, (ii) significant environmental 
improvements in production and consumption are possible under different 
'relations of production', and (iii) all major, fundamental alternatives to the 
present economic order have proved unfeasible according to various 
(economic, environmental and social) criteria. 
 
(Source: Mol & Spaargaren, 2002, 38) 
 
 
Huber, amongst the earliest proponents (Huber 1985, 2004), saw these 
empirical changes as indicative of a new form of industrial development, in 
which technological innovations and industrial entrepreneurialism are being 
deployed. Ecological degradation stems from the colonization of nature and 
society by technology as modernity progresses through two stages, the first 
being the industrial revolution and the rise of the engine and electrification, 
and the second being the age of mass transportation and consumerism driven 
by rapid technological development and deployment. He argues that we are 
witnessing a third phase of super-industrialisation, in which the colonization of 
nature by technology is being overcome ‘through the introduction of new, and 
more intelligent technologies’ (Huber 1985, p. 174 in Mol, 1996, 38). 
Technologies for environmental protection in the 1960s and 1970s provided 
‘end-of-pipe’ fixes that attempted to clean up polluting industrial production 
post-hoc. In processes of EM though these first-generation technologies are 
being replaced by more resource efficient technologies directed at ‘clean’ 
production and ‘green’ products that had emerged through rapid innovation in 
nano-technology, computerised design and production and new materials. It 
was these new resource efficient technologies, Huber argued, that made the 
decoupling witnessed by Jänicke (1989, 1989) possible and which are ‘the 
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key component of any viable response to ecological challenges’ (Huber 2004, 
p. 6).  
 
Jänicke shares this technological optimism in his conceptualization of EM as a 
form of environmentally friendly technological innovation (Janicke, M. 1988 in 
Christoff 1996, p. 182). The decolonization of nature occurs as firms and 
industrial actors realise the economic potential of material efficiency and 
technological deployment in response to new consumer demand, profit 
threats (whether resulting from regulatory burden or economic shocks), 
resource scarcities and price fluctuations (Christoff 2006, p. 183). This shift 
from first wave – curative – to second wave – preventative – technologies 
brings ‘a more ecologically rational material and energy input and output in 
the economic sphere’ (ibid, p. 39).   
 
In this conceptualization, ecological modernisation emerges on the basis of 
economically inspired technological development, rather than any overt 
ecologically inspired normative objective.  This rapid technological 
development and deployment overcomes the colonization of nature because it 
serves to achieve an ‘ecologization of the economy’; ‘that is, a more 
technologically rational material and energy input and output in the economic 
sphere and the possibility of monitoring these material and energy flows’ (Mol 
1995, p. 39).  
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There are some that argue that this is little more than ‘greenwashing’, or 
simply dressing up a cost-saving measure (such as more energy efficient 
machinery) as an ecological measure (Christoff 2006). Mol, (1996), the most 
prolific theorist in mainstream EMT, counters this by saying that Huber doesn’t 
offer a sufficiently robust account for why these technological shifts occurred, 
calling for a move away from looking at ‘technological innovations as the 
(only) causal factor determining socio-economic change’ (Mol 1995, p. 40). 
Underpinning these transformations are new ways of thinking about and 
acting within the environment that have begun emerging, such that decisions 
become increasingly made on the basis of ecological criteria as well as 
economic, political or social criteria (Mol 1995). Speaking more technically, 
the ecology becomes economized as economic concepts and behaviours 
directed at environmental protection permit a value to be placed upon the 
environment, thus giving ‘nature its rightful place in the economic game’ (Mol 
1995, p. 39).  This manifests itself, he argues, in three key institutional 
transformations that accompany EM:  
 
1. Modern science and technology plays a pivotal role in these ecology induced 
transformations, which are no longer limited to the introduction of add-on 
technologies or process-integrated adaptations, but include changes in 
product chains, technical systems and economic sectors/clusters:  
2. Private economic actors and economic and market mechanisms play an 
increasingly important role in processes of ecological restructuring, while the 
role of state agencies changes from bureaucratic, top-down dirigisme to 
‘negotiated rulemaking’ and the creation of favourable conditions for such 
transformation processes; 
3. Environmental NGOs change their ideology, and expand their traditional 
strategy of keeping the environment on the public and political agendas 
toward participation in direct negotiations with economic agents and state 
representatives close to the centre of the decision-making process, and the 
development of concrete proposals for environmental reform 
(Mol 1995, p. 58) 
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A number of empirical examinations of processes of EM have emerged in 
recent years that draw upon this core EM framework. This begun with a focus 
on the experiences of developed Western political-economies, particularly the 
Netherlands and Germany but also the United Kingdom and Scandinavia 
(Weale 1992, Hajer 1995, Mol 1995, Buttel 2000, Cohen 2000, Lundqvist 
2000). In response to criticisms that ‘EM is a Northern (Western) oriented 
discourse rooted in a particular stage of economic development’ (Toke 2001, 
p. 289) empiricists cast a wider net, resulting in a number of studies into EM in 
a variety of national contexts outside of the traditional EM heartland including: 
the China and South East Asia (Frijns et al. 2000, Sonnonfeld 2000, 
Sonnenfeld and Mol 2006, Zhang et al. 2007); post-Soviet states (Gille 2000); 
and other Western developed nations (Janicke and Weidner 1997, Weidner 
and Jänicke 2002a). A similar range of empirical applications has been made 
to a variety of industrial sectors and processes within particular nation states 
(most notably: Mol 1995, Spaargaren 1997, Pellow et al. 2000, Spaargaren 
and Van Vliet 2000, Scheinberg 2003, Revell 2007, Goodchild and Walshaw 
2011, Toke 2011a, 2011b). Within these cases EM exists as either an 
identifiable policy strategy or a process of industrial reform.  
 
There are broad normative concerns over whether EM itself is achievable or 
even desirable, but whether we have confidence in the outcomes of this 
agenda or not we must remain open to discussion on how EM emerged as a 
political or industrial strategy and the factors that govern its evolution. The 
propensity with which it has been embraced worldwide is enough to require us 
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to pay closer attention to the conditions that lead to its success, in spite of 
whether or not the ultimate end-goal of EM is sub-optimal. EM may be 
imperfect and may lead to sub optimal outcomes, but the take home message 
from these empirical analyses is that ‘ecological modernization is ultimately 
likely to prove neither completely correct nor completely incorrect; instead, the 
ultimate verdict is likely to be, “it depends”’ (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, p. 
706). 
 
2.1.3. Mainstream and Radical Analytical Accounts of Ecological 
Modernisation 
 
 
The analytical approach discussed thus far constitutes the ‘mainstream’ 
approach to EM, so called for the attention is gives to the rational basis of 
agential and institutional decision making and the resonance the approach 
has with the mainstream of environmental sociology and environmental 
politics, where behaviouralist approaches can tend to dominate.  
 
However, a radical account has also emerged (Toke 2011a). Marteen Hajer, a 
proponent of this radical approach, investigates the implications of new 
dominant discourses of environmental governance. Rather than approach EM 
as a series of institutional changes underpinned by institutional reflexivity it is 
understood as a discourse of environmental governance that serves to 
legitimize particular institutional forms (Hajer 1995).  
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The differences between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘radical’ approaches to EM of 
Mol and Hajer respectively are largely ontological: Mol rests upon a 
foundationalist ontology that privileges the existence a social world 
independent of our knowledge of it that can have direct causal influence on 
behaviour. Hajer rests upon an anti-foundationalist ontological position that 
privileges the social construction of knowledge and the way that 
interpretations of the world structure outcomes4. Thus they can be considered 
complementary rather than competing explanations for the institutional 
transformations they seek to explain.5. To illustrate this difference consider 
the central claims of both positions; whereas for Mol EM emerges out of the 
reflexivity of four key institutions for Hajer it is but one of a number of 
competing ecological discourses that supplanted more radical forms that 
existed prior to the 1980s (that advocated de-modernisation, limits to growth 
as part of a broader critique of capitalism). In this sense,  
‘ecological problems do not pose institutional problems by themselves, but 
only to the extent that they are constructed as such. Problems can be 
conceptualized in such a way that they pose an institutional challenge, they 
can be scaled down so as to become institutionally manageable incidents, or 
they can be seen as a process of structural change that are beyond human 
intervention’ (Hajer 1995, pp. 40–41) 
 
 
The EM discourse thus legitimizes institutional reform and has an enabling 
quality.  Environmental discourse is intrinsically fragmented, and storylines 
compete for dominance and are adopted by competing discourse coalitions: ‘a 																																																									
4 A more profound difference can be found between Hajer and Mol on the extent to which they symapthise with this 
politic, but this falls beyond the remit of this thesis. On a normative level Hajer is more critical than Mol, Janicke, 
Huber and other forefathers of EM theory over the extent to which EM can achieve sustainable outcomes, remaining 
sceptical of the extent to which they ‘take the wind out of the sails of ‘real’ environmentalists’ and whether it is ‘any 
more than the confident and feasible answer to what is basically another example of inefficiency and market failure’ 
(Hajer 1995, p. 34).  
5  Although they critique mainstream EM, radical EM scholars remain committed to the principles of ecological 
modernisation.  
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new policy discourse as comprehensive as ecological modernization is not 
conceptualized as one united set of ideas but only gradually emerges after 
years of institutional debate’ (Hajer 1995, p. 29). He argues that EM became 
dominant for four reasons; it presented an opportunity to rectify the failures in 
environmental governance that marked the 1970s and 80s; its assertion of a 
positive sum relationship between growth and ecology could placate the 
demands of both the green and business lobbies by suggesting that being 
green doesn’t represent a threat to economic prosperity; it requires little in the 
way of radical structural change; and it resonated strongly with the trend 
emerging in the 1980s towards deregulation and small state solutions 
characteristic of neo-liberalism (Hajer 1995, pp. 32–33).  
 
A further distinction can be made between ‘weak and ‘strong’ forms of EM 
(Christoff 2006). On the one hand, weak EM is characterised by reforms 
driven by and justified in terms of economistic concerns, which rely primarily 
on technological solutions rather than behavioural change and which are 
driven more by top-down prescription from technocratic elites ‘working in 
relative quiet’ than bottom-up pressures for change (Hajer 1995, p. 281, 
Christoff 2006, Toke 2011a). In these cases sustainability is pursued as a 
‘business case’ (Christoff 2006). On the other hand, strong EM is 
characterised by more ecologically justified reform driven by behavioural 
change on the demand side as a route to the deployment of technologies. 
Here change is driven bottom-up, through civil society led action (Lovell 2004, 
Christoff 2006, Toke 2011a). These stronger forms are encouraged in large 
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part by more deliberative, discursive practices (Hajer 1995, Dryzek and 
Schlosberg 2005). For example, Dryzek (2002, p. 143)  talks of framing the 
relationship between state, market and civil society along more deliberative 
lines to incorporate a bottom-up reorganisation of the basis of liberal 
democratic society in order to circumvent its tendency towards technocracy 
and inefficiency. Hajer argues along similar lines for ‘the mobilization of 
independent opinions versus the respected powers of authorities’ (1995, p. 
281) through the mass mobilization by grassroots social movements groups.  
There is an inherent scepticism of the extent to which technologies can be 
relied upon to solve the environmental problem – Hannigan (2006, p. 26) talks 
of mainstream EM being ‘hobbled by an unflappable sense of technological 
optimism’ – and in these more radical variants emphasis instead is placed 
upon altering consumption patterns and fostering bottom-up forms of EM that 
challenge conventional elite discourses through civil society deliberation. 
 
Similarly, Greenwood (2012, 2015) talks of the challenges of policy 
coordination that come with ‘weak’ approaches to EM, whereby the 
government necessarily has to coordinate between a range of competing 
interests (inside and outside the machinery of the state) in a way that can both 
appease powerful opponents whilst at the same time staying true to the 
principle of EM.  
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2.2. The Role of the State in Ecological Modernisation 
 
If it indeed is the case that EM ‘‘depends’ on various things’, as Fisher and 
Freudenburg suggest, then given the strong links between the analytical 
dimensions and normative political programme of EM, ‘it would be highly 
beneficial to devote a significantly larger fraction of our effort to studying the 
more specific factors upon which it depends’ (2001, p. 706).  
 
The analytical dimension of EMT has certainly made significant inroads here, 
but one factor that requires further study is the role played by local 
government in responding to and contributing to national legislative programs 
directed at EM. In order to outline where a discussion on local government 
should be situated, our attention needs to turn briefly to an understanding of 
how EMT conceptualizes the role of the state. There is a tendency within EMT 
to imply an essentialism in terms of emergent discourses or institutional shifts 
and the emergence of a new sphere of ecological rationality. Often there is a 
sense then that EM is un-falsifiable, in so much as it rests too strongly on its 
structural-functionalist roots to imply an inevitability in the transition towards 
ecological modernization6. Greater focus is needed on the internal workings of 
the state in particular – especially away from best practice cases – in order to 
overcome this essentialism.  																																																									
6 McLaughlin (2012), for example, is skeptical of what he sees as an inherent determinism in this line of thinking, 
arguing that it implies ‘a providentialist subtext within EMT that suggests that despite obstacles and interfering forces, 
the path of social change privileged by EMT will win out in the long run’ (McLaughlin 2012, p. 181). This stems from a 
tendency within EMT to discount or ‘explain away’ deviation from the expected trajectory and a tendency to select 
cases on the dependent variable in a way that favors the cutting edge, ‘best practice’ cases. EM is open about its 
tendency towards selecting ‘cutting edge’ innovations to highlight best practice and emergent trends in industrial 
production but critics argue that the focus on the ‘EM successes heralded by Mol and his colleagues may simply 
represent a ‘creaming’ of a programme of ecological incorporation into production practices’’ (Hannigan 2006, p. 28). 
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2.2.1. Existing Conceptualization of the State in EM. 
 
As it stands, the role of the state as it has thus far been conceptualized in 
EMT is as an incubator for the development of new technologies and scientific 
practice and to intervene in the market in order to create the ‘favourable 
conditions for the transformation of private enterprise and scientific and 
technological communities’ that Mol mentions (1995, p. 58) and to use 
environmental protection as a means to foster economic growth, which as we 
saw in Section 2.1., is a central tenet of EMT. Because of the state’s inability 
‘to monitor and control the billions of material and energy transformations 
taking place each day’ a bureaucratic, command-and-control style regulatory 
approaches to environmental governance will prove ineffective and are likely 
to be inefficient, inflexible and ‘a brake rather than a motor of technological 
innovation’ (Mol 1996, p. 46).  
 
As a result, EM is often accompanied by a shift in policy from ‘curative and 
reactive to preventative, from ‘closed’ policy making to participative 
policymaking, from centralised to decentralised, and from dirigisme to 
contextual ‘steering’’ (Mol 1996, p. 141) such that the boundaries between 
state and market become redrawn. As Revell says;  
‘The state in ecologically modernizing nations plays a key role in encouraging 
the ‘greening of industry’ and the integration of environmental and economic 
goals. Arising out of the deregulation and privatization trends of the 1980s, 
the ecological modernization of policy-making…involves a transfer of 
responsibilities for environmental reform from the state to the market. There is 
an increasing emphasis on stakeholder participation and partnership in policy 
formulation, especially between the state and industry. The popularity of 
command-and-control regulatory approaches recedes in favour of policies 
that attempt to ‘steer’ industry towards environmental reform. These include 
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market-based instruments such as environmental taxes and voluntary 
agreements’  (Revell 2005, p. 346). 
 
Hajer talks of the shift from the ‘classic bureaucratic’ (1995, p. 27) state, 
marked by ‘predominantly ‘react-and-cure’ formulae for regulation’ (1995, p. 
26) towards a more diffuse, regulatory state characterized by ‘more innovative 
‘anticipate-and-prevent’ type policies (1995, p. 26). Seen in these ways the 
transformations in the market, civil society and state are directed towards 
mainstreaming technological innovations and it is the state that acts as the 
catalyst for institutional change. Civil society has had a historically important 
role to play in this process. Beginning in the 1980s, they began to sympathise 
to a much greater extent with the normative vision of EM, partly in response to 
a frustration at a lack of involvement in decision making processes (Mol 
2000). They had to find a way to respond to new forms of environmental 
crises without going beyond the dominant terms of the debate. It was 
subsequently pressuring government for change in a language they could 
understand, who then in turn introduced regulatory, economic or exhortative 
policies where appropriate, leading to a further institutionalization of ecological 
concern in a reflexive, on-going process. 
 
2.3. Problematizing Existing Conceptualizations of the State in 
Ecological Modernisation Theory 
 
An issue with early conceptualizations of the role of the state within EMT is 
that they offered little discussion of the kinds of factors that affect the 
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propensity with which the state could begin legislative programs directed at 
EM when confronted with environmental problems, challenges or crises. The 
work of Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidnar did emerge to fill this gap, but left 
a lot to be desired in terms of how strategies that were designed were actually 
implemented in practice. They argued that the extent to which this shift occurs 
is dependent upon the extent to which it has undergone a process of ‘political 
modernisation’ (Janicke 1988, Janicke 1997, Leroy and van Tatenhove 2000, 
van Tatenhove and Leroy 2003), a process which entails the policy capacity 
of the state to be built to allow greater state-market interaction.  
 
Policy capacity, defined as ‘the institutionalisation and internalisation of new 
stages of problem-solving capacities in reaction to (or anticipation of) societal 
challenges and crises’ (1997, p. 3) is built in processes of ecological 
modernisation as ecological concern becomes more greatly institutionalised in 
response to civil society pressures and changing external circumstances 
(manifest in legislative programmes, institutional structures and new formal 
and informal rules and practices).  
 
In some senses then political modernisation is a precursor to widespread 
ecological modernisation, in so much as it entails the ‘renovation and 
reinvention of state environmental policies and politics’ in response to new 
pressures and challenges (Mol et al. 2014, p. 266) and connects the ideas of 
environmentally oriented governance to environmental outcomes in an explicit 
way by suggesting that the state adopts a new capacity to respond to latent 
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demands from emerging EM-inspired advocacy coalitions and innovative, pro-
environment market actors (for example, those in the renewables industry).  
 
However, although political modernisation entails a shift to governance, often 
when we talk about a shift from government to governance there is a 
tendency to downplay the still crucial role played by the state and to downplay 
the internal political mechanisms that underlie the state’s involvement within 
governance processes (Peters and Pierre 2006). This is certainly the case in 
the context of EM; discussion of a shift towards a more ‘hand-off’ approach to 
governing has often been shorthand for a pro-market orientation in empirical 
studies that risks shifting focus away from internal state dynamics. Because of 
this, the state in EMT is often seen as a junior partner. Peters and Pierre 
argue that ‘the most important thing about state institutions for the governance 
process is that they provide an agreed upon mechanism for establishing 
priorities, and for making choices among competing processes’ (p. 215), and 
in EM this is no different. Whilst those decisions will be made in negotiation 
with a range of non-state actors, the state remains central to those 
negotiations and decisions. Policy choices need to be a) made and b) 
legitimized.  
Specifically, ‘little is said about the social and political barriers that are likely to 
be faced in trying to implement these strategies’ (Hannigan 2006, p. 26). The 
emergence of policy directed at EM (clean technology investment, the 
creation of environmental standards or eco-taxes for example) is 
underexplored in the literature. The internal politics of policy capacity are as 
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important to understand as the effect of capacity on state-market interaction.  
One particularly interesting dynamic in this internal political context is the role 
played by local government. The role assigned ‘to the sub-national scale and 
the local state is circumscribed’ within EMT and, more importantly, ‘any 
analysis [of ecologically modern policy] is confined to the nation state’ (Gibbs 
2000, p. 13). Analysis of factors underpinning processes of ecological 
modernisation (and thus, given the linkages between the two, the quality of 
EM’s normative prescriptions) have remained focus on the national level (see 
in particular: Weale 1992, Hajer 1995, Mol 1995, Janicke 1997, Gille 2000, 
Lundqvist 2000, Sonnonfeld 2000, Revell 2005, 2007).  
 
The literature on local and urban climate governance hints at the growing 
importance of urban and (to a lesser although still important extent) rural 
environments in both causing and responding to environmental degradation 
as important incubators for change (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007).  
 
2.4. Bringing Local Government into Ecological Modernisation 
Theory  
 
Broadly, we can talk of two stages in local level responses to climate change. 
Municipal voluntarism saw cities engaged in voluntary activities as a means to 
increase their ability to respond to climate change, whether through joining 
transnational networks such as Energie Citiés or the ICLEI, declaring 
intentions to reduce ‘in-house’ emissions or through the publication of 
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emissions reduction strategies. A new wave of strategic urbanism has 
emerged, which sees cities take a more direct, political approach that brings 
together a range of actors within a more integrated strategic framework 
(Bulkeley 2013, pp. 74–82).  
 
This latter phase of local level responses manifests itself in four types of 
urban governance programme. First, they can self-govern, for example by 
committing to reducing emissions on their own estate, or to increase the fuel 
efficiency of their own fleet. Second, they can also ensure the provision of a 
low-carbon or resilient infrastructure. Third, they can enable new forms of 
governance that see new forms of partnership open up between civil society 
and private actors that attempt to incentivise behavioural change outside of a 
binding regulatory framework. These can include education campaigns to 
encourage public-transport use or awareness campaigns to reduce food-
miles. Fourth, they can instigate regulatory frameworks intended to influence 
behaviours and outcome, including taxes, subsidies, land zoning, congestion 
charges and land-use planning.  (Bulkeley 2013, pp. 93–97, Bulkeley and 
Kern 2006). Given that local government already does contribute to EM in 
these different ways, there is a clear need for EM literature to consider their 
role within its framework. 
 
It is this regulatory role that is interesting in the context of EMT. In England, 
where power is highly centralised, this regulatory role is ‘enabled’ by national 
level decision makers, who specify the conditions and boundaries within 
which local governments can act such that local government may, in effect, be 
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tasked with implementing policy agendas that sit within the ecological 
modernisation agenda that are designed elsewhere (McEvoy et al. 1998, 
Allman et al. 2004, Evans et al. 2004, Joas et al. 2004, Bulkeley and Betsill 
2005, Wilson and Game 2006, Loring 2007, Goodchild 2010, Goodchild and 
Walshaw 2011, Argyriou et al. 2012a).   
 
However, there is an implicit assumption within EMT that implementing 
policies and devolving powers and policy to lower levels of government is a 
problem free process (Gibbs 2000, p. 14). The same is broadly true of the 
literature on urban and local climate governance, where little consideration is 
given to how local and national levels interact in processes of multi-level 
governance, nor how local government responds to and enacts policies 
design elsewhere. Here too, implementation is implicitly understood as being 
problem-free.  
 
The reality though is likely to be quite different: devolving powers to local 
authorities does not automatically lead to the adoption of those powers, as 
within such a multi-level system there is an inevitably a contest between local 
political processes that affects the extent to which different levels of 
government can join together. This is an important point to reiterate: where 
this study differs from existing policy analysis within the literature on urban 
climate governance is way that it focuses on the interaction and interplay 
between local and national legislative agendas whilst still remaining sensitive 
to internal local political processes.  
	51	
2.5. Overarching Aim of the Study  
 
So there is a deficit within EMT; where the state is talked about attention 
remains focused largely on the influence of and contribution made by national 
government. If EMT is to provide an account for the emergence of an 
ecological switchover and the role that the state plays within that switchover 
(as it claims to be able to do) then it needs to have more tools at its disposal 
to explain the role that local governments play in legislating EM themselves.  
 
Mol (et al 2013) list four trends within existing EM scholarship which, ‘taken as 
a whole…represent the distinct approach, coherent perspective and active 
research program of ecological modernisation theory’ (p. 20). The latest of 
these four waves is characterized by the ‘internationalization of ecological 
modernization research’ in response to ‘cross-border problems and…growing 
international efforts and coordination for solving environmental problems’ (p. 
20). Be that as it may, we should not lose focus of internal politics inherent to 
processes of political and ecological modernisation. A fifth trend of EM 
research is therefore proposed and deployed to justify this thesis, one that 
focuses on how, why or whether local authorities contribute to processes of 
ecological modernisation. This calls for a focus on the implementation of 
regulatory strategies in processes of EM and how local governments are 
tasked with implementing and contributing to such strategies.  
 
Given these shortcomings and in the spirit of this new wave of EM research, 
the aim of this thesis is therefore to theorize the dynamics of these local 
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contributions to state-led processes of EM (political modernisation, to use 
Jänicke’s terminology). Much like Jänicke & Weidnar have theorised the 
factors that can explain variation in national environmental policy responses in 
the context of EM through the lens of policy capacity – as we saw above – the 
aim here is for a similar modelling of local government. Since EM does not 
theorise the role of local government in EM processes, the overarching aim of 
this thesis is to explore explore how such a theoretical framework can be built.   
 
The empirical case of sustainable construction is used as a means to do so. 
To reiterate the point made towards the end of the introductory chapter, 
although the primary motivation and contribution of the thesis is to develop 
theory in this way there is an additional contribution to be achieved by looking 
more specifically at the case of sustainable construction. Empirically it will 
address the gap within the existing literature on sustainable homes about the 
factors that account for local engagement and variation in the design and 
implementation of sustainable construction policy. Theoretically though it 
marks the first step in a broader process of theory generation that engages 
with the objective outlined above; a study of the variation in uptake of 
supplementary sustainability standards in the context of the ecological 
modernisation of residential housing will allow for the construction of a 
heuristic model that can be deployed elsewhere in the future.  
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Chapter Three: 
 
The Ecological Modernization of Residential Housing 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter will show that the residential housing sector in England has 
undergone a transition towards ecological modernization that has been 
heavily influenced by exhortative and binding changes to planning and 
construction regulation. In doing so it argues that it is a fruitful site for 
analysis.  
 
As we saw in the introduction, in 2006 the UK government introduced a zero-
carbon homes agenda in order to reduce the emissions associated with the 
construction and use of homes through the introduction of changes to building 
regulation and planning policy regimes. The purpose of this chapter is to 
outline what that agenda entailed in the context of ecological modernization 
and the role local government played. However, in order to do that a more 
detailed historical assessment of the nature of the planning system is needed. 
Here we will see a complex institutional arrangement spread across the 
national, regional and local level with competencies divided between them 
and a system that is dependent upon the private sector providing sufficient 
homes and thus developer profit and growth. This growth dependent planning 
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system characterizes the behaviour of actors at all spatial levels, as well as 
the evolution of the system in its entirety. By exploring these influences in 
more detail, this chapter provides the necessary context through which to 
more fully explore the role that local authorities have played in the EM of 
residential housing and deploy the model of environmental policy capacity 
developed in the next chapter.  
 
The first section outlines the zero-carbon homes agenda. The second situates 
this in the context of EM, arguing that it is a good example of a state-led 
process of EM but one that is also ‘weak’, given its emphasis on growth 
dependency and economic concern. The third section details the specific role 
that local government plays in the planning system in order to justify the 
inclusion of this case as a site to explore local contributions. Here we will see 
they play a considerable role in detailing the type, nature and quantity of 
development. However, we will also see that it is a site that has undergone 
considerable change in recent years – particularly focusing around the 
entrenchment of growth dependency – that has caused the relationship 
between local and national governments to change.  
 
 
3.2. The Zero Carbon Homes Agenda 
 
 
Between 2007 and 2015 the UK government introduced an innovative ‘zero-
carbon homes’ agenda in order to increase the sustainability of new 
residential buildings in England. The agenda emerged when the UK 
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Government published Building A Greener Future (DCLG 2007a), in which it 
laid out how the planning policy regime could be used to contribute towards 
the country’s broader climate change strategy and binding emissions 
reduction targets. The most important prong of this housing-led strategy was a 
target that by 2016 all new homes built in England would need to be ‘zero-
carbon’, where ‘the net carbon emissions from all energy use in the home 
would be zero’ (DCLG 2007a, p. 5). This marked a step-change in the 
commitment of government in fostering sustainable construction.  
 
This zero-carbon homes agenda was announced at a time when government 
was actively pursuing the ecological modernization agenda, which since the 
1990s has been the central direction in which environmental governance in 
England is pointed. Weale refers to this as the ‘new politics of pollution’ 
(Weale 1992, Barry 2005, Revell 2005). The mid 2000s saw sustainable 
housing rise sharply on the incumbent Labour government’s agenda (see 
Lorenzoni et al. 2008). Prior to this, sustainable housing policy was little more 
than an ‘analytical or social construct’ to label a heterogeneous set of policies 
and initiatives spread across different policy areas and departments 
(Pickvance 2009, p. 331). Housing was targeted as a key area in which the 
government could further its EM agenda and make meaningful emissions 
reductions, given that 27% of emissions stem from the construction and use 
of homes (Van Bueren and De Jong 2007, p. 544, Osmani and O’Reilly 2009, 
p. 1917). This followed a history of government intervention in the research 
and development into these technologies. The oil crises of the 1970s provided 
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an incentive for government to allocated R&D resources to exploring the 
potential of these technological solutions (Smith 2007).  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the overarching objective of a state-led 
EM agenda is the incentivisation of the deployment of eco-technologies by 
industry actors. The state’s role in this incentivisation process in this case has 
taken three forms. Pickvance (2009) talks of its three governing strategies: 
regulatory, exhortative and economic. Others have referred to the use of 
‘smart’ regulation (Greenwood 2015, p. 429) – that which involves a 
combination of both traditional binding regulatory approaches but also more 
informal market-based instruments ‘such as eco-taxes and tradable permits, 
voluntary agreements negotiated with different sectors of industry, and the 
setting of environmental targets’ (Revell 2005, p. 116).  
 
It is the regulatory agenda that has proved most influential. Central 
government introduced mandatory standards within national Building 
Regulations 7. Underpinning the zero-carbon homes target were proposed 
changes to Part L of the Building Regulations (which addresses the 
conservation of fuel and power and takes account of heat gain and losses and 
building energy efficiency). Initial proposals suggested that a 25% increase in 
energy performance would be written into the 2010 iteration of regulations 
(compared to 2006 levels), a 44% reduction in 2013 and a 100% reduction in 																																																									
7 These Building Regulations typically set mandatory minimum standards for the design and construction of buildings, 
covering a range of areas such as health and safety, fuel and power provision, disabled access, space and water 
use. Building Regulations systems make sure that any development that takes place meets minimum construction 
standards to ensure safe, habitable development. 
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2016. The purpose of this policy was both to encourage further developments 
in technological advancement and mandate their deployment in the market in 
order, over time, to economize sustainability in this context.  
 
Exhortative policies are those that encourage behavioural change amongst 
actors by altering preferences, whilst economic policies incentivise change. 
As we saw in the introduction, the government published the Code for 
Sustainable Homes (CSH) alongside the step-changes to Building 
Regulations. The CSH was a voluntary standard that provided technical 
guidance on achieving standards of sustainable construction exceeding those 
in Building Regulations. It was designed to serve as a reference point for the 
future trajectory of changes to Building Regulations, highlighting as it does the 
practices and techniques required to meet specific standards. The CSH 
codified the development practices required to achieve defined levels of 
sustainability, measured across nine categories: energy/CO2, water, 
materials, surface water run-off, waste, pollution, health and well-being, 
management and ecology. A number of points were gained for achieving 
specific levels in each category, with minimum standards needed for energy 
and water. A rating of between zero and six stars is achieved on the basis of a 
points tally, with level 6 being a zero-carbon home in which all emissions 
(including those involved in both the construction and use of the building) are 
offset on-site. A home rated at Level 6 represents an 'exemplar development 
in sustainability terms' (DCLG 2006, p. 6).  
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Because it defined sustainability across a number of categories its 
requirements were considerably broader than those laid out in national 
Building Regulations (McManus et al. 2010, Gibbs and O’Neill 2015). A home 
that is rated against the CSH has achieved a greater level of sustainability 
because it has met minimum standards in other areas not covered by Building 
Regulations, which narrowly focuses on water and energy requirements. 
There is a degree of overlap between Part L and the energy/CO2 component 
of the CSH: the three step changes to Part L discussed above conform to 
levels 3, 4 and 6 of the CSH respectively. 2013 Part L requirements conform 
to between Levels 3 and 4 of the energy/CO2 category. However, a home 
specifically built and rated to Level 3 of the CSH has more stringent 
sustainability standards given that the CSH is a broader standard than Part L.  
Indeed, the purpose of the CSH was to provide a signpost to future reforms to 
the energy and carbon elements of Building Regulations ‘therefore offering 
greater regulatory certainty’ (DCLG 2006, p. i). 
 
In addition to this regulation and exhortation though there were a handful of 
economic incentives in place to raise the sustainability standards of residential 
buildings, but these are limited and centre largely on incentivising the 
retrofitting of existing buildings8. There is a comparatively smaller focus on 
economic incentives for new development. The 2007 Budget did introduce a 
relief from Stamp Duty Land-Tax – ‘a transaction tax payable on the purchase 																																																									
8 For example, schemes exist to subsidise renewable energy installations (through the Feed in Tariff or the Low 
Carbon Buildings programme schemes) or home energy efficiency (though the Green Deal and the Warm Front 
schemes) or through more general advice and publicity schemes (through the Energy Savings Trust or various 
demonstration programmes) (Pickvance 2009). 
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of land and property…payable by the buyer at a rate which depends on the 
value of the property’ (HM Treasury 2007, p. 1) – for new zero-carbon homes 
valued up to £500,000 (above which a £15,000 reduction of overall Stamp 
Duty liability would be provided). However, this relief ended in 2012.  
 
Overall it was the regulatory strategy that has had the greatest impact on 
changing behaviours through institutionalising ecological protection measures. 
Homes built in 2015 were achieving the equivalent of between Code levels 3 
and 4 in terms of energy and CO2 simply by meeting minimum Building 
Regulations standards, a roughly 33% increase in carbon emissions when 
compared to 2006 levels. The policy ‘is widely agreed to have galvanised the 
building industry, encouraging the development of new technologies’ 
(Greenwood 2012, p. 167), and ‘the introduction of the 2016 target and 
associated regulatory changes are widely recognised to have been a 
significant spur to innovation across the sector’ (Greenwood 2015, p. 436). 
The costs associated with achieving low carbon standards have decreased 
dramatically over recent years as innovation, expertise and supply chains 
have become more developed in response to this agenda9. This state-led, 
regulatory approach has thus had a positive impact on de-coupling growth 
																																																									
9 Evidence from DCLG has shown that the cost of complying with Code Level 3 energy/CO2 requirements has come 
down from £4500 to £1100 in the four years from 2006 to 2010 (DCLG 2011). The cost of solar PV, a key technology 
used to meet standards, fell from around £4000 per kWp to roughly £1500 kWp between 2011 and 2014 alone (Zero 
Carbon Hub 2014, p. 17). Overall, the typical construction costs associated with zero-carbon development have 
halved since 2011 (Zero Carbon Hub 2014, p. 2). Although cautioning that cost-analyses necessarily lack precision, 
given variation in site-requirements across development, the Zero Carbon Hub suggests that ‘what we can see 
clearly is a trend of significant cost reductions over time. In the seven years since the zero   carbon policy was first 
announced by the Government we have seen costs fall by tens of thousands of pounds’ (Zero Carbon Hub 2014, p. 
3). 
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from emissions that has effectively (although not imperfectly) sought to 
economise ecological protection measures.  
 
Nevertheless, the zero-carbon homes targets and Code for Sustainable 
Homes were abolished in 2016 by a Conservative government with a 
preference for a deregulatory approach. In spite of this, as Lemprière (2016) 
shows, the policy did galvanise industry and led to a marked increase in the 
sustainability of buildings. Various elements of the Code for Sustainable 
Homes will be incorporated into later iterations of national Building 
Regulations, without a specific zero-carbon target. The abolition of this policy 
is discussed at greater length in Section 6.2.2. below. 
 
As we saw in chapter one, EM entails the institutionalisation of ecological 
protection measures within modes of production and consumption by state, 
market and civil society actors that serves to mandate, encourage and/or 
incentivise the use of technology by market actors in order to decouple growth 
from emissions. It is this kind of institutionalisation process that we can 
witness here. In this context the regulation discussed above has sought to 
decouple growth from emissions through the deployment of new technologies 
and design practices in a way that continues to privilege growth. 
 
Generally the government took a hands-on approach to the process but, 
where possible, has also take a hands-off approach. The case of zero-carbon 
homes ‘provides grounds for accepting that technological and industry experts 
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have a necessarily pivotal role in such areas of governance’ (Greenwood 
2015, p. 10) given the technicalities involved. There is an implicit recognition 
that any policy must respect the boundaries of the house-building industry and 
residential housing market, and a more pragmatic approach to respecting 
those boundaries rests in collaborative steering arrangements rather than 
those that forced hierarchically. Three examples help to illustrate this point.  
 
First, decisions about the nature and pace of this legislative agenda have 
been highly technocratic, involving a close, restrictive policy community in 
which industry groups have considerable influence, with government playing a 
somewhat subsidiary role (Rydin 2013a, p. 4). The ‘Zero Carbon Hub’, formed 
in 2008, has been particularly important in this regard. It was responsible for 
the day-to-day management of the zero-carbon transition by: defining zero-
carbon, undertaking research and engaging with industry to raise awareness 
(RSA 2012) and is made up of a mix of industry representatives. It sought to 
depoliticise contentious decisions over definitions, technical details and 
timetables by involving industry actors at arms-length from government 
(although government did sign off and respond to recommendations made by 
the Hub, with no obligation to follow them) (Zero Carbon Hub n.d.).  
 
Second, policy shies away from the promotion of particular technological 
solutions. Although it effectively mandates the deployment of renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and waste-recovery technologies in order to meet 
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specific emissions reduction targets it allows developers flexibility in terms of 
what solutions to employ.  
 
Third, we can point to the use of a smart regulatory approach that requires 
both mandatory and optional elements.  We can talk then of a ‘green state’, 
without whom shifts in industrial practice would not have occurred (see 
Greenwood 2015).  
However, the adoption of the ZCH agenda has not been problem-free . At 
times it has been subject to criticism and plagued by contention and gridlock. 
As we have seen, the Zero-Carbon Hub brings together a range of 
stakeholders and aims to reach key decisions implicit in the transition to ZCH 
in dialogue with those actors most affected. These included discussions on 
the timetable to achieving ZCH, the role of the CSH in national building 
regulation standards, the definition of zero-carbon itself and what measures 
would be required to meet that definition .  
The latter two points were subject to considerable contention throughout the 
life of the ZCH agenda. The original goal, as announced at the launch of the 
CSH, was for all emissions reductions to be achieved through ‘on-site’ 
solutions, whereby on-site technologies and behaviours were the only factors 
that would count towards emissions levels. This was strongly resisted by 
industry (Greenwood 2015), given that the technologies required to meet this 
standard are often only effective on particular sites. For example, one 
technology that is often required to meet the 100% on-site target is a district-
	63	
heating scheme, with a combined heat and power network. These are better 
suited to large ‘greenfield’ sites (those on undeveloped land) than they are to 
small brownfield sites. Even then, many of those larger sites are built and sold 
in several phases, but the infrastructure for these networks has to be installed 
across the site at the earliest opportunity, meaning an initial outlay of several 
million pounds with a long wait for a return on that investment (Goodchild and 
Walshaw 2011).  
Industry has called for the definition to include a provision to allow for a 
percentage of the energy needs to be provided off-site, through ‘allowable 
solutions’ to supplement on-site fabric efficiency and renewable energy 
measures. The role of allowable solutions would be to allow developers to 
offset those emissions that cannot be feasibly provided on-site without 
jeopardising the viability of the development itself. It was argued that 
allowable solutions would allow the developer to either pay into a green 
infrastructure investment fund or provide retrofitting measures to its existing 
housing stock as a way to offset emissions.  
However, there was considerable debate over the details of these allowable 
solutions. The decision to drop the 100% on-site target in favour of allowable 
solutions, in 2009 (Greenwood 2015) was met with resistance in the Zero 
Carbon Hub by the WWF, who resigned in protest, but was nevertheless 
welcomed by stakeholders from government, industry and the technological 
communities. Although there was wide-agreement that off-setting was the 
preferred route, the level at which such off-setting schemes should be set 
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(including the ‘price’ of emissions should a green-fund be used as a means to 
do so) was subject to considerable disagreement amongst industry experts. 
Different stakeholders had differing opinions about the routes to achieving 
zero-carbon, which, as Greenwood (2015, p. 434) argues, is an ‘example of 
the challenges of ‘intra-policy’ coordination in terms of balancing criteria such 
as feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and the need for innovation in building 
technologies and methods’.  
However, beyond the divide between ‘on-site’ and ‘off-site’ advocates, there 
were also disagreements over whether the emphasis should lie more on 
technological solutions (whether on or off site) reducing demand for energy 
use within the home in the first instance (what would be considered a 
‘stronger’ form of EM, see Section 2.1.3) as a means to achieving zero-
carbon. As Greenwood (2015, p. 434) argues:  
Some designers and developers favoured a strong standard of building air 
tightness that entailed a need to install mechanical ventilation and heat 
recovery (MVHR) systems to provide sufficient ventilation. These stake- 
holders, such as the Sustainable Building Association (AECB), were strongly 
influenced by the approach of the German Passivhaus Institute and their 
proprietary international standard (an example of policy learning being 
enabled by non- mandatory schemes). By contrast, larger house builders 
highlighted what they saw as the dangers of a requirement for MVHR, 
arguing that the home-buying public would not adequately understand such a 
system. Consequently, occupants might not use the system properly and 
might, for example, leave windows open, which interferes with the working of 
MVHR and can lead to a net increase in energy use. 
 
The CSH itself has also been criticized as an inappropriate tool to achieving 
zero-carbon by industry actors. A recurring critique of the standard comes 
down to the issue of ‘who pays’. Some, particularly house-builders, question 
whether the potential for an uplift in house-prices built more sustainably would 
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materialise, fearing instead that the costs associated with building to higher 
levels of sustainability would have to be borne by the developers themselves. 
In theory, ‘the additional costs associated with zero-carbon homes will largely 
be passed back to landowners in reduced land value uplift’ (DCLG 2009, p. 
46), but as Goodchild and Walshaw (2011, pp. 943)  point out, ‘much depends 
on the state of the local housing market…at times of inflation…landowners 
are usually assumed to absorb the additional cost…At times of depressed or 
declining property values, in contrasts, landowners and their advisers are 
likely to resist any further devaluation’. Similarly, profit-sensitive developers 
are hesitant to absorbing the cost (Goodchild and Walshaw 2011, p. 943). 
These findings were echoed by Heffernan and colleagues (2015), who found 
that economic factors (such as capital costs, viability, land values, perceived 
risk and a lack of demand) were key barriers to achieving compliance with low 
and zero-carbon standards.  
Beyond this, developers have had concerns about the technology-led 
approach that underpins the ZCH, which, they say: is likely to be 
misunderstood by building contractors, designers and architects; will cause 
problems for subsequent tenants; is likely to fall short of promised reductions 
in emissions and energy use; and is likely to require on going maintenance 
(Heffernan et al. 2015, p. 29). Similarly, there were concerns amongst house-
builders (particularly those building at volume) over how they could 
incorporate these new design principles into their often long and complex 
supply chains, whilst ensuring that knowledge and expertise could keep up.  
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Of course none of this was helped by the uncertainty at the national level over 
definitions and timetabling and the fact that key dates for achieving particular 
milestones in the ZCH agenda were moved.  
However, this doesn’t discount the potential for the ZCH in general and CSH 
in particular as tools to achieving zero carbon. As we saw above, it was 
directed at the decoupling of emissions from growth. What we witness here 
are ‘co-ordination problems’ (Greenwood 2012, 2015, 2016) and represent 
more of a critique of the ‘weak’ approach to EM that was adopted than a 
critique of the EM credentials of the ZCH agenda or CSH as a whole. As 
Greenwood argues, these concerns ‘highlight how achieving even the ‘weak 
EM’ goal, of promoting ‘win–win’ technologies that simultaneously improve 
both environmental and economic efficiency, involves some significant, 
complex challenges for policy- makers’ (Greenwood 2015, pp. 438), which, as 
we will see in the next sections, has come to define the ZCH agenda.  
 
3.3. The Ecological Modernisation of Residential Housing 
 
 
To what extent can ZCH agenda be said to be an example of EM? Most 
notably, it encourages the use of novel eco-technologies by industry actors 
through government regulation, whether nationally (through including various 
aspects of it in Part L Building Regulation changes) or locally (in the case of 
those who have adopted Code standards). This is a key feature of processes 
of EM, which, as we saw in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. above, relies upon this 
marriage of technology and markets, facilitated by government action.  
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As such, the state acts to incubate behavioural shifts among industry actors, 
but does so in a way that minimises command-and-control type policies. This 
idea of contextual ‘steering’ is a key component of a state-led EM strategy 
under conditions of market failure, as we saw in Section 2.2.1. above. The 
quasi-mandatory nature of the policy at the national level (i.e. the fact that 
various parts of the Code were included in mandatory building regulations, 
whilst others were voluntary) and the devolution of supplementary standard 
setting powers locally reflects the fact that planning is marred by market 
failure. In such cases the state has a necessarily interventionist role to play if 
outcomes are to be achieved.  
 
Nevertheless, the emphasis remains pointed towards ‘steering’, rather than 
‘command and control’. As we saw in Section 3.2., the ZCH agenda avoids 
promoting particular technological solutions. Although it does effectively 
mandate the deployment of renewable energy, energy efficiency and other 
technologies in order to meet particular Code standards, it does allow 
developers the flexibility to choose what solutions to employ. Key details of 
the policy making process itself were decided upon in dialogue with industry 
and business through the Zero-Carbon Hub which, as we saw in Section 3.2. 
above, sought to depoliticize decisions over definitions, technical details and 
timetables at arms-length from government. In this sense, industry 
representatives were given a pivotal role in deciding the details of policy 
proposals, as we would expect in a process of EM.  
	68	
 
We can also see clearly that the ZCH agenda aims to achieve the dual notion 
of continued economic growth and reduced emissions, a central component of 
EMT. We saw in Section 2.1. that EM involves the institutionalization of 
ecological protection measures within modes of production and consumption 
by the state, market and civil society in order to foster the adoption of eco-
technologies and practices by the market in order to decouple growth from 
emissions. We can see this kind of decoupling at work here: continued house-
building is advocated, but in a way that tries to ensure sustainability.  
 
 
A number of other studies have shown the extent to which the construction 
sector has become framed around achieving a decoupling of growth from 
emissions conducive with ecological modernisation in pursuit of sustainable or 
zero-carbon homes (Congreve 2003, Lovell 2004, 2009, Pickvance 2009, 
Goodchild and Walshaw 2011, Greenwood 2012, 2015, Gibbs and O’Neill 
2015) 10 . Cherry et.al. (2015, p. 308) for example argue that ‘ecological 
modernisation is uncritically embedded within dominant media depictions of 
low carbon housing. Focus is placed on technological progress and economic 
incentives as the inevitable route to sustainability alongside a relative neglect 
of the cultural and social implications of this’ (Cherry et al. 2015, p. 308). 
Lovell (2004, p. 49) refers to the approach to sustainable housing being 
underpinned by a ‘smart-house’ storyline, where ‘householders are not 
																																																									
10 How an issue (or rather a solution) is framed discursively is crucial in complex policy situations where action is 
required across societal institutions (Hajer 1995; Lovell 2004), given that it ‘necessarily sets parameters on the 
solutions which are sought’ (Lovell 2004, 39).  
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required to modify their behaviour in order to become less resource 
intensive… one can live in a smart house and continue to behave as normal’ 
because provisions are made in the design and construction of the home on 
the supply side using novel eco-technologies, rather than through demand-
shifts in ‘in-use’ behaviour.  
 
Yet this is a ‘weak’ approach to EM (Lemprière 2016). It is based upon 
technocratic, top-down prescription (as part of a smart regulatory mix), where 
policies are justified in terms of economics and relies upon action on the 
supply side (through encouraging a fabric-first approach to sustainability in 
which technological inputs take the place of changes in occupier behaviour). 
For the purposes of this study this means that sensitivity to the economic 
conditions accompanying processes of ecological modernisation – such as 
concern with housing supply, developer profits and land values – forms the 
basis of decisions made about sustainability and thus must form the basis of 
any analytical discussion. To speak more technically, in weak processes of 
EM economic rationality plays a comparatively greater role than in strong 
processes of EM. As Lemprière (2016, p. 704) argues:  
It provided little incentive for the necessary alignment of different factors: civil 
society was excluded over time to make way for technocratic ‘insiders’ and 
often ignored; the burden was placed almost exclusively on housebuilders to 
account for compliance costs; it relied heavily upon state-led solutions which 
caused coordination problems; it lacked technical or temporal definition; and it 
was underpinned by an uncertainty that undermined the economic case.  
 
The fact that the ZCH agenda is an example of weak EM is unsurprising when 
one considers the growth dependent nature of contemporary planning in 
England. When planning is growth dependent, development is governed by 
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the scope for developer profit, meaning that development is only possible 
where it is viable11 (Rydin 2013a) and that the planning system as a whole 
exists to further economic growth.  
 
Historically the public sector has played a far greater role in regulating 
landowners than it does today by providing homes directly (Rydin 1998, 2011, 
2013a, Cullingworth 2015)12. Within this era the private sector still played a 
central role, but the public sector played an active role as a landowner, 
investor and legislator. However, increased dissatisfaction with the quality of 
this housing provision, the financial crisis of the 1970s (and accompanying 
property crisis) and a shifting ideology on the role of the state as regulator and 
provider accompanying the rise of Thatcher and neo-liberal economic doctrine 
																																																									
11 As a result, growth dependency comes under challenge in periods of economic downturn, where the scope for 
profit is diminished and thus supply restricts. Since the 2008 financial crisis the calls for deregulation in the housing 
sector have been strong given that if developments are no longer viable they will not be provided by the market, 
ceteris paribus. A central area of concern has been the definition of ‘zero-carbon’, over and above a specific concern 
with the particular ‘steps’ leading up to it through progressive changes to Part L of the Building Regulations. The 
original definition of zero-carbon in Building A Greener Future implied that that ‘over a year, the net carbon emissions 
from all energy use in the home would be zero’ (DCLG 2007a, p. 5). Importantly, this would be achieved through on-
site measures – meaning that all the infrastructure required to achieve zero-carbon would need to be provided by 
changes to the fabric of the building (the ‘fabric efficiency’) or through the provision of on-site renewable energy 
technologies. There was no scope to incorporate off-site renewables. Also significant is what is included in the 
definition of ‘energy use’ in this original policy proposal: ‘we believe that emissions form all energy use - including 
from appliances and cooking - in the home should be considered’ (DCLG 2007a, p. 17 emphasis added) – this is 
referred to as unregulated energy – rather than just those associated with heating, lighting, ventilation and hot water 
as previously embodied in Building Regulations – referred to as ‘regulated energy’. The emissions rate to be 
mitigated under this proposal is therefore considerably higher than one that focuses just on regulated energy. This, 
coupled with the on-site requirement places considerable burden on developers that they struggled to find a way 
around. If this standard was to be adopted into Part L of the 2016 Building Regulations then, at the time, costs were 
predicted to be 25% and 50% higher compared to 2006 Regulations (DCLG 2008, p. 17). The purpose of the Zero 
Carbon Hub was to provide the means through which research could be undertaken and best practice could be 
developed to find a way to achieve this target, but it became clear that the unregulated energy component was 
unrealistic, citing cost concerns. The nature of growth dependent planning means that social benefits must be 
extracted from developer profit. For example, developers are required through development orders to pay for 
infrastructure requirements to accompany new development (schools, utilities, and so on) and to provide a 
percentage of affordable homes that are sold at 80% of market-value. The industry was concerned that a further 
regulatory requirement such as this would make many developments unviable, restricting supply (Interview with trade 
association representative, January 2015). After a successful lobbying campaign directed by the Home-Builders 
Federation, the main trade body for housing developments, it was announced in 2006 that the definition would be 
changed to include regulated energy only. The WWF called this a watering down of policy and left the Zero Carbon 
Hub in protest (WWF 2011).  
12 The post-war council estates are the most visual and well-known manifestation of this era. 
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(and the original presumption in favour of development) saw a shift that 
reduced the scope of regulation (Rydin 2013a, Cullingworth 2015).  
 
The effect of this growth-dependent system is to ensure that any attempt to 
regulate the development industry through national planning policy – whether 
that be to increase sustainability, infrastructure provision, affordable homes 
provision, community facilities and so on – must be done in a way that 
remains sensitive to financial viability of development13. Planning economics 
tells us that the price that developers are willing to pay for land is affected by 
the regulatory burden they face: the addition of regulation that raises 
production costs lead the developer to value the land less highly in order to 
maintain its profit margin.  
 
The addition of regulation has one or two (or both) effects. First, land owners 
will be more reluctant to sell land in that regulatory environment, preferring 
instead to hold onto it in the hope of a more favourable regime in the future. 
Such a regulatory framework therefore runs the risk of restricting land supply 
and, thus, housing provision. This leads on to a second effect. Developers will 
have to absorb the costs they cannot extract from land-values, jeopardising 
profit margins. This too leads to a decrease in supply, ceteris paribus.  In both 
cases the outcome is a decrease in supply. Any proposed regulation has to 
be sensitive to this. This weakness, coupled with the 2008 financial crisis, the 
																																																									
13 This is also the case, as we will see later, where local authorities attempt to introduce provisions to increase the 
sustainability of homes. It remains a problem with such growth-dependent systems of planning, especially where 
growth cannot be guaranteed (Rydin 2013a) 
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deregulatory agenda of an incoming government and difficulties reconciling 
differences on definitions and timetables, led to the demise of the ZCH 
agenda in mid 2015 as the government prioritized supply over sustainability 
(Lempriere 2016).  
 
3.4. The Role of Local Government in Planning  
 
 
In England local authorities play a central role in introducing planning policies. 
Planning policies exist to get the right houses built in the right place at the 
right time: 
‘If we are to have successful communities, decisions need to be made about 
what is the ‘right stuff’ – how many houses, how much shopping, new sources 
of employment, key services, - where it should go, and how can it be put in 
place when it is needed. When we have new residential development, will the 
jobs and services be there to meet residents’ needs without the need to travel 
significant distances?’ (Cullingworth and Nadin 2006, p. 199).  
 
It is these questions that local authorities answer in their local planning 
policies. Whereas national level building regulation policy provides a guide to 
how houses are built, planning has greater say over when, where and in what 
form. Local authorities have considerable autonomy over their areas, although 
do so within an enabling framework from central government. In this sense we 
can say that they act as rule takers (in so much as they are obliged to 
consider Building Regulations and national enabling frameworks) but also rule 
makers (in so much as they determine the answers to the questions posed 
above).  
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Definitions of the purpose of planning have changed over the years and differ 
in different parts of the world, where different development traditions prevail. A 
broad definition is that planning is designed to ‘regulate the development and 
use of land in the public interest’ (Cullingworth 2015, p. 7). A more nuanced 
definition suggests that planning can be viewed as:  
A self-conscious collective (societal) effort to imagine or reimagine a town, 
urban region or wider territory and to translate the result into priorities for area 
investment, conservation measures, new and upgraded areas of settlement, 
strategic infrastructure investments and principles of land regulation. It is 
recognized that planning is not only undertaken by professional urban and 
regional planners (other professions and groupings are also involved); hence, 
it is appropriate to refer to the ‘planning system’ rather than just to the tasks 
undertaken by planners…At the core of urban planning is a concern with 
space (Cullingworth 2015, p. 5) 
 
Planning in the UK: is plan-led (in so much as overarching strategic planning 
documents guide the development of a local area); focused on empowering 
individuals and communities to have a say in their surroundings, focused on 
enhancing a local area; focused on driving economic growth; focused on 
meeting objectively assessed housing needs, taking account of market 
signals (including affordability and land-prices); designed to ensure a 
consistent and appropriate supply of developable land; focused on good, high 
quality design and should take into account the character of different areas 
(including sites of special interest and heritage sites) (see DCLG 2012a para. 
17). If we were to characterize its core function we could conclude that 
planning is ‘about the legitimate role of the public sector, acting in the avowed 
public interest, to intervene in the rights of private households, private 
companies and private landowners (Rydin 2011, p. 9).  
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Local planning policies therefore contain priorities and policies for 
development concerning infrastructure (telecoms, transport or waste 
management), employment growth strategies and business development 
(such as determining the types of development in a local high street or the site 
of an enterprise zone), community facilities, environmental protection (such as 
greenbelts, open spaces and ecology management) and, most importantly for 
this context, housing. Local planning policies determine where major 
developments will be cited, what types of developments will be granted 
planning permission over the cycle of any policy document (typically fifteen 
years), design protocols for buildings, the balance between residential and 
commercial development, land supply and housing allocations in the future, 
amongst a wealth of other things.  
 
3.5. Institutional Levels in English Planning Policy 
 
Prior to 2011 four distinct institutional levels were important in determining 
local planning policies14 (Rydin 1998, pp. 71–89, 205–234, 2011, pp. 12–34, 
Cullingworth 2015, pp. 85–137). Nationally the Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG) issued Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) (pre-
2004) or Planning Policy Statements (PPS) (2004-2011), regional bodies 
published Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) (pre-2004) or Regional Spatial 
Strategies (RSS) (2004-2011) and pre-2004 county councils were responsible 																																																									
14 A different institutional arrangement exists in London, where elements of regional planning still exist and where 
different arrangements exist between different institutional levels. Similarly, different planning arrangements exist 
between the four nations of the United Kingdom, so the focus within this thesis remains squarely on the English 
context.  
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for the publication of countywide Structure Plans. The purpose of regional 
planning guidance and regional spatial strategies is to set a development plan 
with a 20 year plus horizon that serves as a non-statutory strategic framework 
into which development plans at lower administrative levels sit. Structure 
plans provide a countywide 15-year plus framework.  
 
Pre-2004, local authorities were responsible for the publication of the Local 
Plan, an authority-wide detailed planning policy and strategy document with a 
10 year horizon, and Supplement Planning Guidance, which contained more 
detailed information and guidance on policies and development proposals 
contained within the Local Plan (but which do not in themselves introduce new 
policies or site allocations). Between 2004 and 2011 local authorities were 
tasked with publishing Local Development Frameworks (LDF) (2004-2011). 
LDFs were made up of a number of Development Plan Documents (DPDs), 
which included a mandatory Core Strategy (which, much like the Local Plan, 
provided the overarching local planning policies and strategy), site-specific 
allocations and proposals (which allocate land for major developments and 
often contain Area Action Plans (AAPs), which are in effect mini-core 
strategies that govern major development sites within the local administrative 
area). The LDF additionally often contained Supplementary Planning 
Documents (SPDs), which were similar in status to the SPGs that they 
replaced. Other documents made up the DPD, but are of only limited 
relevance here.  
'&!
The various institutional levels in planning are summarised in FIgure 3.1. 
below.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Institutional Levels in Planning in England 
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PPG and PPS documents were intended to ensure that a consistent approach 
to the drafting and adoption of subsidiary planning policy documents (whether 
regional, county or local) and are material considerations in the drafting and 
implementation process. This means that subsidiary documents must remain 
sensitive to their contents and where they haven’t they should expect 
opposition (whether in the plan adoption stage or where decisions are being 
made and implemented 15). These documents provided strategic overview 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
15 The plan-drafting stage itself is regulated centrally. A number of stages are involved. Considerable evidence is 
needed to justify the inclusion of particular policies and site-allocations, as well as to understand the state of the local 
land and housing market in years to come. An initial outline of policies, proposals and site allocations is then issued 
for public consultation, often a number of times: issues and options outlines the broad local concerns and proposes a 
number of outline (and preferred) options for public consultation, a preferred options plan then takes these responses 
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over a number of areas, including the plan making process itself (PPS 12), 
planning for town centres (PPS 4 and 6), planning for renewable energy (PPS 
22) and planning for sustainable development (PPS 1)16. PPS 11 set out the 
terms of regional planning, broadly stating that the RSS had to contain a 
regional vision, spatial strategy and implementation plan. The Structure Plans 
contained similar content, but were restricted to one local administrative area 
(unless specific arrangements for a joint plan had been made), whereas the 
RSS was able to cut across administrative borders in a way that made large-
scale infrastructural planning and efficient allocation of land and housing 
provision more likely. 
‘Strategic planning has reflected the need to coordinate the plans of lower tier 
authorities and to address issues which, in terms of scale and size, transcend 
local boundaries, such as housing provision, transport and other major 
infrastructure. In the past, it has also been a vehicle for broader regional and 
national goals when combined with wider regional plans and policies, national 
policy guidance or targets – setting a framework and context for planning at a 
more local scale’ (Boddy and Hickman 2013, p. 744) 
 
Local Plans and LDFs then initially had to be consistent with the regional and 
county strategies, as well as respecting the PPG and PPS. These plans were 
(and still are) produced by each local planning authority17 (so, district councils, 
metropolitan boroughs, city councils, unitary authorities – but not county 
councils), and their purpose ‘is to set out priorities and policies for 
development in relation to housing, business, infrastructure (such as 																																																																																																																																																															
and forms them into a more coherent plan, the draft plan sees further consultation and the proposed submission sees 
the plan in its final form before submission to the secretary of state. The Planning Inspector, an arms-length body, is 
then called upon to hear representations on either side and to judge on whether the document has been produced in 
accordance with national and regional planning guidance, is evidence based and that representations have been 
heard. There are a number of more technical or bureaucratic processes that needed to be completed. Recently there 
are also additional requirements on cooperation with neighboring authorities.  
16 We will talk more about PPS1 below.  
17 We can talk of local planning authorities (those with responsibility for planning, including district, metropolitan and 
unitary councils) but in this thesis they are referred to simply as local authorities.  
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transport, waste, and telecoms), health, security, community facilities and 
services, and the environment. It should set out what are the opportunities for 
development in the area, and say what will and will not be permitted and 
where’ (Newton 2012, p. 6). It sets a long-term vision and strategy for the 
area18. Policy influence therefore cascades downwards from the national to 
local level.  
3.6. The National Planning Policy Framework: Entrenching Growth 
Dependency  
 
However, the entire planning system underwent a step-change reform in 2012 
(although it had been subject to various lesser revisions over past decades – 
particularly in the post-war period). The incoming Conservative-led coalition 
government sought to streamline what many had come to regard as an unduly 
cumbersome system. For example, the RSS process had bought with it over 
1,000 pages of guidance, not discounting similar breadth embodied in the 
various PPSs and DPDs.  Despite the Government’s pledges to adopt  a more 
generally localist agenda, including the abolition of the Regional Spatial 
Strategies (in which hugely unpopular house-building targets were being set) 
by any standards, the publication in 2012 of the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF), represented a strong centralizing step. This replaced the 
PPS system, removing the need for planning documents at the county or 
regional level (with the except of minerals and waste plans) and involved the 
reformation of local planning policy arrangements, removing the portfolio of 																																																									
18 It is worth noting that a lower administrative body exists. Parish, village, community and neighbourhood plans have 
a very narrow and specific focus and fall outside the remit of this thesis.  
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documents comprising the Local Development Framework (specifically the 
Development Plan Documents), replacing it with 52 page document that 
outlined a new national governance context and a streamlined Local Plan and 
Supplementary Planning Document arrangement. As a result it abolished any 
national or regional spatial strategies (and with that, specific housing 
allocation figures for different regions).  The 230 documents and 7,000 pages 
that comprised the old system had been replaced by a 52 page document that 
talked in broad terms, leaving a lot of room for interpretation by both housing 
developers and local authorities.  
 
A key implication of the nationalisation of regional and county-wide strategic 
planning was that it would ensure (or at least increase the likelihood of) 
sufficient provision of homes and accompanying infrastructure within and 
between administrative areas. In this latter respect, the NPPF contains a ‘duty 
to cooperate’, where ‘local planning authorities will be expected to 
demonstrate evidence of having effectively cooperated to plan for issues with 
cross-boundary impacts when their Local Plans are submitted for 
examination’ (DCLG 2012a, p. 43). However, the duty to cooperate provides 
no statutory commitment on local authorities to meet their neighbours 
demands, provided such behaviour can be justified when any local plans are 
inspected (more on this inspection process below). 
 
At the heart of the NPPF is a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable 
development’, which ‘should be seen as a golden thread running through both 
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plan-making and decision-taking’ (DCLG 2012a, p. 4). Sustainability is defined 
along three dimensions: economic, social and environmental. What this 
presumption means is that ‘development that is sustainable should go ahead, 
without delay’ (DCLG 2012a, p. 4). Whilst this may imply that only those 
developments that fulfil all three criteria (and thus contribute positively to the 
economy, support communities and contribute to environmental protection 
and enhancing the natural and built environment) there is a heavy skew 
towards the economic element of that triad.  Those local authorities that do 
not introduce local plans that ‘boost significantly the supply of housing’ 
through allocating a five-year supply of ‘specific deliverable sites’ as 
measured against local land and [affordable] housing needs are likely to have 
their plans found unsound when they are examined at an independent 
inspection (DCLG 2012a, p. 12). If developers could indicate that local 
authorities were not adequately striving towards this end they would win 
planning applications on the basis of this presumption and begin major 
development on land that was not considered in the local plan. Indeed in 
many ways the presumption in favour of sustainable development is a rebirth 
of the presumption in favour of development that existed under Thatcher, 
where a deregulatory agenda shifted the balance of powers away from 
planning authorities towards development and resulted in a decrease in 
powers for planners and local politicians. For housing developers it meant that 
they ‘have the right to build homes and other local buildings provided that they 
conform to national environmental, architectural, economic and social 
standards’ (The Conservative Party 2009, p. 3).  
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Whilst the NPPF espouses a commitment to a triadic definition of sustainable 
development it is in reality the case – because of the growth dependent 
nature of planning – that environmental and social benefits are only accruable 
where they do not impact upon the economic viability of development. Viability 
is defined as ‘competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer 
to enable the development to be deliverable’ (DCLG 2012, p. 41), a suitably 
broad definition that leaves considerable scope to developers to argue against 
such provision. Perversely, where the NPPF is important is that it allowed 
developers to resist social and environmental requirements at every planning 
application.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the residential housing sector in England 
has undergone a state-led process of weak EM driven by a zero-carbon 
homes agenda that, until 2015, compelled industry to embrace new 
technologies to reduce the emissions associated with the construction and 
use of homes.  The extent to which local authorities play a central role in the 
planning process and the extent to which that behaviour is nested within 
regional and national bodies means it is an ideal site to deploy the model of 
local environmental policy capacity developed in the next chapter. This 
chapter has provided a detailed history of the planning process over the last 
twenty years, arguing that it is characterized by growth dependency. The 
complex institutional matrix of the planning system split across national, 
regional and local levels has an important influence on the behaviour of local 
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government, whether in terms of limiting or enabling particular behaviours or 
entrenching a particular normative or discursive vision of growth dependency 
and ecological modernization.  
 
There is a two-pronged conclusion. It isn’t just a useful empirical arena in 
which to discuss local environmental policy capacity, but the same study will 
address gaps in the emerging empirical literature on the zero-carbon homes 
agenda. The literature has focused on: how the agenda has been framed 
(Lovell 2004, Smith 2007); its implications for the social housing sector and 
the perceptions held by deprived communities of such interventions (Scott et 
al. 2014); its potential to achieve its objectives (McManus et al. 2010); 
perceptions of private-sector industry actors (Williams and Dair 2007, Osmani 
and O’Reilly 2009) and of home-buyers (Lovell 2005); the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in its emergence (Lovell 2009); and on-going policy challenges 
faced by government (Greenwood 2012, 2015). There has been only a 
tangential concern with the behaviour of local government.  
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Chapter Four:  
 
Local Environmental Policy Capacity: An Analytical 
Framework 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
The analytical framework deployed in case study research is important as a 
lens to structure and focus the discussion that emerges. In this thesis theory 
is defined as ‘a set of analytical principles designed to structure our 
observation and explanations of the world’ (Cairney 2012, p. 5) and the 
theoretical framework presented in this chapter forms the basis for the case 
studies outlined in 5.6. and is deployed in chapters seven and eight. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical frames used and, thus, the 
analytical model deployed throughout the rest of this thesis. 
 
The model seeks to account for the environmental policy capacity – ‘the 
objective limits to (and necessary preconditions of) successful solutions of a 
given type of problem, limitations beyond which failure sets in, even in cases 
of good luck, skill and highly motivated actors’ (Janicke 1997, p. 1) – and is 
designed in order to respond to the shortcoming highlighted in chapter two 
concerning the under-theorization of the contributions of local authorities to 
processes of EM. The model is underpinned primarily by concepts from new 
theories of institutionalism, which provide a useful set of tools to account for 
the regulating effect of formal and informal rules and practices on political 
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behaviour. Additionally the model situates policy entrepreneurs as important 
agents in both responding to prevailing institutional rules and practices but 
also in reforming them and designing new one. The model therefore relies 
upon a dialectical relationship between agents and institutions. This dialectical 
relationship is actioned through policy networks, groups of stakeholders 
interacting with one another in pursuit of policy goals. Therefore policy 
networks theory is deployed. Lastly, given the centrality of economic 
rationality to processes of EM, sensitivity is given to the prevailing economic 
conditions. The relationship between these elements is presented in figure 4.1. 
below. 
 
The central premise of the model is that policy entrepreneurs negotiate 
existing policy networks, whose composition and strength is conditioned by 
prevailing and emerging institutional landscapes. These same institutional 
landscapes also affect the range of acceptable and permissible behaviour of 
those agents, but the two forces interact dialectically such that agents can 
create their own institutional space. Contributions to EM by local authorities 
are conceptualized as a process of institutional change, and actors are 
integral in those processes.  
(%!
 
Figure 4.1: A Model of Environmental Policy Capacity 
 
The following section outlines how environmental policy capacity has been 
deployed elsewhere in the literature on EM. Section 4.3. discusses the nature 
of policy entrepreneurship, situating it at the heart of the discussion. Section 
4.4. focuses on institutional theory, discussing the constraining and enabling 
effects of rules, practices and narratives on entrepreneurs, discusses how 
those entrepreneurs can affect institutional change and introduces the idea of 
synchronicity to account for the interaction of national and local governments 
and the way that this inhibits institutional change, even when ambition or 
context otherwise would allow for it. Section 4.5. focuses on the way policy 
entrepreneurs navigate policy networks, together with the way that interaction 
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is itself influenced by institutional contexts. Section 4.6. discusses how 
economic conditions may play a dual role, depending on the extent to which 
the direct and indirect costs associated with local EM contributions can be 
accommodated within the existing political economy; strong economic 
performance may act as both an inhibitor or enabler of action depending on 
exiting institutional and network dynamics. So, whilst economic strength may 
sometimes – as in the case of sustainable construction – be a necessary 
condition, it may not be sufficient for contributions.   
 
An important question to consider before the model is unpacked is the extent 
to which this model will be relevant beyond the UK, given that as it stands it is 
developed and applied in the local context. The main issue to consider when 
applying this model to a different context is the degree of centralization within 
a political system; local government in England has often been used as a 
political football by central government. It has been subject to significant 
reform for example, and finds its powers enabled through a top-down 
mandate.  Therefore, if this model is to apply elsewhere we must be sensitive 
to this. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the model is inapplicable outside 
a centralized political system, just that the model may need to be refined. The 
nesting of local behaviours within a national level system of rules and 
regulations forms only one part of the model and can be easily adapted to 
better reflect the balance.  
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There would also need to be a greater focus on the construction and 
formulation of problems to reflect the greater autonomy local authorities would 
have to choose problems worthy of response and then formulate those 
responses.  For example, in a hypothetical system where local authorities 
have complete autonomy to legislate for environmental sustainability a 
researcher - when studying variation across cases and/or applying a model of 
local environmental policy capacity – would need to be sensitive to how one 
particular issue made it onto the agenda and why the policy response took the 
form it did. The work of Kindgon on agenda-setting (discussed below) would 
be useful here and could be more fully integrated into the model in order to 
capture the agenda-setting dynamic. Alternatively, a different epistemological 
stance could be taken to focus more heavily on problem formation and 
construction as a precursor to action.  
 
Beyond this, sensitivity is needed to the way that other elements of the model 
manifest themselves. It is likely that the form that particular dynamics takes 
differs across space. Again though, this is where the adaptive nature of the 
model comes into its own (see Section 5.1. below); the model tells us that 
resource exchange is important, for example, but the researcher has sufficient 
analytical ‘room’ to more precisely define what form and pace that resource 
exchange takes. For example, a political system might be characterised by 
more informal, illicit exchanges of resources in pursuit of political gains (bribes, 
etc). Or, it may be that the dialectical relationship between policy 
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entrepreneurs and institutional rules (depicted by the double-headed arrow in 
Figure 4.1) may not be as strong.  
 
4.2. Environmental Policy Capacity 
 
 
Environmental policy capacity has been used as a framework to account for 
outcomes in national government environmental policy responses in a number 
of countries (Janicke, Monch, Ranneberg, et al. 1989, Janicke and Weidner 
1997, see Weidner and Jänicke 2002b). Sabatier (2007, p. 4) refers to the 
staggering complexity of the policy process’, with outcomes involving 
‘extremely complex set of interacting elements’ (Sabatier 2007, p. 3). John 
(2012) stresses the importance of five interrelated processes when discussing 
the policy process: policy networks, institutional rules and norms, exogenous 
socio-economic factors and ideas. This multi-factoralism underlying public 
policy outcomes has been emphasised elsewhere, most notably in the 
literature on local government innovation (see Osborne 1998, Osborne, 
Stephen & Brown 2011) and public policy implementation (see Sabatier 1988) 
and, as we saw in chapter two, EMT (Janicke 1997, Janicke and Weidner 
1997).  
 
A theoretical approach that focuses on one ‘school’ or ‘tradition’ at the 
expense of others would therefore have missed the influence of a range of 
potentially important factors. The usefulness of a model of environmental 
policy capacity stems from its assertion that ‘successful environmental 
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protection is brought about by a complex interaction of influences and not by a 
single, isolated factor, nor a favourite instrument, nor a single type of actor, 
nor a particular framework condition’ (Janicke 1997, p. 4), and its ability to 
account for this complexity.  
 
Jänicke’s model was developed in comparative study of national 
environmental policy-making and provides a multi-factoral perspective on the 
limits and preconditions of successful environmental policy-making. In doing 
so it accounts for the endogenous and exogenous factors underpinning 
environmental policy outcomes at the national level. Jänicke tells us that the 
capacity for action ‘depends on [the] strength, competence and constellation’ 
of opponents and proponents of change (Janicke 1997, p. 6), and thus 
situates actors at the heart of his model. The same is true of the model 
developed below.  
 
Jänicke suggests that the success of actors is contingent upon a) structural 
conditions and b) situative contexts. Structural conditions are comprised of 
three factors. First, cognitive-informational framework conditions – ‘the 
conditions under which environmental knowledge is produced, distributed, 
interpreted and applied’ (Janicke 1997, p. 7). Second, political-institutional 
framework conditions –  ‘the constitutional, institutional and legal structures 
[and] the institutionalised rules and internalised norms’ (Janicke 1997, p. 7). 
Third, economic-technological framework condition – ‘the performance, 
technological standard, sectoral composition, or general availability of raw 
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materials’ (Janicke 1997, p. 7). Situative contexts can be thought of as 
‘windows of opportunity’. Jänicke qualifies this by arguing that ‘the structure of 
problems as well as the capacity to respond to them is strongly influenced by 
economic performance’ (Janicke 1997, p. 4).  
 
Jänicke’s framework has been developed in a national-level context and is 
largely incompatible in its existing form given that the model therefore 
explains policy responses in a cause-and-effect type relationship: an 
environmental problem arises, which does or does not provoke a policy 
response depending on the alignment of various constituent factors. However, 
in this thesis we are looking at regulatory powers, where the policy ‘problem’ 
is clearly defined and the nature of the policy ‘response’ is broadly dictated 
elsewhere, thus severing this cause and effect link. Rather than being 
confronted with a problem and being tasked with formulating a response, local 
authorities are confronted with a policy and being given the choice of whether 
to adopt it. Both situations invoke an element of choice, but the former 
provides governments with the choice over the policy itself. The latter simply 
gives local government the choice to adopt a policy or not. This means that 
cognitive-informational and economic-technological framework conditions and 
problem structure play a less significant role in this case. This model was 
therefore not applicable for this study, but nevertheless provided inspiration 
for the one eventually developed in so much as it also holds as central the 
role that political entrepreneurship play in a complex institutional setting.  
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An attempt to tailor this model to the local context was made by Press (1998). 
Press’ model of local environmental policy capacity focuses on five 
interrelated factors: social capital, political leadership and commitment, 
economic resources, administrative resources, and environmental attitudes 
and behaviour (Press 1998, p. 44), and defines capacity as ‘a community's 
ability to engage in collective action that secures environmental public goods 
and services’ (Press 1998, p. 37). However, the model he develops seeks to 
account for environmental policy outcomes, rather than outputs. By focusing 
on outcomes he is interested in, ‘observable physical, behavioural and 
biological indicators…activity of agencies…measures of emissions or 
discharges…levels of some pollutants…[and] exposure to contaminants’ 
(Press 1998, p. 31). This means that the policy system is black boxed in the 
model, situated as little more than a conduit through which social norms, 
social capital and external constraints – ‘local private and public wealth or 
state and federal mandates, funding and locally available expertise’ (Press 
1998, p. 39) – influence policy choices and outcomes.  
 
Press falls into the trap of providing a unifactoral explanation for what is a 
complex, multi-factoral process. Jänicke avoids such black boxing somewhat 
by focusing on ‘political-institutional framework conditions’ as a factor that 
inhibits or encourages proponents and opponents of change. Because this 
thesis is concerned with explaining variation in outputs – ‘regulations, 
programs, or ordinances’ (Press 1998, p. 29) – we can only draw limited 
insight from this model. 
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Nevertheless, these two existing attempts to theorise environmental policy 
capacity provide useful signposts to the interaction between various structural, 
institutional and agential factors. They also signpost the need for greater 
consideration of the political dimensions of capacity; rather than black-box 
them they need to be bought to the fore.  
 
4.3. Policy Entrepreneurship 
 
 
The model of local environmental policy capacity developed in this thesis 
considers the presence and behaviour of policy entrepreneurs as the most 
important factor in accounting for variation in EM contributions by local 
authorities. Discussion on policy entrepreneurship has a strong grounding in 
existing literature on local government behaviour in particular and innovations 
in governance in general. It stems in large part from the agenda-setting 
literature (see in particular Kingdon 1984), but also has featured in 
discussions within the policy diffusion literature (Berry and Berry 1990, Shipan 
and Volden 2008, Walker 2012) and the literature on policy innovation 
(Newman et al. 2000, 2001, Bartlett and Dibben 2002, Hartley 2005).  
 
Kingdom (1984, p. 214) for example, in his attempts to explain patterns of 
agenda setting, talks of the importance of policy entrepreneurs as bridges 
between novel policy proposals and existing problems and as a mechanism 
through which the policy process can be navigated. There he argues that 
policy entrepreneurs ‘distinguish themselves through their desire to 
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significantly change current ways of doing things in their area of interest’ 
(Kingdom 1984, p. 214). These individuals possess a ‘willingness to invest 
their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the 
hope of a future return’ (Kingdon 1984, p. 122) and are thus important in 
raising an issue on the legislative agenda and in securing institutional 
resources to ensure implementation and are therefore likely to be key actors 
in any local networks. Roberts & King (1991, p. 151), along similar lines, 
understand policy entrepreneurs as those who ‘develop a new idea, translate 
it into a more formal statement (such as a proposal, bill or law), and then help 
to implement it into public practice as a new program’. Most famously, 
Osborne and Brown (2011) and Osborne and Gaebler (1993) showed the 
centrality of policy entrepreneurship to public sector innovation; arguing in a 
similar vein, Bartlett and Dibbon (2002, p. 119) suggest that we should 
understand ‘entrepreneurship and innovation as necessarily going hand in 
hand in the local government context’.  
 
Bartlett and Dibben (2002) also suggest that a distinction should be made 
between different types of policy entrepreneurs19. They argue that we can 
distinguish between policy champions and policy sponsors. This is an 
important distinction to make and one that is followed through in the model 
developed in this thesis. Such a distinction recognises the difference between 
those who push for change and those who support it through the legislative 																																																									
19 Similar attempts at offering distinctions between different types of policy entrepreneurs have been made in the past, 
most notably by Roberts and King (1991). Such distinctions are often overly complex; for example, Roberts and King 
(1991) lists seven types of policy entrepreneurship. It was felt that such a distinction would muddy the waters, when 
all that is really required is a distinction between those outside the policy arena (i.e. those without a political mandate) 
and those inside.  
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process; often there is a tendency to imply that the two are the same. Policy 
champions, on the one hand, are those who champion ‘their proposal for a 
new service through the council decision-making procedures’ or who possess 
a desire to ‘make a mark’ (Bartlett & Dibben, 2002, p. 112). Policy sponsors, 
on the other, are those who give a political mandate to the innovation pushed 
for by champions. They argue that ‘a champion working without a sponsor…is 
less likely to see innovations through to successful implementation’ (Bartlett 
and Dibben 2002, p. 212). It is for this reason that Mintrom and Norman 
similarly argue that ‘the efforts of ‘outsiders’ to make change often comes to 
nothing’ (2009, p. 656). 
 
A champion may exist in the council itself – whether as a councillor or officers 
and managers – or elsewhere in the network. Similarly, in some cases the 
sponsor function may be provided by officers and managers as well as 
elected councillors. Nevertheless, those with high capital, high levels of 
resources and/or resources that are depended upon by other actors ‘can be 
more circumspect and invest their more extensive resources in low-risk 
incremental ventures’ (Christopoulos 2006, pp. 772–3). Seen in this light, 
policy champions and sponsors represent two sides of the same coin, yet two 
sides that are mutually co-dependent; entrepreneurialism as a whole is 
contingent upon both being present (even if, as the case may be, the policy 
champion is also the sponsor). 
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Of course, such agency is not problem-free and the efficacy of their 
endeavours is contingent upon a range of contextual factors. It is for this 
reason that the relationship between agents and broader institutional and 
structural contexts is elucidated further in this chapter and forms a central part 
of the model developed and deployed in this thesis.  
 
Examples of championship and sponsorship may help for clarification. We 
might refer to attempts made by central government from 2011 onwards to 
packages of responsibilities and decision-making powers (mainly focusing 
around skills, infrastructure and economic development) to groups of local 
authorities (known as ‘combined authorities’) in an attempt to foster urban-led 
economic growth. Such proposals were championed heavily by Jim O’Neill) 
formerly an economist at Goldman Sachs and later a minister in the 2010-
2016 Cameron government) in his role as the chair of the City Growth 
Commission, an influential think tank pushing for city-region autonomy. 
However, it was George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2010-
2016, who acted as the policy sponsor by lending political support that saw 
those proposals turn into policy. He successfully navigated a complex political 
arena that saw powers devolved from numerous central government 
departments (most notably the Department for Transport and the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills) and constructed numerous ‘tailor-made’ 
deals made with groups of local authorities. Greater Manchester was the first 
to negotiate such a deal and we can see similar examples of championship 
and sponsorship at work here. A package of devolved powers for Manchester 
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were championed by the Council’s Chief Executive, Sir Howard Bernstein, but 
sponsored by the Council’s leader, Sir Richard Leese.  
 
Thus, policy entrepreneurship is understood as a form of proactive leadership, 
defined as ‘a style of leadership that is oriented towards seeking out new 
ideas, and encouraging others to do the same’ (Newman et al. 2000, p. 47). 
Leadership in this sense is hidden, in so much as ‘while authority wide 
leadership is important…often the difference between translating new ideas 
into practice and their getting stuck is the existence of individuals to drive the 
initiative and, if necessary, fight for it’ (Newman et al. 2000, p. 47). The 
necessary characteristics of entrepreneurs so conceived are a ‘deep 
knowledge of relevant procedures and the local norms that serve to define 
acceptable behaviour’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009, p. 656).  
 
The dialectical, strategic relationship between economic, institutional or 
network structures and agency implies that entrepreneurship is an intrinsically 
‘insider’ affair, in so much as it is those within these contexts that possess the 
‘deep knowledge’ of procedures and norms prevalent in and restricting a 
context. Within the context of local climate governance policy entrepreneurs 
can be instrumental in securing policy success (Allman et al. 2004, Pitt 2010). 
They work to increase expertise, push for innovative change, or channel 
demands of proponents (Bartlett and Dibben 2002, Christopoulos 2006, 
Mintrom and Norman 2009).  
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They, by definition, are political insiders and their influence is therefore 
contingent upon their status and authority, conceptualized in terms of their 
resourcefulness (which, as we see when discussing policy networks in section 
4.3. are an important determinant of their ability to broker between 
stakeholders). Put another way, ‘the amount of political capital actors are 
willing to employ is determined not only by how much capital they initially 
possess but what are the potential returns’ (Christopoulos 2006, p. 772). This 
isn’t to suggest that those with low political capital, low resources or resources 
upon which actors have low dependency cannot influence outcomes, just that 
it is more difficult and that they ‘can only hope to attain prominence by 
engaging in high-risk opportunistic actions’ (Christopoulos 2006, p. 772). 
 
However, it is important to note that policy entrepreneurs do more than push 
for proposals or influence institutional design, ‘they also lie in wait – for a 
window to open’ (Kingdon 1984, p. 181) As Kingdon argues, policy 
entrepreneurs play an important role when ‘problems, policies and politics 
come together certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, 
and both of them are joined to favourable political forces’ (Kingdon 1984, p. 
170). These windows of opportunity are by no means the only way through 
which entrepreneurs can influence outcomes, but they are a useful means 
nonetheless.  
 
There are similarities between the concept of policy entrepreneurship (and the 
related idea of champions and sponsors) and the idea of norm 
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entrepreneurialism (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Norm entrepreneurs 
are seen as those who call attention to issues or even ‘‘create’’ issues by 
using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them’ (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). However, as conceived in the thesis the idea of policy 
entrepreneurship goes further than an interaction just with norms. There is a 
dialectical relationship with institutional practices (akin to the idea of norms) in 
the sense that policy entrepreneurs are both constrained and enabled by 
practices but also in a position to position to change them (for example by 
offering educational opportunities to shift councillors’ mind-sets on climate 
change). In this sense they act as norm entrepreneurs. However, they go 
further in the sense that they can also have an effect on the constitution and 
operation of a network (in the sense that they may be in a position to select 
members of networks, exchange resources or instigate rule or practice 
changes that shift the relative value of particular resources (see Section 4.5.1 
for more on the relative value of resources). These could have been labelled 
‘network entrepreneurs’ (see Christopolous 2006) if they were being 
discussed singularly. What’s more, where policy entrepreneurs differ from 
norm entrepreneurs is that their behaviour is directed towards the goal of 
policy change, thus norm or network entrepreneurialism is a means to a 
conscious end.  
 
-- 
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In this section we have seen how policy entrepreneurs – champions and 
sponsors – that exist within the local authority can exploit windows of 
opportunity to influence outcomes. Without this kind of agency contributions 
are less likely to take place, and the inclusion of an agential focus is 
deliberate in order to avoid a deterministic understanding of institutional 
constraints. The following section discusses the nature of institutions, arguing 
that whilst they constrain or enable particular behaviour by entrepreneurs they 
themselves are also constructed by entrepreneurship.  
 
4.4. Institutional Theory: Why Institutions Matter 
 
 
 
So, whilst policy entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for contributions to 
the EM process, it does not exist in a contextual vacuum. Whilst Jänicke and 
Press recognise the importance of institutions in their models of 
environmental policy capacity, we must avoid the black-boxing political 
systems (a tendency of which both are guilty, to differing extents) and instead 
talk specifically about their constraining or enabling effects. Broadly speaking, 
institutional dynamics affect the extent to which entrepreneurs are able to 
exercise influence and affect outcomes (Hay and Wincott 1998).  
 
The central tenet of ‘new’ institutionalist theory, which has emerged to 
account for the constraining and enabling effect of these institutions, is that 
political behaviour cannot be understood without referencing the institutions 
within which it takes place (Schmidt 2006, 101). Institutions are the standard 
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operating procedures that: constrain outcomes through formal rules and 
informal practices; that occur regularly; and that are accompanied by 
procedures to sanction non-compliance (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). They 
constrain or enable particular forms of behaviour by influencing actors’: 
interests, preferences or sense of appropriate behaviour, paths (not) taken 
and ideas. Each will be dealt with below. Additionally, the theory of 
environmental policy capacity developed here situates actors and institutions 
in a dialectical relationship, such that agents are seen as both constrained 
and enabled by institutions but also involved in their (re)creation.  
 
‘New’ theories of institutionalism emerged in the 1980s out of a frustration with 
the ‘old’ way political science was dominated by behavioural and rational 
choice approaches to the understanding of political action. Institutions within 
this behavioural turn were seen – at best – as an accumulation of individual 
preferences that had little constraining effect. James March and Johan Olsen 
(1984, 1989), the forefathers of new institutionalism, advocated a return to a 
study of political institutions that had been the ‘historic heart of the discipline’ 
(Rhodes 1997, p. 5, cited in Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 23) and ‘part of 
the toolkit of every political scientist’ (Rhodes 1997, p. 64, cited in Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013, p. 24) prior to the behavioural turn. A methodologically 
individual focus that saw institutions as the outcome of atomistic, self-
interested behaviour missed the important influence that institutions 
themselves had on the availability and choice of behaviours by actors. It was 
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clear that ‘the organisation of political life makes a difference’ (March and 
Olsen 1984, 747).  
 
These ‘new’ institutional approaches differed from their ‘old’, ‘first wave’, pre-
behaviouralist counterparts in three important ways, though. First, they were 
concerned with informal convention as well as formal rules. Second, they saw 
actors and institutions as co-constitutive of on another. Institutions play an 
important causal role and ‘are political actors in their own right’ (March and 
Olsen 1984, 738) that both shape and are shaped by political action. Seen 
like this, individuals are not atomistic ‘but rather are embedded in a complex 
series of relationships with other individuals and with collectivities’ (Peters 
2012, p. 26). Individuals’ preferences are understood as endogenous to the 
institutions in which they operate, a markedly different understanding to that 
implicit within behavioural perspectives, which see them as exogenously 
formed. Third, they adopted a more critical approach to the way that 
institutions embodied particular values and identities.  
 
4.4.1. Institutional Constraints and Enablers: Rules and Practices 
 
 
We can talk of the constraining effects of institutions by thinking in terms of 
rules and practices. This focus on standard operating procedures allows us to 
conceptualize institutions in both formal and informal terms. On the one hand 
they are ‘rules-in-form’ (Ostrom 1999, p. 49): the ‘dos and don’ts’, the formally 
agreed upon, codified rules. On the other they include ‘rules-in-use’, the ‘dos 
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and don’ts that one learns on the ground’, the informal practices (Ostrom 
1999, p. 49). Institutional rules are formally codified and constructed. They 
constrain or enable actors by prescribing allowed and prohibited behaviour 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, pp. 53–55). They are embodied in constitutions, 
policies, regulations and so on. 
These are constituted through institutional practices. Institutional practices are 
more informal and rather than being codified tend to be demonstrated ‘in-use’. 
Particular ‘ways of doing things’ embodied in informal rules are often the 
source of the most relevant and important incentives to action. Sociological 
strands of institutional theory have the most to say about these informal rules, 
given their emphasis on actors’ sense of ‘appropriate behaviour’ (see section 
4.4.1.2. below). March and Olsen write that ‘although self-interest 
undoubtedly permeates politics, action is often based more on discovering the 
normatively appropriate behaviour than on calculating the return expected 
from alternative choices’ (March and Olsen 1984, 744). The focus on these 
kinds of informal practices is at the centre of the ‘rediscovery’ of institutions 
after the behavioural turn, but rather than separate out an understanding of 
rules from practices (as the distinctions between rational choice, historical and 
sociological institutionalism forces us to do) there is a lot to be gained from 
thinking about rules and practices on a continuum ‘from highly formal to highly 
informal, with many places in between’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 60).  
 
The literature on local government innovation tells us that the prevalent 
culture of a local authority – an informal practice – has an important 
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determinant effect on the propensity to innovate (Osborne 1998, Newman et 
al. 2001, Middlemiss and Parrish 2010). In their discussions on the role of 
communities in low-carbon transitions Middlemiss and Parrish introduce the 
idea of cultural capacity, ‘the legitimacy of sustainability objectives in light of 
the history and values of a community’, and organizational capacity,  ‘the 
values of the organisations active within a community and resulting support 
available for community action’ (Middlemiss and Parrish 2010, p. 7561). 
Culture in this context relates to the previous tendency within the local 
authority to innovate and to lead the way in a particular policy area, a factor 
that Newman et.al. (2001, p. 67) found to be important in explaining local 
innovation.  
 
Table 4.1 outlines the core distinction between rules and practices as forms of 
institutional constraint:  
 
 Rules Practices 
How we recognize them Formally constructed and recorded Demonstrated through conduct 
Empirical examples Clauses in a constitution, terms of 
reference, national and international laws 
How elected members conduct 
themselves in parliaments, assemblies or 
local councils 
Enactment by actors through Writing and formal interpretation – e.g. 
law to policy documents to guidance 
The consistent rehearsal of ‘the ways in 
which we do things around here’.  
Sanctioned by.. Coercive action through formal rewards 
and punishments 
Displays of disapproval, social isolation 
and threats of violence. 
Impact on actors through Reading representations and 
interpretations of rules (e.g. speed limit 
signs, procedure manuals) 
Observing the routinized actions of 
members of the group and seeking to 
recreate those actions 
Interconnection between nodes Rules often formalize well-established 
practices 
Rules  may specify the practices through 
which actors must enact the rules 
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Table 4.1. Rules and Practices as Forms of Institutional Constraint 
(Adapted from Lowndes and Roberts 2013, pp. 52–53) 
 
To qualify as an institution – as opposed to, say, a tradition – there must be a 
degree of regularity in the regulatory capabilities of that institution and some 
form of retribution if particular rules and practices aren’t followed. To illustrate 
the distinction let us take the following example. Within a committee, formal 
rules may outline the procedure with which witnesses are called upon and 
questioned by legislators. These are rules in form. However, a particularly 
aggressive style of questioning is not something that is codified as a formal 
rule but one that nevertheless is clearly visible and has an effect on the 
behaviour of those being questioned. This is a rule-in-use. Sanction for failing 
to follow correct rules in questioning will be achieved through formal 
punishment, for example a removal from the committee. Sanction for failing to 
follow the correct practice – for example one committee member bucks the 
trend and adopts a lenient or sympathetic questioning style – is sanctioned 
through display of disapproval or social exclusion and isolation (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013, p. 53). 
 
Within local government we can ‘identify local government rules that are 
consciously designed and clearly specified – like constitutions and structure 
plans, community strategies or performance plans and agreements’ (Lowndes 
2005, p. 292). These might exist within the local authority (i.e. planning 
policies that concern development) or between the local authority and other 
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institutions (such as neighbouring authorities, regional bodies, development 
corporations or housing developers). Alongside formal rules ‘we can also 
recognise informal rules that take the form of unwritten customs and codes… 
like ‘community leadership’, the ‘public service ethos’, or ‘continuous 
improvement; or that may underpin ‘negative’ frameworks like 
departmentalism, paternalism or social exclusion’ (Lowndes 2005, p. 292).  
 
We need to also consider formal rules and informal practices emanating from 
central government. Local powers are enabled or constrained by decisions 
made at higher levels. Whether or not a local authority is permitted through 
formal rules to set local standards on sustainable construction, for example, is 
contingent upon enabling powers from higher decision making bodies. This is 
typical of processes of multi-level governance, where ‘competences and 
authority are shared between different levels of government’ or where 
‘multiple overlapping and interconnected horizontal spheres of authority are 
involved in governing particular issues’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 48). 
Informal practices emerging from the national context are also important 
though. Jollands (2008, p. 5, cited in Bulkeley et.al. 2009, p. 24) argues that 
the ‘lack of acknowledgement, encouragement and clear national level 
guidance on climate change for local governments’ represents a significant 
informal barrier to action’. So we must be considerate of any potential 
discrepancies between rules and practices at the national level (more on this 
below).  
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Table 4.2. below highlights a number of rules and practices at both the 
national and local level that may be important in the context of local 
contributions to EM. It is not an exhaustive list of specific rules and practices. 
Instead, its purpose is to sensitize the reader to the range of possible 
institutions that exist in the local context and may play a role in structuring 
outcomes in the case of local authorities engagement with ecological 
modernisation. What is important to remember is that the separation of central 
and local level rules and practices is not meant to suggest these exist as two 
discrete levels – a distinction that is important in its own right and forms a 
central component of this theory in terms of institutional synchronicity, 
discussed in section 4.4. below.  
 
 Rules Practices 
Central Government Enabling powers (Burch 2010) 
Investment and funding  
Legislation 
Organizational 
creation/destruction (e.g. 
QUANGOs, Regional 
Development Agencies) 
The nature of central-local 
relations (whether in general or 
with a particular LA) 
Informal expectations of the role 
of local government (e.g. striving 
for efficiency, localism, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Local Government Local legislation 
Neighbouring local authorities’ 
legislation (Argyriou et al. 2012b, 
Mann et al. 2014) 
Legislative process 
(consultations, inspections, 
evidence gathering) 
Budgetary mechanisms 
Political make-up of council 
(Mann et al. 2014) 
 
 
 
Local culture in particular policy 
area 
Attitudes towards devolved 
policy. 
Attitudes towards neighbouring 
local authorities/central 
government/regional bodies 
Attitudes towards environment 
Attitudes towards local 
government’s role in 
environmental governance 
Attitudes towards local-central 
relations 
Attitudes towards principles of 
localism 
Officer-councillor relations 
Local authority-citizen relations 
 
Table 4.2. Institutional Rules and Practices in The Case of 
Supplementary Powers for Ecological Modernization 
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This way of conceptualizing institutions in terms of rules and practices is part 
of a third ‘wave’ of institutionalist research: a new ‘new’ theory of 
institutionalism. It emerged through attempts to achieve a rapprochement of 
existing work, which had branched off into at least eight different variants of 
institutional theory: rational choice, historical, empirical, constructivist, 
sociological, network and international (Peters 2012, pp. 18–21) and feminist 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013) institutionalisms. It has drawn strong influences 
from four of these in particular: rational choice, historical, sociological 
institutionalism and constructivist institutional theories (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013, p. 32). All four present useful ideas for conceptualising the relationship 
between institutions and actor behaviour given the way they outline how 
institutions constrain actor behaviour, so are all considered within the model 
of environmental policy capacity developed in this thesis. Each will be dealt 
with in turn. 
4.4.1.1. Influence of Rules and Practices on Actor Preferences 
 
Rational choice institutionalists understand institutions as the ‘rules of the 
game in society’ (North 1990, p. 3), within which political actors attempt to 
maximise their own interests. Institutional rules and practices structure the 
conditions for rational action, ‘thus in these models the individual politician is 
expected to manoeuvre to maximize personal utility, but his or her options are 
inherently constrained because they are operating within the rule set of one or 
more institutions’ (Peters 2012, p. 48). Here ‘the individual is constantly 
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asking the consequential question ‘what action would produce the highest 
utility for me, in a context where institutional rules place some constraints on 
subsequent behaviour’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 36). It emerged out of 
an attempt by rational choice theorists to ‘bring the state back in’ to ‘explain 
outcomes that could not be explained by universal theories of rational action 
without reference to institutional context’ (Schmidt 2006, 103).  
4.4.1.2. Influence of Rules and Practices on the Logic of Appropriate 
Behaviour  
 
Sociological institutionalists see institutions as ‘collections of interrelated rules 
and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between 
roles and situations’ (March and Olsen 1989, 21). The norms and values 
embodied within particular institutions shape political outcomes by creating 
meaning for individuals. So, rather than understanding outcomes on the basis 
of a logic of consequentiality, as per rational choice or historical 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalist adopt a logic of appropriateness. 
These logics of appropriateness ‘are followed because they are seen as 
natural, rightful, expected and legitimate’ and because actors ‘seek to fulfil the 
obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political 
community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its 
institutions’ (March and Olsen 2004, p. 4 cited in Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 
p. 30).  
4.4.1.3. Influence of Rules and Practices on Paths (Not) Taken  
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Historical institutionalists define institutions as ‘formal and informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of 
the polity’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 938). They focus on the structuring effect 
of institutions over time (Pierson and Skocpol 2002), and in so doing adopt a 
non-linear understanding of causality that focuses attention on the 
constraining and enabling effects of historical institutional arrangements (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). A core argument is that a failure to take a historical 
perspective means we end up with a ‘snapshot explanation for what should be 
seen as a moving picture’ (Pierson 2000, p. 263).  
 
Historical institutionalists talk of the ‘path dependency’ of institutions (Pierson 
2000), the basic idea of which is that ‘once policy makers have started down a 
particular path (however arbitrary the initial choice), the costs of changing 
direction are high’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 39). These ‘increasing 
returns’ mean that decisions made at one point in time have an effect on 
decisions made at another point in the future (Steinmo 2008) and imply a 
‘stickiness’ to policy (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, p. 699). Rules and practices 
thus ‘have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized’ 
(Pierson 2000, p. 259). The high density of institutions in political life, power 
asymmetries and political complexity combine to produce high sunk costs to 
political behaviour and thus ‘make increasing returns processes in politics 
particularly intense’ (Pierson 2000, p. 257). Institutional change most often 
occurs, in this scenario, through sudden accentuated punctuations to an 
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otherwise sticky equilibrium (Pierson 2000, p. 257) – as we discuss below in 
section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1.4. Influence of Rules and Practices on Ideas and Perceptions 
 
 
Constructivist institutionalists take a different perspective on the way that 
institutions enable or constrain behaviour.  Rather than focusing on external 
rules or norms they instead focus on the way that an external reality is 
processed by actors themselves as they create meaning and understanding 
of the world around them through ideas and discourse. They are thus 
concerned with the context in and through which ideas are communicated and 
the way that those ideas inform outcomes. Institutions then are ‘constraining 
structures and enabling constructs of meaning which are internal to ‘sentient’ 
(thinking and speaking) agents’ (Schmidt 2010, 4). Actors construct their own 
realities, and thus the way that they do that is malleable. Rules and practices, 
although external to the way actors interpret and construct the world, 
nevertheless have an impact upon the way that process pans out. So, 
changing external rules and practices can influence the perceptions that 
actors have.  
4.4.2. Theories of institutional change 
 
 
The previous section showed that rules and practices constrain behaviour, 
through altering preferences, logic of appropriateness, paths (not) taken, and 
perceptions of the world around them. Although these constraining effects of 
institutions are important to consider, how the way existing institutions change 
is what we are ultimately concerned with when discussing contributions to 
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EM, given that such contributions require a change from one institutional 
configuration to another. This is where policy entrepreneurship and institutions 
interact; contributions to processes of EM necessarily imply institutional 
change, where existing rules and practices are subject to reform and it is 
actors who lie at the heart of such processes.  
A lingering critique of institutional theory (see Peters 2012) is its inability to 
adequately account for processes of change, given the emphasis often place 
on the stickiness and inertia embedded within institutions through increasing 
returns and processes of path dependency, with some suggesting that 
institutional theory, particularly historical institutionalist accounts, ‘sometimes 
lapse inadvertently into institutional determinism’ (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 
p. 16). Whilst it may be the case that institutions may possess path dependent 
characteristics and stability may be a more prominent feature of institutional 
life, institutional change clearly does occur. It is said to occur in one of two 
ways: suddenly or gradually. 
 
Until recently scholars have relied upon the idea of a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
to account for these change processes. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have 
argued that the bounded rationality of institutional actors – how an issue is 
framed – and agenda-setting all help to explain change. As issues fall into the 
purview of institutional actors and rise on the agenda they can be subject to 
sudden, intense and dramatic activity. Conversely, where an issue falls on the 
agenda or where it is framed as unimportant or solved inertia can kick in. 
Punctuations, then, emerge from shifts in either preferences or attentiveness; 
	112	
policy makers may be unwilling, for example, to reform existing institutions 
because such behaviour is electorally unpopular or because they have more 
pressing matters on hand (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Where a critical 
mass of attention is achieved, a tipping point is reached, new approaches are 
considered, new priorities are assigned or where new ideologies emerge, 
punctuation occurs. Krasner (1984) has developed this notion of punctuated 
equilibrium further to bring a focus on both internal and external shocks or 
crises as determinants of these preferences and the attention given to 
particular institutional designs and arrangements. New institutions, then, 
‘originate during periods of crisis’ (Krasner 1984, p. 240) as they alter the 
preferences of institutional designers and the urgency given to particular 
issues.  
 
However, as Duit (2007) argues, whilst the notion of a punctuate equilibrium 
‘does resemble some historical processes…this is far from proof of its 
applicability as a general model of political and institutional change’ (2007, p. 
1098 emphasis original). Indeed, Streeck and Thelen (2005) contested this 
punctuated equilibrium model (accounts, they argue, that locate institutional 
change in ‘convulsive historic ruptures’; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 18) by 
arguing instead that institutional change is a near continuous process of 
gradual but transformative change. The emphasis here is on the way in which 
institutions change occurs incrementally. Institutions reform to reflect 
changing contexts not by sudden, dramatic change but instead through a 
process of layering and gradual adjustments (where existing institutions take 
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on new forms, are reformed through the creation of new, layered institutions, 
where they no longer have relevance or drift to take on a new relevance). A 
core distinction between these two accounts of institutional change is the 
extent to which they understand institutional change as a necessary depletion 
of existing institutions. For Krasner, punctuated equilibrium causes the demise 
of existing institutions, which become replaced by new ones that reflect 
changing priorities and preferences. For Streeck and Thelen institutions 
instead evolve. They have developed a typology of gradual change that 
focuses on the effects of: displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and 
exhaustion (see Table 4.3. below).  
 
Dynamic of Institutional Change Defined as: 
Drift ‘Neglect of institutional maintenance in spite 
of external change resulting in slippage in 
institutional practice on the ground’ 
Conversion ‘Slowly rising salience of subordinate relative 
to dominant institutions’  
Exhaustion ‘Gradual breakdown (withering away) of 
institutions over time’  
Layering ‘New elements attached to existing 
institutions gradually change their status and 
structure’  
Displacement ‘Redeployment of old institutions to new 
purposes; new purposes attached to old 
structures’  
 
Table 4.3: Dynamics of Gradual but Transformative Institutional Change 
(Source: Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) 
 
 
Displacement occurs with the rising importance of peripheral institutions. 
Institutions sit within an ‘interdependent web of an institutional matrix’ (North 
1990, p. 95), where they are ‘nested or embedded within wide institutional 
frameworks that exist above, below and alongside’ (Lowndes 2005, p. 294). 
Displacement occurs through ‘the rediscovery or activations – and, always, 
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the cultivation – of alternative institutional forms’ from within this matrix 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 20), or through the blending or assimilation of 
new institutional logics, the material practices and social constructions that 
underpin institutional behaviour (Skelcher and Smith 2014, p. 8). The central 
argument is that in ‘critical moments or periods latent subsidiary ways of 
action can be rediscovered’ through ‘cultivation by enterprising actors’ 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, pp. 20–21).  
 
Layering takes place where path-dependent processes preclude the 
dismantling of existing institutions, so change stems from new elements being 
added to those existing institutions in a way that changes their form, which 
may occur through ‘the active sponsoring of amendments, additions or 
revisions to an existing set of institutions’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 23). 
This kind of differential growth sets in motion ‘dynamics through which they, 
over time, actively crowd out or supplant by default the old system’ (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, p. 24).  
 
Drift occurs through the intentional or unintentional neglect of institutional 
maintenance, even where external circumstances require or encourage it. A 
failure to actively maintain the institution ‘may amount to actively allowing it to 
decay’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 25).  
 
Conversion occurs where institutions are directed towards new purposes or 
goals, whether because of unintended consequences, through compromise in 
political negotiation, because of the circumvention or subversion of rules by 
actors, or because of changing contextual conditions (Streeck and Thelen 
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2005, pp. 26–27). Lastly, exhaustion refers to the breakdown of institutions 
over time, through decreasing returns, as institutions become older and more 
stretched, or where the institution has sowed the seeds of its own destruction 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, pp. 29–30).  
 
When it comes to the local contributions to EM itself policy entrepreneurship is 
important in stimulating many of these dynamics. They can prevent drift, 
where through ‘deliberate neglect’ institutions lose their relevance in spite of 
changing circumstances. Or may play a role in fostering the change of 
existing institutions in order to accommodate new supplementary standard 
setting powers; for example, new powers may be suitably layered onto 
existing institutional rules in so much as they can be ‘attached to existing 
institutions [and] gradually change their status and structure’ (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, p. 31). Or, they could convert existing institutions in a way that 
means they serve new functions, such as capitalizing upon latent 
environmental awareness (an institutional ‘practice’) and redirecting it towards 
a more explicit focus on sustainable homes. They could similarly seek to 
exhaust institutions preventing the uptake of supplementary standards (such 
as explicit wording in local policy). 
 
So far we have seen the structuring effect that institutional rules and practices 
have on actors’ preferences, logic of appropriate behaviour, availability of 
paths and ideational construction of the world around then, and the way that 
those rules and practices can change over time both gradually or suddenly. 
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This change though occurs though by purposive agency, highlighting a close 
relationship between institutions and agency that needs to be considered; 
actors are both constrained by institutions but also complicit in their design 
and reform.  
 
 
4.4.3. The Dialectical Relationship Between Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Agency   
 
We can talk therefore of a dialectical relationship between agents and 
institutional contexts; policy entrepreneurs do not just accept the status quo, 
they attempt to change it in pursuit of their aims. Indeed, this is often how they 
achieve their aims. They are therefore important in the creation of new rules 
and practices and thus in the dynamics of institutional change.  
 
So, whilst institutional theory is a useful lens through which to account for 
variation in contributions, a more nuanced understanding of differences in that 
variation can be obtained from also understanding the interaction of policy 
entrepreneurs and institutions. A central component of the model of 
environmental policy capacity that this thesis seeks to develop is the local 
institutional landscape; variations in contributions by local authorities can be 
accounted for in part by the nature of this landscape and how actors both 
negotiate and influence it. In other words, variations can be accounted for in 
part by the differing institutional contexts actors in each local authority are 
subject to and thus the differing rules and practices prevalent in each case. 
However, the inter-relationship between agency and institutions is also 
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important.  Those local authorities that have champions within them who are 
able to either navigate favourable institutional contexts or shape existing 
contexts to make them more favourable would be in a better position to 
contribute to the EM process. 
 
The dynamics of institutional change (particularly gradual change dynamics) 
are underpinned by intentional, purposive design: 
‘While highly unlikely to achieve all they set out to do, attempts at institutional 
design are inevitable as political actors seek to make their values ‘stick’ 
through institutional mechanisms. Such action does not only include heroic 
foundational moments (new constitutions, for instance) or fundamental reform 
programmes, but also many disparate small actors of adjustment undertaken 
by strategic actions on the ground’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 171) 
 
As Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 19) argue ‘political institutions are not only 
periodically contested [by agents]; they are the object of on-going skirmishing 
as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions in 
pursuit of their goals, or by subverting or circumventing rules that clash with 
their interests’. Various attempts have been made to understand the 
relationship between agents and institutions – reflecting the on-going structure 
agency debate (see Hay 2002, 89–134). Hay and Willcott see the relationship 
between agents and institutions dialectically, where ‘change is seen as the 
consequence (whether intended or unintended) of strategic action (whether 
intuitive or instrumental), altered through perceptions (however informed or 
misinformed) of an institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors 
and perceptions over others’ (Hay and Wincott 1998, 955). This is closely 
related to Hay and Jessop’s ‘strategic relational approach’ (Hay and Jessop 
1995) where ‘actors are presumed to be strategic – to be capable of devising 
and revising means to realise their intentions’ (Hay 2002, p. 126) and are 
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situated in an on-going process of institutional exposure, strategic action and 
institutional reform, a process affected by perceptions of the institutional 
landscape (and its shortcomings) and their ability to develop and exercise 
effective strategy.  
Lowndes (2005, p. 291) and Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 179) develop this 
dialectical approach further to offer a comprehensive theorisation of 
institutional entrepreneurship. They refer to a process of institutional 
bricolage, which they argue ‘may actually be the only route to institutional 
innovation in the face of path dependency’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 
180). Bricolage refers to the idea that actors ‘make and remake institutions on 
a daily basis’, (rarely do so from scratch) through four dynamics: 
remembering, borrowing, sharing and forgetting.  
 
Such a view recognizes the importance of endogenous sources of institutional 
change and reflects a third phase in institutional theory commitment to ‘bring 
the actor back in’. (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, pp. 179–185). Remembering 
refers to the idea that latent institutional resources can be reactivated in 
pursuit of new objectives (and thus has resonances with the idea of 
displacement) (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 181). The notion of path 
dependency suggests that initial decisions can preclude particular paths from 
being available to actors at later junctures. The notion of remembering implies 
that these ‘paths that were feasible but foregone’ can be reactivated or 
rehabilitated in new contexts by institutional actors ‘searching through past 
repertoires’ (Lowndes 2005, p. 301). This relates closely to the notion put 
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forward by Crouch and Farell of institutional ‘redundancies’, the idea that ‘far 
from being coherent, they are characterized by redundancies, previously 
unknown capacities, and incongruities, which frequently provide the means 
through which actors – whether firms, policy entrepreneurs, or others – may 
seek to tackle new exigencies’ in the face of changing environments (Crouch 
and Farrell 2004, p. 8).  
 
Borrowing occurs when institutional actors actively seek to transfer 
institutional resources from one ‘action space’ to another (Crouch and Farrell 
2004, Lowndes 2005, p. 302). Referring again to the idea of an institutional 
matrix, borrowing takes place where actors – often those who operate within 
more than one action space, referred to elsewhere as boundary spanners 
(Williams 2002) – draw inspiration from institutional formations elsewhere. 
Sharing takes place where actors transfer experience through networks; 
‘while ‘borrowing’ involves the same actor transferring experience between 
the different arenas in which she acts, ‘sharing’ provides access to the 
institutional repertoires of other actors (who operate in different action 
spaces)’ (Lowndes 2005, p. 304). Alternatively, ‘if remembering is about 
looking backwards and borrowing is about looking sideways, then sharing 
involves looking outwards in the search to expand or recombine institutional 
resources’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 184). Forgetting has resonances 
with the idea of drift, particularly the notion of ‘deliberate neglect’ (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, p. 31), and involves the purposive neglect of existing 
institutions. Where institutions fail to be maintained, they can begin to ‘wither 
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on the vine’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 185). However, it is important to 
note that processes of forgetting can be difficult (for the same reasons that 
institutions tend to be sticky and inert), especially where it is the case that 
institutional rules are neglected, given the potential for practices and 
narratives to either prevail regardless or lie dormant beneath the surface 
waiting to be remembered at a later stage.  
 
4.4.4.	Institutional	synchronicity	as	a	determinant	of	institutional	change.	
 
 
In the previous section we elaborated upon and integrated the discussion on 
institutional entrepreneurship with that on institutionalism and institutional 
change through the notion of bricolage. Variations in contributions to EM – 
conceptualized above as a process of institutional change – come about 
through differences in the purposive action by policy entrepreneurs directed at 
institutional maintenance or change. Thinking in this way requires an 
assessment of extant institutional landscapes, actor strategies and their role 
as agents of institutional change.  
 
However, these existing accounts of institutional change and the dialectic 
understanding of the relationship between actors and institutions as it has 
thus far been discussed fail to consider that local government operates within 
a multi-level context. This is a problem endemic to the literature in general.  
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We saw above that the notion of bricolage is central to discussions on 
institutional maintenance and change – and thus to our understanding of the 
constraining and enabling effects of institutions themselves – but we must do 
more to recognise that processes of institutional bricolage take place in a 
multi-dimensional institutional setting, where ‘the institutions of local 
governance are shaped by rules that emanate from higher tiers of government 
(national legislation, EU directives), by ‘institutional templates’ that circulate in 
the wider society and economic…and by locally specific cultures and 
conventions’ (Lowndes 2005, p. 294). Although the likes of Lowndes and 
Roberts acknowledge that ‘in local governance…the shape of the institutional 
matrix emerges as the outcomes of action at many different institutional levels’ 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 180), there is a failure to account for how 
interactions between institutional rules and practices at each level impact 
upon the nature and pace of institutional change locally. Borrowing and 
sharing in particular can take place across administrative levels. However, 
there is a problematic assumption within such discussions that such 
processes occur problem-free, or that power balances between them are 
equal. This would imply that when new contexts encourage either sharing or 
borrowing by local government actors from institutions at, say, the national 
level, such processes occur regardless of the dynamics at play between the 
two levels.  
 
Whilst theories of institutional bricolage certainly have their place in explaining 
institutional change, greater focus on the multi-level dimension of institutional 
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change and design is needed when we are talking about institutional change 
in the context of local government than is currently offered in the literature, 
because such changes occur within bounded spaces. The extent to which 
actors can interpret the institutional world around them to initiate and design 
institutional change within those spaces is a product of institutional 
architectures at different levels, so greater consideration of the 
interdependencies between those levels is needed.  
 
There are hints from within the existing literature of the importance of this 
dynamic, but thus far no concrete conceptualizations of the interaction of this 
multi-level dimension on institutional behaviours. For example, Lowndes 
(2005, p. 292) has remarked that we should conceptualize local governance 
as an ‘institutional matrix’ where ‘different rule-sets change at different rates in 
and in different directions, reflecting power relationships and the 
‘embededness of local governance in specific historical and spatial contexts’. 
Nevertheless, there has yet to be sufficient theorization for how those 
‘different rates’, ‘different directions’, or ‘power relationships’ influence the 
pace and direction of institutional change. In other words, how formal and 
informal rules at one level synchronize (more on precisely what this means 
below) with those at another structure the range of possible outcomes and the 
scope for institutional design and change. The literature on local and urban 
governance also points towards these ‘multiple overlapping and 
interconnected horizontal spheres of authority [that] are involved in governing 
particular issues’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 48). Indeed, the centralization 
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inherent in the British political tradition (Hartley et al. 2004) – even in spite of a 
recent emergence of a discourse of devolution and decentralisation – means 
that local policy discretion is on the whole contingent upon central government 
legislative or (de)regulatory action.	 
 
The concept of institutional synchronicity is developed here as a novel 
concept to address this shortfall in the literature and account for this dynamic. 
Where institutional architectures are spread over multiple-jurisdictional levels 
(as with local governance) the degree of institutional synchronicity  - the 
extent to which overlapping institutional rules, practices and narratives that 
are spread across jurisdictional levels align at those different levels – is one 
determinant of institutional change alongside those discussed above. So, 
rather than just rely on the notion of punctuated equilibrium or graduated 
change as a factor involved in institutional change, consideration of 
synchronicity is also needed.  Institutional synchronicity is not just discussed 
in order to enrich the analysis of local contributions to processes of EM, it is 
discussed as an end in its own right; the notion of synchronicity is a novel 
contribution to the literature on institutions, particularly that which focuses on 
the dynamics of institutional change.  
 
Broadly, it is argued that local government institutions often emerge and are 
made possible within an ‘enabling’ framework, whereby local competences 
are prescribed through series of formal rules from central government. These 
national rules have two effects. First, they are the ‘external shocks’ that can 
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bring about shifts in priorities and preferences amongst local decision makers 
in line with the punctuated equilibrium model. Or, alternatively, they act as 
incubators or inhibitors to processes of gradual but transformative change by 
limiting the pervasiveness of local dynamics of layering and gradual evolution.  
In this latter conceptualization the scope for bricolage is diminished through 
boundary conditions on legitimate or appropriate action that have emerged 
elsewhere.  
 
We can talk in terms of rule-based and practice-based synchronicity. Local 
government in England operates within a framework enabled by rules 
emanating from central government, where particular powers are devolved or 
particular responsibilities assigned to local authorities (often with a degree of 
voluntarism attached). We can conceptualize this as the emergence of 
national level institutional rules from central government. Conflicts may 
emerge where these national rules conflict with local rules and practices. 
Where there is a voluntarism attached to the embrace of these national rules, 
such conflicts may undermine the capacity of local authorities to embrace 
them, even where political will is on side. Where there is a mandatory element 
– that is, where local authorities have little choice but to embrace such rules – 
there is the potential for tension where they conflict with dominant practices 
abound locally. In both situations the pace and direction of institutional change 
within local government is determined in part, then, by the dynamics of 
institutional synchronicity.  
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4.4.4.1. Rule Based Synchronicity 	
 
Rule based synchronicity occurs where local government institutional rules 
can accommodate emergent national institutional rules within existing 
decision making processes at the local level. New national level rules that 
enable or constrain particular types of local government behaviour interrelate 
with existing or emerging rules at the local level, such that conflict may arise. 
New rules that grant local authorities the opportunity to integrate new planning 
regulations, for example, are only useful to a local authority if it is in a position 
to re-draft its local planning policies. Thus, this lack of synchronicity acts as a 
constraint on institutional change, despite the wishes of local actors.   
 
There are two additional elements to consider when talking about rule-based 
synchronicity. The first is whether national rules (particularly devolved policies) 
are relevant to a local context or, in other words, whether that policy applies in 
a particular context. For example, legislation that gives local authorities the 
choice to introduce particular farming standards has little to no relevance in an 
urban environment. The second concerns the activities of the local 
government and the extent to which it is experiencing what we might refer to 
as legislative congestion; limited resources (whether in terms of economics, 
available expertise or more fundamental concerns over legislative time on the 
Council’s agenda) influence the priority given to different policy areas.  
 
4.4.4.2. Practice Based Synchronicity  
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Practice based synchronicity occurs with alignment between national level 
rules and local institutional practices. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 53) 
suggest that ‘narratives are often used to justify the existence of rules [and] 
rules often formalize well-established practices’, suggesting an 
interrelationship between the two. Extending this into a multi-level setting 
allows us to say that local narratives may conflict with emerging national rules, 
thus precluding their justification, and those same rules may either legitimize 
or discredit existing local practices. This therefore acts as an inhibitor or 
enabler of institutional change.   
 
Both notions of synchronicity have different effects depending on whether 
rules emerging nationally are voluntary or mandatory. If a local authority has 
the option of whether or not to embrace new rules then all notions of 
synchronicity can serve to frustrate or encourage institutional change – by 
encouraging or inhibiting the embrace of those rules. Where those rules are 
mandatory, and where local government thus has no alternative but to 
embrace them, these processes are still at work but work in more subtle 
ways. In this latter case a lack of synchronicity manifests itself in frustration or 
tensions, which can themselves serve to encourage institutional change 
through generating new practices or narratives.  
 
Synchronicity between national and local level can be understood as an 
enabling condition for processes of institutional change. Without synchronicity 
between levels, the extent to which institutions are able to change – in spite of 
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actors intentions, or lack thereof – is restricted. However, the presence of 
synchronicity alone does not ensure outcomes; such situations present the 
windows of opportunity that entrepreneurs are skilled in exploiting, as we saw 
in section 4.3.  Defining synchronicity along these two dimensions adds 
nuance to discussions on multi-level governance, avoiding the assumption of 
unproblematic implementation or interaction between administrative levels.  
 
 
-- 
 
So far in this chapter we have seen the constraining and enabling effect of 
institutional rules and practices, how actors are complicit in their reform over 
time and how the synchronicity between national and local level can restrict 
the scope of institutional change and provide a window of opportunity that 
entrepreneurs can exploit. However, policy entrepreneurs do not operate in an 
agency vacuum; they interact with other actors in complex webs. These policy 
networks, and their internal dynamics, also have a structuring effect on the 
role of actors and thus the way that local authorities can contribute to 
processes of EM.  Entrepreneurs are key actors in any local policy networks, 
but their action can be constrained or enabled by network dynamics.  
 
4.5. Policy Networks and Institutional Entrepreneurship: 
Resources, Resource Exchange and (Changing) Institutional 
Contexts 
 
Who interacts within a network, the resources they hold and the way they 
interact matters, because it affects the influence that policy entrepreneurs 
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have in affecting outcomes. The dialectical interaction between agents and 
institutions discussed in the previous section are mediated through policy 
networks – in other words, they are sites of institutional design. Policy 
networks are ‘the set of political actors inside and outside government who 
are involved in, or take an interest in, the making of public policy, and/or the 
relations between these actors’ (Compston 2009a, p. 7). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the English planning regime is characterised by a 
stratification of power, frequent regulatory change and a shift in power in 
recent years from the state to private sector actors. How these other actors 
behave therefore has an influence on the change we see. New institutions are 
created and regulatory change elsewhere can empower existing groups at the 
expense of others.  
 
Borzel distinguishes between the  ‘interest mediation’ and ‘governance’ 
schools when discussing policy networks (1998, p. 254): 
‘The interest mediation school conceives policy networks as a generic 
concept which applies to all kinds of relations between public and private 
actors. For the governance school, on the contrary, policy networks only 
characterize a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy 
(governance), namely the one based on non- hierarchical co-ordination, 
opposed to hierarchy and market as two inherently distinct modes of 
governance’ (Borzel 1998, p. 254 emphasis original) 
 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992, pp. 251–255) talk of different ‘types’ of these policy 
networks, each of which has a different effect on outcomes and are situated 
on a continuum; on one end of the continuum are tightly integrated closed 
networks comprising a handful of members with stable memberships. These 
‘policy communities’ usually share similar ideologies and achieve high 
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degrees of consensus. ‘Issue networks’, at the other end of the continuum, 
have complex memberships that include a range of government, non-
governmental and private actors. Membership is erratic and in flux, and 
consensus is often difficult to achieve.  
Networks represent ‘a stable or recurrent pattern of interaction between 
individuals or organizations’ (Ansell 2009, p. 75). They can enable particular 
forms of behaviour because they can be ‘channels of information and aid’, 
whilst they can constrain when ‘they are structures of social influence and 
control that limit action’ (Ansell 2009, p. 75). Policy entrepreneurs must 
navigate these ‘entangled web of relationships’ (Ansell 2009, p. 76), acting as 
brokers between the external and internal; whether opponents or proponents 
of change, local residents, other local authorities, national government or a 
range of other stakeholders. We know from elsewhere the power of cross-
border learning in facilitating innovation amongst policy makers, not least at 
the local level (Berry and Berry 1990, Walker 2012).  
 
The ease with which entrepreneurs can navigate these networks is a product 
of the composition and dynamic of the network itself. This is conceptualized in 
terms of the resourcefulness of network actors and the resource exchanges 
between them. Each group has its own interests and goals, and seeks to 
exert influence on policy makers through deploying their resources and 
exchanging resources with others. 
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4.5.1. Network Actor Resources 
 
The extent to which each actor within a network is able to pursue their 
interests is a product of their resourcefulness and the extent to which they are 
able to ‘trade’ those resources with others. Compston suggests that ‘each 
actor wants something from one or more other actors and is prepared to 
exchange something of their own in order to get it’ (2009b, p. 728), Börzel 
argues that network actors  acknowledge that ‘co-operation is the best way to 
achieve common goals’ (1998, p. 254). Resource dependency theory explains 
policy outcomes on the basis of these interactions (Rhodes 1985): private and 
public actors possess a variety of different resources that are depended upon 
in a variety of ways by other actors in the network. Compston (2009a, p. 26) 
defines eight tradable resources, which are outlined in Table 4.4, below.  
 
Controlled By Resources 
Public actors alone Policy amendments 
Access 
Public and private actors Veto power 
Information (either through 
lobbying or in a consultative 
role) 
Cooperation with implementation 
Recourse to the courts 
Political support 
Private actors alone Private investment 
 
Table 4.4: Tradable Resources of Policy Network Actors 
Source: Amended from Compston 2009, p. 26 
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Resources reflect the institutionalized status of particular interests that 
influence policy outcomes. All actors have them and it is through these formal 
and informal interactions that they make use of them. They all have resources 
that decision makers either want or have no choice accepting. Within the 
context of policy capacity, we can say then that the capacity of a local 
authority to contribute to EM is contingent upon the resources of the local 
authority vis à vis other network actors (and thus the extent to which it 
depends upon the resources of other network actors) and the ability of policy 
entrepreneurs to exploit and deploy those resources.  
 
Public actors (central and local government actors) are the only actors that 
can provide amendments to legislation and access to the policy-making 
process (through, for example, committee appointments or commissioning). 
Other resources though can be possessed by both public and private actors. 
Actors both inside and outside the council may possess veto power over 
policy unless concessions are made. Opposition parties, for example, may 
form a coalition against proposals made by the ruling party. Actors external to 
the legislative may possess a de facto veto power if their resources in other 
areas are so great that the threat of their withdrawal can have a similar effect 
as a veto. For example, if a firm employs 50% of people in a district it can 
threaten to move elsewhere if a policy is passed. Such a threat may, in effect, 
veto the proposal. Information is a key tradable resource. Compston (2009a, p. 
29) lists three ways in which it can be used. First, if an actor controls 
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information in an area they can trade this for amendments. Second, 
information can be deployed to change the preferences of policy makers. 
Third, policy learning from other policy environments can also change actor 
preferences. If local authority x adopts a policy that has a series of unintended 
consequences it may change the preferences of authority y.  
 
If the cooperation of an actor is needed to implement a policy that actor has 
leverage over policy makers to seek policy amendments. Policy makers have 
an incentive to exchange amendments for implementation. Recourse to the 
courts is particularly important in this context, allowing legal challenges where 
local authorities have overstepped their role. Central government sets clear 
boundaries around when, where and how a local authority can act. Any party 
– central government, other local authorities or private sector actors –that 
feels that these conditions have been breached can launch legal action to 
block, delay or amend policy to bring it in line with the enabling framework. 
Additionally, private actors alone can control flows of investment, which can 
be an important tradable resource. The threat to disinvest can be a powerful 
tool.  
 
Political outcomes can be explained in part on the basis of how these 
resources are possessed, depended upon and exchanged across a network. 
Within the context of EM we know that policy-makers play an important role in 
arbitrating between the demands of industry and the demands of pro-
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environment groups. Resources are a useful way to conceptualize how and 
whether this arbitration takes place.  
4.5.2. Resource exchange amongst network actors 
 
Jänicke (1997) refers in his discussions on policy capacity to the ‘participative 
capacity’ of a government, defined as ‘the openness of the input structures of 
the policy process’ (1997, p. 12). There are similarities here with the idea of a 
political input structure, which refers to the ‘openness of political regimes to 
new demands on the input side’ (Kitschelt 1986, p. 63) from social 
movements, civil society groups and interest groups and lie on a continuum 
from ‘open’ to ‘closed’. Kitschelt developed the idea to elucidate the dynamics 
of resource dependencies. It wasn’t enough, he argued, for us to focus on the 
resources of a group when explaining outcomes, but instead we must be 
sensitive both to whether or not the political system is conducive to interest 
group and social movement influence.  
 
Given that the involvement of external advocacy groups is a ‘relevant factor 
for the general opening-up and modernisation of a political system’ (Janicke 
1997, p. 12), sensitivity to the way that social movements and interest groups 
interact with the local government is important. We can expect that those local 
authorities that have a more participative style of policy-making and that have 
well resourced and organized local pro-environment interest groups are better 
able to contribute to EM. They can do so by integrating the local community 
into the decision making process, thus taming the objections of opponents 
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whilst at the same time altering the balance of resources in a network. We 
saw in the previous chapter that civil society support within EM catalyses 
ecological concern amongst other actors. 
4.5.3. Political Dissonance and Congruence 
 
 
An additional influence on the ease with which entrepreneurs can navigate 
policy networks is the degree of congruence that exists between those 
members of the network with which a statutory relationship is mandated in 
national level rules. For example, chapter three showed that local authorities 
have recently been required to cooperate on deciding local housing targets 
and cooperate on where those houses should be located (the duty to 
cooperate). This introduces a statutory requirement for cooperation, so a 
useful notion to consider is the degree to which relationship between those 
stakeholders is characterised by congruence – a relationship built upon 
mutual trust, cooperative working and reciprocity or dissonance – a 
relationship built upon mutual distrust, little to no cooperative working and a 
unilateral relationship or breakdown of cooperative working.  
 
4.5.4. Institutional Contexts and Network Dynamics 
 
 
Thus far we have theorised the way in which entrepreneurs can navigate 
policy networks. However, much in the same way as actor preferences, 
appropriate behaviour, paths (not) taken and ideas are informed by 
institutional rules and practices, the dynamics of networks (i.e. the perceived 
resourcefulness of actors and the nature of resource dependencies and 
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exchange and the patterns of behaviour amongst network actors) are 
themselves influenced by this external institutional context. We must remain 
focused on the interdependencies that exist between network dynamics, 
policy entrepreneurs and institutional contexts. For example, as Toke 
suggests, ‘the resources of network members may be increased simply 
because the policy context increases the importance of the policy objectives 
with which a particular interest group is most concerned’ (Toke 2001, p. 770). 
Particular legislative changes nationally, for example, may shift the balance of 
power towards or away from housing developers. Marsh and Smith suggest 
that ‘in order to understand how networks affect outcomes, we also need to 
recognize that there is a dialectical relationship between the network and the 
broader context within which it is located’ (2000, p. 7). Although they are 
important in linking problems to solutions, agents do so within particular 
temporal, spatial and institutional contexts. The resources of actors and the 
degree to which they are depended upon are influenced by how those 
contexts change. Toke (2010, p. 765) argues that ‘changing resource 
distributions among actors can help explain policy outcomes’ but that 
‘changing resource distributions may be associated with changes in policy 
context’. These changing external contexts can influence actor preferences, 
their resourcefulness and the perceived or actual worth of those resources by 
other actors. Any model of local environmental policy capacity should seek 
not just to map the range of actors, interests, resources and dependencies but 
also relate these to a broader institutional context as discussed above.  
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4.5.5.	Political	Parties,	Political	Dynamics	and	Expertise			
Thus far we have investigated the constraining and enabling effects of 
institutions, the way that entrepreneurs confront and negotiate them and how 
those entrepreneurs fit within prevailing and emerging policy networks. 
However, an important dynamic to consider is the influence of local politics 
and local political parties. There is a balance to strike, as we saw briefly 
above and will see in more detail in section 5.1., between the theoretical 
parsimony of extant conceptual models and the adaptability that is often 
required for effective social and political analysis.  Anything that may ground 
the model in too specific a context may only serve to inhibit its applicability to 
other contexts. Thus, one could situate political parties as an independent 
causal force within the model of local environmental policy capacity, but to do 
so would ignore that different party-political systems prevail across different 
contexts. Given that one of the contributions of this thesis is to develop a 
model of local environmental policy capacity that is applicable beyond the 
case of sustainable housing, this kind of flexibility and adaptivity matters.  
 
As such, local political dynamics and the influence of political parties is 
captured through the idea of resource exchange and network dynamics 
(particularly the idea of political dissonance and congruence – see section 
4.5.3.) Local political actors are network actors in their own right, with their 
own resources (for example they may hold the balance of power, may be the 
ruling party, may hold key portfolios in the cabinet and so on – see section 
4.5.) and their involvement is reflected through these dynamics. 
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Understanding them as network actors – in the same way as industry groups 
or policy entrepreneurs are – allows us to understand their resourcefulness, 
the extent to which those resources are depended upon by others and how 
they relate to, interact with, and depend upon other actors in the network.   
 
The same is also true of experts and expertise. Individuals may serve as 
experts, whether in political parties or elsewhere, such that one might wonder 
how they relate to policy entrepreneurs. Certainly, those with technical 
knowledge can be policy entrepreneurs, but only when there is clear evidence 
that they have actively sought policy change, as per the definition offered in 
section 4.3. However, if they aren’t in pursuit of policy change they may 
instead simply be resources that the council can deploy in pursuit of CSH 
targets, for example: technical knowledge and expertise is useful in 
counteracting developer opposition to the inclusion of sustainable construction 
targets; similarly, it is useful when drafting and implementing sustainable 
construction policy. It thus serves as an informational resource for local policy 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Including the influence of political party dynamics and expertise in these less 
obvious ways reflected the desire to keep the model adaptive and thus flexible 
in the context of this research, and flexible in the context of application in 
other policy or geographical settings.  	--		
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One final component of the model of local environmental policy capacity are 
economic framework conditions, which can influence network dynamics, 
institutional contexts (although institutional contexts can also influence 
economic conditions) and thus the scope and permissibility of policy 
entrepreneurship and, ultimately, contributions to EM.  
 
4.6. Economic Framework Conditions 
 
 
As we saw chapter two, the literature on ecological modernization has tended 
to focus heavily on the role that economic conditions play as determinants of 
ecologically directed change. The dual notions of ecologizing the economy 
and economizing ecology are used to explain why industry may begin to form 
decisions on the basis of economic and ecological rationale. A central tenet of 
any ecologically modern approach to environmental governance is the extent 
to which the costs associated with a particular course of environmental 
stewardship can co-exist with a more immediate concern with profitability, 
economic prosperity and growth (Mol 1995, Mol and Sonnonfeld 2000). More 
technically, EM theorists talk of the necessary congruence of economic and 
ecological rationality if growth is to be decoupled from environmental 
degradation (Mol 1996).  
 
This emphasis on economic conditions continued in Jänicke’s model of 
environmental policy capacity, where he argued that ‘the structure of 
[environmental problems] as well as the capacity to respond to them is 
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strongly influenced by economic performance’ (Janicke 1997, p. 4). However, 
both within that model and the one developed here economic conditions has a 
dual effect, influenced by the extent to which the policies adopted locally as a 
result of those contributions have an economic impact – whether direct or 
indirect – and also the extent to which strong economic performance is 
included as a specific condition in any devolution terms.  
 
Strong economic performance in this context is defined as the extent to which 
the costs associated with particular policies can be reconciled with the 
existing political economy. In other words, the extent to which economic and 
ecological rationality can exist in a positive-sum relationship. Ecological 
modernisation, as we saw in earlier chapters, is contingent upon decisions 
being made increasingly on the basis of economic, political, social and 
ecological concern. What that means in this context is that when seeking to 
account for contributions to EM by local government sensitivity is needed to 
the direct and indirect costs associated with the policies they put in place in 
doing so (see Table 8.1 below for examples of each). The extent to which 
economic performance of a local authority becomes problematic in terms of 
affecting contributions is a product of these direct and indirect costs and, more 
specifically, the extent to which they can be incorporated into the existing 
political economy.  
 
Direct Costs Indirect Costs 
• Policy design costs  
o e.g. evidence gathering 
• Industry compliance costs 
o e.g. production costs 
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underpinning a new local 
planning policy  
• Procurement costs 
o e.g.  buying a new zero-
emissions council vehicle 
fleet 
• Monitoring costs 
o e.g. training building 
control officers to ensure 
compliance with a new 
building standard. 
 
associated with meeting a 
zero-carbon homes 
standard. 
• Consumer costs 
o e.g. change in values of 
houses near a new 
neighbourhood recycling 
plant, or the rise in 
domestic energy costs 
associated with renewable 
energy subsidies.  
Table 4.5: Direct and Indirect Supplementary Standard Costs 
 
Different levels of economic performance may work to both enable and 
constrain behaviour, suggesting a strong link between economic performance, 
institutional factors, network dynamics and agency. Different institutional rules 
and practices can affect the extent to which these costs can be incorporated 
and the extent to which particular economic conditions prevail. Existing rules 
can exacerbate housing shortages, for example, and new ones can alleviate 
them, particular practices encourage cross border working to alleviate housing 
shortages, existing green-belt policies can influence house prices, and so on.  
 
As we saw in the previous section, networks can have institutionalizing effects, 
where they constrain and enable behaviour by affecting the distribution of 
powers, interests, and identities of (and the dynamic of interaction between) 
network actors. Network composition and dynamics (conceptualized in terms 
of resource exchange and dependency) can influence the perception of 
economic conditions by actors. This interdependency of institutions, agents, 
networks and economic tells us that we should avoid an overly deterministic 
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focus on economic conditions (a tendency within some EM research; 
McLaughlin 2012) as a condition for contributions to EM.  
 
Whilst strong economic performance may be a necessary condition for action 
– where such action has an economic impact – it is likely not to be a sufficient 
condition. Although a base-line of economic strength matters where economic 
performance is a condition for local contributions (where, say, the embrace of 
devolved powers are conditional upon specific economic conditions), the 
effect it has on outcomes is likely to be more nuanced; the effect depends on 
the extent to which the economic impact of any contributions can be mitigated 
given prevailing economic circumstances, which in part depends on 
institutional and agential contexts. What this means is that similar economic 
contexts can be interpreted differently by actors in different contexts, such that 
outcomes differ dramatically.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter a theory of local environmental policy capacity has been 
developed, in response to shortcomings of EMT to account for the 
contributions local authorities make to processes of EM. This is presented 
diagrammatically again in Figure 4.2, for reference.  It draws on a range of 
different theoretical positions, which are used in a process of ‘synthesis’, 
where insights from multiple theories are ‘combined to produce a single theory’ 
to provide a heuristic lens through which to explain outcomes (Cairney 2013, 
*$"!
p. 2). It draws insight from a range of approaches: new theories of 
institutionalism, theories of network governance and theories of 
entrepreneurship and policy championship. The role of economic conditions is 
also considered. Agents acting as policy entrepreneurs and policy champions 
are the driving force behind any attempts by local government to contribute to 
processes of EM. They are constrained by economic conditions, institutional 
rules and norms and network dynamics. The former are largely outside of 
their control, but the latter are influenced by their behaviour.  
 
Figure 4.2: A Model of Environmental Policy Capacity 
 
A headline statement summarising this model would be that contributions to 
EM are driven by policy entrepreneurs who are constrained by institutional 
rules and practices (and institutional synchronicity), network dynamics and 
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economic conditions. However, there are additional layers of complexity given 
that entrepreneurs and network actors can influence the institutional 
landscape (thus requiring us to think in terms of a dialectical relationship 
between institutions and agents). Policy entrepreneurs channel pro-
environment interests through policy networks, which are governed by internal 
resource dynamics and institutional framework conditions. Institutional 
framework conditions also structure the range of permissible and acceptable 
behaviour and the scope for purposive institutional design (and thus change), 
whether through altering preferences, restricting choices, affecting logics of 
appropriateness or the ideational construction of reality, or by enabling or 
constraining particular behaviour through processes of synchronicity. 
Economic conditions can act both to enable or to constrain behaviour, but the 
extent to which they do depends on the composition of networks, prevailing 
and emerging institutional rules and the skill of entrepreneurs to navigate that 
environment.   
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Chapter Five:  
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The need for greater consideration of the role that local government plays in 
processes of EM was established in Section 2.4, where it was argued that a 
fifth phase of EM research that focuses on the dynamics of local contributions 
is needed. Section 3.3. situated changes to the residential housing sector as 
an example of EM where local governments appeared to act as contributors. 
As outlined in Section 2.5. this thesis is exploratory in nature and is geared 
towards generating a theoretical account for local contributions to processes 
of EM. To recap, the two research questions that stemmed from these 
observations were:  
 
1. What is the nature of the contributions that English local authorities make in 
pursuit of ecological protection and sustainability in the residential housing 
sector? 
1.a. How, if at all, has the nature of these contributions changed over 
time? 
1.b. How widespread have the contributions of local authorities been in 
this regard? 
1. c. How much commonality and variance has there been in such 
contributions? 
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2. How can we account for any differences in the contributions that local 
government make?  
 
This chapter outlines the methodological choices made that guided attempts 
to answer these questions. It describes the justification for and construction of 
a mixed-methodological approach that relies first upon the construction of a 
dataset that charts local contributions to EM in this case (in pursuit of an 
answer to research question 1) as well as two in-depth case studies (in 
pursuit of an answer to question 2). These case studies were supplemented 
by a binomial regression analysis, designed to introduce an element of rigour 
but also a degree of triangulation. The details of all of these stages form the 
basis of the chapter.   
 
The first section discusses mixed-methodological approaches, including how 
and why they are deployed here. The second discusses the official 
documents, reports and extant literature that were used to answer question 
one. The third section discusses the practicalities involved in constructing a 
dataset of local contributions to EM. The fourth section discusses the use of 
regression analyses. It is in this section that discussions over the definition of 
‘differences in contribution’ as used in the above research questions are 
explored. The fifth section introduces the case study methodology deployed 
here, including its appropriateness for a study of this sort, the links between 
the various other methodological elements, case-selection strategies, issues 
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of reliability and validity and more practical considerations involved in their 
execution.  
 
This theory was developed using an adaptive approach to theorising, whereby 
extant theoretical material is employed jointly with emergent data obtained in 
the course of the research. Such working ‘ensures that extant or prior 
concepts and theory both shape and inform the analysis of data which 
emanates from on-going research at the very same time that the emergent 
data itself shapes and moulds the existing theoretical materials’ (Layder 1998, 
p. 166). This kind of ‘adaptive theoretical’ approach (c.f. Layder 1998) is 
useful in exploratory research geared towards theory development given that 
it draws upon the strengths of both inductive and deductive approaches, 
whilst recognising their respective limitations. In this sense it allows the 
researcher to situate themselves mid-way between grounded theory 
approaches (which approach data ‘blind’ in order to inductively derive 
theoretical explanations) (see Glaser and Strauss 2012) and purely deductive 
approaches (which test a priori hypotheses in order to evaluate a theory).  
 
It is also useful in case-study research, the dominant method employed in this 
study (see sections 5.4. and 5.6. below). Vennesson suggest that ‘case study 
research and process tracing presuppose the existence of theoretical 
frameworks’ and that ‘in many situations, researchers should keep in mind 
that they will have to contribute to this theoretical endeavour themselves. Off-
the-shelf theories are likely to be either lacking completely, or inadequate to 
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the task’ (Vennesson 2008, pp. 236–237). In sum, the researcher needs to 
ask ‘how can I show my readers that I did not impose my favoured theory as 
the explanation?’  
 
Adaptive approaches provide some countenance to this by requiring the 
researcher to remain sensitive to emergent findings and explanations. In the 
context of this adaptive approach case studies are useful for driving new 
hypotheses (Bryman, 2006: George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2003). In the 
adaptive approach, orienting concepts are used to direct the initial stages of 
the research, but they are sufficiently adaptable to provide flexibility. These 
orienting concepts are drawn from the theoretical work in the early stages of 
the thesis together with the findings from the quantitative stage of the 
research, as well as through an on-going process of reflection in the course of 
the qualitative work. The result is a coding strategy that is both theoretically 
informed, but not completely tied down to a pre-existing theory in a way that 
may jeopardise important factors not previously considered.  
 
Qualitative case-studies are less focused on the operationalization of 
variables in the way we see with variable oriented research and more on 
constructing a theoretically informed explanation of the events in a particular 
case as a means to assess the predictive capacity of a theory. Whereas 
variable oriented research is concerned with elucidating the causal influence 
of particular variables on an outcome, theory oriented research ‘seeks to 
understand complex units’ (Della Porta 2008, p. 198). Thus, this research 
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eschews a focus on hypotheses in the conventional sense, favouring an 
emphasis instead on using theoretical propositions and positions to uncover 
particular mechanisms not in order to ‘prove’ or ‘falsify’ a particular statement, 
but instead in an attempt to provide a thick, rich and theoretically informed 
explanation.  
 
Epistemologically, this approach therefore rests upon an assumption that our 
knowledge of an objective world is necessarily subjective and interpretive 
such that often there is no one ‘truth’ about why things occur the way they do, 
instead we use theory to provide a particular interpretation of it that relies 
upon the sum of our theoretical understanding of a particular phenomenon. 
For that reason the ‘end point’ of the research is reached when a complete 
enough picture is obtained to adequately explain the particular phenomenon 
from a particular theoretical perspective. This theoretical saturation marks the 
point at which subsequent data-collection yields no new insights.  
 
5.2. Mixed Methods 
  
Research question number two asks how we can account for variations in the 
contributions that local governments make to the EM of residential housing. 
The theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter guides the 
analysis, in line with an understand of theory as ‘a set of analytical principles 
designed to structure our observation and explanations of the world’ (Cairney 
2013, p. 5) rather than as the source ‘testable’ hypotheses. Theory 
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understood in this sense is a guiding mechanism, and the decisions taken 
over methods were done so in order to be able to tease out the most 
appropriate, reliable data such that theory could be deployed in this way.  
 
It was decided early on that a mixed-methodological approach would be 
taken, given that it allows the ‘best of both worlds’ when it comes to deploying 
different methodological tools. It was clear that the dataset could be more fully 
exploited by situating it within a mixed-methodology and that doing so would 
increase the rigidity of the approach taken to answer question 2.  
 
Employing mixed-methods brings a number of immediate advantages First, it 
allows for the convergence or confirmation of findings obtained using different 
methods. This kind of triangulation – ‘the development of converging lines of 
inquiry’ (Yin, 2003, 98) – is an important objective as it allows the researcher 
to demonstrate that conclusions ‘are not due simply to an artefact or invalidity 
associated with a particular method’ (Morgan, 1998, 365). Findings can be 
corroborated by the systematic collection of information from multiple sources 
concerning the same fact or phenomenon. Second it allows findings to be 
complemented by alternative data sources. For example, as we will see below 
the regression analysis used to aid case selection showed a weak association 
between economic framework conditions and the incorporation of CSH 
targets. The case studies that follow provide an opportunity to interrogate that 
association more closely, uncovering nuance and hidden detail that cannot be 
captured quantitatively.  
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There are four ways of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
visualised in Table 5.1 below, which broadly reflect the priority given to either 
and the sequence in which they are carried out. This study will follow a 
quantitative preliminary design, outlined in the top right quadrant.  
 
Qualitative Preliminary Quantitative Preliminary 
A smaller quantitative study guides 
data-collection for a principally 
quantitative study. Used to generate 
hypotheses, develop context for 
questionnaires, etc.  
A smaller quantitative study guides 
the data collection for a principally 
qualitative study. It can be used to 
guide sampling, establish preliminary 
results to pursue in depth, etc.  
Qualitative Follow-up Quantitative Follow-up 
A smaller qualitative study helps 
evaluate and interpret results from a 
quantitative study. It can be use d to 
provide interpretation for poorly 
understood quantitative results.  
A smaller quantitative study helps to 
evaluate and interpret results from a 
principally qualitative study. It can be 
used to generalize to different 
samples or test emerging theories.  
 
Table 5.1: Strategies for Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research Designs  	
Source: Adapted from Yin 2003, p. 24 
 
 
In this design, quantitative study preceded qualitative. In other words, the 
case study was guided in part by the quantitative analysis. This allows those 
elements of the theoretical model that lend themselves to quantification and 
statistical operationalization to be studied in a more rigorous manner than is 
the case within case studies. Indeed, Bryman (2006, pp. 609–613) suggests 
that mixed-methods can be employed to explain or illustrate findings in more 
detail and tackle different research questions with the most applicable 
techniques, all in order to increase the ‘completeness’ of the research. 
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The classic example is a preliminary survey or census of a field setting either 
to guide the selection of sites and informants or to provide a context for 
understanding the contacts that one does make. Preliminary quantitative 
results can also help to focus the analysis of large amounts of qualitative 
data. For example, if tabulations from a preliminary survey reveal interesting 
patterns of association, a detailed qualitative analysis can provide a much 
richer understanding of why these patterns exist or how they operate’ 
(Morgan, 2008: 369).  
 
The rigid divide placed between qualitative and quantitative methods in social 
research often reflects little more than a deterministic rejection of one or the 
other on the basis of entrenched epistemological or ontological differences 
about the nature of social research and the role of the researcher in the social 
world (Layder, 1998). Researchers are often encouraged to adopt either 
quantitative or qualitative methods when conducting research, but in doing so 
there is an explicit rejection of their respective merits and drawbacks (Bryman, 
2006). This is often framed as an ontological or epistemological argument: 
quantitative methods are more amenable to positivists attempting to 
objectively model and account for a world ‘out there’ in the objective 
ontological sense in a way that eschews interpretation in favour of scientific 
rationalism (and thus subscribes to an objective epistemological outlook). 
Qualitative methods are traditionally the preserved of those with a relativist 
ontological outlook, where the world we research does not exist independent 
of our interaction with it, and a subjective epistemology, where our 
understanding of that world is only ever partial and always incomplete.  
 
However, to presuppose that reality is understood with reference to one 
ontological approach alone is to misunderstand the variegation of social 
reality and the subsequent need for ontological plurality. The common 
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argument against the mixing of methods is that because they are associated 
with different paradigms, an irreconcilable epistemological conflict exists if 
they are combined in the same study (Bryman, 2006; 2008, Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It is often argued that the different assumptions 
underpinning these ontological and epistemological positions about what 
constitutes the social world and how we can attempt to make sense of the 
social world inform different methodological approaches and that ‘the kinds of 
information they produce are often incommensurate’ (Morgan, 1998: 363). 
However, there is a difference though between attempting to bridge two 
different paradigms and combining methods with a sensitivity to the 
paradigmatic stance that underpins the research project, because:  
[i]f a particular paradigmatic stance provides the framework for a project, then 
the selection of an appropriate method or combination of methods does 
become a largely technical task (ibid).    	
Often the distinction then is more empirical that philosophical, a question of 
what tools can best be employed in order to understand a particular 
phenomenon or answer a particular question. In this sense mixed-methods is 
employed here because it allowed a choice of the ‘best tools for the job’.  
 
Thinking in this way forces the researcher to recognise the respective merits 
of both qualitative and quantitative methods (and, crucially, the respective 
flaws) such that they can be employed as and when necessary in order to 
bolster the rigour of the study. The point to stress is that mixed methods are 
used in this study to tease out different elements of a social world that is 
stratified (in the sense that different aspects of it lend themselves to 
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quantification and observation in different ways, requiring different tools). 
Each method has its own advantages for representing different aspects of that 
stratified world. Therefore mixed-methods are used under the same 
paradigmatic umbrella rather than across two (competing) paradigms. There 
are elements of the social world that are more amenable to quantification in 
the positivist sense with others that require a more interpretive stance. Mixed 
methods provide a useful toolkit for this realist epistemology.  
 
Why not employ an exclusively quantitative approach? Quantitative 
approaches are most beneficial – and reliable – when the indicators deployed 
accurately represent the concepts that they are intended to represent. The 
difficultly of choosing appropriate proxy measures of concepts is a factor that 
can undermine the power of quantitative work, especially where the concept-
indicator link is necessarily tenuous (such as where inherently subjective 
concepts are being measured). Quantifying economic growth, for example, is 
more straightforward than quantifying cultural norms.  
 
When it came to what elements of the theoretical model to put forward for 
quantitative analysis the choice was clear. As discussed above, it is often 
difficult to understand the importance of economic conditions in explaining 
outcomes directed at EM. Expanding the dataset discussed in section 5.4. to 
include a range of economic indicators would allow quantitative analysis of the 
influence of economics on particular outcomes in this context in a way that will 
rigorously explore this claim. 
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Those elements of the theoretical model that do not lend themselves to 
quantification are explored through case study.  
 
Attention now turns to discussing both of these methods in detail.  
 
5.3. Accounting for Local Contributions: The Use of Official 
Reports and Extant Literature 
 
 
As we have seen, our understanding of local government in the context of 
sustainable housing is under-developed, so a necessary degree of 
background work needed to be conducted, primarily in order to gauge the 
‘who’ and ‘what’ of the policy area. This is necessary in pursuit of answer to 
research question number one, which asks what role local authorities have 
played in the EM of residential housing, and paves the way for case study in 
pursuit of an answer to research question number two. 
 
Documents were mainly sourced from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government, which is responsible for national Building Regulations, the 
governance of local and regional planning policy and the zero-carbon homes 
policy agenda. These were available freely online. Previous work on the 
national-level zero-carbon homes policy was used to gain an initial foothold on 
the relevant documentation (see Osmani and O’Reilly 2009, McManus et al. 
2010, Goodchild and Walshaw 2011, Pan and Garmston 2012, Paul 2013, 
Rydin 2013b, Greenwood 2015, Heffernan et al. 2015). It became clear at an 
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early stage that all the information needed to answer this question was 
contained in the handful of documents that launched major policy 
announcements concerning both the zero-carbon homes agenda and the role 
of local authorities within it (namely DCLG 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2014a, HM 
Treasury 2015). This avoided a considerable amount of time being spent 
looking for a metaphorical needle. Having said that there were a number of 
conditions around which this documentary trawl was premised; documents 
post-2006 would be obtained, given that this is the birth of the zero-carbon 
agenda as a whole, with a cut off at July 2015, which signalled the end of the 
zero-carbon homes policy agenda. Only official government documents would 
be obtained, although peripheral sources would be used (such as think tanks, 
academic literature or industry groups) in order to clarify or elucidate findings 
contained therein.  
 
5.4. Quantifying Local Contributions: Constructing a Dataset 
 
 
Question 1.b. asks how many local authorities made contributions to the EM 
process. This necessarily had to precede the work used to answer question 1, 
given the unknowns about the nature of local contributions. In some ways the 
answer to this question will be useful in its own right, as an assessment of the 
local receptiveness to the CSH, but in others it is a necessary step to 
undertake in order to fully address research question number 2 proper.  
 
	156	
For these reason a dataset was constructed. As we will see in more detail in 
the following chapter, local authorities contribute to the EM of residential 
housing primarily through introducing Code for Sustainable Homes targets 
into their local planning policy documents. For that reason, an assessment of 
which local authorities had introduced such requirements is a straightforward 
way of quantifying local contributions in this case.  
 
Local authorities are required to make their local planning policies20 publicly 
available, a requirement which most fulfil by making them available online. 
Between January and March 2014 copies of these planning policies 
(embodied variously in Local Plans or Core Strategies21) were downloaded 
and read for their sustainable construction policies (if any). The layout of 
these documents makes such references easy to find, typically contained in a 
section on ‘the environment’ or ‘sustainability’. However, for completeness a 
number keyword searches were also carried out for ‘sustainable homes’, 
‘sustainability’, ‘zero-carbon’, ‘zero-carbon homes’, ‘the Code for Sustainable 
Homes’, ‘energy efficient’ and ‘energy efficiency’.  
 
If any relevant policies were discovered the details were collected and 
tabulated into an SPSS dataset. A number of data-points were included: what 
CSH levels were required in different years (from 2006 – the beginning of the 
devolution of discretionary powers – through to 2016 (the theoretical end of 
the zero-carbon homes agenda)); whether a minimum development size was 																																																									
20 See section 3.4 
21  See section 3.4 
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required for those levels to become mandatory; and whether the local 
planning policy had been formally adopted or was still in draft form22 (and if 
relevant, what stage of the drafting process). These data-points were chosen 
because they represent the full scope of choice available to a local authority in 
this context, as we will see in Section 6.2.  
 
An example of how this would look in the database is provided below in Table 
5.2. A link to the complete dataset can be found in Appendix iii. 
 
Authority 
Name 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Stage Min. 
Size 
Authority X 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 4 4 4 6 Adopted. 10 
Table 5.2: Example Database Entry 
 
In this fictional example the local authority x requires Code level 3 between 
2010 to 2012, after which Level 4 becomes mandatory until 2015. Level 6 
applies thereafter. These requirements apply to all developments of 10 or 
more houses and the plan has been formally adopted.  
 
Information was available for 261 out of 326 local authorities, with the 
remainder excluded from any further analysis for a number of reasons; most 
typical reasons for exclusion were because of difficulty accessing or retrieving 
																																																									
22 As before, these terms are described in detail in Section 4.3 of the next chapter. 
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data in an up-to-date format. Nevertheless, a sample of 261 is more than 
adequate (Bryman 2008, p. 310)23.  
 
5.5. Binomial Regression Analysis As A Quantitative Preliminary 
 
Binomial regression analysis is deployed in the quantitative stage of the 
research. Binomial logistical regression analysis can be used to understand 
the relationships and associations between ordinal dependent variables in 
order to predict outcomes or, rather, to calculate the percentage of outcomes 
on the dependent variable that can be predicted using the independent 
variables included in the regression model (Haggett and Toke 2006, p. 105). It 
is used when there is a dichotomous dependent variable and more than one 
independent variable (measured on either a continuous, nominal or ordinal 
scale). It was chosen because it is a widely used tool for analysts attempting 
to predict outcomes and uncover associations, as is the case here. Notice the 
emphasis placed on association rather than causation; as Haggett and Toke 
state: 
‘Causation implies that a variable drives the outcome. This is philosophically 
unsupportable, illustrated by the frequently cited tale of ice cream sales and 
sunstroke. Ice cream sales and cases of sunstroke increase at the same 
time, but nobody claims that one ‘causes’ or significantly influences the other’ 
(Haggett and Toke 2006, p. 105) 
 
Given the centrality of economic framework conditions to the model of local 
environmental policy capacity it was useful to incorporate a quantitative 																																																									
23 Having said that, a pitfall of the approach deployed here is the issue of implementation; the proposed method is 
concerned solely with the design and adoption of policies, with no consideration given to whether those policies are 
implemented over time. Without significantly impacting the resources available to conduct this study there was no 
practical way to incorporate this focus in the analysis.  	
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analysis that focused on the relationship between economic conditions and 
variations in contributions. Economic framework conditions are deemed 
central to sustainable construction in particular and EM in general. PPS1, 
Building a Greener Future and the NPPF, as we saw above, placed a strong 
emphasis on the viability of any supplementary standards, so it would follow 
that indicators of (un)viability would serve as a useful starting point in 
understand the factors that can account for variations in contributions by local 
authorities. As we saw in chapter two, ecological modernisation theory places 
economic rationality at the heart of attempts to explain outcomes – particularly 
when focusing on private sector contributions to EM. By exploring the 
relationship between variations in contributions by local authorities and a 
number of relevant economic indicators we can assess whether this centrality 
is appropriate in the local context.  
 
The definition of viability embodied in the NPPF was used as a guide for the 
variables to include in the analysis. There a development is said to be viable 
where ‘competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to 
enable the development to be deliverable’ exist (DCLG 2012a, p. 41). 
Measures of viability so conceived were deemed to broadly coalesce around 
indicators of housing market strength and growth. A stumbling block was the 
availability of information that could be used to measure such conditions at 
the level of local government. Data was obtained primarily from the Office for 
National Statistics and the 2011 Census, the two most comprehensive and 
readily available datasets that cover this level of detail and which focus on the 
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variables of interest. Of the data available a number of indicators were found 
that could be used as indicators of housing market strength and growth. 
These were: the mean volume of house building per annum, measured 
between 2006 and 2013 (DCLG 2012b); the percentage population change 
per annum between 2006 and 2011 (ONS 2014); the percentage house price 
change per annum between 2006 and 2012 (Hometrack 2015). Different date 
ranges here reflect differences in the availability of up-to-date information24.  
 
One issue that needed attention was the way to conceptualize (and measure) 
‘variations in contributions’ that local governments make, as research 
question 2 asks. This is the case for both the regression analysis itself but 
also the case study. Understanding what is meant by variation is crucial if an 
effective analysis is to be undertaken. As briefly discussed above and 
discussed in depth in chapter six, local governments contribute in the zero-
carbon homes agenda by setting Code for Sustainable Homes standards that 
supersede sustainable construction standards that have emerged nationally 
(see section 3.4 in particular). For that reason the dependent variable in the 
regression analyses is a binary distinction between those local authorities that 
have incorporated (or attempted to incorporate) sustainable construction 
standards against those who have not. Such a distinction can be made from 
the dataset constructed in order to answer research question 1.b.; those local 
authorities that have indicated Code policies in a draft or adopted version of 																																																									
24 At the outset of the study it was assumed that a range of other economic variables could be included in the 
analysis, such as average salaries, but a lack of complete information at this local scale frustrated this ambition. The 
variables selected represent a compromise of sorts; the analysis strives to achieve the balance analytical rigor and 
reliability.  
	161	
their local planning policy were considered examples of the former, whereas 
those who have failed to were considered examples of the latter.  
 
Within the rest of the study the idea of ‘variations in contributions’, as outlined 
in the research questions, is understood to refer to the extent to which Code 
policies have been introduced or not, or whether attempts have been made to 
introduce them. On the one extreme will be those who have introduced the 
highest levels of the Code, whilst on the other are those who have made no 
effort to introduce Code standards. In between will be a range of local 
authorities that have introduced middling Code targets, or those who have 
tried but failed to introduce Code targets. 
 
The decision to also include those who have yet to have their plans formally 
approved could be seen to be problematic, given that during the course of the 
research the local authority may either subsequently lose supplementary 
powers, have their plan rejected outright or have the CSH policy specifically 
rejected25. Nevertheless such a criticism is misplaced, because if anything the 
structural, institutional, network or agential dynamics of such a process may if 
anything yield more nuanced findings than those where a local authority 
experienced plain sailing. Challenges, setbacks, opposition and resilience 
provide a more detailed exposition of the local politics of EM.  
 
																																																									
25 As it turns out the latter of these two did occur in Cambridge City Council, the case finally selected to represent a 
more successful authority (and discussed in chapter seven).  
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On this basis three hypotheses were developed that would guide the 
regression analysis: 
 
1. Local authorities with high percentage house price change per annum are 
more likely to have adopted or attempted to adopt supplementary CSH 
standards.  
2. Local authorities with a high volume of house building per annum are more 
likely to have adopted or attempted to adopt supplementary CSH standards. 
3. Local authorities with high percentage levels of population change per annum 
are more likely to have adopted or attempted to adopt supplementary CSH 
standards. 
 
High house price change, high volume of house building and high 
percentages of population change are thought to be associated with an 
increased likelihood in adopting supplementary CSH standards because they 
are all indicative of a buoyant, profitable market for construction. Given the 
emphasis on growth-dependency within planning in England (as discussed in 
chapter three) and the centrality of economic rationality to processes of 
ecological modernisation (discussed in chapter two) – especially where such 
processes are ‘weak’ (see chapter three) – such buoyancy is understood to 
be integral.  
 
The use of binomial logistical regression rests upon the assumption that a 
number of conditions be met: independence of cases; a linear relationship 
between the continuous independent variables and the dependent variable; at 
least 15 cases; no significant outliers; and mutually exclusive categories. All 
conditions were met here. The data collected for each data-point was recoded 
into three ordinal categories (low or negative, medium and high). This was 
done in SPSS using the ‘recode’ feature and was achieved using average 
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figures, ranking each case on the basis of where it relates to the mean value. 
This is done for two reasons; it limits the distortive power of outliers and 
extreme values and it is an efficient way to measure and define ‘low’ values 
as expressed in the hypotheses. Within the analysis a significance level of 5 
percent  (p<0.05) or less is sought. This represents the likelihood that the 
association occurred by chance through random fluctuations.  
 
The findings from this regression analysis would serve two purposes. On the 
one hand it will allow us to understand the extent to which economic 
framework conditions can account for variations in contributions by local 
authorities to the EM process in this case. On the other it will provide a 
springboard for comparative case-study, where these findings can be 
elucidated further.  
 
As we have seen, the CSH has built within it various ‘levels’ against which 
buildings can be rated. The question of why the significance of explanatory 
factors (economic conditions, etc) for setting requirements for different levels 
of the CSH (e.g. the difference between adoption of levels 3 and 4) was not 
explored needs to be addressed. There were three practical barriers standing 
in the way of this kind of analysis. First, it would have proved too difficult to 
account for the changing nature of policies adopted. As we will see, a large 
number of local authorities introduced ‘tracking’ Code standards that 
increased in stringency over time. It would be difficult to account for this and 
to be sure that any proposed increases over time were actually to be met. 
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Second, it would have been difficult to distinguish between those who adopted 
the Code wholesale and those who only required particular components of it. 
Third, as we have seen, local authorities often imposed a minimum 
development size, above which particular Code levels are required. It would 
have been too cumbersome to account for the different minimum qualifying 
development requirements adopted by each local authority. Some local 
authorities required Code on all their developments, some on developments 
of greater than 100, some greater than 10 and so on. It wasn’t clear how 
these differences could be explained. Indeed it was for these reasons that the 
dependent variable was ‘adoption’ of Code policies or ‘no adoption’.  
 
5.6. Comparative Case Study Methodology 
 
 
Case studies were chosen because they are the preferred strategy ‘when 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions being posed, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context’ (Yin 2003, p. 3). The term case here refers a 
‘phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically 
as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events’ (Vennesson 
2008, p. 226). Developments in the residential housing sector are treated as a 
single case of ecological modernisation. A case study is defined as 'a 
research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a 
small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each 
case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena by 
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developing and evaluating theoretical explanations’ (Vennesson 2008, p. 226) 
and can be broadly grouped into four types (Venesson 2008, pp. 227–228): 
descriptive, interpretive, hypothesis generating/refining, theory-evaluating. 
(227-228). This study uses the second type. The interpretive case study – 
also referred to as the disciplined configurative case study (see Yin 2003) –  
relies upon ‘the existence of middle-range theories that provide a set of 
hypotheses – sometimes even broad guidelines rather than clearly formulated 
hypotheses – which serve as a guide for the conduct of the research’ 
(Vennesson 2008, p. 237) for the purpose of evaluating or refining existing or 
emerging theories.  
 
More specifically, the work employs an embedded case study design, one 
where ‘the same case study involves more than one unit of analysis’ (Yin 
2003, p. 41).  An embedded case study is one where a meta-case is chosen 
as an overarching case of something (in this case local governments role in 
the EM of residential housing as an example of local government 
contributions to EM generally) with a further selection of cases that represent 
instances of that case. Yin (2003, p. 45) argues that ‘the evidence from 
multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust’. Such an embedded approach was 
chosen consciously to allow for a thorough application of the theoretical 
concepts developed in chapter four, which often rely upon micro-institutional 
processes that can only be elucidated with an eye towards analytical depth. 
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The use of a comparative case study methodology (where two or more cases 
are compared with one another in order to elucidate generalizable findings to  
a broader range of cases) certainly brings its own challenges (discussed 
below), but it increases the external validity and in doing so provides a 
rigorous basis from which to make generalizations that extend beyond the 
cases at hand.  
 
Questions such as research question 2, especially when viewed in the context 
of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, lend 
themselves well to in-depth, comparative case study for a number of reasons. 
First, this research is inherently explorative, so the luxury of selecting 
variables deductively for quantitative analysis is limited somewhat (indeed the 
ability to quantify aspects of the theoretical model extends barely beyond 
those chosen for the regression analysis) pointing us in the direction of a 
more qualitative approach that skirts the boundaries of induction and 
deduction.  Second, there is a necessary complexity inherent in the local 
policy-making arena that, together with the exploratory nature of this research, 
implies a level of nuance and richness that is beyond the means of a 
quantitative analysis. The aim of the research as it has been designed here 
has been to strike a balance between parsimony and rigour, ensuring that a 
sufficiently rigorous research design can provide reliable findings that are, to 
some extent, generalizable to a broader population of cases.  
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It must be said that the ability to generalize beyond the population is 
marginally limited by the move away from a deductive or quantitative 
approach in favour of case study - indeed one of the most sustained 
objections to the use of case studies is that they often offer limited scope to 
generalize findings to a broader population of cases in these ways (c.f. 
Flyvbjerg 2006, Ruddin 2006). However, it is important though to be sensitive 
to the nature of generalization within the case-study tradition. When case 
studies are employed (and particularly when they are used for the purposes of 
theoretical development, as is the case here) the emphasis is not on statistical 
generalization but on analytical generalization or, in other words, the extent to 
which theoretical findings can be transposed to broader populations:  
Case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the 
experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing a case study [the] 
goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and 
not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)’ (Yin, 2003: 11). 
 
Nevertheless, consideration must be given to the extent to which 
generalizations are possible with any given research design. There is a 
danger with improper design that whilst case-study findings may be useful in 
elucidating dynamics inherent to that case there may be limited opportunities 
to draw conclusions about other cases of the phenomenon under 
investigation. In comparative study such as this, this kind of limitation would 
fatally undermine the scope to reach any kinds of conclusions, let alone 
generalizable ones. Underpinning the methodological decision made in the 
course of the research and discussed below is a consideration for how this 
can be avoided. 
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5.6.1. Case Selection Strategies 
 
Two cases were chosen for this study – Oxford City Council and Cambridge 
City Council (more on this below). Two – rather than one, three or more – 
were chosen largely for two reasons. First, the exploratory nature of this 
research meant that little was known about the subject area prior to this study, 
necessitating qualitatively rich case studies. Second, resource constraints 
inherent in doctoral research (namely time and funding) meant efforts had to 
be concentrated in a small number of locations (Burnham 1997). Whist it may 
seem that narrowing the range of cases would impact our ability to 
generalizable to the broader population of local authorities, one effective way 
to ensure generalizability is by introducing a rigorous case selection strategy. 
 
Rigorous case study was fostered through the introduction of a the 
comparative element of this study, given that only then can different values on 
particular theoretical variables be assessed across a range of outcomes for 
the dependent variable. As Della Porta explains, ‘in many research designs, 
the choice of the comparative method is not just a second-best one imposed 
by the availability of data; rather, it is justified by its capacity to go beyond 
descriptive statistical measures, towards an in-depth understanding of 
historical processes and individual motivations’ (Della Porta 2008, p. 201).. 
The method ‘adopts the same logic as the statistical method, adapting it to 
those situations in which we deal with complex phenomena without the large 
number of cases necessary for a statistical analysis’ (Della Porta 2008, p. 
201). The benefit of this method is that although the level of control between 
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variables remains relatively low compared to pure-quantitative comparisons ‘it 
is often the only scientific method available for the study of macrodimensional, 
interdimensional and institutional processes’ (Della Porta 2008, p. 202 
emphasis added).  
 
Two strategies are most frequently employed in comparative case study 
design: most similar and most different research designs (George and 
Bennett 2005). A most similar comparative case study is one where the 
population of cases under investigation differ on the outcome of the 
dependent variable but are similar on a number of independent variables, 
allowing the researcher to say something to the relative influence of different 
independent variables. The most different design requires the selection of 
cases that are similar on the outcome of the dependent variable, but which 
have different values for a number of independent variables, similarly allowing 
for a number of conclusions on the relative influence of others.   
 
In this work a most-similar design was adopted, where the intention was to 
choose two cases that reflect a variance on the outcome of the dependent 
variable (i.e. the engagement with the zero-carbon homes agenda) but which 
shared similar values on a number of independent variables. It is important 
when investigating the factors that cause an outcome to be considerate to a 
range of outcomes on the dependent variable (Collier & Mahoney: 1996). 
Choosing cases for no other reason that their value on the dependent variable 
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is problematic and should be avoided, for fear of inserting a systematic bias 
into the study (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994): 
For example, if a scholar wishes to understand why certain countries 
experience high rates of economic growth, the relevant contrast space should 
include low-growth countries that serve as negative cases and consequently 
make it meaningful to characterize the initial set of countries as experiencing 
high growth…the assessment of explanations for high growth should 
therefore be concerned with the comparison set that includes these negative 
cases.  
(ibid, p.67) 
 
 
Geddes (1990) echoes this call for variance, suggesting that selecting only 
those cases which are ‘strong’ performers, for example cases A and B, allows 
the researcher to only see what factors those cases have in common. It is 
only when the researcher contrasts these findings with weak performers can 
she be confident in any conclusions she makes. Studying cases A and B 
alone, the researcher might find that factors X and Y are present and might 
conclude that it is those factors that lead to the strong performance. However, 
contrasting ‘strong’ cases A and B with ‘weak’ cases C and D, she finds that Y 
is present in all instances, thus ruling it out as a causal variable. However, she 
notes that X is not present in the weak cases C and D. This allows her to be 
more confident in a conclusion that X causes strong outcomes. If cases C and 
D were not included in the study and the researcher instead chose on the 
basis of the value of the dependent variable then the initial conclusion she 
made that X and Y were correlated with strong performance would be false.  
 
However, there was no prior knowledge of which local authorities were doing 
what with regards to sustainable residential housing, a stumbling block that 
undermined the extent to which most-similar cases could be chosen. George 
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and Bennett (2005) cite this as a common problem with this research design, 
as it is difficult at the beginning of the project to know what similar means in 
any given context and thus on what basis to compare. The emphasis on 
similarity necessitates a degree of a priori knowledge about the factors that 
contribute to a particular outcome in order to allow for a selection based upon 
a variance in the outcome of the dependent variable and similarity on a 
selection of independent variables.  
 
However, the purpose of this research is to begin a preliminary exploration of 
potentially influential independent variables. This presented the researcher 
with a paradox: the goal of the research is to provide insight into relevant 
independent variables, but the rigour and success of that research is 
dependent upon, in part, sufficient foreknowledge about relevant variables 
prior to the research. 
 
For that reason a more approximate case selection strategy was employed, 
one that sought to emulate the conditions of a most-similar design but which 
reflects the lack of a priori knowledge of potentially important causal variables 
in this case. This required selecting an initial case and offering an 
approximate comparison to sit alongside. In January 2013 three brief, informal 
telephone interviews were carried out with one industry representative, one 
academic and one local council officer with expertise in this area. Each was 
asked to suggest a candidate for an ‘exemplar’ local authority, defined as one 
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that has stood out for its attempts to increase the sustainability of residential 
housing in a way that supersedes the national strategy.  
 
In all three discussions Cambridge City Council was singled out as an 
exemplar case. This is confirmed by assessing the number of CSH Post-
Construction Certificates. These certificates are issues to a building post-
construction in order to certify that it has achieved a Code rating (although 
information is not available that specifies the levels at which these ratings 
were awarded), and are available on a quarterly basis from the Department 
for Communities and Local Government website (DCLG 2014b). Cambridge 
City Council issued 2,555 certificates between 2006 and 2014. When adjusted 
for the number of houses constructed, Cambridge City Council achieved the 
highest number of Code Certificates of any local authority outside London 
(London operates under a unique regulatory environment and is excluded 
from this study), and the fifth highest of any local authority (including London) 
nationally. A brief glance at its local planning policy indicated that at the time 
of this case selection decision it had had yet to fully adopt its local plan, which 
proposes a Code Level 4 requirement for all developments. Although a 
number of these Code certificates would be issued for developments, which 
choose to meet CSH standards voluntarily, it would indicate that the Council is 
managing to mandate CSH standards without a formal basis in law. Indeed, 
Cambridge City Council had been successful in introducing a number of site-
specific planning policies (known as ‘Area Action Plans’) in which Code 
targets were set (this is discussed in much greater detail in chapter 7).  
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Having established Cambridge City Council as an exemplar case, the 
challenge was to find a most-similar comparison. Reiterating the discussion 
above, this would necessarily have to be approximate.  
 
Ecological modernisation occurs where ecological protection becomes 
economically viable, so it follows that strong economic conditions lend 
themselves to a more amenable marriage between economy and ecology. 
Any comparative case would thus need to reflect the economic conditions 
prevalent in Cambridge. In this case, the most relevant indicators of economic 
strength are local house prices and percentage house price change. Also 
deemed relevant, though, was the overall level of construction, the overall 
population and whether the local authority was urban or rural. A rural, 
sparsely populated local authority that has low levels of construction and a 
depressed housing market cannot meaningfully be compared to a city like 
Cambridge, an urban, densely populated city with high levels of construction 
and a buoyant market. If such a comparison were to be made it wouldn’t be 
clear whether any differences in outcome on the dependent variable were the 
result of these innate differences. 
 
Cambridge City Council has some of the most expensive property prices of 
any local authority in the country. Average house prices between 2006 and 
2012 were £299,980 and changed 21% over the same period. (DCLG 2012b) 
The 2006-2012 average house price is 9 times average annual salary in the 
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City (DCLG 2012c). Cambridge City Council’s average population between 
2006 and 2012 was 119,41426 (ONS 2013) and between 2006-201327 it had 
constructed an average of 354 homes a year (ONS 2014).  
 
The most effective filtering device is average house prices, given the broad 
range across the country. Oxford City Council achieved similar levels of 
(un)affordability as Cambridge City Council; average house prices between 
2006 and 2012 in the authority were £328,625 – having changed 30.2% over 
the same period – which represents 9.1 times the average annual salary 
(DCLG 2012b, 2012c). Oxford City Council’s average population between the 
same period was 147,463 (ONS 2013) and between 2006 and 2013 it had 
constructed an average of 367 homes a year (ONS 2014). Importantly, only a 
limited number of Code certificates had been issued for developments in the 
area, at 655 between 2006 and 2013 (DCLG 2014b). What’s more, there was 
no indication from an initial glance at Oxford City Council’s planning policies 
that it had attempted to introduce Code targets, nor that it had introduced site-
specific requirements.  
   
Table 5.2. summarises these findings, as well as situating each case in 
relation to national average.  
 
 																																																									
26 Compared to the national average of 160,283 in the same period (ONS 2013) 
27 The differing date ranges (e.g. 2006-2012 vs. 2006-2013) reflects the availability and format of data. 2006 was 
chosen as a starting point because it was the year in which the zero-carbon homes agenda was launched. The upper 
limit was determined by the date of the data collection and analysis, aswell as data availability.  
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 Cambridge City 
Council 
Oxford City Council National Average 
Average House Prices 
(2006-2012) 
£299,980 £328,625 £224,488 
Average House Price 
Change (2006-2012) 
21% 30.2% 8.16% 
House Prices relative to 
Average Income 
9 times 9.1 times 8.01 times 
Average Population 
(2006-2012) 
119,414 147,463 160,283 
Average Annual House 
Build (2006-2013)  
354 367 381 
Code Certificates 2,555 650 1,071 
 
Table 5.3. Most Similar Case Selection Criteria: Cross Case Comparison 
 
 
On that basis, Cambridge City Council and Oxford City Councils are chosen 
as the two cases for in-depth case study, the former as an example of a local 
authority that has made strong inroads into embracing supplementary 
standard setting powers and the latter an example of a local authority that has 
made fewer inroads.  
5.6.2. Internal Validity  
 
Rigour in case selection is directed towards external validity, the extent to 
which we can have confidence that the conclusions reached in Oxford and 
Cambridge City Councils can be generalized to the broader population of local 
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authorities. Whilst always imperfect – for that is the nature of case study – the 
use of a most-similar design goes a long way to increasing reliability in this 
regard.  
 
Issues of internal validity were also considered in the research design. 
Internal validity refers to the extent to which we can have confidence in the 
findings from individual case studies – that is, whether the conclusions we 
reach (and which we seek to generalize) have been formed through rigorous, 
well-designed and consistent research. How can we know, in other words, 
that the research was ‘done well’ (Yin 2003, p. 33). Yin (Yin 2003, p. 33) 
suggests three measures that can increase the internal validity of case study: 
the use of  process tracing, interview schedules, and case study protocols. 
These three techniques were thus deployed in this study.  
 
5.6.3. Process tracing 
 
Within each case, process tracing was used in order to build up a picture of 
each case’s respective experiences using the aforementioned theoretical 
framework. Process tracing entails the researcher to assess a theory ‘by 
identifying the casual chain(s) that link the independent and dependent 
variables’ in order to ‘uncover the relations between possible causes and 
observed outcomes’ (Vennesson 2008, p. 231). Process tracing is often used 
in case studies technique to build up thick, rich description that is amenable to 
analysis (George and Bennett 2005, Collier 2011). Whilst necessarily 
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descriptive, it differs from mere storytelling in three ways. First, it is focused, 
dealing only with particular aspects of a case. Second, it is structured, in so 
much as the researcher uses a previously defined theoretical framework to 
guide analysis. Third, its goal is to provide a narrative to a causal path that 
links inputs to outputs (Vennesson 2008, p. 235). It has a natural synergy with 
the way that case study is approached in this study. Within this study the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter four is used as the analytical 
guide. So, the political process surrounding the sustainable homes agenda in 
each case is traced, but effort is made to elucidate the dynamics of each 
particular conceptual heading (rules, practices, economic conditions, and so 
on).  
5.6.4. Interview schedules & case study protocols 
 
A cross-section of actors who had knowledge or involvement in the 
sustainable homes agenda in each case was chosen for interview28. These 
include: local politicians (both active and retired), civil servants (again, both 
active and retired), local and national civil society and industry groups, 
national and local housing developers and local academics in the planning 
field with a knowledge of (or involvement in) the particular local policy 
process. These were chosen to represent the full range of perspectives on 
both the context and policy-making process relevant in the context of the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter two. Interviews were conducted in 
Cambridge between January 2014 and April 2015 and in Oxford between 																																																									
28 In some cases there was a crossover, with actors being involved or familiar with the agenda in both cases or at a 
national level. 
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November 2014 and June 2015. In total 25 interviews were conducted29. At 
the outset of the research there was no ‘set’ number of interviews, but instead 
interviews were conducted until a saturation point was reached, where the 
marginal returns of each interview approached zero. There were a small 
number of interviews that whilst deemed desirable (if not essential) were 
nevertheless not carried out because of a lack of cooperation from 
prospective respondents. Nonetheless, despite this a sufficiently broad range 
of opinions has been heard.  
 
The focus of the interviews was on recent developments in the area of 
sustainability in housing in each case. A pitfall of research into historical 
institutional processes is knowing how far back in time to focus attention. This 
is an empirical problem more than anything and for the purposes of the 
research here a clear link needed to be visible between present day and 
historical factors for the latter to be considered causally relevant. In all cases 
though the focus of attention rarely stretched further back than two decades30. 
 
On the whole interviews lasted between one and a half and three hours and 
were conducted on a semi-structured basis. Respondents were contacted by 
e-mail and were told the purpose of the research and their involvement within 
it. A series of scoping interviews was conducted in the first few months of 
																																																									
29 See Appendix ii for a breakdown of these interviews.  
30 This decision was made ‘in-use’; it became clear during the course of case study that beyond this point there was 
so little emphasis on sustainability in buildings (or indeed in sustainability in general) that it was deemed unsuitable to 
continue beyond this point. There are, in some cases, particular policy decisions from before this period that were 
deemed important (for example, greenbelt policies introduced after the Second World War). Alas, their inclusion was 
justified on the basis that they have been the subject of policy amendments or debates in the last two decades.   
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doctoral study with policy experts  (in government, industry and academia) in 
order to provide a broad overview of the context and policy process. This was 
a useful exercise in scoping the terms of the debate and range of possible 
enabling and limiting factors. This meant that it was possible, having selected 
cases, to select an initial sample of interview respondents (focussing initially 
on the most ‘visible’ individuals, such as key policy makers). From there a 
snowball sampling technique was adopted, which saw new opportunities for 
discussions open up as the research developed.  Prior to the interviews an 
interview schedule was created that outlined the main discussion points31. It 
was constructed to correspond to the various aspects discussed in the 
theoretical framework, including those subject to quantitative analysis (in 
order, as we saw, to allow for triangulation and complementarity). Questions 
were open ended, and the schedule was design as a guide rather than a 
template for the discussion. The same schedule was used for all respondents, 
with minor variations to reflect different roles, timelines or areas of expertise. 
 
A case study protocol was drawn up 32 . This is ‘intended to guide the 
investigator in carrying out the case study’ that ‘contained the procedures and 
general rules that should be followed’ in order to ‘remind the investigator what 
the case study is about’ (Yin 2003, pp. 63–65). It provides an overview of the 
project, practical field procedures and the key questions to be asked of each 
case and is intended to ensure consistency across cases when it comes to 
data-collection.  																																																									
31 This can be found in Appendix ii 
32 This can also be found in Appendix ii. 
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5.6.5. Documentary Analysis 
 
In many ways, though, interview transcripts were a secondary data source. 
The primary source of information (which was used to inform the interview 
schedules) was documentary analysis. This method was employed because it 
provides a rich source of information, although only where documents are 
accessible. This was the case here because local authorities are obliged to 
provide a range of documentation to accompany the Local Plan, including 
evidence bases, draft proposals, consultation responses, reports, committee 
proceedings and both internal and external communications33. These are 
freely available on their websites. In addition, a range of peripheral 
documentation that provided context was obtained. This emanated from the 
council itself but also from external stakeholders, extant academic literature 
and news sources and included statistical information, reports, policy briefs 
and private or third sector research.  
 
Documents were obtained where they provided insight into one or more 
aspects of the theoretical model, so there was a degree of filtering required by 
the researcher. All these documents provide a useful insight into the 
institutional and structural dynamics of the policy making process and, as 
above, were used to complement, inform and/or triangulate findings from 
interviews and statistical work. 
 
																																																									
33 A full list of the documents used in both cases can be found in Appendix ii.  
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5.6.6. Coding 
 
Both interview and documentary data was catalogued using NVivo. There it 
was coded using the codes drawn from the concepts discussed in chapter 
four. Although drawn from theory these codes were nevertheless sufficiently 
‘adaptive’ to avoid a narrow fixation on deductive logic. Data was coded in 
order to allow for a narrative to be constructed of the main developments in 
each case vis à vis the theory of local environmental policy capacity 
developed in chapter two. This would form the basis for the comparative 
analysis undertaken in chapter seven. 
 
5.6.7. Ethical Considerations 
 
All respondents were presented with an information sheet, attached in 
Appendix ii. Consent was sought to record the interviews, and interviewees 
were told that their contribution was entirely voluntary and they were able to 
withdraw their consent at any time before, during or after the interview. In the 
majority of cases interviews were conducted in person at a location of their 
choosing, but in four cases this was not possible and telephone or Skype 
interviews were conducted instead (primarily where the individual had moved 
abroad). In many cases there has been the possibility for follow up 
discussions in the weeks or months following the interview. This two way 
dialogue was often useful for clarifying particular aspects, developing new 
ideas and thoughts and keeping abreast of the latest developments in each 
case. What’s more, the researcher engaged in a number of discussions with 
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industry and government practitioners at various specialist conferences and 
seminars on the built environment as well as major trade shows.  
 
Interviewees were informed that any contributions would, where possible, be 
anonymised and informed that data would be handled in conformity with both 
the University of Birmingham’s Code of Practice for Research as well as the 
Data Protection Act 1998. As a result, interviews were transcribed and digital 
copies securely stored and, in line with guidance from the UK Research 
Councils, recordings and transcripts have been retained for future access and 
verification over the next ten years.  In addition, care was taken to follow the 
University of Birmingham’s ethical guidelines. The data collection strategy 
was approved by the University’s ethical review committee in January 2013. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
No methodological approach is without its faults, yet work can be done at the 
research design stage to increase the strength of the study through careful 
choice of methodological tools. Within this study the aim had been to achieve 
rigour but also generalizability. Hence the inclusion of a regression analysis 
and most-similar case selection strategy, respectively. The theoretical 
framework developed in chapter four is the guiding force behind the data-
collection process, but the nature of data sources was determined by a 
pragmatic attitude towards the divide between quantitative and qualitative 
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research; a pragmatic approach is taken where the ‘best tools for the job’ are 
selected in order to develop a mixed-methodological design.  
 
In addition, a stratified approach is taken, where the findings from early 
research questions inform subsequent ones. It is hoped that the ambition to 
introduce rigour in case selection strategies has aided the scope for external 
validity; that is, the confidence we have that a study of two cases can form the 
basis of a generalization to the entire population of local authorities in the 
context of their contributions to the EM of residential housing.  
 
However, to what extent can the findings from the case of local engagement 
with the ecological modernisation of residential housing be generalized in the 
same way? How will we know if the findings developed in this study are 
relevant, say, to the way in which local governments become involved in the 
ecological modernisation of waste management, for example? There are 
three points to make. First, there is an explicit exploratory focus of this 
research. Indeed the aims of the research as a whole is to develop a toolbox 
to account for these other engagement processes, forcing us to ask how we 
can refine the toolbox that is developed here. In this sense it is recognised 
that there are potential limitations, but it is argued that those limitations will 
only become apparent on the basis of further research going forward. Second, 
there is scope for theoretical generalization. Third, there are likely to be 
boundary conditions placed around these theoretical generalizations that 
reflect the specific institutional arrangement between central and local 
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government in England and which limit the usefulness of the policy capacity 
model in, say, a federated system (for more on this see section 4.1.). 
Nevertheless, none of these are fatal to the purpose at hand and their true 
influence will only be clear after this and further research is carried out. The 
implications of these shortcomings are discussed in chapter ten. 
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Chapter Six:  
 
Assessing the Nature and Extent of Local Authority 
Contributions to the Zero Carbon Homes agenda 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters the case has been made for a greater focus on local 
government’s contributions to processes of state-led ecological modernisation 
directed by national government, with the English planning regime situated as 
a focal point. Research question number one asks the nature of local 
contributions, how those contributions have changed over time, the number of 
local authorities that have contributed as such and whether variance exists 
between local authorities in terms of their contributions. This chapter seeks to 
answer those questions. In doing so it shows that in the case of residential 
planning local authorities acted until recently as supplementary standard 
setters. given their ability to set sustainable construction standards 
(specifically the Code for Sustainable Homes) for local development that 
exceed those in national Building Regulations.  
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Interestingly, this can be situated as a novel type of contribution, previously 
under-discussed in the extant literature on local and urban climate 
governance. Their behaviour is heavily circumscribed by national level 
enabling rules which, between 2006 and 2015 were unusual in the extent to 
which they allowed for local discretion. However, from 2012 the landscape 
became more problematic with the introduction of a set of restrictions on local 
behaviour that placed a much greater burden on local authorities to justify the 
economic impact of any such supplementary standards. In 2015 this 
discretion was completely curtailed, before (as we saw in chapter three) the 
zero-carbon homes agenda was abolished in 2015. Nevertheless we will see 
that a significant number of local authorities embraced these supplementary 
standard setting powers, albeit to differing extents and at different times.   
 
However, this chapter has a dual purpose. Beyond addressing research 
question number one it also begins to address research question number two 
(which asks how we can account for variation in the contributions local 
authorities make). To what extent can economic factors alone account for 
such variation? As we saw in chapter two, ecological modernisation theory 
traditionally places considerable emphasis on the causal influence of 
economic rationality as a boundary condition around ecological, social or 
political rationale. Jänicke & Weidner’s conceptualization of environmental 
policy capacity uses a similar logic to underpin their understanding of national 
responses to environmental crises. There they argue that ‘per capita GDP is 
most closely related to environmental policy outcomes’ (Janicke and Weidner 
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1997, p. 14). However, when we run the regression analysis discussed in 
section 6.5. we find that a different story emerging in this case. Economic 
conditions – defined in this case in relation to local house market conditions – 
are only weakly correlated with outcomes. The implications for this research 
are significant, in so much as it supports the idea that economic conditions 
play less of a role in the local context than we would expect. Nevertheless, a 
baseline level of economic buoyancy is a necessary condition to action – 
given the wording of national level enabling rules governing supplementary 
standard setting in an era of growth dependency, see section 6.2. below – but 
on its own economic buoyancy cannot be used as a predictor or an 
explanation for local adoption of supplementary standard setting powers. As 
we will discuss in more detail in chapter 10 and as we saw briefly in section 
2.1., this presents a paradox of sorts, whereby it would appear that the 
positive-sum potential of economic growth and environmental protection is 
limited given that, in this case at least, a baseline level of economic 
performance is required.  
 
The first section of this chapter outlines the specific contributions local 
authorities have been able to make – charting any changes along the way – in 
order to answer research question number 1.a. The second section then 
relates these contributions to our existing understanding of urban and local 
climate governance. The third then quantifies the contributions made to 
answer research question numbers 1.b. and 1.c. The fourth section is where 
we find the regression analysis. The chapter concludes by arguing that the 
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early findings support the suggestion made in earlier chapters that a multi-
factorial explanatory model is appropriate in the local context, thus paving the 
way for the in-depth case study analyses in following chapters.  
 
6.2. Local Involvement in Sustainable Construction: 
Supplementary Standard Setting 
 
In whatever form, planning policies leave an important legacy and are the 
most important documents driving the nature, pace and direction of local 
development. There have been a number of mechanisms within the pre-2004, 
2004-2011 and post-2012 planning policy systems described in the previous 
chapter for local authorities to make supplementary contributions to national 
level strategies for sustainable construction that this section will now outline. 
Prior to 2004 there were no formal, institutionalized mechanisms through 
which local authorities could introduce supplementary standards. Although a 
handful did introduce Merton Rule type policies – those that allowed for 
specific targets for on-site renewable energy generation on new 
developments34  – these were on an ad-hoc basis rather than in response to 
circumscribed arrangements in national level policy. 
 
																																																									
34 Named after the London Borough of Merton, the first local authority to incorporate a similar policy. 
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6.2.1. Institutionalizing Supplementary Standard Setting: Planning Policy 
Statement 1 (Planning and Climate Change) 
 
The post-2004 Planning Policy Statement (PPS) system was the first era in 
which institutionalized local standard setting became a reality. PPS1 
(Delivering Sustainable Development) replaced the 1997 PPG1 (General 
Policies and Principles) when the PPG system was abolished. It was updated 
in 2007 to incorporate a focus on ‘Planning and Climate Change’. This 
supplement to PPS1 (referred to simply as PPS1 hereinafter) ‘sets out the 
overarching planning policies on the delivery of sustainable development 
through the planning system…by setting out how planning should contribute 
to reducing emissions and stabilizing climate change’ (DCLG 2007b, p. 1). It 
made broad statements about the need to incorporate a focus on climate 
change into local plans, such as:  
 
‘Planning authorities, developers and other partners in the provision of new 
development should engage constructively and imaginatively to encourage 
the delivery of sustainable buildings (DCLG 2007b, p. 17)’  
 
 
It also formalized Merton Rule type policy settings by offering guidance on 
how to manage permissions for renewable and low-carbon energy generation.  
 
Most significantly though it introduced information on local requirements for 
sustainable building standards, stating that:  
 
There will be situations where it could be appropriate for planning authorities 
to anticipate levels of building sustainability in advance of those set out 
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nationally. When proposing local requirements for sustainable building 
planning authorities must be able to demonstrate clearly the local 
circumstances that warrant and allow this….[and] when proposing any local 
requirement for sustainable buildings planning authorities should…’specify 
the requirement in terms of achievement of nationally described sustainable 
building standards, for example in the case of housing by expecting identified 
housing proposals to be delivered at a specific level of the Code for 
Sustainable Homes’(DCLG 2007b, p. 17).  
 
This builds on a commitment made at the time of the original ‘zero-carbon by 
2016’ announcement and the publication of the Code for Sustainable Homes, 
embodied in Building A Greener Future, where it states that ‘there are 
circumstances in which we do believe local authorities could drive things 
further and faster, in particular where local authorities can demonstrate that 
there are clear local opportunities to use renewable or low carbon 
energy…local authorities can themselves play a critical role’ and that ‘where 
there are demonstrable and locally specific opportunities for requiring 
particular levels of building performance through the planning system these 
should be set out in advance in a development plan document’ (DCLG 2007a, 
pp. 18–19). So, although compliance with the CSH was voluntary at the 
national level35 (DCLG 2006, p. i) PPS1 gave local authorities the powers to 
set Code standards in their DPDs36.  
 
This, in effect, meant that they were able to set standards for sustainability in 
residential housing that superseded those nationally (and embodied in the 																																																									35 Although between 2008 and 2010 a Code rating was mandatory (but not the achievement of any particular level) 
as part of the Home Information Packs scheme. 	
36 This supplementary standard setting role was formally adopted in the 2008 Planning and Energy Act, section 1(1) 
of which states that ‘A local planning authority in England may in their development plan documents, a strategic 
planning panel may in their strategic development plan… include policies imposing reasonable requirements 
for…development in their area to comply with energy efficiency standards that exceed the energy requirements of 
Building Regulations’  
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Building Regulations), provided that they could justify their inclusion in the 
context of growth dependent planning37. 
 
6.2.2. Restricting Local Supplementary Standard Setting: The National 
Planning Policy Framework, Housing Standards Review and Abolition of 
the Zero-Carbon Homes Agenda 
 
The 2012 NPPF placed restrictions on local supplementary standard setting 
power, largely in response to opposition from volume house-builders  
(Interview with Industry Representative, January 2015). Ironically it was the 
inclusion of a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ that bought 
on this difficulty. Given the extent to which it focuses attention on viability it 
made it harder for the inclusion of supplementary standards, especially given 
it introduced further attention on the effect any standards would have on 
viability. This move was welcomed by house builders, who had become 
frustrated at what it saw as increasing costs imposed on them through local-
plan sustainable construction policies (interview with Industry Representative, 
February 2015). However, it was criticised by local authorities as it limited the 
extent to which they could place planning-gain demands (i.e. those which 
																																																									
37  This thesis focuses on the CSH powers rather than the Merton Rule type policy powers as examples of 
supplementary standard setting behavior. The reason for this is that two-fold. First, Merton Rule type policies that 
require a 10% or 20% (most often) on-site renewable energy generation target would become de facto mandatory 
through progressive updates to the Building Regulations in pursuit of the 2016 zero-carbon homes target. Second, 
the CSH requires a far broader level of supplementary action than a Merton Rule type policy as we saw in chapter 
one, seeing as it focuses not just on energy but also on water, ecology, waste, materials and so on (including, in any 
case, a high degree of on-site renewable energy generation that means it in many ways incorporates an in-built 
Merton Rule ‘lite’ type policy). In growth dependent planning systems it represents a bigger ‘cost’ for developers, thus 
implying more dynamic political underpinnings.  	
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require developers to factor in specific additional costs onto development for, 
say, sustainability, infrastructure, affordable homes requirements and so on) 
on house builders to address sustainability and thus favoured private-sector 
profit over societal need (interview with planning consultant, March 2015). 
Whilst by no means impossible, local authorities did find it more difficult to 
impose sustainable construction standards in their areas as a result of these 
changes (Interview with Sustainability Officer, January 2015).  
 
It introduced additional clauses on how local authorities could embrace 
supplementary standard setting powers, even where viability hadn’t been 
compromised. Local authorities would be required, ‘when setting any local 
requirement for a building’s sustainability, [to] do so in a way consistent with 
the Government’s zero carbon buildings policy and adopt nationally described 
standards’ (DCLG 2012a, p. 22). Additionally, ‘they should assess the likely 
cumulative impacts on development in their area of all existing and proposed 
local standards, supplementary planning documents and policies that support 
the development plan, when added to nationally required standards’. 
Standards would only be considered where ‘the cumulative impact of these 
standards and policies should not put implementation of the plan at serious 
risk, and should facilitate development throughout the economic cycle’ (DCLG 
2012a, p. 42) 
 
In effect this meant two things. First, viability would play a much greater role. 
Second, that the links between the CSH and the zero-carbon by 2016 agenda 
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embodied in Building A Greener Future would become stronger. Because the 
definition of zero-carbon within Building Regulations would differ from those in 
the CSH any supplementary standards would have to remain sensitive to the 
building regulation definition (thus meaning that, in effect, local authorities 
would be automatically barred form introducing Code 6 requirements, 
notwithstanding the inevitable viability issues).  
 
Most recently, the 2015 Housing Standards Review curtailed local authority 
involvement in standard setting for sustainability even further, removing their 
powers to set Code targets and limiting the extent to which they can require 
energy performance standards that exceed those set nationally (HC Deb 25 
March 2015, c488WS). Justified as a continuation of the deregulatory agenda 
that justified the NPPF, the Housing Standards Review was intended to 
rationalize and simplify ‘the many overlapping and confusing standards 
currently in operation’, meaning that ‘many of the requirements of the Code 
for Sustainable Homes will be consolidated into Building Regulations…in light 
of this, the Government thinks that the current Code will need to be wound 
down to coincide with the changes incorporating the new standards coming 
into force’ (DCLG 2014a, p. 2). Government felt that because Part L of the 
Building Regulations (that governing energy and fuel use) were set between 
levels 3 and 4 of the energy component the Code ‘[it] has been successful in 
doing its job in terms of pointing the way forward…[but] the government does 
not now see a need for levels or separate carbon and energy targets in the 
Code…[they] should be set in Building Regulations’. It was the governments 
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preferred view therefore that these requirements are set nationally, removing 
local discretion (DCLG 2013, p. 62). These reforms were justified heavily in 
economic terms (as one would expect in growth dependent planning), 
whether it be the way that ‘national and local policies can clash…causing 
confusion and potentially extra cost’ or higher levels of the Code being 
‘applied inappropriately without consideration of viability’ or ‘the impact [of the 
CSH] can be to make development unviable’ (DCLG 2013, p. 63).  
 
Transitional arrangements accompanying the Housing Standards Review 
mean that local authorities that have policies in their local plans or DPDs may 
still ask developers to build to those higher energy standards, but have been 
advised not to request higher than Code level 4. The CSH remains a condition 
on existing planning applications (whether because of plan policies or ad-hoc 
requirements), so house builders will have little choice but to continue to build 
to Code standards for these extant developments (likely for a number of 
years). Although the Housing Standards Review doesn’t talk specifically about 
the future of Merton Rule type policies, it is clear that even more stringent 
viability and evidence requirements would be needed for their incorporation 
(and for their maintenance where they have otherwise been adopted) such 
that it is questionable whether they would make it through that inspection 
process at all (Greenwood and Congreve 2016).  
 
However, despite claims that ‘Building Regulations will need to play a strong 
role in the development of zero carbon policy’ on the basis of the revocation of 
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both local discretion but also the CSH, in 2015 the Government announced its 
intention to abolish the entire zero-carbon homes agenda. In Fixing the 
Foundations: Creating A More Prosperous Nation (HM Treasury 2015) the 
Government announced that ‘the government does not intend to proceed with 
the zero-carbon, Allowable Solutions carbon offsetting scheme, or the 
proposed 2016 increase in on-site energy efficiency standards’ (HM Treasury 
2015, p. 46). At the time of writing there are proposed reforms to Part L of the 
Building Regulations in the pipeline, but on the basis of this announcement 
they will not seek to achieve the ‘zero-carbon’ requirement originally proposed 
back in 2006. Instead they will seek to consolidate the various aspects of the 
Code as it is wound down, but even here it is becoming clear that a number of 
elements within the Code will not find their way into Building Regulations (the 
latter will cover energy efficiency – measured in terms of dwelling emission 
rate – fabric energy efficiency, indoor water use and security. This excludes, 
for example, the environmental impact and sourcing of materials, site waste, 
NOx emissions, daylight, energy labelled white goods, external water use, 
energy display devices and composting. In total only 12 out of the 34 original 
CSH elements are retained in national Building Regulations or through the 
few local discretionary powers that remain38 – see Greenwood and Congreve 
(2016)).  
 
So, whilst Part L will have gone some way since 2006 to achieving zero 
carbon, it falls short of the original intention. Nevertheless, the zero-carbon 																																																									
38 These cover access, space and water use.  
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target in general and the CSH in particular have served part of their original 
aims. Building Regulations are in 2015 at a significantly higher level in terms 
of energy efficiency compared to 2006, costs have decreased through 
economies of scale and expertise amongst stakeholders has increased.  
 
The failure to meet the original 2016 target has resulted from what 
Greenwood (2012, pp. 162–3) has referred to as a coordination problem. The 
state, in attempting to arbitrate between competing interests on the supply 
side to encourage the deployment of technologies and new construction 
practices has found itself unable to reconcile divisions (particularly over 
definitions, technological solutions and financial burden) in an environment 
marked by uncertainty and significant complexity. Lemprière (2016) suggests 
that the inherent ‘weakness’ of the policy approach taken (which, as we saw 
in Section 3.3., places a burden on the supply side with little input into shifting 
demand practices) created a window that opponents of the policy (namely 
housing developers) could exploit, which is pertinent given the governments’ 
deregulatory agenda. Housing is a highly politicized policy arena, and the 
supply (and, related, the affordability) of homes is a topic of considerable 
policy debate. Objections from housing developers have been able to 
successfully tap into that debate when objecting the zero-carbon by 2016 
targets. Van Bueren and de Jong (2007, p. 547) similarly point towards issues 
over state regulation for sustainable development.  
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As we saw above, the 2010-2015 Coalition government has been further 
institutionalizing growth-dependent planning through the NPPF, which seeks 
to remove regulatory burden on developers whilst at the same time attempt to 
integrate a zero-carbon homes agenda. It has unsurprisingly proved difficult to 
reconcile a logic that emphasizes de-regulation in pursuit of growth 
dependency with one that emphasizes raising sustainability standards through 
increased regulation. Given the extent to which housing provision is growth 
dependent, it is perhaps little surprise that regulation is being removed.  
 
To recap briefly, we saw in chapter three that residential housing in England 
has undergone a process of EM that is heavily dependent upon the state 
instigating a smart regulatory approach (were both binding and voluntary 
measures are introduced) that instituted a step-change reform process to the 
energy components of national Building Regulations. It also introduced the 
Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH) that could be used voluntarily by 
developers as a reference point for the future trajectory that Building 
Regulations would take in the build up to ‘zero-carbon by 2016’.  
6.3.  The Role of Local Government in Urban Climate 
Governance: A Recap 	
6.3.1.		Four	Traditional	Local	Government	Roles	
 
As we saw in Section 2.4., the literature on urban and local climate 
governance points to four typical roles that local governments play in 
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mitigating and responding to climate change (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007, 
Bulkeley 2013). To recap, they can: self-govern, ensure provision of 
infrastructure, enable new forms of governance and regulate (both through 
‘soft’ and ‘hard regulation). Self-governing may take the form of internal 
emissions monitoring procedures for local administrative buildings or 
measures designed to reduce those emissions. Enabling occurs where the 
local government provides facilitative means to local residents or business 
(through, say, grants or business rates relief) to allow them to take proactive 
steps to reducing their environmental footprint. They may, for example, 
provide free home energy assessments or grants and loans for home energy 
efficiency improvements. Provisions are made where the local government 
installs (or facilitates the installation of) cycling racks, electric car charging 
stations, car-sharing schemes and other infrastructural measures. Regulation 
occurs where the local government has an influence over firm and individual 
behaviour in order to make them do things they otherwise wouldn’t have done 
through, for example, sustainable construction targets or fines for failing to 
recycle adequately.  
 
A local authority that is able to adopt a strategic approach to climate mitigation 
and adaptation that draws upon the full range of these roles is in a strong 
position to instigate local attitudinal and behavioural shifts. To do this they 
should rely on a combination of both governing and governance strategies, 
seeing as the two can interact and self-reinforce (Evans et al. 2004). 
Grassroots organizations such as Transitions Towns and various 
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transnational networks such as ICLEI, C40, Climate Partnership and Energie 
Cités for example play important discursive and ideational roles that can 
influence local political agendas or open up new possibilities for political 
deliberation39.  
6.3.2. A Fifth Role: Supplementary Standard Setting 
 
However, in this context we can talk of a new, fifth role. Local authorities act 
as supplementers that set regulatory standards for sustainability locally that 
exceed those nationally. Supplementary standard setting was defined earlier 
as the power to set standards that are more stringent than those that exist 
nationally in order to encourage and/or require behavioural shifts amongst 
market actors in order to decouple economic growth from environmental 
negative externalities. In this context central government acts as an enabler 
and, in so doing, delegates autonomy to local government who, if they are 
willing to and in a position to do so, can set these kinds of standards. This 
voluntary aspect of supplementary-standard uptake is an interesting one, 
because it allows an avenue through which to interrogate the dynamics that 
explain the adoption and evolution of supplementary standards over time. The 																																																									
39 It is perhaps no surprise then that local government is seen as an important component in any national climate 
change strategy (whether striving for or underpinned by a logic of ecological modernisation or otherwise). The British 
government’s own committee on climate change recognizes this, saying that ‘there is an important role for local 
authorities in preparing for climate change’ and calling for ‘increased focus by local authorities in order that climate 
risk is managed appropriately’ (Committee on Climate Change 2012, p. 9). Supranationally, the 1992 Rio de Janeiro 
‘Earth Summit’ called on local governments to work alongside national governments to respond to environmental 
problems. The resulting Local Agenda 21 project ‘specifically recognised the role of local governments, as ‘the level 
of governance closest to the people’ and their communities in delivering sustainable development’ (Joas	 et	 al.	 2004,	 p.	104). These behaviors are well discussed in the literature on urban climate governance. Early interventions focused 
on arguing the case for local involvement, before more recent work began to focus on specific issues. These 
included, the relative autonomy of local government in being able to respond the way it wished (Collier 1997, 
Deangelo and Harvey 1998), the sectors with the biggest capacity to make a difference (Collier 1997), an 
assessment of the actions being taken locally (Collier	 1997,	 Agyeman	 et	 al.	 1998,	 Angel	 et	 al.	 1998,	 Deangelo	 and	Harvey	1998,	Easterling	et	al.	1998,	Kates	et	al.	1998,	Brody	et	al.	2008,	Zahran	et	al.	2008,	Argyriou	et	al.	2012,	Mann	et	
al.	 2014), and the use and deployment of evaluation procedures (Agyeman	 et	al.	 1998,	 Easterling	 et	al.	 1998,	 Kates	 et	
al.	1998).  	
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central-local relationship in this context is represented in Figure 6.1 below and 
it is this supplementary standard setting role that is explored in the rest of this 
chapter, as a distinct, novel form of local action in climate governance.  
  Figure 6.1: National and Local Interaction  
 in Supplementary Standard Setting 
 
This is closely related to the previous discussions on regulatory functions, but 
there is an important distinction. We can therefore distinguish two types of 
regulatory responses by local government. First, there are those that operate 
relatively independently of the national or supranational level. Here local 
government uses its competencies to engage in its core functions relatively 
free of external influence. Often these kinds of behaviours are ‘soft’, in the 
sense that they shy away from the regulatory role and tend more towards self-
governing, provision or enabling (Evans et al., 2004; Joas et al., 2004). 
Second, there are those that take place through enabling powers from central 
government and which allow local authorities to adopt regulatory roles that 
mean, in theory, that they can introduce legislation that is more stringent than 
that at the national level. As later chapters will show, this is the case with local 
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authorities and sustainable construction. ‘Soft’ strategies tend towards pareto-
efficiency – where all actors benefit - and present only limited political contest 
for local decision makers. ‘Hard’ strategies, however, tend towards 
redistribution, where there is a measurable effect on resource distributions 
amongst key policy actors at the local level. In such situations the political 
dynamics underpinning the policy process are markedly different40 
 
6.4. Quantifying Supplementary Standard Setting in English 
Local Authorities  
 
Having established the nature of local government contributions, the 
remainder of this chapter addresses the second part of research question one 
by quantifying the range of contributions and using statistical techniques to 
assess the relationship between contributions and economic framework 
conditions. Chapter two called for a move away from a focus on the economic 
drivers of ecological modernisation when discussing local contributions to EM, 
arguing instead that whilst economic conditions have a role to play they are 
bracketed by particular institutional and agential factors. The findings within 
this chapter support this argument; we find that economic variables – those 																																																									
40  This study also talks to the literature on local government climate governance (aswell as that on zero-carbon 
homes and EMT). Within this literature there are two problems that mean we must tread cautiously when discussing 
supplementary regulatory powers. First, studies of local responses to climate change, as we will see elsewhere, treat 
the local level as a ‘black box’, disconnected from economic, political and social dimensions within regional, national 
or supranational contexts (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005).  With supplementary regulatory powers it is the case that 
powers are enabled or constrained by decisions made at higher levels and we need to therefore consider this multi-
level dimension in discussions on local capacity. We can talk of two ‘types’ of multi-level interaction. Type I refers to 
‘a hierarchical approach which focuses on the ways in which competences and authority are shared between 
different levels of government’, whereas Type II refers to ‘a polycentric model in which multiple overlapping and 
interconnected horizontal spheres of authority are involved in governing particular issues’ (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, 
p. 48). 
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that indicate the strength of local housing markets, as discussed in section 
5.4. – correlate only weakly with the outcome on the dependent variable – 
defined as whether a local authority has introduced Code policies into a draft 
or adopted version of its local plan.  
 
Research question 1 asks what role local authorities have played in the 
ecological modernisation of residential housing. We saw above that they 
adopted a supplementary standard setting role between 2006 and 2015, albeit 
one that became more difficult to embrace over time because of national level 
institutional rule changes. Nevertheless, they have had the ability to 
contribute to the ecological modernisation process in this time by setting CSH 
standards that, in effect, mandate higher sustainability standards than those 
outlined nationally in Building Regulations.  
    
This section shows how many local authorities introduced (or attempted to 
introduce) CSH standards into their local plans or core strategies during this 
time. What follows is an assessment of the sustainable construction policies in 
place across every English local planning authorities for which data was 
available (n=261) from 2006 to 2014. Local plans were downloaded from local 
authority websites, where they were browsed for relevant Code policies. A 
note was made on the particular standard requested, the status of the plan 
(whether it was draft or adopted) and whether there was any movement over 
time in the standard required (for example a Code Level 3 requirement up 
until 2013 and a Level 4 requirement thereafter).  Complete details of the 
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choices made in the design of this analysis were discussed in section 5.4., 
above.  
 
Between 2006 and 2014 a total of 127 local authorities had indicated an 
intention to incorporate Code standards into their local plans. This is 48.3% of 
the sample; this is a considerable number when one considers that such 
behaviour is voluntary. A distinction needs to be made between those who 
have successfully had those plans adopted after an independent planning 
inspection and those who remain in the drafting stage.   
 
Table 6.1. outlines how many local authorities had formally adopted plans 
containing Code standards and those that had included Code standards in 
draft plans that at the time of investigation had yet to be adopted. From this 
we can see that 85 of our sample have formally adopted Code standards. 
Why separate in this way? It is possible that at the planning inspection stage 
CSH standards are argued against by opponents on the basis of viability. 
Given that it is impractical to assess the evidence base of each of these drafts 
a degree of caution and pragmatism has to be maintained when discussing 
these cases. To assume that a draft policy equates to a formally adopted one 
is problematic. For that reason, the breakdowns that follow are separated into 
two: the 85 that have formally adopted and the remaining 45.  
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Plan Making Stage Number With CSH Policies At Each 
Stage by 2014 
Adopted 85 
Proposed Submission 39 
Preferred Options41 4 
Issues and Options 2 
Total 130 
 
Table 6.1: CSH Policy Uptake: Separated by Plan-Making Stage  
 
6.4.2. Local authorities with Adopted Local Plans/Core Strategies 
 
Table 6.2 provides a breakdown of how many of those local authorities 
requiring Code standards with adopted local plans or core strategies had 
required particular Code standards in each year. We can recall from section 
3.2. that the Code can be used to rate the sustainability of homes across nine 
categories, the outcome being a rating from zero to six stars, with the latter 
representing 'exemplar development in sustainability terms' (DCLG 2006, p. 
6).  
 
We can see from Table 6.2. that the most popular level at which to set local 
standards shifted in 2012-13 from Level 3 to Level 4. This reflects the 2013 																																																									
41 Preferred options and issue and options are scoping draft copies of local plans that lay out a number of preferred 
policy options for a wide-ranging public consultation.  
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updates to Building Regulations, which would mandate achievement of 
between Level 3 and Level 4 in Building Regulations (although exclusively in 
terms of the energy component of the Code). A number of local authorities 
pre-empted this by introducing ‘tracking’ Code standards that increased at 
particular intervals. The most typical was a Level 3-4 rise in 2012-13, and a 
Level 4-6 rise in 2015/16 to coincide with the zero-carbon by 2016 updates to 
Building Regulations. We can also see however that a number of local 
authorities (17 by 2014 and a proposed 14 by 2016) still required level 3, 
despite a higher standard in energy terms at the national level. Despite this, 
the Level 3 standard is still supplementary, given that it mandates compliance 
with eight other sustainability areas, as we saw in section 3.2. Nevertheless, 
we see that by 2016, when the zero-carbon standard was due to be 
introduced, a spread of standards are required (again, bearing in mind the 
distinction between Building Regulations and Code standards with regards 
their breadth and supplementary status). Notwithstanding the changes 
discussed above to the target and to local discretion with this deadline, by 
2014 we see that the majority of those requiring standards were requiring 
Level 4 (64 of 85).   
 
 Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Total 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2008 0 0 0 7 4 0 0 13 
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2009 0 0 0 12 2 0 0 14 
2010 0 0 0 26 3 0 0 29 
2011 0 0 0 34 13 0 0 47 
2012 0 0 0 40 24 1 0 65 
2013 0 0 0 20 58 2 0 80 
2014 0 0 0 1742 64 3 0 84 
201543 0 0 0 16 66 3 0 85 
2016 0 0 0 14 27 11 33 85 
 
Table 6.2: Number of Local Authorities With Adopted Local Plans 
Requiring CSH Standards, separated by year and by Code level. 
 
We can also see that very few authorities introduced level five or level six 
requirements into local plans (even those that track to match the 2016 update 
to Building Regulations). This reflects the costs associated with building to 
such levels. Although in section 3.2. we saw that the costs of complying with 
Code Level 3 energy/CO2 requirements decreased from £4500 to £1100 per 
unit in the four years from 2006 to 2010 (DCLG 2011), costs at the top levels 
of the Code have presented challenges for cost-sensitive housing developers. 
It may well be the case that the costs associated with achieving zero-carbon 
standard have decreased by roughly half between 2011 and 2014 (Zero 
Carbon Hub 2014, p. 3), but two observations need to be made. First, even 
after these cost reductions the costs of achieving the zero-carbon standard in 																																																									
42 A decrease in those requiring particular code levels from one year to the next does not indicate a withdrawal from 
the CSH, rather it indicates a progressive tightening of standards over time in some local authorities. For example, a 
number required Level 3 until 2013, whereupon Level 4 would apply, rising to Level 6 in 2016.  
43 The dataset was construction towards the end of 2014, so the figures for 2015 and 2016 are indicative, those 
suggested in local planning policies for where the standard would reach ceteris paribus. Clearly, given the reforms at 
the national level through the Housing Standards Review these are no longer attainable. 
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2014 were still estimated to be c£6,700-7,500 greater for a detached home (or 
c.£3,700-4,700 greater for a semi-detached home or c£2,200-2,400 greater 
for a low-rise apartment) than a home at minimum building regulation 
standard. Second, the time-frames involved in drafting local plans means that 
estimates were likely to have been higher when local government would be 
considering the incorporation of Code standards. For example, in 2008 the 
costs associated with meeting the zero carbon standard would have been 
c££37,817-£47,533 greater per unit for a detached home (c£31,207-c£37,668 
greater for a semi-detached or c£19,080-c£22,555 greater for a low-rise 
apartment) (DCLG 2008, pp. 31–33). Given the importance of justifying the 
incorporation of Code policies to an independent planning inspector these 
costs would have been unpalatable to a planning policy maker, given the ease 
with which housing developers could claim that such requirements would 
impact upon viability.  
 
It may seem that the potential reduction in costs would have mitigated the 
objection from developers, concerned as they were with their margins and 
bolstered by the institutional backing of a growth dependent planning system 
(see chapter three.) However, although costs have fallen dramatically, as the 
above figures showed, estimates in 2008 for the costs of achieving zero-
carbon development by 2016 painted a different story. Predictions estimated 
that the extra costs of building a semi-detached house to zero-carbon 
standard in 2016 would fall to c£22,475-c£28,293 (DCLG 2008, p. 39), a 
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reduction of c£8,732-£19,240 but not as significant as the actual reduction, 
which was in the region of a c£18,775-c£23,597 reduction in costs.  
 
Figure 6.2. shows how many local authorities introduced Code standards in 
any particular year. From this we see a significant flurry of activity between 
2010 and 2013. This reflects two things: first, the fact that a number of local 
authorities may have had to wait before updating their local plans after the 
devolution of supplementary powers. Second, the length of time it takes to 
draft a local plan or core strategy, which can take many years. Similarly, there 
are two possible explanations for the tailing off of uptake post 2013. The first 
is that a saturation point had been reached whereby all of those local 
authorities in a position to adopt Code standards had already done so. The 
second is that because the data-collection was conducted in 2014 it may have 
been the case that a number of plans that were yet to be adopted had 
aspirations to achieving Code standards.  It is towards these draft plans that 
our attention now turns. 
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6.4.3.! Local Authorities with Draft Local Plans/Core Strategies 
 
Table 6.3 below shows a similar breakdown of Code standards by year as 
before but for those local authorities that had (by 2014) yet to have their plans 
formally approved at inspection.  
 
 Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Total 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2009 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2011 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2012 0 0 0 8 4 0 0 12 
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2013 0 0 0 11 18 2 0 31 
2014 0 0 0 9 33 2 0 44 
2015 0 0 0 9 38 2 0 45 
2016 0 0 0 7 18 10 10 45 
Table 6.3: Number of Local Authorities With Draft Local Plans Requiring 
CSH Standards, separated by year and by Code level. 
 
A similar picture emerges here; a number of local authorities adopt a tracking 
Code standard to stay ahead of national updates to Building Regulations, 
although a greater concentration of those with draft policies are requiring 
Level 4 requirements than those with adopted plans when 2016 comes 
around.  Figure 6.3. visualizes the number of proposed new standards per 
annum amongst this group44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
44  The fact that plans that have yet to be adopted can refer to standards in the past reflects the delays that often 
emerge in the plan-writing process. It is for this reason too that the ‘title’ year-range of a plan often does not coincide 
with when it was formally adopted, as we will see in the two case studies.  
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The level of ambition within these drafts plans indicates that there was 
considerable desire for supplementary standards by local authorities at the 
time of the abolition of supplementary powers and the zero-carbon homes 
agenda in 2015 with the publication of the Housing Standards Review and 
Fixing The Foundations respectively (discussed above). 
 
 
6.4.4.  Minimum Development Size Requirements for Code Standards 
 
 
Local authorities are able to specify in their plans the levels above which 
Code standards would apply when they write their supplementary standards.  
Table 6.4. shows us that the large majority require standards on all 
developments (82.4% of those with adopted plans and 88.9% of those with 
draft plans), with only a handful imposing a minimum. The most typical, where 
there was one, was developments of 10 or more, 11.8% of those with adopted 
plans required this level and 6.7% of those working on drafts.  
 
Minimum Size 
Requirements 
Those With Adopted 
Plans 
Those With Draft Plans 
>1 70 82.4% 40 88.9% 
>5 2 2.4% 2 4.4% 
>10 10 11.8% 3 6.7% 
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>100 1 1.2% 0 0.0% 
>200 2 2.4% 0 0.0% 
 
Table 6.4: Minimum Development Size Requirements for Code Levels: 
Adopted and Draft Plans 
 
6.5. Regression Analysis Findings 
 
Having established that roughly 50% of local authorities embraced 
supplementary standard setting powers to require CSH standards in their 
local plans it is time to understand the relationship between these outcomes 
and economic framework conditions that abound locally. Using binomial 
regression analysis we can use the same dataset discussed above together 
with variables that account for economic strength locally. Full details on the 
construction of this analysis can be found in chapter five. The findings show 
that the performance of local authorities in this regard cannot be explained 
with reference to economic conditions alone, signalling the move towards in-
depth case study. However, we have seen above that consideration of the 
viability of supplementary sustainability standards is a legal requirement of 
local authorities. So, in this case strong economic conditions – defined, as we 
saw in terms of house market strength – are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition when considering local contributions.  
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 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 9.942 3 .019 
Block 9.942 3 .019 
Model 9.942 3 .019 
Table 6.5: Binomial Logistical Regression Analysis Findings (i) 
 
 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 222.360a .057 .077 
Table 6.6: Binomial Logistical Regression Analysis Findings (ii) 
 
 
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 LAStrength Percentage 
Correct  .00 1.00 
Step 
1 
LAStrengt
h 
.00 63 26 70.8 
1.00 43 36 45.6 
Overall Percentage   58.9 
Table 6.7: Binomial Logistical Regression 
Analysis Findings (iii) 
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 B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
Exp(B
) 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lowe
r Upper 
 House 
Building 
Per 
Annum, 
2006-2013 
.402 
.22
2 
3.29
4 
1 .070 1.495 .968 2.309 
Percentag
e 
Population 
Change 
Per 
Annum, 
2006-2011 
-.008 
.23
4 
.001 1 .973 .992 .627 1.570 
Percentag
e House 
Price 
Change 
Per 
Annum, 
2006-2012  
.512 
.22
1 
5.38
8 
1 .020 1.669 
1.08
3 
2.572 
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Constant -
1.99
6 
.65
0 
9.44
0 
1 .002 .136   
Table 6.8: Binomial Logistical Regression Analysis 
Findings (iv) 
 
Tables 6.5-6.8. present the outputs from the regression analysis run, drawn 
from SPSS. Table 6.5 shows that the logistic regression model was 
statistically significant, χ2 (Chi-Square) = 9.942, p < .05. We can see from 
table 6.6 that the model only explained 7.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in supplementary standard setting and correctly classified 58.9% of cases. 
Table 6.8. shows that of the three predictor variables only one was statistically 
significant, percentage house price change (2006-2012). Increasing 
percentage house price change is associated with an increase. Those in 
higher categories of percentage house price change were 1.669 times more 
likely to adopt supplementary sustainability standards than those in lower 
categories.  
 
That the model only accounted for 7.7% of the variance of the outcome of the 
dependent variable is a strong indicator that other factors must account for 
variation in uptake of CSH standards. Whilst they do play a role, and whilst 
they are a necessary condition given the growth dependent nature of 
planning, economic conditions alone – or at least indicators of housing market 
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strength and growth as proxies for viability – cannot explain the uptake of 
supplementary standards alone.  
 
6.6. Conclusion: Problematizing Local Supplementary Standard 
Setting Behaviour 
 
Having provided a brief history of planning policy in England, an investigation 
of the role of local authorities in the state-led EM of residential housing and 
recounting the findings from a large-N survey conducted in 2014 this work is 
in a position to take a step forward. Chapter one problematized the way that 
local government is conceptualized in accounts of EM and set the case of 
residential housing up as a site of analysis. This chapter has answered the 
first research question by arguing that local authorities act as supplementary 
standard setters (and setting this up as a novel ‘type’ of behaviour previously 
ignored in our discussions on local climate governance), that they have 
discretion over when policies are adopted, minimum size requirements, 
whether to track updates to Building Regulations and at what level they are 
set, that many have been denied the opportunity to adopt their supplementary 
standards in light of institutional change nationally (despite investing 
resources in pursuit of them) and showing that almost 50% of local authorities 
have embraced that role.  
 
This chapter also though, through the regression analysis, marked the first 
step in answering research question number two. Existing thinking about EM 
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and the wording of the supplementary standard setting powers point towards 
economic framework conditions – particularly, in this context, indicators of 
housing market buoyancy – being important factors that can account for 
variation in uptake of CSH standards. By pointing towards a weak association 
between the two this chapter has shown that a much more complex answer is 
needed to answer the question of why variation between local authorities 
exists. However, we do know that the emphasis on growth dependency within 
the planning system places a strong emphasis on viability as a precondition 
for planning gain measures such as CSH targets. As we will see later, this 
requirement for strong economic framework conditions prior to contributions to 
EM would seem to undermine the central premise of EMT, that of the inter-
relationship between economic growth and environmental protection.   
	218	
 
 
Chapter Seven:  
 
The Emergence of a Sustainable Construction Regime 
in Cambridge City Council 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
 
Cambridge City Council has used various mechanisms to introduce 
supplementary sustainability standards for residential buildings, showing a 
strong willingness to embrace the powers devolved to it. Since the 2007 
publication of PPS1, which formalized those devolved powers, it has actively 
sought to introduce supplementary standards into planning policy documents 
it has been tasked with constructing or revising. The first section of this 
chapter outlines the nature of these policies, arguing that supplementary 
standards have become more deeply engrained over time. It also shows that 
its efforts were curtailed by legislative reforms at the national level in the 
Housing Standards Review, which remove local discretion in setting 
supplementary standards, as we saw in chapter six.  
	219	
The second section then accounts for this policy trajectory in line with the 
theoretical discussion in chapter four, thus contributing to the answer to 
research question number two (which asks how we can account for variation 
in the contribution local authorities make to the EM process). We will see that 
a ground-breaking housing-led growth strategy provided a window of 
opportunity, but that it was down to well-resourced policy entrepreneurs 
situated within a favourable policy network context to both exploit the 
institutional conditions that emerged during this window and redesign existing 
institutions along more sustainable lines. Cambridge embarked upon a major 
growth strategy with considerable institutional support from the national and 
regional level in the early mid 2000s. This helped to alleviate political 
pressures (somewhat) to address housing affordability and provision issues, 
provided a strategic vision in the planning department and coincided with the 
emergence of the national zero-carbon homes agenda and decisions about 
local autonomy over supplementary standards.  
 
Things were further helped by the nature of development this kind of large-
scale expansion entailed, which encouraged economies of scale and reduced 
costs (and thus the scope and power of opponents’ objections). A harmonious 
relationship between relevant stakeholders both allowed this kind of strategy 
to emerge in the first place, but ensured that the focus could lay more heavily 
on the nature and type of development rather than being delayed and 
frustrated by realpolitik. It is from these discussions that a strategic vision of 
sustainable homes emerged, and one upon which local policy champions in 
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Cambridge City Council could attach themsleves in order to tie these 
economic, institutional and network factors together.  
 
7.2. Legislating for Sustainable Homes  
 
Since 2006, Cambridge City Council had many numerous attempts to 
introduce sustainable construction targets and requirements for new homes 
into various elements of the local development framework, including Local 
Plan or Core Strategy policies, AAPs and SPDs. 
 
It’s first such policies were contained in its 2006 Local Plan, where policy 8/15 
stated that: ‘developers of major proposals above a threshold of 1,000 square 
meters or 10 dwellings will be required to provide at least 10% of the 
development's total predicted energy requirements on-site, from renewable 
energy sources’, caveated by a condition that ‘these requirements may be 
relaxed if it can be clearly demonstrated that to require full compliance would 
not be viable’ (Cambridge City Council 2006, p. 94). In addition to this Merton 
Rule type policy, policy 3/1 states that ‘where major development 45  is 
proposed developers should complete the Council's Sustainable Development 
Checklist and prepare a Sustainability Statement and submit both with the 
planning application’ (Cambridge City Council 2006, p. 22).  
 
																																																									
45 Defined as 10 or more dwellings 
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Whilst the 2006 Local Plan made allowances for sustainable construction 
standards, more stringent requirements were introduced in 2008 in the 
Northwest Cambridge AAP. AAPs replace existing planning regulations in the 
area over which they have jurisdiction, so are ‘mini’ local plans and are 
therefore a material consideration in directing planning matters. The 
Northwest Cambridge AAP outlined planning policies for a major housing 
growth point that emerged as part of the growth strategy discussed in more 
detail in section 7.5. below. This University of Cambridge led development 
would provide 2000 student beds, 2,5000 homes (about half of which would 
be for University keyworkers), significant University research facilities and 
retail space.  
 
In between the Local Plan and Northwest Cambridge AAP, the CSH had been 
published and PPS1 had specified detailed conditions on local policy 
discretion for supplementary standard setting, so it is interesting to note that 
the Council embraced both at the earliest opportunity. In this AAP a whole 
Code Level 4 for the first 50 dwellings on the site was required, wherein it 
would rise to Level 5 beyond 50. This was an unusually stringent requirement 
both then and now. At the time national Building Regulations equated roughly 
to Level 3 (but only in the area of carbon emissions and energy efficiency). 
Because of the statutory nature of the AAP and the wording of the policy, for 
the first time the Council was able to use sustainability standards as a 
material consideration in planning applications (i.e. it could refuse applications 
on that basis). 
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During negotiations in 2010 over a second major development site, in the CB1 
district in the centre of the City (which would provide 650 homes and a mix of 
retail and leisure opportunities) the Council again pushed for the highest 
standards possible, given site constraints. Rather than an AAP, a Site 
Development Framework was drawn instead, which has the same binding 
status governing development but does so within the existing Local Plan 
framework rather than through the adoption of a new, localized one. Under 
this scheme developers are subject to Section 106 (S106) requirements, 
conditions put on developments to require, for example, the construction of 
infrastructure, affordable homes or, in this case, to adhere to sustainable 
construction standards. This framework required an initial whole Code Level 
4, rising to Level 5 over time in line with changes to Part L of the national 
Building Regulations. The Level 4 requirement was until place 2013, after 
which Level 5 applied, thus keeping standards at CB1 ‘one step ahead’ of 
national Building Regulations (Interview with Planning Consultant, February 
2015; Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer at Cambridge City Council, 
January 2015).  
 
Work began in 2011 on the 2014 Local Plan (Cambridge City Council 2013). 
Policies here would require that all development should reach Code Level 4, 
achieve a 44% reduction in CO2 relative to 2006 Part L requirements and 
achieve 80 litters per head per day water use46. (Cambridge City Council 
2013, p. 102). Whilst this thesis is concerned largely with the CSH (given its 																																																									
46 The inclusion of CO2 and water standards as well as a Code level is deliberate. Doing so mandates an overall 
Code Level 4 but standards for emissions and water that go higher than Level 4.  
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potential as a supplementary standard) it is interesting to note the strong 
commitment to sustainability outlined in this plan, which at its heart contained 
a vision that all development should: ‘be designed to be adaptable to our 
changing climate’ (Cambridge City Council 2013, p. 103); adopt design 
strategies that focus firstly on minimizing energy demand, seek to reduce 
transport related emissions (Cambridge City Council 2013, pp. 103–4); be 
designed in a way that minimizes and recycles construction  (Cambridge City 
Council 2013, p. 104); be designed to meet Level 5 of the Code for 
Sustainable Home’s water requirements (Cambridge City Council 2013, p. 
104) as well as pay consideration to biodiversity, pollution, mobility, wellbeing 
and heritage.  (Cambridge City Council 2013, p. 107).  
 
Table 7.1 outlines that various policies discussed above, for reference: 
 
Name Year Purpose Binding? Details 
2006 Local Plan 2006 Set out detailed 
policies, land-
allocations 
Y Introduced a 10% ‘Merton 
Rule’ and Sustainable 
Checklist 
Sustainable 
Construction 
Supplementary 
Planning 
Document 
2007 Set out detailed 
requirements to 
meet 
sustainability 
requirements in 
2006 Local Plan 
Y Technical guidance for 
complying with 2006 
Local Plan’s sustainability 
requirements  
NW Cambridge 
AAP 
2008 ‘Mini’ local plan 
for NW 
Y (in NW 
Cam) 
Set out CSH Level 5 
requirement for 
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Cambridge Site development 
CB1 
Development 
Plan 
2010 Development 
requirements for 
CB1 site 
Y (in CB1) Level 4 CSH requirement 
2014 Core 
Strategy  
TBC Set out detailed 
policies, land-
allocations; 
replaces 2006 
Local Plan 
Y Attempts to introduce 
CSH Level 4 requirement 
across the city.  
Table 7.1: Supplementary Standards in Cambridge City Council.  
 
7.3. Entrepreneurs 
 
Lying at the heart of Cambridge’s success in introducing supplementary 
sustainable construction standards were a small group of policy 
entrepreneurs: one elected official (who was, at various times, leader of the 
Council and portfolio holder for both planning and climate change) and two 
consecutive sustainability officers, who bought high levels of expertise and 
who also served as policy sponsors and champions. What’s more, the council 
was run in the key stages of its attempts to introduce sustainability standards 
by a Liberal Democrat party group with a strong manifesto commitment to the 
environment.  
 
These policy entrepreneurs had a keen interest in principles of sustainable 
design and began to institutionalise not just an environmental awareness but 
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specific attention to supplementary standard setting powers. Without the input 
of these key political entrepreneurs it is unlikely that Cambridge City Council 
would have introduced the supplementary standards that it did. They acted as 
brokers between competing interests, built up local resilience, embedded 
expertise within the planning department and expended their own political 
resources in doing so. This made them well placed to exploit institutional and 
economic circumstances which, as we will see below, aligned favourably.  
 
The former leader of the council and planning portfolio holder placed 
sustainability and design at the centre of their thinking about Cambridge’s 
growth and devoted considerable resources to the political management of 
the various planning documents into which sustainable construction policies 
were embedded. Later also the portfolio holder for ‘Climate Change and 
Growth’ and in charge of climate change policy across the council as well as 
planning, she was vocal in embracing the principles of sustainable design. In 
her own words,  
My view is that it’s something that you wouldn’t expect not to have in a 
properly well-designed development. You’d expect sustainability to be a part 
of it by default. I think that’s where the ideal should be. You obviously want it 
to be part of something that is finely done, sustainable in the richer sense of 
the word. Well designed, in a proper way. Functionally very well designed 
(Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015)  
 
Others elsewhere in the council remarked that her involvement was the 
moving force and spurred on by her own personal interest in the subject area: 
‘She was the definite moving force; the key person. [Sustainable housing] is 
something that she’s very keen on’ (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, 
January 2014) 
 
‘The portfolio holder for planning at the time had a huge commitment on 
sustainability and was really well informed. It might be more interesting to say 
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who was the drag.  I can’t think of one.  Because people are so much bound 
up in what we are trying to do’ (Interview with Director of Environment, 
February 2015) 
 
 
Where this councillor was effective was in taking a pragmatic approach to the 
way that climate change was approached by the Council, breaking down the 
techno-phobia that often prevents decision makers committing to sustainable 
development. She was able to exploit what expertise already existed in the 
Council and commit to employing external consultants and experts to 
undertake the necessary background work where that wasn’t possible.  
It’s very easy to be frightened about climate change and it’s quite hard to get 
people to feel confident about it because it’s a very technology driven area 
and you have to explain a lot of things. I couldn’t stand up and give a lecture 
on what climate change is; the great thing about Cambridge is that you don’t 
have to, because people know it…the important thing is not be hung up about 
that. It was very important for politicians and staff not to feel like it was above 
them or over their heads. Although it was important to have a specialist, what 
you can’t have is a specialist culture. What you don’t want is a person who 
thinks they’re the expert and no-one else feels like they know enough or are 
qualified (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015). 
 
A considerable barrier though when designing local plans is to ensure that 
any policy proposals are adequately evidenced, a process that requires both 
considerable resources and considerable expertise. The political will within 
the Council was aided by a high level of technical expertise amongst the 
officer groups involved, led in particular by a dedicated Sustainability Officer. 
This post was created in the mid 2000s and had been filled twice between 
then and the 2014 Local Plan. It was the first holder of this post that 
conducted the necessary work to justify the original Merton Rule type policies 
in the 2006 Local Plan and the Code requirements in Northwest Cambridge 
and CB1. However, beyond this she was important in working with the 
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Climate Change and Growth portfolio holder to integrate sustainability across 
departmental siloes. The second holder, who started in 2010, was 
instrumental in negotiating the planning applications accompanying Northwest 
Cambridge and CB1 as well as integrating sustainable construction principles 
(amongst other things) into the 2014 Local Plan.  
In terms of what my role was within the council, I sat within the planning 
policy team so I advised on the development of new climate change policy 
and sustainable construction policy. I also then give guidance on planning 
applications. I’ve worked on this policy area helping to develop evidence 
bases. I sit in the policy team, so develop the policies in the first place, but 
also then see it through to the implementation in new developments. The 
success of the sustainability message is partly down to having the officers 
within the council who know what it takes to then get that policy adopted 
because there’s a lot of evidence base that has to go into it’ (Interview with 
Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015). 
 
It is important not to understate how important having this level of expertise 
can be, considering the level of technical awareness needed in order to 
scrutinize development proposals, planning applications and completed 
projects, navigating a complex (and evolving) legislative framework and 
commissioning evidence bases for proposed standards. This kind of expertise 
serves, as we saw in section 4.5.5. as a significant resource for the Council, 
given the importance it has in acting as a counterpoint to external opposition 
of any proposals. These barriers can be administrative, in the sense of the 
workload involved in justifying CSH targets, or legal, in the form of continued 
opposition from developers, landowners and other third party bodies. 
‘We were very fortunate with [our sustainability officer]. She has got an 
extremely good grasp of sustainable buildings issues. She is extremely well 
motivated and a tremendous asset to us in doing what we need to do. There’s 
not much she doesn’t know.’ (Interview with Director of Environment, 
Cambridge City Council, February 2015 
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‘[The sustainability officer] knows the right things, how to get there, how to 
encourage people and so on. She understands some of the issue, she has 
the ability to engage technically with people and understand the technical 
issues when needed and to get people on side. That’s the strong thing’ 
(Interview with Planning Consultant, May 2015) 
 
In a time of fiscal restraint amongst local governments it is unusual for such 
posts to have survived, let alone be created in the first place. 
‘We have an excellent level of expertise. We have some experts that are very 
unusual. We have a water and drainage expert, for example. Many councils 
just can’t manage to keep such a person. What happens elsewhere is 
Councils will say, ‘right, you’ve got to put in a sustainable urban drainage 
system in the plan’, then the developer puts in a whole bunch of 
documentation and the officers look at it and say ‘gosh, that’s impressive’. But 
we’ve got a guy who can actually spot whether any of it is bullshit’ (Interview 
with Cambridge City Councillor, March 2014). 
 
The role provides an internal coherence within the council itself, as it allows a 
point of contact for other departments to gain advice and feedback on plans, 
proposals or policies.  
‘Having dedicated staff has bought us expertise, allowing us to better 
negotiate with developers and so on and so forth. But also, everybody can 
ask that staff for advice and offer people quite simple frameworks for 
answering questions they may have. A colleague gave many briefing 
sessions to councillors on things that you and I might take for granted, that 
you should know x, y or z about sustainability. She gave classes on it! Then 
you started having people at planning committees then asking ‘how are you 
meeting your 10% obligations’. Then you have political signals going out 
(Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015) 
 
This not only made the job of developing and justifying proposals Cambridge 
City Council easier but also helped to reinforce a norm of sustainable 
construction. Developers are now expectant of critical scrutiny over the 
sustainability credentials of applications and have an awareness of the levels 
of technical expertise that exist (Interview with House Building Executive, April 
2015). One particular example helps to illustrate this. A major volume house-
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builder opposed the affordable homes and sustainable homes requirements 
that were being asked for on a development on the southern fringe of the city 
and launched an appeal to that effect:  
[At this stage] Cambridge didn’t have a policy for Code. We went to them and 
said that we cannot afford Code and the high levels of affordable housing that 
they were asking [on the site]. They asked us what we could afford, we said 
that we can afford X. They said that they would support low levels of 
affordable housing if you give us high levels of sustainability because we’re a 
liberal based folk and that’s our expectation. We said fine, we went in on that 
basis and they refused us. We went in on appeal and we lost. So we had to 
do a 40% affordable and all the bells and whistles for sustainability, even 
though it wasn’t in policy. What we should have done, like other developers 
do, is say no. Say that we would give you what was in the policy, which 
wasn’t a lot. We’ll give you the affordable, but we’ll challenge it. You’ll hear 
the planning officers at Cambridge tell you this, they got one over on us. Hey, 
look. In some respects Cambridge did a really good job. They got the high 
levels of sustainability, the high levels of affordable homes and the great 
infrastructure, but we as a company have paid for it (Interview with 
Housebuilding Executive, April 2015).  
 
 
This was only possible with a political will and technical expertise. By 
maintaining resources here despite budgetary cuts the council has maintained 
its professional expertise. Such expertise was an important resource for the 
council, allowing them to interrogate planning applications more adeptly, fully 
engage in the evidence gathering and dissemination required to include 
specific Code targets and increasing the overall level of awareness amongst 
councillors and officers. For that reason we can point towards 
entrepreneurship in Cambridge City Council as an important factor when 
accounting for supplementary standard setting.  
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7.4. Institutional Rules and Practices 
7.4.1.	Growth	Restriction		
 
Whilst Cambridge has always seen itself as at the vanguard of environmental 
awareness the extent to which it could act on that in the built environment was 
heavily circumscribed. From 1950 until the 1990s Cambridge was restricted in 
the extent to which it could grow – both in terms of population and area – by 
restrictive residential and commercial planning regulations laid out in the 1950 
Holford Report that capped populations at 100,000 (from a base of 81,500). 
The intention was to safeguard the ‘present character and fine qualities of 
Cambridge’ (Holford and Wright 1950, p. 24).’ Development beyond this point 
was to be directed towards neighbouring towns outside of the city boundaries, 
although there were small allowances in Holford for pockets of development in 
the West of the City and pockets of employment growth (Brindley et al. 1996, 
p. 30).  
 
From the 1960s onwards this limit-to-growth was reinforced by the formation 
of the Cambridge greenbelt, a 5 mile deep strip of mainly agricultural land 
drawn tightly around the boundaries of the City (While et al. 2004, p. 287). 
Given that they can only be altered in ‘exceptional circumstances’, greenbelts 
(by design) represented a significant obstacle to growth and expansion 
(Cullingworth and Nadin 2006, p. 233).  
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The considerable economic success of Cambridge in the post-war period – 
The Cambridge Phenomenon – placed pressure on the local housing market. 
Between 1950 and 1990 the number of people and jobs almost doubled  (the 
fastest rate of growth in the UK), but did so within a settlement area that had 
remained unchanged for almost a century (Segal Quince Wicksteed 2000a, p. 
86).  
 
Beginning in the 1960s there was a rapid expansion of high-tech firms 
attracted to the city in order to develop and exploit research and development 
that emanated from or clustered around the University of Cambridge and 
latterly Anglia Ruskin University (Segal Quince Wicksteed 2000a, 2000b), 
capitalizing upon the fast paced developments in science and technology. In 
1985 there were around 300 high-tech businesses in the city, comprising a 
mix of ‘drug discovery, bioinformatics, software, computer hardware, 
electronics, ink-jet printing, computer games [and] clean-tech’ (Segal Quince 
Wicksteed 2000b, p. 10) all vying for staff, but by 2011 there were over 900, 
employing roughly 37,000 people (roughly 25% of all jobs).  
 
The effect of The Cambridge Phenomenon was to raise house-prices as 
demand outstripped the curtailed supply. Between 1998 and 2014 average 
house prices rose from £82,000 to £350,000, over a four-fold increase 
(compared to an average increase for the UK as a whole from £45,000 to 
£135,000, a three-fold increase) (Hometrack 2015). Between 2006 and 2014 
alone average house prices increased by 50% in the city, rising to 9 times the 
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average salary (compared to 6.7 for England as a whole) (Cambridge City 
Council 2015, p. 5). This has also had implications for the availability of 
affordable housing in the City.  
 
The provision of housing began to rise on the political agenda, dominating the 
activity of the City Council’s planning department. The University of 
Cambridge commissioned the Mott Report in 1969 to investigate the influence 
of growth-restraint on its own expansion and evolution. It found that more 
fundamental issues were at stake than simply housing shortage and 
affordability; growth restriction strategies were impacting upon the extent to 
which inward investment (of both people and resources) could be maintained, 
whether in the context of industry, the professions or the knowledge economy 
(Brindley et al. 1996, p. 31).  Additionally, where residential expansion was 
taking place was in neighbouring towns and villages outside of the greenbelt, 
creating significant infrastructural issues with the cross green-belt commuting 
and overpopulation of neighbouring villages that resulted (South 
Cambridgeshire District Council 2002, p. 17). Yet within the restrictive system 
there little room for manoeuvre. It is unsurprising that within this context – 
especially considering the low political saliency of sustainable construction on 
the national agenda at this time – few calls for sustainable housing were 
made by the local council.  
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7.4.2.	Growth	Expansion	
 
As awareness of the dangers of this restrictive growth strategy grew, calls 
were increasingly made for a re-think of this strategy. It was during this time 
that policy entrepreneurs were able to institutionalise a commitment to 
sustainable design and construction. Regional planning bodies responded to 
the pressures of growth restriction by announcing a major growth strategy for 
the Cambridgeshire region, including a greenbelt expansion and a number of 
large-scale development sites. The government’s Sustainable Communities 
Plan designated the Cambridgeshire region as a key growth point and, with it, 
devolved considerable funding and institutional responsibilities in order to 
manage the evolution of that growth.  This was focused on the Thames 
Gateway, Ashford, Milton Keynes and the Stansted-Cambridge Corridor and 
provided £610 million between 2003 and 2006 for infrastructure, site 
assembly and remediation and a plan for the construction of 200,000 homes 
spread across the region.  
 
7.4.2.1.	Regional	Planning	Guidance	and	the	Cambridgeshire	and	Peterborough	
Structure	Plan	
 
The growth strategy was institutionalised through two key planning 
documents. At this time housing provision was decided upon at a regional 
level, through Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) – latterly replaced by 
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS), see section 3.5. – which were designed ‘to 
act as a spatial strategy for the region, with a planning horizon of fifteen to 
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twenty years’ (Cullingworth 2015, p. 103). Within these documents a new 
growth strategy was outlined that focused around green-belt land-release.  
 
These regional documents are important, because local planning policies 
must nest within them, as we saw in chapter three. Regional Planning 
Guidance Number Six for East Anglia (RPG6), published by the Government 
Office for the East of England in 2000, set out in general terms land 
allocations for the area, covering the siting and scale of housing development 
and infrastructure across the entire East Anglia region, of which Cambridge 
City Council is just one constituent authority. It was drafted in dialogue both 
with central government but also constituent local authorities, as well as other 
relevant stakeholders. Given the regional and strategic nature of this planning 
document no specific policies are put forward at this level of detail, with the 
focus instead on infrastructural provision, major development citing, housing 
provision targets, employment growth strategies and overarching policy 
principles.  However, having said this, there is a common thread within the 
plan that advocates a focus on sustainability, albeit in broad terms.  
 
The purpose of RPG was to inform a Structure Plan, another regional 
planning document (but one closer to the local government tier) whose 
purpose was to provide ‘a strategic tier of development plan’ and which 
‘consisted of a written statement of strategic policies and proposals (but not 
detailed land allocations) for the area’ (Cullingworth 2015, p. 109). Whilst 
RPG6 provided ‘the outline of the spatial development strategy’ 
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(Cambridgeshire County Council 2003, p. ix), the 2003 Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough Structure Plan, as that covering the region was known, laid out 
in more detail the implications of RPG requirements. Individual planning 
authorities within this region were then required to develop Local Plans that 
conformed to these higher-tier strategies. For that reason their content is 
important in setting the planning context.  
 
Overall, it required that 12,500 homes be built between 1999 and 2016 in 
Cambridge City Council, with around half of these in the city itself and the 
remainder on green-belt land. Policy P9/3C of the plan made suggestions for 
potential green-belt release sites across the Cambridge fringe. However, 
these were only enabling powers. Given that central guidance restricts 
greenbelt release except for ‘in exceptional circumstances’, it would be up to 
Cambridge City Council to provide the necessary evidence base to justify 
such a decision when it writes its own local plan. However, considerable 
emphasis was placed in the Structure Plan (and indeed RPG6) on green-belt 
release, providing a significant political-legal resource for any evidence 
gathering Cambridge City Council would later undertake.  
 
The Structure Plan institutionalized a broad stroke commitment to sustainable 
construction, which helped to legitimize the incorporation of sustainable 
construction standards at a later stage when policy entrepreneurs began to 
apply pressure. Policy P1/3 builds upon the commitment to energy efficiency 
and sustainable development in RPG6 by calling for local planning authorities 
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to adopt local plans that, amongst other things, encourage ‘a high standard of 
design and sustainability…[and] efficient use of energy and resources by 
including energy conservation measures’ (Cambridgeshire County Council 
2003, p. 12). Other policies assert that ‘the environment is protected and 
enhanced’ (Government Office for the East of England 2000, p. 12), or that 
policies strive towards ‘improving the energy efficiency of all building types’ 
(Government Office for the East of England 2000, p. 13).  
 
Table 7.2 below summarizes the main developments in both the growth 
restriction and growth expansion stages of Cambridge City Council’s planning 
policies.  
 
Document Name Year Key Points Binding? Residential Sustainability 
Requirements 
The Holford Report 1950 Restriction on growth, 
precursor to green-belt 
N Nil 
Mott Report 1969 Advocated easing 
restriction on growth 
N Nil 
Regional Planning 
Guidance 6 
2000 Strategic planning for 
East of England 
Region 
Y Broad vision for 
sustainable construction 
Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough 
Structure Plan  
2003 Called for  6000 
homes in Cambridge 
and green-belt 
releases 
Y Introduced requirement for 
local authorities to adopt 
high standards of 
sustainability in Local 
Plans   
Table 7.2: Local and Regional Institutional Rules 
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7.4.2.2.	Local	Planning	Policies	
 
Freeing up land for growth had an important legacy effect because it started 
the debate on sustainability. The regional planning documents contained 
overarching commitments to sustainable construction and introduced a 
requirement on Cambridge City Council to introduce new local planning 
documents, which presented a window of opportunity for those advocating 
sustainable construction. We can understand this era as a time of punctuated 
equilibrium, where institutional statis (growth restriction) is replaced by rapid 
and transformative change (expansion), as discussed in section 4.5. (see also 
Pierson 2000). Sudden institutional change of this nature meant a number of 
important decisions had to be made, most notably about the nature and type 
of growth that the City wanted. It was during these discussions that policy 
entrepreneurs were able to integrate the focused emphasis on sustainability 
within the regional policy framework within local planning institutions.  
 
Since the beginning of the expansion period Cambridge City Council had 
made numerous attempts to introduce sustainable construction targets and 
requirements for new homes into various elements of the local development 
framework, including Local Plan or Core Strategy policies, AAPs and SPDs. 
As we saw in section 7.2, Cambridge City Council’s first such policies were 
contained in its 2006 Local Plan – before the devolution of supplementary 
standard setting powers by central government – where policy 8/15 stated 
that: ‘developers of major proposals above a threshold of 1,000 square 
meters or 10 dwellings will be required to provide at least 10% of the 
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development's total predicted energy requirements on-site, from renewable 
energy sources’, caveated by a condition that ‘these requirements may be 
relaxed if it can be clearly demonstrated that to require full compliance would 
not be viable’ (Cambridge City Council 2006, p. 94). In addition to this Merton 
Rule type policy, policy 3/1 states that ‘where major development 47  is 
proposed developers should complete the Council's Sustainable Development 
Checklist and prepare a Sustainability Statement and submit both with the 
planning application’ (Cambridge City Council 2006, p. 22). This sustainability 
checklist required developers to outline their construction methods, material 
provenance, design-efficiencies and energy efficiency measures. It was 
contained in a dedicated Sustainable Design and Construction SPD, 
published in 2007, whose primary role was ‘as a means of setting out more 
detailed guidance on the way in which the policies in the [Local] Plan will be 
applied in particular circumstances or areas’ (The Planning Inspectorate 2009, 
p. 2). It focuses on outlining more specific details on various aspects of 
neighbourhood design and layout, transport and movement sustainable 
drainage, the Merton Rule policies, waste management provision, biodiversity, 
pollution, air quality, contaminated land, water conservation, materials and 
construction waste, protecting the historical environment. It also contains 
information and advice about resilient design, so that buildings can respond to 
the changes in weather and energy/water distribution in the future.   
 
																																																									
47 Defined as 10 or more dwellings 
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However, it is important to note that ‘information on how the [sustainability 
checklist] scheme meets the recommended standards is entirely at the 
discretion of the applicant’ and that, ‘failure to do so would be unlikely to result 
in a recommendation to refuse’ (Cambridge City Council 2007, p. 7). A Senior 
Consultant involved in major developments in the city suggests that ‘filling out 
a sustainability checklist was not exactly hard’, going so far as to call the 
statement ‘wishy-washy’ (Interview with Senior Consultant, February 2015). 
However, despite this, the checklist did provide the council with something to 
use in the negotiation process for large developments, and meant it could put 
pressure on those developments which although operating within the spirit of 
local regulation nevertheless left a lot to be desired from a sustainability 
perspective (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015). The 
only binding targets in the plan were the 10% Merton Rule type policy.  
 
Whilst the 2006 Local Plan made allowances for sustainable construction 
standards, more stringent requirements were introduced in 2008 in the 
Northwest Cambridge Area Action Plan (AAP), the first of the major growth 
sites associated with the green belt release. AAPs replace existing planning 
regulations in the area over which they have jurisdiction, so are ‘mini’ local 
plans and are therefore a material consideration in directing planning matters. 
Because of the statutory nature of the AAP and the wording of the policy, for 
the first time the Council was able to use sustainability standards as a 
material consideration in planning applications.  
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7.5. Institutional Synchronicity 
 
This growth expansion emerged alongside the rising political saliency of the 
zero-carbon homes agenda at the national level. What local actors were able 
to do was draw upon their political resources to translate that saliency locally 
by exploiting the window of opportunity associated with the growth strategy. 
Local Plans tend to last for a fifteen-year cycle, so they have important legacy 
effects and are only reformed infrequently and AAPs have the same lasting 
impact upon large-scale development sites. Just as the policies associated 
with the growth strategy were being drafted supplementary standard setting 
powers were offered by the government. There was an overarching sense 
that with such a step-change in attitudes to growth comes a responsibility, 
particularly around environmental impacts. One policy entrepreneur remarked 
that ‘Cambridge City Council thought that obviously growth brings with it 
carbon challenges, and we wanted to link the two agendas together’ 
(Interview with Cambridge City Councillor – May 2015). Accordingly, the 2006 
Plan, the first to discuss this growth, sought ‘to guide and facilitate growth in a 
sensitive and sustainable manner, ensuring that the high environmental 
quality of the City is protected and enhanced and that future developments 
offer a full range of opportunities to all its citizens’ (Cambridge City Council 
2006, p. 17). The results of this were the 10% Merton Rule type policy, the 
need for sustainability statements and checklists in qualifying developments 
and the Sustainable Design and Construction SPD that were discussed above 
in sections 7.2. and 7.4.2.2. However, 2006 Local Plan itself was published 
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before either the devolution of supplementary standard setting powers 
through PPS1 and the CSH, meaning that the scope for action within this 
document was limited, restricting behaviour largely to Merton Rule type 
policies and non-binding commitments to sustainability checklists and the like, 
as we saw. 
 
Nevertheless, between the 2006 Local Plan and the Northwest Cambridge 
AAP and CB1 development central government had begun to grant local 
councils greater autonomy, presenting an opportunity for the local authority to 
add to or remove any policy requirements that it had put in place in the 2006 
Local Plan. It is therefore telling of the extant ambition within the Council that 
they were keen to include supplementary standards at the first opportunity. 
Had the Council been writing its local plans after the publication of the NPPF it 
would have found it more difficult to justify the inclusion of supplementary 
sustainability standards, given the reforms it introduced to supplementary 
discretion and the much lower political saliency of sustainable homes at the 
national level at that time when compared to the 2006-2010 stages of the 
previous Labour administration, as we saw in chapter three.  
 
However, the same temporal factors that benefitted the Council between 2007 
and 2012 also halted plans to adopt citywide standards in the 2014 Local 
Plan. The Housing Standards Review removed the powers that local 
authorities have to set supplementary standards (followed shortly after by the 
abolition of the CSH and zero-carbon by 2016 standard, as discussed in 
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section 6.2), despite Cambridge having undertaken considerable work to 
justify their inclusion and despite on-going ambition. After a number of drafts 
the 2014 Local Plan was submitted to the Secretary of State for examination 
in March 2015. Given the embeddedness of local rules in national policy 
context it became clear that the Level 5 requirement within the Local Plan 
would have to be removed if the plan were to be considered sound. The 
Council had made every effort to incorporate supplementary standards, had 
provided a sound evidence base and had faced little opposition to such 
standards (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015). Yet, it 
was prevented from adopting them by changing national policy context.  
 
This, together with the changes that emerged from the NPPF presented 
significant frustration for policy makers in the City – ‘they just keep producing 
policies’ (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, March 2014). Many 
respondents were frustrated at these developments, for example:  
 
I don’t think the level of uncertainty that we’re currently getting from the 
national level helps at all. We were quite happily going through the plan and 
then all of a sudden the Housing Standards Review lands (Interview with 
Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015). 
 
I think being a planning officer within a local authority is really a nightmare 
because of the pace of change. But, in terms of the frustration for local 
authorities currently, it does seem to be more pronounced than previously. 
There are more things left open to interpretation than previously. You could 
argue whether that is a pro or a con but I think on the whole people like clarity 
and the pace and frequency of change seems to be beyond what is normal in 
the cycle of constant change if you like. It must make the job very difficult 
(Interview with Planning Consultant, May 2015). 
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I think the area we have been worried about is around Government chipping 
away at what we think are quite important policy requirements (Interview with 
Director of Environment, Cambridge City Council, February 2015) 
 
Although the Local Plan review was suspended pending more thorough 
consideration of housing projections the CSH policies will, in any case, be 
removed. Any attempt to continue to justify their inclusion at examination will 
be met with resistance from developers given the lack of legislative backing.  
 
Nevertheless, local actors were able to capitalise upon this rule-based 
synchronicity and growth expansion strategy to call for more stringent 
sustainable construction requirements. Indeed we might therefore talk about 
practice-based synchronicity, through a normative commitment within the 
Council to the principles of sustainability and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation; an internal sense that local planning policy was an adequate 
means through which to address the energy efficiency of homes and third; 
that the CSH was an appropriate means through which to do so.  As the 
Senior Sustainability Officer tasked with managing the sustainability within the 
City Council’s policies remarked: 
 ‘[The publication of the Code] helped us to define sustainable construction 
and put a name to it. I think for us we just saw an opportunity. We couldn’t 
miss that opportunity. It was so obvious that this was the perfect opportunity 
to get something quite special. With the amount of growth going on in the city 
that people could see that there was an opportunity to push for higher 
standards. I think we just took a proactive approach. We’ve got a lot of 
growth, lets make it as high quality as we can. It’s all stemmed from there 
really (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, February 2015).  
 
This commitment to the principles of sustainability is embodied in, for 
example, the City’s Carbon Management Plan, which outlines a ‘vision is for 
the city to be “at the forefront of low carbon living”’ (Cambridge City Council 
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2012, p. iv), or the City’s 2012 Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Key 
priorities within this strategy (which builds upon a 2008 plan) concern 
improving the sustainability of Council buildings and Council owned and 
managed homes, continuing to improve cycling infrastructure in the City, the 
creation of a climate change fund, and educational programs. It also provides 
a strategic link between various climate change mitigation and adaptation 
measures, of which supplementary standard setting was one component. 
 
This practice-based synchronicity also extends to the perception by the 
Council of both the appropriate role of local authorities as an incubator for 
supplementary standards and the appropriate role for the planning system in 
raising the sustainability of buildings (rather than relying on national Building 
Regulations) (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, March 2014). As one 
respondent said,  
The inspiring, fabulous thing about working in Cambridge all these years is 
the feeling that if we can’t do this then nobody can. We really do have a duty 
to innovate and lead because we’re wealthy. We’re successful. We are a 
confident city. We value the environment. We are a very special place. We 
believe we’re a special place. We have idealistic values about the quality of 
people’s lives (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015) 
 
There was a very clear sense that the Council felt itself to have an obligation 
to ensure that the development agreed upon would achieve the highest 
possible levels of sustainability and a clear strategy to which that action will 
relate. It is unsurprising then that several respondents remarked that the CSH 
gave a ‘name’ and legal-institutional backing to pre-existing desires within the 
Council:  
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‘I think the Code gave us something that we could look at and a standard we 
can use. The ambition was there before, but the Code helped us to define 
sustainable construction and put a name to it. We recognized that we had a 
supportive national framework through PPS1 and the Code (Interview with 
Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015). 
 
When the code came along it was a way of defining sustainability more 
precisely. The commitment was there first and then the Code came second 
(Interview with Director of Environment, Cambridge City Council, February 
2015). 
 
So, normatively there was a commitment to: sustainability in general, local 
supplementary powers as a policy tool and the CSH as an appropriate means 
through which to address sustainability in housing.  
 
7.6. Networks  
 
In the same way that key actors were enabled and constrained by particular 
institutional factors, they were also constrained and enabled by policy 
networks surrounding planning (which are in turn affected by prevailing 
institutional rules and practices). Pro-environment interests dominate local 
planning networks, limiting the amount of opposition to sustainable 
construction proposals.  
  
It was the University of Cambridge who made – and maintained - the first calls 
for growth. In 1996 it established a coalition compromised of local business 
leaders, politicians, local government officers and local professional groups to 
form Cambridge Futures, whose purpose was to reform the discourse and 
attitude to growth in the city. By drawing on the conclusions of the Mott Report 
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and the importance of The Cambridge Phenomenon to the academic and 
financial future of the University itself they set out to study alternatives to 
growth restriction. 
What the University did was, they said “to maintain our leading status as a 
global player, the City would need to grow”.  They were having all sorts of 
problems with post-docs and accommodation, and so on. The University saw 
this as a straightjacket and started a debate about releasing green belt land 
to accommodate growth within the City’ (Interview with a former Head of 
Planning in Cambridge City Council, February 2015). 
 
The main legacy of Cambridge Futures was the work it undertook on 
alternatives to the existing growth restraint strategy. In that work they 
modelled the impact of seven possible growth scenarios on economic, social 
and environmental grounds: 
The do nothing option, a densification option – try to pile it all in Cambridge, a 
green swap – taking a bit out of the inner boundary of the green belt and 
building urban extensions was a third spatial option. The fourth one was a 
new town beyond the green belt. The fifth one was building out along 
transport corridors. Another one was sprinkling it around the villages and 
there was a virtual highway one which was a sort of hope that everyone might 
work at home in the future and might not need to move anyways (Interview 
with former Head of Planning in Cambridge City Council, February 2015).  
 
On the basis that there was no one ‘fix’; they advocated a mixed approach 
that called for the redevelopment of brownfield sites together with a review of 
the greenbelt. Given the controversial nature of the proposals extensive public 
engagement was sought, and a consensus was reached:  
We did a big exhibition and had a lot of public consultation and workshops 
with Councillors and what emerged from that was a consensus. First of all 
both the do-nothing and the carry on sprinkling it around options were just not 
on anymore. So it was a question if Cambridge was going to grow, what was 
the best approach? What came out was a balanced approach. Let’s try 
maximizing the brownfield sites within Cambridge but recognizing that there 
wasn’t very much brown-field sites, because it doesn’t have an industrial 
heritage – so that wouldn’t be enough. Then lets us tackle of the greenbelt 
and do a review of the inner boundaries to see where you could plan urban 
extensions in ways that would still keep the principle of the purpose of the 
	247	
greenbelt but would still allow for urban extensions (Interview with former 
Head of Planning in Cambridge City Council, February 2015). 
 
The most important external organization to institutionalize a commitment to 
sustainable construction within the discussions on Cambridge’s growth was 
Cambridgeshire Horizons, a non-profit QUANGO formed in the early 2000s, 
which drew upon the principles of sustainable urban growth embodies in 
Cambridge Futures to oversee the growth strategy embodied in RPG6 and 
the Structure Plan. Given the scale of change implicit in the growth strategy 
Horizons was tasked with providing the necessary strategic oversight to 
deliver infrastructure, attract and direct funding and to bring together the 
various stakeholders (Interview with former Head of Planning in Cambridge 
City Council, February 2015). It was established as ‘a consortium for local 
authorities to support growth’ (Interview with Director of Environment, 
Cambridge City Council, February 2015) and was not intended to ‘make’ 
policy but to ensure that the growth that was agreed upon elsewhere was 
managed conscientiously:  
 
The principal behind the consortium was the idea that we wanted not just any 
growth – it wasn’t just housing numbers, it was the sustainability, urban 
design principles and all the rest of it’ – (Interview with Director of 
Environment, Cambridge City Council,  February 2015). 
 
 
It was abolished alongside the removal of regional planning and when central 
Conservative-led coalition government reduced the number of QUANGOs 
soon after the 2010 election.  
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However, it did leave an important legacy, which had a direct influence on the 
trajectory of sustainability standards: the Cambridgeshire Quality Charter for 
Growth. At the heart of the document are ‘four C’s’ which should inform all 
spatial planning in the region: Community, Climate, Connectivity and 
Character. This programme emphasized the need for quality as well as 
quantity in future developments, and ensured a consensus amongst private, 
public and voluntary sector actors on the matter. Central to the discussion 
here is the notion of climate. The Quality Charter for Growth suggests that, 
‘environmental targets [for new development] should be challenging and 
where possible go beyond the minimum standards so that new schemes act 
as exemplars’ (Cambridgeshire Horizons 2010, p. 10). One respondent went 
further, remarking that: 
It had these four Cs. Community, connectivity, climate and character. When 
you read there are about nine or ten objectives under each of those four Cs. 
A lot of that was already, effectively, just putting in simple terms what was 
already in policy. Some of it was new as well, or strengthened and being a bit 
more assertive about what it should be That provided a basis and the 
inspiration, if you like. It was providing the vision that gave people the 
confidence to demand that (Interview with former Head of Planning in 
Cambridge City Council, February 2015). 
 
Although non-binding, it is important to stress the importance of this Quality 
Charter for Growth. It served as a normative benchmark against which the 
behaviour of local authorities (including Cambridge City Council) could both 
be judged but also justified. Additionally, though, because of its institutional 
grounding in RPG6, the Structure Plan and the Sustainable Communities 
Plan, the document could be used as a material consideration for local 
authorities when both designing and implementing their local planning policies 
if they were keen on including supplementary standards (Interview with former 
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Head of Planning in Cambridge City Council, February 2015). What this 
means is that a local authority intent on introducing particular sustainable 
construction standards could use the Quality Charter as a justification for 
doing so when submitting local plans for scrutiny, alongside regional planning 
policies. Additionally, it served to legitimize any claims for supplementary 
standards at the local level that would subsequently be made. It did not 
guarantee that these discussions would arise, but would legitimize any that 
did. Local policy entrepreneurs were empowered by this, and used it as a 
resource. 
 
The highly educated population had formed a number of well-organised 
environmental groups and this kind of growth strategy met with a broadly 
receptive audience, both inside and outside of the council. There was little 
internal opposition within Cambridge City Council, both from officers and 
councillors (on all sides of the political divide). The Liberal Democrats held 
power at the time of the initial discussions and were elected on a pro-
environment mandate: 
‘The environment was very much a Lib-Dem agenda, so we had that political 
mandate behind us. Sustainable homes were very much the Lib Dem 
agenda. Labour was really the only other party that mattered and they were 
quite passive about it, certainly not resistant. We had full control of the 
council, so we just did it. It was pushing at an open door’ (Interview with 
Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015).  
 
‘The Lib Dems came in on the back of an environmental agenda. There was a 
happy coincidence in relation to a strong political impetuous to address 
environmental issues, a history of environmental issues that were 
exacerbated by the development strategy and an acceptance that growth was 
linked to the need for more capacity for more housing and to do those things 
carefully (Interview with Director of Environment, Cambridge City Council, 
March 2015).  
	250	
 
The majority of us Liberal Democrats here are on what you might call the 
green wing, the leftish of the liberal democrats…I don’t think we’ve got any 
climate change sceptics on the Council as far as I know. Others may not be 
as enthusiastic as us but they don’t oppose it (Interview with Cambridge City 
Councillor, January 2014). 
 
Although demand came initially from within the Council there was little 
opposition from local residents or groups at consultation. 
We involved local groups in workshops as well. So we did engage with them 
early on. It was mostly through those workshops that we had and through the 
consultations. What did they bring to the table? I think it’s the support. Having 
that local support of what we are trying to do and I think it terms of localism 
that is really important. We have lots of residents associations in the city and 
a lot of them support what we are trying to do on sustainable construction 
because they want to see the quality and all of that maintained at a high level. 
(Interview with Sustainability Officer, January 2014) 
 
However, although the general populace in Cambridge has a long tradition of 
advocacy on environmental issue – with a wide range of local green advocacy 
groups – there was little evidence to suggest that external green groups acted 
as a direct catalyst for the incorporation of supplementary sustainability 
standards within the growth strategy. There was limited evidence that they did 
play an indirect role in keeping sustainability on the wider political agenda. For 
example… 
‘How significant were the various green groups in the city in bringing this onto 
the political agenda? Did they have much involvement in the agenda setting? 
Yes. They did. They were helpful in creating a culture for where it’s important. 
They would make their voices felt if we weren’t doing climate things. The 
slightly difficult thing for us is that it’s such a technical area, the whole 
planning policy area, that it’s quite hard for groups to follow that in depth to 
follow what’s going when developing planning policies. I’m sure they wrote in 
endorsing things. Politicians know they’re there and we talk to them and go 
their green events’ (Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015) 
 
This isn’t to say that there were not objections to the proposals. However, the 
strong economic environment, strong public support, favourable development 
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characteristics (see section 7.8. below), wording in law and expertise of the 
council meant they were often unsuccessful. After time, Cambridge City 
Council had developed a strong reputation at defending Code policies and 
remained unchallenged, even when attempting to include them in its 2014 
Local Plan. The expertise they had built up when introducing sustainable 
construction policy in the NW Cambridge AAP had helped the council not just 
to navigate the policy-making process but to gain confidence in negotiations 
with land-owners and developers. Successful attempts to incorporate 
supplementary standards into development had reinforced a normative vision 
into the city.  
 
We can talk of a process of institutional layering, which (as we saw in section 
4.5.) involves the ‘active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or revisions 
to an existing set of institutions’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 24) taking place 
such that ‘new elements attached to existing institutions gradually change 
their status and structure’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 31).  
‘When we started the 2014 Local Plan process North West Cambridge was 
quite a good catapult for us: ‘look what we’ve managed to do here, we need 
to get a lot more of this into the local plan’ and revising the Local Plan has 
always been on the cards and has always been on the work programme. I 
think that catapult has always been there from when we started reviewing the 
plan: we knew we really need to improve our climate change coverage from 
two policies [in the 2006 plan] to an entire chapter now. It’s kind of embedded 
in everything we try and do in the plan’ (Interview with Senior Sustainability 
Office, January 2014) 
 
This is an important legacy effect that has set normative boundaries around 
the range of possible behaviours, altering perceptions such that some are 
more appropriate than others: 
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‘There is an expectation within Cambridge that development is delivered safe-
guarding the green spaces, that the community facilities are provided on time 
etc. etc. If we started delivering without those things then I think very quickly 
there would be a turn against growth. There is a sort of consensus. Not 
everyone agrees that growth is a good thing but there is a sort of consensus 
that we are safeguarding the quality of life within the City -and that includes 
the environmental issues. If we were to set that to one side then I think we 
would lose support for growth and there would be very much more opposition 
to it’ (Interview with Director of Environment, February 2015) 
  
‘Council members looked towards NW Cambridge and said, ‘can we do that 
to the rest of the city’? It set a precedent. We certainly wanted to take what 
we had in NW Cam and apply it to the rest of the city, moving that stuff 
forward so that we could start setting standards elsewhere. I think there was 
a very strong feeling that we should be doing that across the whole of the city 
not just on one site’ (Interview with Senior Sustainable Consultant, February 
2015). 
 
‘We’re trying to use them NW Cambridge as a precedent. We’re saying to 
developers that if you don’t do your houses to the same standards then 
they’re going to be a second rate development in comparison’ (Interview with 
Cambridge City Councillor, March 2014) 
 
In part this is reflective of the way that sustainable development is 
institutionalised within the council’s decision-making process.  As we saw 
above Cambridge City Council has history of action of sustainability and 
climate change and as a result of a number of dedicated governance 
structures exist that spread across existing departments and portfolios (see 
Figure 6.1 below) and frequent monitoring and progress reporting takes place. 
 
This environmental awareness and commitment to sustainability also exists 
beyond the Council walls though. The City itself has a long tradition of 
innovation in this field. The University in particular has a strong track record in 
this area and has attracted (and incubated) a pro-environment culture within 
the City. It had its own internal structures and processes for raising the 
"%#!
sustainability of its estates and has long championed the green agenda 
through funding, strategy or direct action.  
Why is Cambridge so green? I think it’s the nature of the city. I think it does 
attract certain people, because the university is here. There is a big clean 
tech sector in this area, for example. It does attract people who are already in 
that mind-set’ (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2015) 
‘It is a product of Cambridge socio-economic position. It makes life for the 
council easier…we are mostly pushing at an open door’ (Interview with 
Cambridge City Councillor, January 2014).  
‘We are quite free-thinking and progressive people in Cambridge. When they 
hear about it they will ask you what you’re doing. There’s no resistance!’ 
(Interview with Cambridge City Councillor, May 2015).  
 
Figure 7.1: Climate change governance structures in Cambridge City Council 
(Source: Adapted from Cambridge City Council 2012, p. 24) 
 
Another important network interaction was with South Cambridgeshire District 
Council. The abolition of regional planning in 2010 and the publication of the 
NPPF – with its broadly defined Duty to Cooperate replacing binding cross-
border working (as we saw in section 3.6.) – meant in broad terms that such 
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cross-border cooperation could not always be guaranteed. The ‘duty’ does 
place a burden on neighbouring authorities to share provision but leaves 
precise figures, sites and footprints open to (often lengthy) negotiation and 
potential contestation. Contestation can arise when growth-averse local 
authorities or those with housing shortages of their own are asked by their 
neighbours to accommodate developments that will largely serve the latter.  
 
In previous sections we saw that the growth strategy presented a window of 
opportunity for stakeholders to integrate a focus on sustainability. However, 
this growth strategy would not have been possible had it not been for 
congruence between Cambridge City Council and its neighbour, South 
Cambridgeshire District Council that allowed both the initial emergence of the 
growth strategy and its continuation post-NPFF.   
 
Cambridge is unusual in so much as SCDC is its only administrative 
neighbour, circling as it does in a donut shape to completely surround the city. 
Many of the strategic development sites that underpin the city’s growth 
strategy are at the edge of the city (most notably at the NW Cambridge site) 
and straddle the border between the two. Under the existing Structure Plan 
and Regional Planning Guidance system there was a binding obligation to 
work together where necessary to accommodate housing projections in line 
with typical approaches to regional planning; a regional body outlines housing 
need and key strategic development points, leaving it down to local authorities 
to (where necessary) work together to deliver.  
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Their relationship is marked by high degrees of political harmony. Whilst there 
were disagreements over precise figures and site footprints (Interview with 
Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2014), South Cambridgeshire District 
Council was nevertheless willing to work together with the City to 
accommodate its housing growth even after the abolition of regional planning. 
This harmony was crucial, for it meant that Cambridge could have some 
degree of certainty that problems surrounding housing shortages and housing 
affordability were at least partly being alleviated.  
 
We have always worked closely with South Cams, even before the duty to 
cooperate. We’ve produced joint area action plans before the duty to 
cooperate came in. A lot of people who live in South Cams look towards the 
city for their services, facilities and jobs, so there’s always been that close 
relationship. This kind of working brings better coordinated planning and a 
coordinated approach to growth (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, 
January 2015). 
 
 
It wasn’t just AAPs that were written and agreed upon jointly; this cooperation 
continued up until the 2014 Local Plan, which was submitted for examination 
and written jointly by the two local authorities.  
 
The fact that Cambridge City Council had a strong relationship with its sole 
neighbour, South Cambridgeshire District Council, meant that greenbelt 
review, shared vision and a proactive approach to employment and residential 
growth could help to alleviate the city’s housing crisis, creating room on the 
agenda for sustainability.  
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7.7. Economic conditions 
 
The wording of the devolved powers places a strong emphasis on the effect of 
any standards on the viability of future development, as we saw in chapter 
three. The same housing market conditions that led to calls for a growth 
expansion strategy also put Cambridge in a strong economic position to justify 
the inclusion of supplementary sustainability standards to the planning 
inspector. But this was only possible because the growth strategy alleviated 
the political pressure that such a strong housing market bought about. It 
created political ‘room’ for a discussion on sustainability by alleviating 
pressure for a growth in absolute housing numbers and provision of affordable 
homes.  
 
Cambridge was additionally fortunate in that the types of development that 
were being discussed in the early stages of supplementary standard setting 
(i.e. large, green-field developments) were highly amenable to high levels of 
sustainability, both from an economic but also a technical perspective. This is 
important because as we saw above these plans had important legacy 
effects. For example, the NW Cambridge development site was particularly 
unusual: 
‘The Northwest Cambridge site offers particular opportunities [for high 
sustainability standards] due to several key factors, including the scale of the 
development, the mix of uses proposed, land ownership and long term 
interest in the site by the University, and phasing of development over the 
long term amongst others’ – (Cambridge City & South Cambridgeshire District 
Councils 2008) 
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Particularly significant was the scope to incorporate site wide energy 
efficiency technologies (such as combined heat and power or district heating 
schemes), meaning that the cost of Level 5 compliance were reduced 
compared to a smaller, brownfield, more ‘typical’ development.  
‘The bulk of the cost of meeting the Code is in the energy requirements. 
Therefore, where decentralised energy is viable on a site, the energy 
requirements of the Code, certainly up until level 5, if not beyond, are likely to 
be relatively easily fulfilled. At Code level 5, the energy requirements become 
significantly more demanding. They represent a 100% reduction in carbon 
emissions compared to 2006 requirements. It is widely understood that a 
comprehensive, whole site strategy for any particular development is 
essential to meet these standards, as stand alone technologies will not be 
cost effective or viable to meet them in full’ (Cambridge City Council and 
South Cambridgeshire District Council n.d., p. 21) 
 
What’s more, the fact that the University sat as both landowner and tenant on 
the NW Cambridge Site – which was so important, as we saw above, in 
setting a precedent for future developments in the City – meant that traditional 
costs associated with land acquisition did not factor into assessments of 
viability.  Calls for Code Level 5 emanated from the Council but, surprisingly 
(given their long-term interest in lowering energy costs) were met with 
resistance by the University who ‘really resisted badly. We took the view that 
we wanted Code level 5 on the site, and they resisted point blank’ (Interview 
with local Councillor, April 2015). This placed considerable pressure on 
Council officials to fully justify (and argue at inspection) the inclusion of Code 
level 5. As we saw in section 7.4, Cambridge was well placed to deploy this 
required level of expertise.  
 
‘You can’t get these things past the inspector because they’re a nice idea, 
you have to do a lot of work. The University has quite a lot of resources and 
rooms full of men in suits doing their thing, and our Council staff really did 
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manage to pull it off. They convinced the inspector on an evidence basis that 
Code level 5 was sustainable for the university. That was a huge amount of 
work and conviction by them. They were absolutely delighted, we were all 
thrilled (Interview with local Councillor, April 2015) 
 
Indeed the Planning Inspector, tasked with ensuring the validity of the AAP, 
observed himself that ‘a failure to incorporate these kinds of standards would 
be a ‘missed opportunity’ (The Planning Inspectorate 2009, p. 32). Yet there 
were certainly challenges for developers on the site:  
‘I would say that the rigor of the Code five has meant that the architects have 
had to think very, very hard about some of the ways in which they design the 
buildings whereas if they go for Code 4 they wouldn’t have done. So in some 
senses that has been a good thing’ (Interview with Industry Consultant, 
January 2015).  
 
CB1, being an inner city development on brownfield land presented greater 
challenges both for economists and technologists, but the considerable 
returns promised from high house prices in the city-centre alleviated initial 
viability concerns (The Planning Inspectorate 2015a; Interview with Industry 
Consultant, January 2015). 
 
Much like in the case of the NW Cambridge AAP and the CB1 development 
plan, the Council had to provide sufficient evidence to justify the inclusion of 
Code 4 targets in the 2014 Local Plan. A major contributor to that process 
was a major assessment of the possibilities for sustainable construction to be 
advocated through the planning policy process titled Decarbonising 
Cambridge (ElementEnergy 2010). A number of policy proposals were judged 
for suitability and effectiveness (with an eye to the likelihood that those 
policies would make it through an independent planning inspection process). 
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Here it was shown that ‘proposals for residential development or schemes 
which include residential development should consider the requirements of 
the Code for Sustainable Homes’ (ElementEnergy 2010, p. 99). Yet it was the 
Council itself that hoped to include such targets from the outset of the plan 
writing process, learning from experiences in Northwest Cambridge, CB1 and 
elsewhere. Within Decarbonising Cambridge it was shown that the nature of 
the development sites and housing market in Cambridge was conducive to 
the incorporation of Code standards that supplemented those in national 
Building Regulations without any measurable impact upon viability. As we saw 
in chapter five, national policy guidelines allowed for supplementary standard 
setting, but in a way that has a minimal effect on the viability of proposed 
developed, citing concerns over a reactive restriction of supply in light of 
standards that compromise the bottom line. This places considerable burden 
on those Councils that wish to incorporate those standards to provide 
sufficient evidence to prove the viability to that effect. Decarbonising 
Cambridge represented a significant attempt to do so and showed that, on the 
whole, development viability would not be compromised by supplementary 
standards.  
 
Whilst Code Level 4 was sought for the 2014 Local Plan, the Council 
wanted to go further. Architects of the policy initially aimed for a Level 5 
requirement, but stopped short on the basis of viability and a belief that 
such stringent requirements would fail to make it past inspection.  
‘We were initially going to have an onsite carbon reduction of 70%… but I 
think we took the decision that it was probably too risky, even though we had 
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the evidence base to support it, it was probably not going to get through an 
examination. I am disappointed to have had to downgraded, I would have 
loved to have gone for 70%, but I think the reality of getting something 
through an examination is that it's better to have a policy than to not have 
anything’ (Interview with Senior Sustainability Officer, January 2014) 
 
The view was taken that a less stringent but more pragmatic level should 
be sought, for fear that a more stringent requirement would either be 
rejected at examination or through planning appeals by developers 
(Interview with Senior Sustainability Office, January 2015).   
 
7.8. Conclusion: Institutionalising Sustainable Construction 
Standards 
  
In this chapter we have seen that policy entrepreneurs were able to capitalise 
upon existing, external institutions and in so doing created new, internal 
institutions. The emerging regional normative framework, institutional 
synchronicity, latent institutional and network resources and rapid expansion 
of the city presented opportunities for entrepreneurs to institutionalise Code 
policies. Gradually the local planning system was layered to incorporate a 
much more rigorous and widespread focus on sustainable construction. 
Developers came to expect high standards in the city, with little chance of 
opposition. What changed were the external rules from central government, 
which removed supplementary standard setting powers before the Council 
was able to pass its Level 5 requirement. Rather than preclude further action 
by installing uncertainty, this simply stopped a rigorous policy in its tracks. 
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Chapter Eight: 
 
The Demise of Sustainable Construction Standards in 
Oxford City Council 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Whilst the previous chapter focused on a success story in the provision of 
sustainable planning regulation this chapter focuses on a local authority that 
has taken a different, seemingly opposite trajectory. Prior to the devolution of 
supplementary standard setting powers in 2007 Oxford City Council could 
have been considered a success in its own right; it had an ‘in-house’ 
sustainable construction standard of its own, targets from which were 
integrated into local planning policies. 
 
However, over time this success has diminished. In recent years this in-house 
standard has become redundant until eventually there were no supplementary 
standards in place. This chapter follows a similar structure to the previous 
one; having explained the range of policies in place over time the discussion 
turns to explaining why Oxford took the trajectory it did in order to pave the 
way for a comparative analysis in the following chapter and, ultimately, to 
answer to research question number two. Or, put differently, this chapter asks 
why Oxford went from a local authority that was ahead of the curve in 2006 to 
one that is considerably less innovative.  
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We will see that the ambition, expertise and entrepreneurship that existed in 
the 2000s struggled to compete with an institutional and economic context 
that prioritised housing affordability over sustainability in a context of acute 
housing shortages, growth restriction and rapid employment growth, 
especially when the in-house standard had just been adopted. What this 
serves to highlight is that although policy entrepreneurs are important in 
pushing for sustainable construction targets, without an institutional context 
that provides an adequate window of opportunity or one that incentivises such 
innovation their input is much less influential. As the saliency of sustainability 
decreased those advocating sustainable construction found themselves 
alienated within a policy network that prioritised employment growth and badly 
resourced or situated to set about reforming the dominant institutions that 
precluded an on going focus on sustainable construction in the first place.   
 
The discussion below begins by explaining those policies in place with Oxford 
over the last decade before covering the expertise and policy 
entrepreneurship that has taken place; the institutional and economic context 
and the anti-sustainability bias that abounds in local policy networks. This 
paves the way for a comparative analysis of both case studies in the chapter 
that follows. 
 
 
 
	263	
8.2. Sustainable Planning in Oxford City: From Leader to Laggard 
 
8.2.1. Innovation in Sustainable Planning: The Natural Resource Impact 
Assessment  
 
There is a history of innovation in sustainability and climate change 
mitigation/adaptation in Oxford City Council, both in a general sense and in its 
approach to planning regulation. However, this momentum has faltered in 
recent years. It was amongst the first local authorities to require specific 
sustainability standards for residential housing through specific wording in 
their 2001 Local Plan (adopted in 2005). This puts it considerably ahead of 
the curve when compared to other local authorities. Policy CP.18 required 
compliance with a Natural Resource Impact Assessment (NRIA) for 
developments over 10 homes or 2000m2 of non-residential space (Oxford City 
Council 2005, p. 25). In some respects the NRIA is comparable to the Code 
for Sustainable Homes, although it is not as broad or comprehensive.  
 
The purpose of the NRIA was to allow developers and planners to ‘evaluate 
the natural resources and environmental impacts and benefits arising from a 
proposed development’ (Oxford City Council 2006a, p. 5) and comprises two 
components, both of which were developed by the Council itself. The first is a 
series of questions for developers covering the design of the building. The 
second is a checklist, with minimum standards across a number of areas; 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, materials and water use (see Table 
	264	
8.148). The Council remarks that ‘rarely is the City Council likely to approve a 
development where a score of six is not achieved including at least the 
minimum standard in each section’ (Oxford City Council 2006a, p. 34). More 
detailed advice on how to comply with the NRIA were contained in the Natural 
Resource Impact Assessment Supplementary Planning Document, published 
in 2006 (see Oxford City Council 2006a).  
 
 Minimum Standards Preferred Standard Target Standard 
Energy 
Efficiency 
SAP49 Rating of 
‘Good’ 
1 point SAP rating of 
‘best’ 
2 points SAP rating of 
‘advanced’ 
3 points 
Renewable 
Energy 
20% 1 point 30%  2 points 40% 3 points 
Water 54m3/bedspace/
year 
1 37.5m3/bedspace
/year 
2 points n/a n/a 
Table 8.1: The Natural Resource Impact Assessment Sustainability 
Checklist 
(Source: Adapted from Oxford City Council 2006a) 
 
The most important of these is the requirement that 20% of a building’s 
energy requirements come from on-site renewable energy provision. This was 
considerably more stringent than the London Borough of Merton’s 2003 
Merton Rule (which called for a 10% on-site requirement, discussed in section 
7.2.). More importantly, no such requirements existed at the national level, 
meaning that these were supplementary standards. What’s more, there was 																																																									
48 Materials have not been included in this table because their points are dependent upon a series of calculation that 
are not necessary to reproduce here. 
49 SAP – the standard assessment procedure – is a methodology used to define the energy efficiency of a building. 
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no basis in law for local supplementary standard setting powers at this time, 
meaning that they were not subject to the stringent testing required of 
supplementary standards after the publication of PPS1 and, latterly, the NPPF 
(interview with Oxford City Councillor #1, April 2015). Nor was there a 
renewable energy standard nationally, so these policies represent somewhat 
of a watershed. 
 
This innovation reflects a commitment to sustainability that is spread across 
the Council’s activities. It was successful in implementing its 2008 Carbon 
Management Strategy and Implementation Plan, reducing the emissions from 
Council activity by 25%. It is the recipient of major national awards, (The 
Energy Saving Trust’s Green Fleet Heroes and Carbon Trust Innovation 
Award in 2009/10, “Highly Commended” in the Low Carbon Council category 
of the Local Government Chronicle awards 2011/12) and was one of one 9 
leading local authority areas in the UK invited to take part in the DECC 
sponsored Low Carbon Frameworks project (leading to £360k of additional 
funding which has helped kick-start Oxford low carbon communities projects 
and Low Carbon Oxford initiative – discussed below) (Oxford City Council 
2012a, p. 1).  
 
More recently, the Low Emissions Strategy (Oxford City Council 2013a) was 
the first attempt the Council made to integrate an over-arching carbon 
reduction plan across the Council’s policy areas in order to ‘provide the 
framework to ensure that we maximise the co-benefits of tackling climate 
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change and air quality in an integrated and co-ordinated way (Oxford City 
Council 2013a, p. 1). These documents commit the Council to a 50% 
improvement in the energy efficiency of Council Housing, a 40% reduction in 
overall CO2 emissions by 2002 (compared to 2006 levels) and a 50% 
reduction in emissions from housing through renewable energy schemes.  
 
8.2.2. The Decline of Sustainable Planning Innovation: From Innovation 
to Stagnation 
 
Whilst Oxford was ahead of the curve in the earlier days of the zero-carbon 
homes agenda the same cannot be said today. Even in spite of the engrained 
focus on climate change across the council on a strategic level, Oxford City 
Council has fewer policies in place in recent years concerning the 
sustainability of buildings, even if the commitment to sustainability in other 
areas of the council remains. Indeed, climate change didn’t even feature in 
the City’s 2012 Housing Strategy (see Oxford City Council 2012b) and today it 
has no policies in place that be considered supplementary in the sense 
discussed thus far, as we will see below. 
 
During its life the NRIA lost relevance as national Building Regulations were 
reformed in line with the target for all new homes to be zero carbon by 2016 
(see chapter three). Between 2006 and 2013 the NRIA did require 
sustainability standards supplementary to those in national Building 
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Regulations, but it was after this that step-changes nationally superseded it, 
something the Council itself recognizes:  
After 2013, the mandatory criteria for the code for sustainable homes 
[incorporated in Part L of the Building Regulations] would replace most of the 
requirements of the NRIA (energy efficiency, water efficiency and use of 
materials). The energy efficiency and water criteria are also duplicated by the 
Building Regulations (Oxford City Council 2011a, pp. 12–13) 
 
Surprisingly, the NRIA was watered down rather than reformed to keep it 
‘one-step-ahead’, replaced instead with a requirement for Energy Statements 
to accompany planning applications. This change was made following the 
proposed (but ultimately delayed) updates to national Building Regulations in 
2013. The 2005 Local Plan, where the NRIA was first introduced, was 
replaced by the in 2011 Core Strategy (which reiterated the existing NRIA 
policies) and, most importantly, the 2013 Sites and Housing Development 
Plan Document, which allocated sites for development and sets out detailed 
planning policies. HP11 of the 2013 Sites and Housing Development Plan 
Document (SHDPD) states that:  
Until 31 September 2013, the Natural Resources Impact Analysis (NRIA) 
SPD checklist will be used to assess compliance with this policy. The NRIA 
would no longer apply to residential developments…from 1st October 
2013…The energy statement will replace the NRIA checklist as the means of 
assessing sustainability criteria after 1st October 201350. (Oxford City Council 
2013b, p. 11).  
 
Under this new regime all developers would be required to provide information 
about the energy efficiency of buildings and how renewable energy has been 
incorporated into their form and function, much like the questionnaire 
contained in the NRIA (Oxford City Council 2013b, p. 4). However, 																																																									
50 It does note that should the introduction of Part L updates be delayed the NRIA would continue to apply until that 
later implementation date. 
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importantly, there are no minimum targets or levels for any of those 
categories. Whilst the Council can use the statements as leverage in 
negotiations, there is little that would allow it to deny an application on the 
basis of its energy statement (unlike the NRIA or supplementary Code 
standards). Unlike a Supplementary Planning Document, which provides 
detail on compliance with a particular policy and which forms part of planning 
policy, the advice note on energy statements provided by Oxford City Council 
lacks detail (see Oxford City Council 2013b). It allows for interpretation by 
developers and offers great flexibility in terms of how the policy is applied.  
 
As a result of the SHDPDP, the NRIA now only applies for non-residential 
building, although the 20% on-site renewable energy generation rule does still 
apply as a material consideration for all residential developments of 10 homes 
or more (although such level of on-site renewable energy is a de facto 
requirement of updated national Building Regulations).  
 
Even before this watering down though, there have been concerns that the 
NRIA itself had been poorly implemented over its life. A major advantage of 
the Code for Sustainable Homes when compared to the NRIA is that it allows 
planning departments to easily monitor compliance, because the burden for 
proof lies with the developer to contract an independent Code assessor to 
show compliance. By developing their internal standard Oxford had to ensure 
staff in building control enforcement were adequately trained to interpret and 
apply the NRIA, ensure resources were available for this and ensure that this 
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level of expertise could transcend new generations of planning enforcers and, 
crucially, budget cuts. Problematically, one councillor said:  
‘I don’t think there are as many officers today who understand this stuff. The 
department has certainly changed over the years and the officers that were 
originally involved with the NRIA aren’t around any more’ (Interview with 
Green Party Councillor, April 2015).   
 
Indeed, if we refer to table 8.2 we can see that compliance has been 
decreasing in recent years. There was concern that in recent years there had 
been a decrease in attention given to NRIA scores in planning decisions as 
resources became more stretched and the focus shifted in response to the 
rising saliency of affordability. As one remarked;  
‘The NRIA has slipped away. I think its because officers weren’t being firm 
enough. When it was all new in the lead up to being adopted in policy and the 
first year or so afterwards, it was very much a case of  ‘oh look, this is what 
we can do and we are complying with it’. Once word gets out that the council 
isn’t really being very strict then they don’t comply any more’ (Interview with 
Green Party Councillor, April 2015).  
 
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 
n/a 57 100 89 74 58 75 
Table 6.2. Percentage of qualifying developments that met the NRIA standard 
(Sources: Oxford City Council 2008, pp. 49–50, Oxford City Council 2009, pp. 46–47, Oxford City Council 2010a, pp. 
46–47, Oxford City Council 2011c, pp. 40–41, Oxford City Council 2012b, pp. 33–35, Oxford City Council 2013b, p. 
37) 
 
So with Oxford we have a situation where supplementary standards that were 
introduced in 2005, poorly implemented in recent years and have ultimately 
been watered down rather than strengthened in the face of a strengthening of 
national Building Regulations to keep them one step ahead.  
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The question is, then, why Oxford City Council failed to reform the NRIA or, 
put another way, how it went from a local authority that led in the field to one 
that requires compliance with little more than national Building Regulations.  
 
8.3. Expertise and Policy Entrepreneurship 
 
Central to the model of environmental policy capacity developed in chapter 
four is the role that policy entrepreneurs – whether policy champions or policy 
sponsors – play in institutional design and, in this context, pushing for 
sustainable construction standards to be included in the policy discourse. We 
saw that they are both constrained by existing institutional rules and practices 
but instrumental in the design of new or redesigned rules and practices.  
 
Within Oxford policy entrepreneurs were key to the adoption of the NRIA, but 
over time became restricted in their behaviour by prevailing institutional 
architectures, the focus of the next section. The original ambition for 
sustainable construction that resulted in the NRIA emerged because of 
considerable expertise amongst the Green Party Group in the Council - who 
at the time had seven out of a possible 48 seats on the Council (Oxford City 
Council 2004). The deputy leader of the Council and portfolio holder for 
planning at the time remarks that: 
‘The members and officers were clearly concerned about this. We had a 
reasonably strong ‘small g’ green lobby at the time and we also had the large 
G Greens knocking about, but there was a bit of public and political pressure 
to take an interest in these things as well. We are a relatively small-l liberal, 
tolerant place that is concerned about sustainability. The other thing is that 
land values in Oxford are relatively high so you’re better able to evidence that 
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sustainability requirements don’t compromise viability’ (interview with Oxford 
City Councillor #2, March 2015) 51. 
 
 
It was shortly after the adoption of this standard that sustainable construction 
rose on the national political agenda. The Code for Sustainable Homes, for 
example, was in its drafting stage and a core priority of the Labour 
government – as we saw in chapter three – was to use housing as a means to 
lower emissions as part of a broader low emission strategy. The Oxford Green 
Party were keen to seize the opportunity to capitalize upon their chair of the 
Local Plan Review panel to engage in discussions with officers about what 
was and wasn’t possible and, in doing so, drafted the NRIA (interview with 
Oxford City Councillor #1, April 2015). As the head of planning policy in the 
City said,  
The NRIA was a product of its time. We had positive green members. It 
doesn’t matter what party they’re from, they’re all really hot on the green 
agenda. Initially, when we drafted the Natural Resource Impact Analysis 
SPD, it was them who were pushing it. All the councillors like to ‘out-green’ 
the Greens. Whoever is in, it’s so important to all of them, they’re all clued up 
on the environmental and sustainability matters  (Interview with Head of 
Planning Policy at Oxford City Council, March 2015).  
 
The Green Party played an important role in championing the NRIA 
throughout the Local Plan drafting process, ensuring that NRIA compliance 
became a binding (rather than optional) requirement for developments. It met 
with little internal opposition (‘the main reason why there wasn’t any objection 
was because a lot of the councillors didn’t really understand it, to be perfectly 
																																																									
51 The reader may be wondering why, given their supplementary status, the incorporation of this early NRIA standard 
doesn’t form the core of the empirical discussion. First, at the stage no national strategy existed nationally. Given that 
the focus here is on contributions to national processes of EM, so this falls outside the remit. Second, at the outset of 
the research the focus remained on the CSH as a potential site for supplementary standards (given its relation to the 
national strategy), so little consideration was given for these kind of ‘ad-hoc’ arrangements that, at that time, 
remained rare.  
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frank’ (interview with Oxford City Councillor #1, April 2015)), nor opposition 
from housing developers (Interview with Deputy Leader of Oxford City 
Council, March 2015). The portfolio holder at the time said ‘I certainly didn’t 
get any correspondence about this from house builders. They target their 
representations in areas where they think their input makes a differences.’ 
(Interview with Oxford City Councillor #2, March 2015).  
 
Over time (as we saw above and will discuss below) this expertise was lost as 
priorities within the Council shifted. Evidence from interview respondents 
suggests that in the face of budget cuts from central government and as 
complacency over the NRIA set in the technical expertise of planning officers 
declined over time. There was no ‘go-to’ officer qualified in the technical 
aspects of sustainable construction, making it difficult to fully confront 
developers and challenge the sustainability credentials of their proposals 
(Interview with Oxford City Councillor #2, March 2015). 
 
8.4. Institutional and Economic Constraints  
 
The focus of this discussion though is less on why entrepreneurs were able to 
behave in this way at the time but more on why this momentum was not 
maintained going forward. Over time few efforts were made to contribute to 
the zero-carbon homes agenda by adopting Code standards, even as the 
NRIA became out-dated because of changes to national level Building 
Regulations. A window of opportunity had emerged in 2007 with the 
	273	
devolution of supplementary standard setting powers where local ambition 
was high, political saliency nationally was high and comparatively small 
restrictions were placed on local authorities keen to embrace them, at least 
until 2012 when the NPPF restricted local government’s ability to behave in 
this way, as we saw in section 3.6., closing this window considerably.  
 
Two factors can help account for this. First, there were increasing returns 
associated with the NRIA that institutionalised it as the preferred approach to 
the provision of sustainable homes within the Council. As a recent policy there 
was little political or economic appetite to replace it with Code requirements, 
especially considering (as we will see) the scepticism that exists within the 
Council over the principles underlying the Code itself and considering the 
extent to which the NRIA suited the needs of planners at the time. These 
institutional practices – complacency and scepticism – constrained the range 
of appropriate behaviour by any policy champions keen for reform.  
 
Second, a number of institutional rules crowded sustainability off of the 
political agenda, focussing attention instead on housing affordability. These 
include: an acute housing crisis and rigorous affordable homes requirements, 
a continued growth in employment and a range of growth restriction and 
green-belt policies. The two together – complacency and declining political 
saliency – quelled the focus on sustainability within the planning department, 
leading to a decline in expertise and ambition over time.  
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Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
8.4.1. Institutional Practices: Increasing Returns, Complacency, 
Uncertainty and Scepticism 
 
A process of increasing returns set in as the NRIA was institutionalised into 
various planning policies, meaning that planning policy makers missed a 
window of opportunity to institutionalise CSH targets. The NRIA required 
considerable scoping work, evidence bases, consultation and drafting and 
was a key electoral commitment of the Green Party and Liberal Democrats 
(who had 18 of the 48 possible seats at the time; Oxford City Council 2004), 
making the justification or incentive to remove it small:      
‘We got on to other projects [after the NRIA]. We’ve written two other area 
action plans since and numerous other supplementary planning documents. 
When each of these plans comes a lot of background technical work; habitat 
regulations and sustainability appraisals and so on need to be carried out. 
Sustainability has not been a priority. The West End Area Action Plan was 
adopted in 2008, so we had the NRIA at that point. Pretty much, the next 
project after the NRIA was this AAP. So chronologically the NRIA was a fresh 
document. We’ve got this to apply, we’re still under 2006 Building Regulations 
so all those energy efficiency regulations were still applying. It didn’t make 
sense to then update it, and the Code at that time was not the Code that had 
been refined over the years. Then we were reviewing the Sites and Housing 
Plan and we were also doing the Barton Area Action Plan. We wanted to 
maintain the consistent approach. This NRIA was the approach that worked 
in the City. We did look into the Code, and we did consider it. But we knew 
the NRIA worked. We knew this worked’ (Interview with planning policy 
manager, April 2015) 
 
 
Indeed, evidence from the submission and inspection of these AAPs in 
particular suggests that little effort was made to incorporate higher standards. 
Whilst the 2008 West End AAP reiterated the NRIA, the 2012 Barton AAP had 
removed all reference to the NRIA, instead focusing exclusively on the 20% 
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on-site renewable requirement, highlighting the general decrease in 
importance assigned to the NRIA as a sustainability standard. Interestingly, 
the Inspector of the West End AAP remarked that although some had 
suggested that Code standards be included, the Council had provided a lack 
of evidence or will to do such a thing. She said in her appraisal that ‘it has 
been put to me that increased energy efficiency standards should be required 
for the development at the West End, but this is not supported by detailed 
evidence. This is a matter of detail for the Council in its consideration of 
planning and building control applications’ (Oxford City Council 2014a, p. 27). 
 
There were more thorough discussions on sustainable construction during the 
SHDPD drafting process. Three recommendations were considered by 
officers, either: to introduce Code requirements in advance of those nationally; 
to maintain the existing NRIA approach; or to maintain a 20% on-site 
renewable energy requirement without the NRIA or Code. It was 
acknowledged that a failure to update the NRIA, ‘could be a missed 
opportunity to move the policy framework forward’ and that if that were the 
case ‘the NRIA would need to be updated as a matter of urgency’ (Oxford City 
Council 2011a, p. 14). There was awareness of the Code and discussions on 
including Code requirements in plans coming forward.  
 
Responding to an Energy Savings Trust audit recommendation that Oxford 
looks to specifying minimum Code levels beyond Building Regulations, 
planning officers commissioned viability studies into a Level 4 standard. 
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Despite finding that ‘the majority of the sites of 10 or more homes were 
considered to be viable with no reduction in affordable housing [and that] 
Code for Sustainable Homes Level 4 [is] thought to be a sensible policy 
option’ (Oxford City Council 2011a, p. 9), the proposal wasn’t taken forward.  
 
Instead, as we saw above, the SHDPD opted for a business as usual 
approach with the NRIA in place until the 2013 Building Regulations were 
updated nationally, after which it would be dropped from policy.   
 
Accompanying this process of increasing returns that followed from the 
institutionalisation of the NRIA was a growing uncertainty and scepticism of 
the role of local authorities as contributors to sustainable planning policy and 
the Code for Sustainable Homes as a means to achieve sustainability. By the 
time that these Code policies were being considered for the SHDPD there 
was rising uncertainty about both the Code for Sustainable Homes and the 
entire zero-carbon homes agenda (as well as local government’s role within 
it). The election of a new Conservative-led coalition government in 2010, 
publication of the NPPF in 2012 (with its accompanying restrictions on local 
behaviour and broadly de-regulatory overtones), delays to the step-changes 
to national Building Regulations (see section 3.2.), and the difficulties faced by 
stakeholders in defining key technical and economic elements of ‘zero-carbon’ 
meant that local planning policy makers remained hesitant to embrace such 
powers amidst such uncertainty.  
‘It’s been the government’s intention to phase out the Code for a while. We 
knew about this for a while, so we were like ‘okay, lets look at what works well 
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in the NRIA, what we can have control over. (Interview with planning policy 
manager, April 2015) 
 
 
This reflects scepticism the more generally to the Code for Sustainable 
Homes that we saw in Section 3.2., and to local authorities role within the 
provision of sustainable housing that grew after the publication of the NRIA. 
Evidence from interviews with planning policy makers suggests that the 
planning department disagreed with the underlying premises of 
supplementary standard setting for sustainability that a) local authorities 
should have discretion to set higher standards and b) that the CSH was the 
best means through which sustainability could be achieved.   Conversations 
with those involved in policy within the planning department have indicated a 
degree of scepticism regarding the suitability of using local authority planning 
policy to push for sustainable construction standards, favouring a national 
level building regulation approach. One planning policy manager remarked 
that: 
‘Our members were very supportive of the NRIA, but the messages that we 
were getting from going to conferences and things was that Building 
Regulations – at the national level – are the best place to deal with these 
issues. I think the Code proved quite complicated, certainly it was quite a 
challenge working my way through all of the Code; (Interview with planning 
policy manager, April 2015).  
 
 
There was little faith in the suitability of the Code amongst planners, coupled 
with a sense of pride in the NRIA and an aversion to casting aside what had 
been a very effective document in its time. The sunk costs associated with the 
NRIA (whether through staff training or familiarity by housing developers) 
precluded its abolition in the earliest stages. Tellingly, despite the evidence 
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that Code requirements would not affect the viability of development sites – 
discussed above – there was still resistance within the planning department:  
Bearing in mind that not all of the sites that were tested were viable anyway, 
but a sufficient number were to make the reasoned justification for introducing 
a [Code] policy. I think we would have been in a situation in which very few 
sites were coming forward to development. I’ve got no evidence to show for 
this, it’s just knowing Oxford (Interview with Planning Policy Manager, April 
2015).  
 
Yet these practices – complacency, uncertainty and scepticism – need to be 
situated within the prevailing institutional rules, because they are closely 
related. As Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 53) tell us, ‘rules may specify 
practices through which actors must enact the rules’ and whilst there isn’t an 
overt specification amongst prevailing institutional rules, the practices we see 
above can be better understood if we situate them within that context.  
 
8.4.2. Economic Conditions and Institutional Rules: High House Prices , 
Housing Shortages, Growth Restriction and Affordable Homes Targets 
 
Those advocating sustainable construction or tasked with legislating for it 
were operating in the face of a narrative which prioritises housing affordability 
and housing provision over sustainability given a growing housing crisis, 
fuelled by rules that restrict housing growth and promote employment growth. 
In the following section we will see that although some expansion has been 
permitted in recent years, Oxford City nevertheless suffers from an acute 
housing shortage that shows few signs of improving, driven by continued and 
rapid employment growth and growth restriction from a surrounding greenbelt. 
This has prioritised an institutional commitment to affordable homes provision, 
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but amongst decision makers the dominant narrative is that affordable 
housing and sustainable housing are mutually exclusive. In this political 
climate, the former has become a core focus of legislative activity at the 
expense of the latter, especially considering the emergent practices discussed 
above. Quite simply, sustainability became a less pressing legislative concern 
than housing affordability.  
 
Oxford suffers from a housing shortage, shortage of available land and an 
accompanying shortage of affordable homes to meet ever-increasing 
population growth. Oxford today has the most unaffordable housing outside of 
London, as measured by house prices to average earnings ratios, with prices 
increasing steadily (Hometrack 2015). The City has been described as ‘a city 
with London house prices and Midland wages’ (Oxford City Council 2011c, p. 
4). We saw in Table 5.2 that average house prices had increased by 30.1% 
between 2006 and 2012 (to an average of £328,625, compared to a UK 
average of £224,488) and were, on average, 9.1 times average earnings 
(compared to a UK average of 8.01).   
 
As a result, there is a huge need for affordable housing in the city. A 2007 
Housing Market Assessment for Oxfordshire estimated a shortfall for Oxford 
of between 1,981 and 4,884 homes per year between 2011 and 2016, taking 
account of the existing backlog of those requiring affordable homes. 
Worryingly, ‘if every new home built in Oxford was affordable, we would still 
not meet the need. The annual need will in the future increase as the backlog 
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increases’ (Oxford City Council 2011d, p. 35). Prices would need to drop by 
15% for an average dual income family to consider housing in Oxford 
affordable (Oxford City Council 2011c, p. 5). Public consultation and surveys 
have indicated strong support for an increase in the provision of affordable 
homes, with 53% of residents listing the lack of affordable as their top priority 
for the Council in 2011 and 51% listing high house prices as a top three issue 
(Oxford City Council 2011c, p. 4, 2011d).  
 
Table 8.3 below shows the situation in 2014, using data drawn from a 2014 
housing market assessment commissioned by the Council.  
 
Housing 
Needed Per 
Year (2011-
2031): 
A. 
Demographic 
Base + 
Shortfall 
B. To Support 
Committed 
Economic 
Growth 
C. To Meet 
Affordable 
Housing Need 
in Full 
D. Range: 
Housing Need 
Per Year 
E. Mid point of 
Range 
 780 700 2058 1200-1600 1400 
Table 8.3: Housing Need in Oxford City 
Source: GL Hearn 2014, p. 24 
 
The City needs 780 houses per year in the 2011-2031 period simply to meet 
existing shortfalls and address demographic changes (column A), plus an 
additional 700 associated with an employment growth strategy (column B) 
and 2058 to meet affordable homes requirements (assuming a 50% 
affordable homes requirements on development in the City). This leaves a 
mid-point requirement of 1400 homes per year. Yet, historical construction 
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figures cast doubt on the ability to achieve this projected requirement (see 
Table 8.4).  
 
Year Housing 
Completions 
Cumulative 
Completions Total 
Plan Target Cumulative Plan 
Total 
2005/06 943 943 433 433 
2006/07 821 1764 433 866 
2007/08 529 2293 400 1266 
2008/09 665 2958 400 1666 
2009/10 257 3215 400 2066 
2010/11 200 3315 400 2466 
2011/12 228 3543 400 2866 
2012/13 213 3756 400 3266 
Table 8.4: Historical Housing Completion Rates in Oxford City Council 
Source: (Oxford City Council 2006b, p. 12, 2013c, p. 16) 
 
Whilst completion totals are in line with plan targets (3756 homes compared 
to 3266), there are two observations. First, the number of completions are 
slipping when compared to plan targets. Since 2009 the council has failed to 
achieve the 400 required. This coincides with the removal of regional strategic 
planning and the introduction of the NPPF which, as we discuss in section 
3.6. Second, the need for 1400 homes per year is a long way from either the 
400 target in this plan cycle or the number of completions that Council has 
historically been achieving52: 
‘The level of need for housing identified is quite different from that delivered in 
the past. This reflects evidence that housing provision in the past has not kept 																																																									
52 This places responsibility on neighboring local authorities, which is discussed in more detail below.  
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pace with that needed; the need to house a growing older population (with 
people living longer); and the significant drivers – particularly in terms of job 
creation – which are expected to influence future need for homes…this 
reflects the particular affordability pressures and acute need for affordable 
housing within the City ’ (GL Hearn 2014, pp. 24–25).  
  
This economic situation shows few signs of improving and is having a 
profound effect on the political landscape in Oxford City Council and the ability 
for of the NRIA to even be ‘maintained’, let alone improved or replaced with 
the CSH.  
 
Yet the extent to which these constraints show signs of exacerbating (and 
indeed the reason for the housing crisis in the first place) is frustrated by a 
growth restriction strategy that has limited the extent to which the affordability 
and housing provision issue can be rectified and, with it, the relative political 
saliency of affordability.  
 
A restrictive greenbelt has prevented growth and expansion, placing further 
pressure on the housing market as employment continues to grow and the 
further entrenchment of a narrative prioritising affordable home provision. One 
of the other major institutional concerns within the city – and a major 
contributory factor in the housing crisis – is the environmental constraints that 
it is subject too that serve as a brake on housing growth by restricting the 
amount of developable land and restricting the extent to which affordability 
and housing provision can be addressed. An inability to review the greenbelt 
has meant that this problem is yet to be alleviated, cementing the issue’s 
place at the top of the political agenda locally. A fundamental issue is that 
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planners in Oxford are concerned at a lack of developable land within the City 
boundaries. The city is surrounded by tightly drawn city boundaries, a 
restrictive greenbelt that falls largely outside those boundaries, a high 
prevalence of flooding within the valleys of the River Thames and River 
Cherwell, protected views and areas of outstanding beauty and architectural 
heritage (Oxford City Council 2011e). 
 
The Council recognizes this as a ‘key overarching spatial issue for Oxford’ 
(Oxford City Council 2011e, p. 18). This restricts the availability of both 
greenfield land (most amenable, as we saw in section 7.8., to both large scale 
development in order to solve housing shortages and to efficient, cost-
effective sustainable construction), as well as brownfield land. Where land is 
developable, it is heavily skewed towards brownfield infill sites rather than 
more virgin green-field sites (see Oxford City Council 2013d, pp. 7–17). 
We have very little greenfield. Much of the greenfield land that’s left is green-
belt, flood plain, natural conservation area, public open space, historical parks 
and gardens, children plays areas, allotments. You know, it’s already green 
space. We can’t put the house there, even if we wanted to (Interview with 
Planning Policy Manager, April 2015).  
 
Problematically, the greenbelt falls largely outside the administrative borders 
of the City. Instead they fall under the remit of Oxford’s four neighbouring 
district authorities (Cherwell, West Oxfordshire, South Oxfordshire and The 
Vale of White Horse District Councils). This has made it difficult for the 
Council to undertake greenbelt review, given the political contestations 
involved in this kind of cross-border working (more on this below).  
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For many years, under the old regional planning frameworks (see section 
3.5), the city was subject to restrictive growth. The South East of England 
Structure Plans (of which there were eight between 1979 and 2005) placed a 
brake on the extent to which Oxford could expand, thus limiting the voices 
calling for green-belt expansion: 
The County Council wants to see Oxford thrive as a first class vibrant city, 
modern in outlook with a diverse economy… This does not mean that Oxford 
should grow unchecked, so as to damage its heritage and landscape setting 
and increase pressure on transport and other services. Because of the 
substantial imbalance between jobs and workforce in Oxford, the overall 
growth of employment in the city will continue to be limited. Land is available 
within the city to support the development of employment sectors that need to 
be located there’ (Oxfordshire County Council 2005, p. 4 emphasis added) 
 
The 1996 Oxfordshire County Council Structure Plan too advocates ‘general 
strategy to protect the environment, character and agricultural resources of 
the County by restraining the overall level of development’ (Oxfordshire 
County Council 1996).  
 
This was in spite of continued employment growth. Oxford has a long 
manufacturing tradition but, recently, has also become a centre for high-tech 
industry as a result of spin-offs from the University of Oxford and Oxford 
Brookes University. Oxfordshire County as a whole has 1,500 high tech firms, 
employing 43,000 (SQW 2013, p. 9) gathered broadly around four nodes: 
telecoms & computer hardware, bioscience and medical technology, physics 
related, and engineering & electronics (SQW 2013, p. 1). 59% of people in 
Oxford are educated to degree level, compared to an average of 33% for the 
rest of the country (SQW 2013, p. 27), and 13.4% of people work in medium 
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or high tech industry in Oxfordshire, compared to 9.8% nationally (SQW 2013, 
p. 29).  
 
New rules have emerged that try to institutionalise a commitment to affordable 
homes provision, but they do so at the expense of a concern with 
sustainability because there is a perception amongst decision makers in the 
city that an increased focus on sustainability cannot be reconciled with the 
provision of affordable homes in a positive sum relationship, despite evidence 
to suggest the contrary. To respond to the growing affordability crisis the 
Council introduced a requirement that all new developments would need to 
consider affordable homes provision in the 2001 Core Strategy.  Policy HS4 of 
the 2001 Core Strategy states that:  
‘The City Council will expect affordable housing…from any development of at 
least ten dwellings, that includes residential development on a site having the 
capacity for at least ten dwellings53; or on a residential site of 0.25ha or more 
in an area’ (Oxford City Council 2005, p. 79) 
 
This requirement was reinforced in Core Strategy Policy HS.24 (Oxford City 
Council 2011e, p. 111) to include a specific target requirement: 
‘Planning permission will only be granted for residential developments that 
provide generally a minimum of 50% of the proposed dwellings as affordable 
housing on all qualifying sites54’ (Oxford City Council 2011e, p. 111).  
 
This policy was reiterated in the 2013 SHDPD (Oxford City Council 2011c). In 
addition, an Affordable Housing Supplementary Planning Document, 
published in 2013, provided more detail about how that requirement should be 
																																																									
53 On viability, analysis commissioned by the Council suggested that a 50% requirement on developments smaller 
than 10 would be unviable. This analysis stated that ‘the majority of sites of 10 or more dwellings are viable, where 
50% of dwellings are provided as affordable homes…[but] that sites of less than 10 dwellings were generally not 
viable with 50% affordable housing provided on‐site’ (Oxford City Council 2011d, p. 37) 
54 Sites of 10 or more homes or 0.25ha and greater.  
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met, including detail on exemptions, viability concerns and alternatives to 
direct provision (such as payment into an affordable housing fund) (Oxford 
City Council 2013e). 
 
The advantages of this stringent approach to affordable housing provision is 
that it tries to maintain a supply of affordable housing, but given that the 
majority of developments provide less than 10 homes, on site provision of 
affordable housing will be limited (instead provided elsewhere, likely outside 
the City boundaries). Not surprisingly, it met with resistance from housing 
developers (Interview with planning policy officer, April 2015) and was 
challenged (unsuccessfully) at inspection (The Planning Inspectorate 2010). 
 
Housing affordability remained at the top of the political agenda, so it is 
unsurprising that such a commitment to the provision of affordable homes was 
made.  All political parties were aligned in a push for housing expansion and 
affordable home provision, fearful of anything that might be perceived to 
jeopardize that. Yet despite Council commissioned studies showing that 
requirements for supplementary standards, affordable housing and the 20% 
renewable energy rule ‘would not normally make developments of 10 or more 
dwellings unviable’ (Oxford City Council 2011d, p. 24), any sense that 
restrictions were being paced on development (through regulatory burden) 
could not be reconciled effectively with the drive for increased provision of 
(affordable) homes. The Council-commissioned Affordable Housing Viability 
Study (King Sturge 2011, p. 29) gives a good sense of this attitude:  
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‘Oxford City Council are keen to maximize the number of affordable homes 
provided whilst promoting environmental awareness and reducing costs for 
occupiers of affordable housing. However they recognize that delivering 
housing at Sustainable Code for Homes Level 4 and 5 results in increased 
build costs. As such, they support sustainability initiatives wherever possible 
but appreciate that in the short to medium term, the costs may limit 
opportunities to deliver affordable homes which achieve the highest Code 
Level’. 
 
The perception from interview respondents supports this view. Many 
remarked that proposals to strengthen the NRIA or introduce CSH targets 
would be political unattractive and unlikely to pass muster in a legislative 
landscape that seeks to grease the wheels of housing provision (Interview 
with Deputy Leader of Oxford City Council, March 2015; Interview with 
planning policy officer, April 2015). Legislators and officials felt comfortable 
with the NRIA and felt that any attempts to strengthen it would lead to a 
restriction in the overall housing supply, despite evidence suggesting the 
contrary.  
 
There is a general agreement that Oxford City will be unable to accommodate 
all of its own unmet housing need, relying instead either on greenbelt review, 
a population decline or the cooperation of neighbours willing to accommodate 
large scale development in their boundaries (GL Hearn 2014, LUC 2015, p. 
1). However, whilst there has been a small recent growth in the number of 
development sites, this has been undermined by a recent employment-growth 
strategy and very limited green-belt release. The City has issues with the 
amount of available land in the City, leading to uncertainty about how such 
employment growth can be accommodated within the existing city boundaries 
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or how existing infrastructure can cope from inter-town and city commuting, 
especially considering over 40,000 people per day commute across the 
greenbelt from neighbouring towns and villages (Oxford Civic Society 2014a, 
pp. 13–15). In this context it is unsurprising that affordability and provision 
remain so high on the agenda.  
 
The 2006 Core Strategy (adopted in 2011) proposed a growth in housing. 
Responding to figures outlined in the South East Plan, the last of the regional 
plans, it proposed 8,000 additional dwellings over the period 2006-2026, 
roughly 400 per year (Oxford City Council 2011e, p. 41), distributed as 
follows:  
 
Site Name Type of Development New Development or 
Regeneration? 
Barton 800-1200 dwellings New 
Northern Gateway 55,000m2 of employment 
development + 200 dwellings 
New (greenbelt land) 
West End 700-800 dwellings + retail + 
offices 
Regeneration 
Table 8.5: Major Development Sites in the 2006 Local Plan 
(Source: Oxford City Council 2011e, pp. 43–57) 
The remainder of the projected housing need development comes from: 
Site Name Percentage of remaining Core Strategy 
Housing Figures  
Headington 35% 
Cowley Road 13% 
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Cowley/Blackbird Lees 20% 
Summertown 13% 
City Centre 18%  
Table 8.6: Housing Development Sites 
(Source: Oxford City Council 2011e, pp. 51–68) 
 
However, this land is primarily brownfield and/or inner city development.  It 
remains the case that Oxford is subject to highly restrictive growth, with only 
limited signs of change.  
 
The South East Plan did allocate a major growth point – albeit one in 
neighbouring authorities – in the South Oxford Strategic Development Area. It 
also outlined proposals for major developments at Didcot, Bicester, Wantage 
and Grove (within neighbouring authorities) that would contribute towards 
Oxford’s unmet housing need (Government Office for the South East 2009, p. 
250). Needless to say, there was considerable dispute surrounding the 
negotiations of these figures (interview with reader in planning, Oxford 
Brookes University, May 2015), but the strategic, regional nature of this now 
redundant planning regime meant that such disagreements would not prove 
fatal. In this regard, the plan was clear:   
‘The settlement pattern of the sub-region will change over the Plan period. 
Oxford itself will be allowed to grow physically and economically in order to 
accommodate its own needs, contribute to those in the wider region and help 
maintain its world-class status’ (Government Office for the South East 2009, 
p. 251) 
 
It was this strategic approach that did allow small parcels of land to be freed 
from the greenbelt specifically to meet Oxford’s unmet housing need at the 
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Northern Gateway, Barton and the West End of the City (Oxford City Council 
2011e).  
 
Yet the election of the Conservative-led coalition signalled an end to the 
Regional Planning system, who replaced it instead with the NPPF and its 
‘Duty to Cooperate’. No longer were authorities bound by strategic plans and 
obliged to cooperate on housing provision. They were free instead to 
negotiate their own arrangements with neighbours, subject to certain 
requirements. Needless to say, South Oxfordshire District Council 
immediately withdrew from the South Oxford Strategic Development Area. 
Oxford would lose 4,000 potential homes, with only the Northern Gateway 
remaining as a major urban extension. 
 
To add even greater pressure onto the City’s housing market it is embarking 
upon an employment-led growth strategy with only limited provision for 
housing, focussed primarily around the Northern Gateway. This employment 
growth agenda is being heavily influenced by the Oxfordshire Local Enterprise 
Partnership (OxLEP) - a collection of local business leaders who decide on 
funding allocation and infrastructure planning in the region in dialogue with 
central and local governments. The City signed the OxLEP-driven Oxfordshire 
Growth Deal in 2007, which attracted £118m of funding for employment 
growth strategies focusing around innovation, enterprise, connectivity and 
skills (Cabinet Office 2015). OxLEP also played a central role in the January 
2014 Oxford and Oxfordshire City Deal, together with the districts and the two 
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Universities in the City. City Deals enable ‘local leaders to negotiate bespoke 
arrangements with government departments according to their local growth 
priorities’ (National Audit Office 2015, p. 12). At the heart of this Deal was the 
creation of a ‘knowledge-spine’ connecting towns in the North and South of 
the County with Oxford in the Centre through a package of transport and 
communication infrastructure improvements in order to ‘unleash a new wave 
of innovation-led growth by maximizing the area’s world class assets, such as 
the universities…and ‘big science’ facilities’ (Oxfordshire Local Enterprise 
Partnership 2014a, p. 1). Accompanying this was the promise of 19,000 new 
white-collar jobs, 31,000 in construction and 500 apprenticeships (Lawton 
Smith et al. 2013, p. 665). 
 
The Deal committed to the accelerated delivery of 7,500 additional homes 
(Oxfordshire Local Enterprise Partnership 2014b). However, this delivery 
programme offered no new housing development sites beyond those already 
allocated in local development plans and provided few concrete tools through 
which the target could be realized beyond existing political arrangements and 
planning policy documents, the latest of which have been drafted before the 
City Deal and the Growth Deal. Within this plan housing allocation was 
effectively side-lined and asked little in the way of commitment from Local 
Authorities in order to reflect housing shortages associated with LEP-growth 
(Cabinet Office 2014). Nor did it propose any new powers or mechanisms 
through which growth restriction could be reformed or cross-border working 
could be fostered.  
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An illustration of this can be found when looking at the Northern Gateway 
development. The Northern Gateway is a major employment-led growth site 
of 55,000m2 of employment development and 200 dwellings that has evolved 
from the Oxfordshire Growth Deal, the City Deal and the work of OxLEP and 
is managed through the Northern Gateway Area Action Plan. It sits on (over 
10 acres of) greenbelt land which, despite opposition, was agreed for release 
by the Planning Inspectorate when the AAP was reviewed (Oxford City 
Council 2014b, p. 4, The Planning Inspectorate 2015b, pp. 11–13). Even 
though it is recognized as the most important development opportunity for the 
City, and will provide the single largest area of employment land, few 
accommodations have been made for the increase in population that will 
result (Oxford City Council 2014a, p. 2). The discrepancy between the figures 
for employment (55,000m2) and housing (200 dwellings) are stark.  
 
It remains unclear how the employment growth strategy can be reconciled in a 
city with an acute housing shortage, affordable homes crisis, restrictive 
greenbelt policies and a shortage of brownfield developable land. It is 
unsurprising, in this context, that the issue housing provision and affordability 
has remained so central to the political agenda.  
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8.4.3.	Institutional	Synchronicity			
In Oxford there was a lack of rule-based synchronicity, whereby it had only 
recently adopted its local planning policy documents (after many years of 
negotiations) when supplementary standard setting powers emerged 
nationally. What’s more, it had only recently adopted the NRIA too. Given the 
sunk costs in its development – whether political or economic – the Council 
was unwilling to include national Code type targets when it next had the 
opportunity on geographically bounded planning documents or in site-specific 
planning applications. In this sense, there was a conflict between local and 
national institutional sustainable planning rules that had largely emerged as a 
result of temporal factors.  
 
When it comes to practice-based synchronicity there was little political 
willingness within the Council to embrace supplementary standards – even in 
spite of a high number of Green Party representatives. This was in part 
because of the prevalence affordability on the political agenda but also 
because, as a number of local officers and politicians and local industry and 
civic groups remarked, the planning department has a ‘can’t do’ attitude. This 
manifest itself in the dismissal of voluntary aspects of planning policy – such 
as supplementary standard setting – which were dismissed on the basis of a 
shortage of economic, political or temporal resources.  
 
What’s more, its restrictive growth can be appropriated in part to the culture of 
‘political dissonance’ between Oxford City Council and its neighbours (see 
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section 8.5.1. below), who are deeply resistant to the City’s expansion (Valler 
and Phelps 2016). So, the scope for the embrace of supplementary standard 
setting powers was frustrated by a lack of synchronicity between those rules 
and prevailing local practices. Within Oxford City Council the prevailing 
narrative was one of affordable homes provision, with a dominant storyline in 
place that a focus on sustainability would come at a cost to provision of 
affordable homes, together with an unwillingness to risk the consequences of 
such innovation.  		
8.5.Network Dynamics: Crowding Out, Powerlessness and a 
Faltering Sustainability Agenda  
 
We have seen that policy makers, planners and entrepreneurs in Oxford City 
Council suffered from a degree of complacency about the utility of the Code 
for Sustainable Homes and the challenges of responding to the paradox of 
employment growth in a restricted city, but there has been a determinacy thus 
far about the degree of agency within such an institutional context. It is not the 
intention of this chapter to attribute the decline of sustainability in planning on 
institutional factors alone. Relating back to the analytical model developed in 
chapter four we know that the influence of institutions and agents is dialectical 
and mediated through policy networks; actors are both constrained by 
institutions but also constitutive of them and the extent to which they are able 
to interact within this institutional landscape is, in part, determined by their 
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placement within policy networks, given the importance of these networks as 
institutional designers in their own right.   
 
As we saw, in Oxford policy entrepreneurs were constrained by prevailing 
institutional practices and rules that prioritised employment growth and 
remained focused on the provision of affordable homes at the expense of a 
concern with sustainability. However, it is also the case that they were badly 
placed and resourced within the local policy network to be able to re-design 
those institutions (to include a greater formal and/or informal commitment to 
the principles of sustainable construction, for instance).  
 
Within Oxford the policy network is dominated by actors pushing for either 
employment led growth strategy or an urban, greenbelt expansion. In both 
cases these groups possessed more resources than those advocating 
sustainable construction.  
 
8.5.1. Pro-Growth Groups 
 
Beyond the Council, which obviously possesses considerable resources as 
legislator, the Oxfordshire Local Enterprise Partnership has played an 
important role in structuring the approach taken to growth and development in 
the City. Its membership is made up of representatives from local business, 
chambers of commerce, leaders of the districts, City and County councils and 
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the two Universities55 in the City (OxLEP 2015a) and since its inception it has 
institutionalized a commitment to growth: 
‘Our Strategic Economic Plan sets out our ambition for Oxfordshire to 2030 – 
to drive accelerated economic growth to meet the needs of our science and 
knowledge rich economy placing Oxfordshire at the forefront of the UK’s 
global growth ambitions’ (OxLEP 2015b, p. 3).  
 
It has also been influential in the City Deal and formation of the Knowledge 
Spine, significant forces in local development. The UK government’s recent 
focus on City-Deals and LEPs as a means to drive economic growth in cities 
has created a new institutional framework at the local level with a number of 
formal powers ascribed in particular to LEPs which broadly coalesce around 
the content of the City Deals (see Lowndes and Gardner 2016). These include 
working with central government to establish investment priorities, bidding to 
the Regional Growth Fund, direct investment, involvement in the development 
of national planning policy, local business regulation and involvement in the 
delivery of national infrastructure priorities (House of Commons Library 2015, 
p. 6). Although they lack strategic planning powers they do have considerable 
influence in the strategic development of the individual councils over which 
they are spread.  
 
However, there is little evidence from interview respondents to suggest that 
sustainability is taken seriously within these discussions, again being crowded 																																																									
55 It is interesting to note that Oxford University in particular has been urging for housing growth for many years, for 
many of the same reasons that the University of Cambridge made similar demands – recruiting doctoral post-doctoral 
researchers and support staff is becoming more difficulty with rising house prices and rents. However, unlike 
Cambridge there are no major development sites for the University, meaning that it has been relatively quiet on the 
need for sustainable construction. We will remember that in Cambridge the NW Cambridge development was 
University owned and there were strong incentives to build sustainably, a decision that set a precedent for 
development elsewhere. 
	297	
out by a concern with affordability. For example, in the words of one local 
activist: 
‘We went to this LEP workshop and we were talking about sustainability. 
There was this guy from the LEP board. I said ‘well, affordability versus 
sustainability?’ and he said ‘we would chose for affordability because that’s 
the healthiest for economic growth’. They don’t see it as something that can 
be combined, they see it as either or and that becomes the agenda (Interview 
with community activist, May 2015).  
 
Oxford City Council and OxLEP have also been strong advocates of greenbelt 
expansion, working closely with Oxfordshire County Council and Oxford’s four 
neighbouring local authorities. However, this relationship has been marked by 
considerable political dissonance, frustrating efforts to review the greenbelt in 
the way the Cambridge City Council was able (which arguably, ceteris 
paribus, would have created sufficient room on the political agenda for 
sustainability to emerge alongside affordability as policy concerns, as it did in 
Cambridge).  
 
8.5.1.1. Political Dissonance 
 
Political dissonance is defined as ‘sustained, institutionalized conflict marked 
by contradictory visions and policy incongruity [which] may reflect 
fundamental differences of ideology, objectives, strategy or policy, or – more 
likely – a combination of some or all of these levels’ (Valler and Phelps 
forthcoming). The relationship is characterized in Oxfordshire as such given 
historical tensions over the extent to which Oxford’s growth should be 
accommodated in neighbouring authorities and whether greenbelt review 
should take place.  Broadly, whereas Oxford is keen to expand (primarily 
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through a greenbelt review) its neighbours and County Council have been 
resistant to any such proposals.  
 
There has been sustained conflict between Oxford City Council, it’s 
neighbouring authorities and the County Council, ‘regarding the scale and 
location of growth around Oxford, [with] frustratingly slow progress on 
approving local plans for housing and employment growth throughout the 
county, and a surprising ambivalence about the major infrastructure 
investments that the high tech business community repeatedly says it needs’ 
(SQW 2013, p. 67) 
‘There is real antipathy between the councils. The other councils will not 
consider the expansion of the city. There’s just complete opposition. It’s really 
controlling the city, and preventing housing growth. It’s a big scandal. The 
surrounding districts are implacably opposed to Oxford’s growth. The County 
Council is swayed very strongly by the fact that there are four other district 
councils outside of the city and that the city is a relatively small part of the 
county. So, when the county is looking at where the wind is blowing, the wind 
will be blowing from the districts’ (Interview with Reader in Planning, Oxford 
Brookes University, May 2015). 
 
Central to the argument between Oxford and its neighbours is whether the 
greenbelt should be reviewed. The latter argues that unmet housing can be 
accommodated within Oxford’s city-boundaries or in existing conurbations 
away from the city. The former argues strongly against this, citing concerns 
with congestion, pollution and quality of life as more people will be forced to 
commute across the greenbelt to work. Because Oxford’s greenbelt lies 
largely outside of its administrative border cooperation on this matter is key if 
the agenda is to progress: 
It’s been impossible [to consider greenbelt expansion]. There are two issues 
which are related. We have tightly drawn green belt and we have tightly 
drawn urban boundaries. So the decision on whether or not to build on the 
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greenbelt is one for our neighbours, Cherwell and particularly South 
Oxfordshire. They tend to be opposed to Oxford expansion. That’s the 
difficulty. If it were greenbelt within the Oxford boundary then it would have 
been easier. You would still have to go through the planning process to free 
up green belt but it’s that much harder if you’re having to ask your 
neighbours’ (Interview with Deputy Leader of Oxford City Council, March 
2015)56.  
 
Much of the disagreement stems from these political differences. Between 
1980 and 2000 Oxford City Council was Labour-controlled, with a mix of 
minority and majority leadership (with the Liberal Democrats) in the 
intervening period (currently with a Labour majority). The neighboring districts, 
on the other hand, have predominantly been Conservative controlled since 
their inception in 1973. As one respondent said, ‘The Tory party is incredibly 
strong here, why would they listen to the city?’ (Interview with Reader in 
planning, May 2015). Another said, ‘you’re having to ask neighbouring Tory 
district who don’t like much house building to help you out. They’re not going 
to do it’ (Interview with Deputy Leader of Oxford City Council, March 2015). 
This put the council at a considerable resource disadvantage, given that it 
would be precluded from growing (see section 4.5.5.).  
 
																																																									
56 There was considerable disagreement of the status of other developments allocated to greenbelt land, particularly 
at the Northern Gateway. South Oxfordshire District Council and the Vale of White Horse District Council ‘contend 
that the preparation of the [Northern Gateway] AAP conflicts with the approach of the Statement of Cooperation, 
which requires each local planning authority first to seek to accommodate their own objectively assessed need in full 
before identifying unmet need which other authorities would be asked to accommodate’ (The Planning Inspectorate 
2015b, p. 6). The Planning Inspector disagreed, rejecting the claims from neighboring authorities (The	 Planning	Inspectorate	 2015b,	 p.	 7). Oxford itself makes frequent representations at inspections for neighboring districts’ plans, 
citing concerns that they have failed to fully meet the Duty to Cooperate. For example, in response to the May 2015 
inspection of Cherwell District Council’s Local Plan Oxford commented that ‘the spatial strategy for Cherwell has 
failed to test all reasonable alternatives to accommodate development despite market indicators pointing to 
substantial unmet need and affordability issues, particularly around Oxford’ suggesting that ‘Cherwell should be 
planning to meet its full [objectively assessed need] of 1,140 [dwellings per annum], and for a portion of Oxford’s 
unmet OAN’ (Turley 2014, p. 5). This issue that was taken up by the Planning Inspector, who called for Cherwell to 
‘increase the total number of new houses to 22,840, 2011 – 2031, (1,140 per year) from 16,750, 2006 – 2031 (670 
per year)’ (The Planning Inspectorate 2015c, p. 3). 	
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What effect does this have on the ability to introduce sustainable construction 
standards? Primarily it serves to increase the saliency of housing affordability 
and provision on the political agenda, at the provision of concerns over 
sustainability. The abolition of strategic planning and the introduction of the 
NPPF served to shift the power dynamic within the region; it was now entirely 
possible for neighbouring districts to fight against either expansion plans or 
request to meet Oxford’s un-met housing need.  
 
However, the OxLEP has been influential in overcoming some of the political 
dissonance that has characterised relations between Oxford and its 
neighbouring districts and which has precluded green-belt expansion (thus 
propagating the saliency of affordability on the political agenda) (Cabinet 
Office 2014, p. 5). It has been useful is to play a quasi-strategic role in 
addressing the housing issue in the longer run by prioritizing funding and 
institutionalizing a more formal relationship between neighbouring authorities 
under the rubric of growth. It is unclear through what means it will be able to 
commit local authorities to particular developments or cooperation 
agreements, but there are signs that attitudes in the region are changing. May 
2015, for example, saw the County Council announces a comprehensive 
review of the greenbelt, potentially signalling a (relative) decrease in political 
dissonance. Whilst this may reduce the political saliency of affordability, from 
the perspective of supplementary standard setting it has come at the wrong 
time. This is too little too late given that the window for supplementary 
standard setting has now ended. 
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8.5.1.2. Pro-Sustainability Groups 	
The two main groups pushing for sustainability during the earliest days of 
supplementary standard setting powers were the Green Party, which (as we 
saw above) was key in the initial adoption of the NRIA and a number of 
community groups. Whilst the Green Party has an obvious interest in the 
provision of sustainable homes there are two frustrating factors. The first is 
that the ruling Labour party in the city places considerably more emphasis on 
affordability and absolute housing provision than it does on sustainability, 
depriving it of political support for its objectives. Given the greater resources 
of the Labour party, the political impetus declined over time. The second is 
that they are in opposition and have a poor relationship with the planning 
department, who they view suspiciously. As one Green Councillor noted:  
‘There’s an element of ‘we know best’ in the planning department. There’s a 
bit of a ‘can’t do’ culture which has been hanging around for a long time. 
Often we would propose something and we would know that the response we 
would get would be ‘oh no, we can’t do that’. I think it’s a council that has 
coasted for far too long. It tends just to hang there unless there are people 
are more innovative. That leaves the council into being easily duped by 
consultants (Interview with Green Party Councillor, April 2015). 
 
This likely results from and influences the declining technical expertise of the 
Council in the face of continued fiscal restraint as austerity-driven budget cuts 
have been implemented from above. The planning department is ideally 
placed to influence policy outcomes in the City, given its potential role as 
implementer and knowledge broker. However it lacked technical expertise, 
which precluded it from influencing policy in pursuit of sustainable ends. 
Again, this is a significant resource that the council lacked. For instance, there 
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are no staff dedicated to managing, pushing for or implementing sustainable 
construction standards as there are in other parts of the Cambridge: 
‘The level of expertise on sustainable construction varies. Where the officer 
has difficulties they’ll come to me. I suppose I’m the expert. That’s just more 
to do with having reviewed a heck of a lot of them. The first one I looked at I 
didn’t really understand it. Now, if someone gives me an NRIA or an energy 
statement I know what to look for…I’ve got a standard email that I can send 
saying ‘you need to consider total energy’ (Interview with planning policy 
manager, April 2015) 
 
If you look at what happens at council meetings, which is the most obvious 
place to see, then there is occasional mentions of the environment but it feels 
a bit like an add on. Most of the proposals would come from the Greens. Most 
people aren’t listening. It’s quite obvious that there’s a whipping system. The 
understanding is at quite a basic level. It’s the idea that ‘if I mention the 
environment or sustainability or solar in a sentence that would be alright, 
won’t it? It’s that kind of attitude. There doesn’t seem to be a willingness to 
look into it in any depth (Interview with Green Party Councillor, April 2015).  
 
Instead expertise on particular elements of sustainable construction – for 
example energy modelling, renewable energy schemes and so on – is spread 
throughout the rest of the Council as a whole rather than being contained in 
one department.  
 
Outside the council two organisations are important. First, Oxford Futures – a 
community organisation similar to Cambridge Futures – was tasked with 
modelling future growth in the Oxfordshire region (Oxford Civic Society 2014a, 
2014b). The Oxford Futures Report, compiled in 2014, makes a strong case 
for a strategic approach to growth in Oxford rather than the piecemeal 
approach to urban expansion that has been taken thus far. They advocated a 
holistic, sustainable approach to urban expansion, drawing heavily from the 
experience in Cambridge, which was used as a site of comparison by local 
planners and decision makers (The Economist 2015). They recommended a 
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Quality Charter for Growth and a Quality Panel to inspect the design and 
sustainability credentials of development, very much like arrangements 
abound in Cambridge (Oxford Civic Society 2014b, p. 7).  
 
Second, there is an increasingly well organised green-lobby in the City – 
reflecting the long concern with climate change discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter. There are over 40 low carbon groups in Oxfordshire, spear-
headed by a Low Carbon Hub.  Starting recently it is beginning to have an 
influence on the way that the Council approaches sustainability in the built 
environment. Low Carbon Oxford is a key initiative designed to respond to the 
emissions targets laid out in the various climate change strategies adopted by 
Oxford City Council in recent years.  
 
It was launched in 2010 and is a citywide programme designed to increase 
the sustainability of Oxford through public-private collaboration and works 
closely with OxLEP to increase the limited focus on sustainability within the 
organisation. 31 organisations have signed up to its Low Carbon Oxford 
Charter (this includes public sector organisations, major employers such as 
BMW Mini, local transport operators and local universities and it has 
orchestrated significant investments in solar PV schemes, hydro-electricity 
schemes and funding for community groups (interview with sustainability 
partnerships officer, March 2015). It has led to fifteen projects, of which the 
most visible is the Low Carbon Hub. This is a social enterprise that seeks to 
lower carbon emissions in the Oxfordshire region by developing and investing 
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in renewable energy infrastructure and energy reduction projects (Grant 
Thornton 2013, pp. 4–5). Lastly, the OxFutures Fund was created in 2012 
using European Union funding to contribute to the carbon emissions reduction 
strategies across Oxfordshire (Grant Thornton 2013, p. 5) 
 
During initial consultation of the SHDPD, at which time the Council ran several 
well-attended workshops across the City to encourage community 
participation and collaboration, ‘the overarching emphasis emerging from the 
public was on the need for new build developments to meet high sustainability 
standards’ together with a sense that ‘we cannot afford not to prioritize the 
sustainability credentials of development’ (Oxford City Council 2011f, p. 11). 
This was mirrored internally, where councillors discussed the introduction of 
Code standards as a way to realize greater external recognition for Oxford 
City Council’s approach to climate change mitigation (Oxford City Council 
2010b) and where the exploitation of planning policies to realize sustainable 
ends was recognized as important in the Council’s own Low Emission 
Strategy (Oxford City Council 2013a, p. 9). Despite this though, no additional 
action was taken. 
 
As these organisations start to institutionalize a commitment on sustainability 
within broader networks we can see the balance shift between those 
concerned primarily with economic growth and those concerned primarily with 
sustainability. However, the viability restrictions embodied in the 2012 NPPF, 
the removal of local discretion to set supplementary sustainability standards in 
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the 2015 Housing Standards Review and the demise of the whole zero-
carbon homes agenda in 2016 have meant that the potential for these groups 
to influence has become narrowed as the ability of local authorities to set 
higher standards became more restricted. In other words, the window of 
opportunity has closed.  
 
To summarise, we can say that once the initial complacency about the NRIA 
wore off and recommendations started to emerge to explore Code standards 
or supplementary standards the deck was stacked against those advocating 
sustainable construction within the policy network. They had few of the 
necessary resources required to instigate change and those in positions of 
power had little need to rely on what resources they could bring to the table. 
More recently, a more organised and better-resourced collection of pro-
sustainability groups has emerged, but at a time when supplementary 
standards are no longer a viable option for local authorities in the face of 
external rule changes.  This restricted the extent to which the political saliency 
of affordability could be challenged in favour of a greater and concurrent 
concern with sustainability when the discussions on housing growth emerged. 
As a result, it restricted the extent to which dominant ‘growth’ institutions could 
be supplanted by policy entrepreneurs with institutions directed towards 
sustainability. 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
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What this all meant was that the drive for sustainable construction that 
accompanied the publication of the NRIA faltered on the political agenda, 
replaced instead with a focus on housing affordability and absolute housing 
provision. What expertise that did exist was made redundant because of 
prevailing and emerging institutional rules and practices, their position within 
the policy network and, ultimately, by the Housing Standards Review and 
revocation of supplementary standard setting powers. The initial ambition still 
exists, albeit fragmented inside and outside the Council, but had been 
restricted by rules that favoured growth over sustainability, by practices which 
favoured the maintenance of the recent NRIA rather than its revision in light of 
the national zero-carbon homes agenda and, ultimately, by a lack of technical 
expertise. This lack of expertise is particularly important when we consider 
how difficult it was for those advocating sustainable construction to shift 
dominant rules and practices towards a focus on sustainable construction 
through the network that surrounded the cities growth agenda.   
 
What is apparent is that the longer that economic conditions continue to 
constrain the housing market in the area the greater the extent to which 
affordability sits at the top of the political agenda. In this case, especially 
where a policy such as the NRIA has only just emerged, it is reasonable to 
expect sustainability to fall down the political agenda.  So, economic 
conditions play a dual role. On the one hand they make it easier for the 
Council to justify the inclusion of sustainability construction standards and 
their effect on viability. On the other hand they can influence the political 
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agenda if the housing market becomes so buoyant that it leads to housing 
shortages, particularly of affordable homes, and rising house prices.  
 
However, this chapter has reinforced two messages that run throughout this 
thesis. The first is that well resourced policy entrepreneurs are critical in 
negotiating institutional landscapes. It was because of well-resourced policy 
entrepreneurs that the NRIA emerged and it was the lack of well-resourced 
policy entrepreneurs that led in part to its demise and to sustainable 
construction falling off of the political radar. The second is that there is a 
complex interdependency between agents, networks and institutions, where 
agents work in networks to design new and reformed institutions but are 
constrained by extant institutional architectures. So, whilst entrepreneurs are 
the most important link, the concern over resourcefulness necessarily implies 
that their institutional and structural context plays a causal role. Particular 
network or institutional dynamics have coalesced to lower the saliency of 
sustainable construction (depriving them of resources in the process). 
Entrepreneurs were faced with an unfavourable institutional landscape and, 
over time, this led to a decrease in entrepreneurship as expertise decreased, 
complacency with the NRIA set in and priorities shifted elsewhere. 
Furthermore, those still advocating sustainable construction (whether inside or 
outside the Council) were badly situated within policy networks to be able to 
reform those institutions in pursuit of supplementary sustainable construction 
standards.  
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Chapter Nine: 
 
Accounting for Variations in Local Contributions to 
Ecological Modernisation: Assessing The Findings 
   
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
Research question number two asks how we can account for variations in the 
contributions that local authorities make to state managed ecological 
modernisation. The case for a new way of thinking about local governments 
role in ecological modernisation was made in chapter two and the model of 
environmental policy capacity developed in chapter four provides the 
conceptual tools to answer that research question. What the last three 
chapters have shown is that the model of local environmental policy capacity 
can provide the tools required to study and account for variations and to make 
context-dependent conclusions.  
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to discuss those context-dependent 
conclusions and to explain the variation between Oxford and Cambridge City 
Councils. Broadly speaking, the different trajectories taken by the two reflects 
their differing capacities and the way that policy entrepreneurs were able to 
negotiate them. The difference in trajectories the two councils took was down 
to the differing opportunities that policy entrepreneurs had to interact and 
influence the institutional context they found themselves in. The different 
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capacities are explained, together with the relationship between capacity and 
ecologic and economic rationality. The capacity of a local authority affects the 
extent to which the two can be reconciled in a positive sum relationship. The 
bulk of this chapter focuses on the model’s individual components and how 
they differed across the two cases, as well as how the findings of the 
regression analysis in chapter six relate. It concludes with an assessment of 
the model as a tool to account for the contributions made.  
9.2. Policies In Place 
By the simultaneous end of both the national zero-carbon homes agenda and 
local standard-setting discretion in 2015 the two local authorities had very 
different sustainable construction standards in place and had undertaken 
different journeys to end up in that situation. Whereas Cambridge City 
Council’s approach was marked by an almost continuous process of 
supplementary standard setting, Oxford City Council had failed to sustain an 
early innovativeness. 
 
Table 9.1. summarises the main sustainable construction policies in place 
between 2000 and 2015 in both local authorities. Oxford had introduced 
stringent, supplementary standards earlier than most but had found itself on a 
downhill trajectory since then, with a gradual and relative weakening of its 
supplementary position. Cambridge on the other hand had behaved in the 
opposite fashion. Very little was in place when Oxford introduced the NRIA 
and 20% Merton Rule, save for a 10% Merton Rule type policy introduced a 
year after in 2006.  The energy statements and checklists it also adopted in 
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2006 represented an innovation of sorts, but their non-binding nature restricts 
the extent to which we can refer to them as supplementary. However as time 
went on and as supplementary standard setting became institutionalized 
through PPS1 and Building a Greener Future in 2006 Cambridge introduced 
supplementary standards into a number of major planning documents. 
Whereas Oxford had started strong and gone downhill from there, Cambridge 
had started weak and gained more strength with each subsequent year. 
 
Table 9.1: Supplementary Standards in Place in Oxford and Cambridge City 
Councils by 2015. 
 
Year(s) Oxford City 
Council 
Cambridge 
City Council 
Remarks 
2000-
2006 
 
20% Merton Rule 
type policy (2005) 
10% Merton 
Rule type 
policy (2006) 
Both sets of policies 
were focused on 
developments of  ten or 
more homes.  
 
At this stage, Oxford has 
more stringent 
requirements than those 
in both Cambridge and at 
the national level. 
Sustainability 
Checklist (2005) 
Sustainability 
Checklist 
(2006) 
Sustainability 
Statement (2005) 
Sustainability 
Statement 
(2006) NRIA (2005) 
2007-
2014 
NRIA watered 
down in SHDPD 
from 2013 in 
favour of non-
biding energy 
statements for 
residential 
development 
(2011)  
 
Code Level 
4/5 in NW 
Cambridge 
AAP (2008) 
 
At this stage Cambridge 
has far more stringent 
requirements than those 
in both Oxford and at the 
national level. What’s 
more, the NRIA has 
become largely out-
dated in the face of 
updates to national 
Building Regulations and 
a watering down of the 
NRIA to a non-binding 
energy statement. 
 
Code Level 
4/5 in CB1 
AAP (2010)  
2015   
 
Attempts to 
introduce 
Code Level 4 
into City-
wide Local 
Plan 
Cambridge had made 
significant inroads into 
introducing City Wide 
Level 4 into its Local 
Plan, with a strong 
evidence base and little 
doubt that it would be 
rejected at inspection. 
However, national level 
rule changes preventing 
this plan from reaching 
fruition.   
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The reason for these different trajectories can be attributed to their different 
environmental policy capacities. There was variation because there were 
different capacities to respond to particular circumstances and capacity was 
built or maintained in different ways. Cambridge had developed a capacity 
that focused around expertise, institutional resilience, spreading expertise 
across the council, political support, organizational development, financial 
stability and institutional synchronicity. Oxford’s capacity was undermined by 
institutional instability, a lack in expertise over time, political dissonance, 
financial pressures from an overheating housing market and temporal 
constraints. 
 
Whilst capacities differ between the two, there is nevertheless a latent 
ecological rationality in both cases – evidenced by the initial ambition in 
Oxford and the on-going ambition in Cambridge. Oxford, though, was 
increasingly unable to reconcile ecological and economic rationality in a 
positive sum relationship because the institutional context shifted the relative 
values of actor resources in the policy network. So in both cases there was an 
initial demand for supplementary standards, but it was realized in different 
ways because pro-sustainability groups or individuals were able to draw on 
the different capacities that were present.  
 
What we therefore find is that environmental policy capacity affects the extent 
to which ecological and economic rationality can co-exist, given the 
complexity inherent in policy making locally. 
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9.3. Theorizing Local Environmental Policy Capacity: Oxford and 
Cambridge City Councils 
 
The differences between the two can be seen with more careful examination. 
Table 9.2. below highlights the main differences across all the main elements 
of the model. Reading downwards it shows us the context in which policy 
entrepreneurs were operating and how they negotiated policy networks to 
interact with it.  
 
 
Element of Local Environmental 
Policy Capacity 
Oxford Cambridge 
Agency Policy 
entrepreneurship  
- Well resourced 
initially, but declining 
influence over time 
 
- Well resourced initially and 
increasing influence over 
time 
 
Institutions Rules  - Housing growth 
restriction - Employment growth - NRIA adopted pre 
ZCH agenda - National rule 
changes precluded 
later ambition 
- Housing growth restriction 
followed by expansion - Window of opportunity  - Employment growth - Regional and national 
context that privileged 
sustainability - National rule changes 
precluded later ambition 
 Practices - Complacency over 
policies it already 
had in place - Uncertainty over 
future of zero-carbon 
homes agenda and 
Code - Increasing returns 
associated with 
NRIA - Scepticism of Code 
- Ambition - Culture of innovation and 
sustainability - Expectation/responsibility 
to grow sustainably. - Commitment to 
sustainability within 
regional institutions 
 
 Institutional change - Gradual process of 
institutional drift and 
displacement: As the 
NRIA embedded 
itself it become 
entrenched and 
soon out-dated, with 
- Gradual process of 
institutional layering; 
punctuated equilibrium 
emerged with the NW 
Cambridge AAP, which in 
turn paved the way for a 
proactive approach to 
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no one pushing for 
its reform. 
planning elsewhere. 
 Path dependency - The NRIA became 
path dependent, 
decreasing returns 
set in.  
- The NW Cambridge AAP 
was path dependent in so 
much as it institutionalised 
an approach to 
sustainability within the 
council and within its 
planning documents – 
increased expertise, 
confidence, reduced 
developer opposition. 
 Synchronicity - Poor (bad timing, 
little interest in the 
Code) 
- Good (good timing, high 
interest in the Code) 
 Dialectics of 
institutions and 
agency 
- Entrepreneurs were 
rule and practice 
‘takers’ with limited 
scope to influence 
outcomes. 
- Entrepreneurs were rule 
and practice ‘takers’ and 
‘makers’ 
 
Networks  Network actor 
resources 
- Declining expertise 
of entrepreneurs, a 
resource drain for 
the council. - Those with 
resources to 
influence change 
(i.e. Council, OxLEP, 
County) were all 
pushing for 
employment 
growth/propagating 
the economic 
situation. 
 
- Increasing expertise of 
entrepreneurs as context 
changes, a resource gain 
for the council. 
 
 Dissonance/Congr
uence 
- Dissonance both 
externally and 
internally 
- Congruence both 
externally and internally 
Economic 
Framework 
Conditions 
Economic 
framework 
conditions 
(including direct 
and indirect 
economic costs)  
- High levels of 
unaffordability and 
housing shortages 
initially, worsening 
over time - Helped initially to 
justify NRIA, but 
ended up 
dominating political 
agenda   
- High levels of 
unaffordability and housing 
shortages initially, 
improving over time - Economic conditions 
began to fall on the 
political agenda, creating 
‘room’ for sustainability.  
Table 9.2. Theorising Local Environmental Policy Capacity 
9.3.1. Entrepreneurs 
 
Institutions and agents existed in a co-constitutive, dialectical relationship. 
Dialectical is defined here as an on-going, iterative interaction between each 
group. There are resonances here with the discussions on structure and 
	314	
agency, where ‘any approach which stresses exclusively either structure or 
agency has severe limitations’ (Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 5). Rules and 
practices placed both objective and subjective limits on the range of 
acceptable behaviour, but the actualisation of that behaviour in turn leads to 
new rules and practices or reforms of existing ones. In the two cases a focus 
on these two factors was fruitful in highlighting differences, particularly in 
terms of how growth strategies were affected and how timing and the 
legislative process influenced the trajectory policy took. 
 
Cambridge had internal and external policy entrepreneurs who could act as 
the requisite sponsors and champions who could exploit this political space in 
order to raise the issue of sustainability in buildings on the agenda. Sponsors 
devoted considerable resources to informing policy makers, recruiting 
expertise in the planning departments and brokering between competing 
interests. They were able to negotiate policy networks to engage in processes 
of institutional design. In terms of seizing a window of opportunity, both 
networks and champions were able to capitalise upon the increased focus on 
housing provision (both for its structuring effect on political agendas, but also 
the opportunity it provided to focus on how homes were built within this new 
political space) in order to argue that the new homes in the pipeline should be 
built to the highest sustainability standards. This is a message that gained 
particular traction in the context of green-belt land release. They were met 
with willing sponsors in the form of the Liberal Democrat party groups.  
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Cambridge was able to undertake a greenbelt review, freeing up much 
needed developable land and alleviating some of the more immediate 
concerns with addressing unmet housing need, ensuring the continued 
economic success of the City and addressing the housing affordability 
problem. What’s more, it was in a position to write its local plan at an 
opportune moment of local devolution of supplementary discretion and was 
able to layer standards in an on going process of institutional reform. There 
were thus opportune institutional conditions for environmental concern both 
inside and outside the Council to be translated into supplementary standards.  
 
Oxford, on the other hand, found it difficult to relieve the pressure on its 
housing market given that it had little ability to undertake greenbelt review. 
This kept affordability and provision on the top of the agenda. More 
practically, timing was not on the Council’s side; it had just published its own 
internal NRIA before the national level devolution of powers. When it was in a 
position to rewrite its plans (and thus consider including supplementary CSH 
standards), considerable uncertainty and complacency had emerged, together 
with much stricter criteria on viability. 
 
Those in Oxford City Council were well resourced initially but their influence 
declined over time until they failed to feature in policy networks at the same 
time as the policies they were advocating declined in saliency. Those in 
Cambridge City Council were initially well resourced and their influence 
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continued over time as they met with a good reception and as the saliencies 
of sustainable construction increased with shifting contexts. Differences in 
pace and direction can be accounted for by the differing prevalence of policy 
entrepreneurship and the extent to which policy champions and sponsors 
(inside and outside the local authority) can serve to: maintain existing 
institutions to accommodate supplementary powers, reform existing ones that 
may stand in their way, to play an agenda-setting role and to act as 
knowledge brokers across and within policy networks. What we have seen 
from the discussions on Oxford and Cambridge City Councils is not just that 
actors are important variables in accounting for variations in trajectory, but 
that they act in strategic ways. Hay (2002, pp. 126–130) suggests that actors 
within structured contexts use their own knowledge and expertise strategically 
to serve their interests by working with existing structures, action that 
simultaneously influences those structures in an iterative process. Neither, 
then, is fixed and both are interdependent. 
 
Where this level of agency becomes particularly important is in building 
resilience over time; sustainable homes became institutionalised over time 
through the work of key network actors and key policy entrepreneurs as a 
core strategic objective in Cambridge that in some ways guaranteed it at the 
very least a minimal presence on the political agenda even if institutional, 
economic, network or agency factors changed. For example, even in spite of 
a change from a Liberal Democrat to a Labour administration sustainable 
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homes remained firmly on the political agenda. Where this kind of agency is 
lacking as it was in Oxford over time the resilience is smaller. 
  
Both Oxford and Cambridge City Councils recognized the importance of this 
issue. Where they differed was the extent to which political conditions 
favoured action – as evidenced by political dissonance across administrative 
boundaries in Oxfordshire. In Cambridge though, importantly, the alignment of 
these forces was exploited by policy entrepreneurs – in this case a champion 
in the form of a sustainable construction officer and Liberal Democrat 
councillor and a sponsor in the sense of a sympathetic Liberal Democrat party 
group. The senior sustainability policy officer in Cambridge City Council 
worked extensively with representatives from consultancy and developers and 
other stakeholders (including the public) in order to foster long-term trust and 
to both educate and listen to potential grievances. More broadly, they served 
as a point of contact for those interested in learning more or venting 
grievance.  In Oxford, by comparison, the complacency that set in after the 
adoption of the NRIA meant that the innovation and spur of sustainability 
advocates declined.  
 
9.3.2. Institutions 
 
Institutional rules and practices set the regulatory, normative and discursive 
context in which behaviour of actors takes place. Policy entrepreneurs in both 
cases were both enabled and constrained by institutional rules and practice 
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that abounded locally, regionally or even nationally. Chapter four discussed 
new theories of institutionalism and in doing so we saw how institutional 
change, design and synchronicity are conceptualized and operationalized.  
 
In Oxford the most influential institutional rules that influenced the extent to 
which calls for sustainable construction were made were the restrictions on 
growth, the pro-employment growth strategies in place amongst local and 
regional authorities and the NRIA. The former two prioritised housing 
affordability and the provision of much needed homes on a scarce land 
supply, which decreased the saliency of sustainability. This was especially 
true because of the NRIA, which had only recently been adopted but which 
quickly became out-dated (and watered down). When the Council was in a 
better position to think about integrating Code policies the uncertainty and 
frequent rule changes nationally over the zero-carbon homes policy, the Code 
and local authorities place in sustainable planning acted as a disincentive to 
action.  
 
Alongside these rules there were a number of institutional practices that made 
their work harder, even in spite of latent commitment to sustainability within 
groups within the Council. The most influential was the complacency and 
decreasing returns that set in following the publication of the NRIA, just prior 
to the publication of the Code. Perhaps because of this there was little 
sympathy with the Code amongst council planning policy makers. Their 
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immediate priority was on affordable home provision and it had a strong 
political steer to increase their supply.  
 
Cambridge suffered from a similar growth restriction, but the ability to engage 
in major expansion on the edge of the city provided the political space for 
advocates of sustainable construction to institutionalise a regulatory 
commitment into the planning policies accompanying that growth (for example 
in the Northwest Cambridge AAP). They were able to capitalise upon latent 
and emerging demand for sustainable construction from the University, 
Cambridgeshire Horizons and the rising saliency of zero-carbon homes 
nationally. Over time, as new rules emerged, the ease with which 
supplementary standards could be set increased alongside expertise and 
experience. Alongside these rules there were also a number of practices that 
encouraged policy entrepreneurs. There had been a latent concern for the 
environment and a latent innovativeness for some time. The Code gave a 
name to existing ambition, meaning not just that there was an expectation that 
growth would be obtained as sustainably as possible but that entrepreneurs 
were pushing at an open door. This expectation extended beyond the council, 
to regional QUANGOs and local network actors, particularly the University.  
 
Over time the institutions that were in place when supplementary standard 
setting powers were set changed gradually. In Oxford the sustainable 
construction institutions – whether that is the NRIA or the existing culture 
within the Council and planning department – drifted over time and became 
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displaced. They became displaced because of changes to national Building 
Regulations in line with the zero-carbon target, which rendered elements of 
the NRIA out of date. The culture, expertise and way of working drifted over 
time as a result of neglect as attention became diverted elsewhere. 
Cambridge’s planning institutions emerged through a process of layering, 
where new institutions (policies, ways of working and so on) emerge and 
attach to existing institutions in a way that changes their structure. The way 
that new policies emerged that required specific Code standards gradually 
reformed existing planning institutions.   
 
The Northwest Cambridge AAP itself became path dependent, as it increased 
the expertise and familiarity with the Code. It also created a norm or 
expectation for other growth sites and emerging policies. There were thus 
further incentives to consider Code policies. Cambridge’s tradition of 
innovation in sustainability meant such plans were easy to justify. The 
dominant narrative saw housing provision and affordability and sustainability 
as achievable concurrently.  
 
Conversely, in Oxford the NRIA was path dependent, given the extent to 
which it led to decreasing returns and a complacency. The complacency and 
sunk costs particularly precluded its reform. There were few incentives to 
consider reforming the NRIA to adopt Code policies to stay one-step ahead of 
national level Building Regulations, especially in light of increasing housing 
shortages its increasing political saliency. Over time the dominant narrative 
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saw sustainability and affordability as mutually exclusive and remained 
distrustful of the Code. 
 
Both were influenced by temporal factors though. In many respects 
Cambridge had good timing; it was legislating on its precedent setting 
developments in the window between 2006 and 2012, where viability features 
less heavily in national regulation on supplementary standard setting. Oxford 
had just introduced its NRIA prior to the devolution of powers in 2006/7 and 
when more serious calls were being made for the Code the NPPF had been 
published and there was increasing restrictions on local behaviour alongside 
the rising uncertainty.  
 
In Cambridge then there was far greater freedom for policy entrepreneurs to 
act as institutional designers. There was a window of opportunity presented 
by the growth strategy which, coupled with the prevailing norms and network 
dynamics, meant that they could create new institutions (new roles, policies, 
strategies and norms). In Oxford they had far less agency. The complacency 
surrounding the NRIA and the political unattractiveness of further attention of 
sustainability meant that the same opportunities failed to materialize.  
 
9.3.4. Networks  
 
The ability of entrepreneurs to influence the institutional landscape is 
mediated through policy networks, where the agential manifestation of 
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prevailing institutions and norms interact in the governance process. Context 
influences the relative resourcefulness of network actors and can change 
rapidly because of internal or external factors. Where there is support for 
sustainable construction within a network, or at least support for the principles 
of sustainability in general, policy entrepreneurs can find themselves 
empowered and better able to influence outcomes. 
 
Those advocating sustainable construction standards in Cambridge City 
Council enjoyed strong, cross-party political support and a receptive local 
community. Given the economic situation, there was little viable opposition 
from developers. Those involved in the city’s growth (the University, 
Cambridge Futures, the Regional Development Agencies, Cambridgeshire 
County Council and Cambridge City Council) were all pushing for sustainable 
design, either as a cost saving measure as in the case of the University or as 
a political means to justify greenbelt expansion.  
 
In Oxford City Council an initial constellation of Councillors found support from 
the ruling Labour administration, but the distinction between the planning 
department and those advocating sustainable construction were clear. 
Whereas in Cambridge entrepreneurs were drawn from within the planning 
department or from the portfolio holder for planning, in Oxford proponents of 
change came from outside the planning department. Over time the 
employment growth agenda, spearheaded by pro-business groups through 
OxLEP and the County council and with significant legal-institutional 
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resources, disempowered sustainability advocates. This was in spite of an 
active green community in the city as a whole.  
 
It wasn’t just between green-advocates and growth-advocates that opposition 
emerged, the network in Oxford was marred by political dissonance such that 
there were disagreements between various actors, particularly over the pace 
and direction of Oxford’s proposed city-expansion. For as long as this 
dissonance between Oxford and its neighbouring authorities continues to 
define discussions on the greenbelt the pressures on Oxford’s housing market 
will continue to rise, further decreasing the relative saliency of sustainability, 
ceteris paribus.  As we saw above, Cambridge saw much agreement on the 
principles of growth and expansion and the City Council had a particularly 
close relationship with its sole neighbour, allowing it to grow.  
 
Where the network was receptive their collective resources could be deployed 
to add value to the proposals of entrepreneurs. For example, having support 
of the Cambridgeshire Horizons, the QUANGO managing the major growth 
sites in Cambridge, or the ruling party group increases the likelihood, ceteris 
paribus, that outcomes can be influenced. Where the network was not so 
receptive it was more difficult to draw on network actor resources, especially 
when changing institutional contexts are affecting them.  
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9.3.5. Economic framework conditions 
 
Underpinning the institutional context, and thus the behaviour of policy 
networks, were economic framework conditions. Reconciling economic costs 
with ecological benefits is central to ecological modernisation, whether it 
emerges organically or through purposive state-action. In the private sector 
the reconciliation of economic and ecological concern is one based upon the 
savings associated with efficiencies. Within local government though 
economic concern has a Janus face. Whilst top-down enabling rules may 
specify a degree of economic strength – as it does with supplementary 
standard setting – the same strength can act as a constraint as we saw in 
Oxford, where housing affordability remained at the top of the political 
agenda.  
 
It is not always clear the effect that economics will have, in other words. 
Further development of the model would seek to further integrate the idea of 
economic framework conditions within the context of institutions and networks 
to allow such flexibility and contingency. Nevertheless, what has become 
clear is that economics has an effect on all. The extent to which decisions can 
become increasingly made on the basis of economic and ecological criteria is 
influenced by the interaction between agents, networks and institutions in the 
local political economy.   
 
What we can say though is that this presents a paradox for existing 
discussions on EM. As we saw in section 2.1., a core assumption of EM is 
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that environmental improvements can lead to economic prosperity and vice 
versa. However, local contributions to EM in this case were only in reality 
possible where economic prosperity already exists. This could be because of 
the wording of enabling legislation from central government or because 
discussions on sustainable homes often get crowded out  when  markets fail. 
However it occurs, it does seem to undermine the notion that economic and 
environmental prosperity can exist in a positive sum relationship. In 
Cambridge the market was thriving, with space to grow and continued 
prosperity. Oxford was prosperous, but its housing market was failing 
considerably.  
 
Within Oxford the economic case for adopting supplementary planning 
standards had been evidenced, but the overheating of the housing market 
prioritized a different response. In Cambridge the dampening of the pressures 
caused by economic success created capacity for greater concern with the 
sustainable aspects of growth. The economic success of Oxford 
overshadowed the political agenda, primarily because the institutional 
architecture structuring the housing market failed to respond in the way it did 
in Cambridge. In both cases changes in context affected the behaviour of 
champions and those advocating sustainability in construction. In Oxford the 
economic circumstances diverted political attention and despite the fact that 
the resources of proponents hadn’t changed their influence declined. The fact 
that Cambridge was able to quell some of the more immediate pressures on 
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its housing market through expansion presented a window through which 
proponents could influence outcomes.  
 
Both cities had suffered as products of their own successes; marked increase 
in employment figures and a shortage of available, developable land had 
historically inflated house prices and reduced the number of affordable 
homes. In both cases housing affordability and unmet housing need have long 
had an ideational influence on the way that planning was approached in the 
city; vote-seekers responded to the issue to prioritise housing provision, 
planners found their agenda structured in particular ways, citizens became 
more focused on the issue, and so on. In both cases house-prices rose as 
restrictive growth was coupled with an increase in employment (whether 
organic, as in the case of Cambridge, or more consciously directed, as is the 
case in Oxford) and associated increases in population and further increase in 
un-met housing need. Where matters differed is the extent to which these 
were improving or declining. Institutional factors restricted the extent to which 
Oxford could make inroads to alleviating this problem. This served to keep 
unaffordability and housing provision at the top of the political agenda, as 
local decision makers scrambled to find an adequate response. Cambridge 
though found itself in a position where it could grow, thus alleviating this 
pressure and creating political room for a focus on sustainability, amongst 
other things. 
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Of course, both direct and indirect costs operate on a relative level; their effect 
is a product of the local political economy. Therefore, the extent to which 
supplementary standards are adopted is also a product of the ability of the 
local political economy to absorb or accommodate those costs. The 
regression analysis discussed in the end of chapter six highlighted that Code 
standard adoption was contingent in small part on the buoyancy of the local 
housing market. Where a housing market is growing slowly or where values 
are low developers are less able to absorb indirect policy costs (see section 
4.6) making the local authority’s job of justifying policy more difficult, thus 
precluding action.   
 
At what stage do the costs become ‘too much’ though, such that they are 
unable to be accommodated? First, a policy may be perceived to be 
inappropriate on the basis of its economic costs. This has an agenda-setting 
function, restricting the range of policy proposals appropriate for political 
consideration. Yet perception alone isn’t a deciding factor, instead it only has 
limited influence on defining the range of possible behaviours. It is still 
possible for a local authority to introduce a measure to this effect, providing a 
more important condition is met: costs cannot be significant enough to trigger 
any legal mechanisms in place that protect the integrity of economic 
rationality.  
 
In the case of sustainable housing sensitivity had to be paid to the effect of 
supplementary standards on viability. This kind of legal mechanism served as 
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a filtering device for local authorities interested in implementing standards; if 
evidence could not be provided that would highlight a limited effect on viability 
then action is effectively curtailed (whether by failing to initiate the policy 
process in the first instance or through having it removed at inspection).  
Needless to say, this latter influence is only a consideration if there are explicit 
requirements within the supplementary standard framework that preclude 
such behaviour, or in other words where an overt emphasis on economic 
rationality is institutionalized. Thus the extent to which ecological rationality 
can become institutionalised into the decision making process and reconciled 
with economic rationality is a key determinant factor in this process. 
 
Whilst the affordability issue is rising in Oxford it is, relatively speaking, 
decreasing in Cambridge as more housing comes to market. Neither the 
housing affordability problem nor the issue of addressing the City’s unmet 
housing need have been ‘solved’ in the literal sense in Cambridge, but recent 
years have seen affordability and housing provision fall on the political agenda 
in a way that opened up room on the agenda for sustainability. Thrown into 
the equation were problematic timing and procedural issues in Oxford that 
restricted both the attractiveness of sustainability standards and the scope to 
actually change anything.  
 
However, the extent to which sustainability can become incorporated in the 
planning realm – whether such measures may represent a significant 
economic cost to an industry or raise threats of a failure to meet housing need 
– depends on their political attractiveness in relation to other areas of focus 
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that may be on the political agenda. The rising relative saliency of affordability 
in Oxford has justified a bigger focus on affordable home provision, resulting 
in the 50% affordable homes requirements. This is both indicative of a bigger 
relative focus on the issue but also constitutive of an institutionalization of 
measures that only served to increase the difficultly in the future of introducing 
sustainable homes targets, given the more pertinent concerns with viability 
that emerge as a result of both a high affordable homes requirement and high 
sustainability standard. Cambridge was ‘only’ subject to a 40% requirement, 
which also served to increase the saliency of the idea of sustainability 
standards from a viability perspective.  
 
9.4. Interaction Within Environmental Policy Capacity  
 
 
It was always the intention of the model developed in this work to focus on the 
interconnections between agents, networks, institutions and economics. The 
need for that approach has been evidenced by the empirical work, which as 
we have seen highlights that interaction. Policy entrepreneurs sit as silent 
puppet masters, spotting opportunities where possible. Their involvement is 
therefore inevitable, but outside of their control is a world of institutions at 
multiple scales and powerful and well-resourced network actors within a 
centralized political environment. By pushing for sustainability within the 
council where the opportunity arises these policy entrepreneurs can influence 
the institutional world around them. Sometimes there is a degree of 
serendipity involved, whether because of a good timing or a supportive group 
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of advocates in the space around them. Other times work has to be done to 
convince the right people at the right time. A policy so specific as this needs 
advocates to come to fruition, especially in the earlier days of the zero-carbon 
homes agenda where general awareness about the Code for Sustainable 
Homes was more limited. In each case these entrepreneurs worked differently 
because they were faced with a different world around them. Without 
advocacy there would be no standards set. Over time the capacity for agency 
in Oxford declined as expertise dispersed and policies became displaced. 
Cambridge was dealing with numerous full-scale planning inquiries at which it 
was pushing for the highest available sustainability standards, so over time its 
expertise increased.  
 
When successful, they don’t act alone for long. A little input in the legislative 
process can take on a life of its own as it works it way through the Council, 
provided the right capacity exists elsewhere that can be evidenced. Where 
there is little opposition their job is easier, as it was in Cambridge. As 
institutions elsewhere shift the ease with which they can do this increases. 
They find windows of opportunity, or the opportunity to contribute to or tap into 
latent concern with sustainability that exists elsewhere. They are too weak to 
force these windows, but they can exploit them.   
 
9.5. Conclusion 	
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This chapter has shown is that we can indeed account for variation in the 
contributions that local authorities make to processes of ecological 
modernisation by studying the local environmental policy capacity. Doing so 
provides the researcher with an adaptive toolkit to study agency, institutions 
and structures and trace the evolution of policy. What the case studies have 
done is provide a rigorous application of that model. The findings from the 
regression analysis and case studies are in themselves useful for 
understanding the zero-carbon homes agenda in more detail and raise 
important questions for future research.  
 
This thesis’ dual empirical and theoretical contribution means attention has to 
divert away from the zero-carbon homes agenda back to a discussion on 
theory and a reflection on the environmental policy capacity model. The model 
has shown sufficient adaptability to respond to what is a complex and 
dynamic policy space, more so in political systems as centralized as that in 
the UK. Many elements, particularly of institutional theory, can be deployed 
from an integrated analytical toolbox and, given its roots in many of the 
agential and structural theories that inform the work on entrepreneurs and 
networks, it can integrate well across the model.  
 
Table 9.2. illustrates that the model, when combined with process-tracing 
techniques as it has been here, can cut through the complexity to produce 
what is essentially a three dimensional policy world onto a two-dimensional 
map. The interdependencies between its various components are able to 
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come out clearly. The agency element of the model offers rigidity, given that 
agents lie at the heart of institutional design and behaviour. This dialectical 
relationship between agents and institutions is gaining more traction in the 
literature, particularly when it comes to the role of agent as purposive 
institutional designer (Hay and Wincott 1998, Lowndes and Roberts 2013). 
This thesis shows clearly the need to think more often of the way that 
individuals can influence institutions, rather than the other way around. Small, 
niche policies such as Code standards required agency-legwork, but once 
institutionalized into local planning regimes they have a legacy effect that 
works to sustain them. In Oxford this worked to its detriment as the NRIA 
became out-dated, but in Cambridge it allowed for a process of layering to 
take place as expertise increased and a logic of appropriateness emerged. In 
both cases though individuals or groups of individuals initiated the process, 
without whom outcomes would look different. When asking how we can 
account for variation in outcomes in this case then the answer should be 
clear: focus on what the policy entrepreneurs were dealing with.  
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Chapter Ten: 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
There is clearly an ambition within local governments to respond to the 
challenges of climate change. We should not forget this. The UK government 
has over recent decades made significant inroads, legislating and 
incentivizing a process of ecological modernisation across a number of 
sectors (Lorenzoni et al. 2008), but more remains to be done. The ebb and 
flow of politics can present setbacks, just as they did with the abolition of the 
zero-carbon homes agenda in 2015 by a de-regulatory agenda abound 
nationally. There are always then areas for improvement and local 
government provides a natural home for much of that work, given its centrality 
to many aspects of daily life.  
 
This is already well known of course, as we saw when looking at the literature 
on urban climate governance. However, the case that this thesis has made is 
that much greater consideration is needed of the various capacities that exist 
within local authorities to become more inclusive in national legislative 
strategies directed towards ecological modernisation. One-size-fits all 
strategies emanating nationally certainly have a place, for example where 
national energy infrastructure may be required, but we saw in chapter two that 
the ability for ecological modernisation to become a reality is dependent upon 
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the ability for economic and ecological rationalities to be reconciled. Given the 
variation within countries on economic performance it may often be wise to 
devolve voluntary, supplementary powers to local authorities to contribute 
where possible.  
 
The changes to the residential housing sector since 2007 have provided an 
ideal opportunity to investigate what happens when they are given this choice. 
It is up to others to investigate the impact of their involvement, but it is enough 
to cite the ambition that exists within England and the case studies of 
innovation from across the world (see Lorenzoni et al. 2008, Bulkeley et al. 
2009, Bulkeley 2013 for a range of success stories). The need for this kind of 
investigation was well discussed in chapter two, but the means through which 
it would unfurl were discussed in chapter four. The model of local 
environmental policy capacity that was developed there attempted to strike a 
balance between respect for the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of ecological modernisation theory and providing the tools to 
map the complexity of the policy making process. The black boxing of agency 
within ecological modernisation theory provided inspiration for the central 
focus on policy entrepreneurship, championship and sponsorship that has 
flowed throughout this work. Yet the need to overcome the simultaneous 
tendency within the literature to disaggregate agents and institutions added an 
additional layer of nuance because it focused attention on their inter-
relationship. Finally, situating entrepreneurs within the context of wider policy 
networks allowed a much clearer understanding of the way that institutions 
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constrain or enable behaviour and how agents influence existing and 
emerging institutions than would have otherwise been possible. This echoes 
Jänicke and Weidnar’s work on environmental policy capacity, which as we 
saw in chapter four, responded to the assertion that ‘successful environmental 
protection is brought about by a complex interaction of influences and not by a 
single, isolated factor, nor a favorite instrument, nor a single type of actor, nor 
a particular framework condition’ (Janicke 1997, p. 4).  
 
A mixed-methodology allowed the research question to extend beyond asking 
just why something occurred. By virtue of its novelty the zero carbon homes 
agenda has attracted only limited academic discussion and has said little 
about the role of local authorities, as we saw in chapter three. This required 
looking precisely at what their involvement looked like and how many had 
engaged, the subject of chapter six. The dataset that resulted though could be 
used to assess one of the more central claims of ecological modernisation 
theory: economic conditions play an important role in whether or not decisions 
become increasingly made on the basis of ecological concerns. Case studies 
alone can play an important role but an epistemologically pragmatic approach 
is needed when looking at the value of quantitative techniques. The goal 
within this thesis has been to provide an interpretation of a complex political 
world from a realist epistemological perspective. Any methodological 
technique that can provide insight into a phenomenon and which doesn’t raise 
significant measurement or concept-indicator difficulties is welcome. The 
centrality of economic conditions to ecological modernisation theory and to 
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the model of local environmental policy capacity and the ease with which they 
can be measured (thus minimizing any concept-indicator problems) meant 
that the opportunity to statistically measure its influence was embraced.  
 
The limits of this regression analysis though need to be stressed. As we saw 
in chapter five its purpose was to pave the way for the qualitative tools 
deployed in the two case studies. Its findings on their own tell us only part of 
the story and make only limited sense without the findings from Oxford and 
Cambridge. In many ways though the case studies alone too only tell part of 
the story. They show the Janus faced of economic conditions in this context; it 
is unusual that although a baseline of economic strength is a necessary 
condition given the direct and indirect costs and regulatory conditions that 
may accompany devolved powers, it can both enable and constrain 
outcomes. Whilst it is needed, it alone can’t be used to accurately predict or 
forecast engagement with supplementary standards. Only further research will 
tell if the story is the same in other cases.  
 
This concern with prediction or forecasts hints at a normative undertone in this 
work. Both the introduction and chapter two stressed the links between the 
normative and analytical dimensions of ecological modernisation theory; the 
strength of the former is contingent on the completeness of the latter given the 
roots they share. State-led approaches to ecological modernisation such as 
the zero-carbon homes agenda bring with them considerable risk in so much 
as there is no guarantee that devolved powers will be embraced. This may be 
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irrelevant from a political perspective, dependent on the outlook of national 
government at any particular time, but from an ecological perspective it is 
important. We have seen throughout this study the ambition that exists, 
whether in the literature reviews on urban climate governance or the 
entrepreneurs in Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
If there were greater understanding about the factors that stood in the way or 
which encouraged local authorities to engage in national strategies policies 
could be designed more effectively, where the will exists.  This isn’t just about 
homes. The same story is likely to be repeated in a number of policy areas 
where local and central government are bought into close interaction, from 
transport to energy. Enabling powers structure local legislative behaviour, so 
further work should look at likely sites where that extents towards a 
supplementary role. The more we understand about this interaction the 
greater confidence we can have in how we engage local authorities in our 
broader national strategies.  
 
Approaching fifty per cent of local authorities had adopted or attempted to 
adopt supplementary Code standards by the time such a power was revoked, 
as we saw in chapter six. The level of ambition seen in Cambridge and these 
high adoption rates suggest an ambition locally to contribute to a broader 
transition process. This thesis contributes to a widening of the debate on 
ecological modernisation, to add understanding of how local government 
behaves when it is given the room to do so. The cases showed the complexity 
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involved in negotiating an institutional landscape that presents numerous 
obstacles. Growth dependent planning places a much greater emphasis on 
the economic dimension of the ecological-economic divide and as it becomes 
more entrenched (Rydin 2013a) and places additional demands on those 
local authorities with the ambition or will to act.  
 
But the cases do show the usefulness of the model of local environmental 
policy capacity as a tool to study the evolution of this process at work. In both 
cases latent demand for sustainability existed but both took very different 
directions. The level of complexity encountered wasn’t fully appreciated at the 
outset of the research. The adaptive approach to theorization employed (and 
discussed in chapter five) gave resilience to the model as it evolved. The 
danger would be that the model was too reflective of this particular case, but 
the anchor provided by the orienting concepts and umbrella of institutional 
theory has proved useful in detaching much of the theoretical discussion away 
from the empirical data. 
 
This thesis then has made two important contributions; one empirical and one 
theoretical. On the empirical front it has significantly increased our 
understanding of the zero-carbon homes agenda in its own right. There had 
been few previous attempts at codifying local responsibilities, even less 
attempts at quantifying their embrace of those responsibilities and no attempt 
to explain variation in the rate of that embrace. From that perspective a great 
deal has been learnt about the dynamics of local involvement in sustainable 
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homes agendas. On the theoretical front this study has made significant 
inroads by developing, applying and refining a conceptual model to account 
for local contributions to processes of EM, thus responding to the gaps 
highlighted there. Doing so has important ramifications for future study. When 
accounting for other EM processes a more comprehensive understanding of 
contributions can be sought, one that accurately accounts for local dynamics 
where necessary. 
 
The advantage of the model of local environmental policy capacity is that it is 
rooted in theory that brings with it flexibility, making it adaptive to particular 
context. Capacity takes many forms and the model allows those forms to be 
assessed. So what form did it take here? We can point to one important factor 
in particular; empowered policy entrepreneurs within a favourable institutional 
architecture and economic framework conditions that can accommodate the 
contribution. There is much though that occurs elsewhere that is outside the 
reach and influence of any one individual but which nevertheless open the 
way for or prevent supplementary standards being set. Yet without a group 
advocating, little would happen. 
 
The usefulness of the model stems from the way that it shows the relationship 
between economic and ecological rationality and the myriad factors that can 
prevent ecological concern getting a sound footing during any windows 
present. When applied in this case it showed us that much can stand in the 
way of the reconciliation of ecological and economic rationality, even in the 
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case of will or ambition. This is in the spirit of existing discussions on capacity 
in the literature on ecological modernisation where, remembering back to 
chapter four, it was defined as ‘the objective limits to (and necessary 
preconditions of) successful solutions of a given type of problem, limitations 
beyond which failure sets in, even in cases of good luck, skill and highly 
motivated actors’ (Janicke 1997, p. 1). Economic rationality alone does not 
structure outcomes, much stands in the way and it is entrepreneurs who need 
to realize ecological goals.  
 
Although future studies of similar devolutions of power should be sensitive to 
the institutional, agential, economic and network conditions within local 
authorities, many of those factors are more serendipitous than others and 
thus are more difficult to consciously change. There are many contextual, 
temporal or procedural factors that are difficult to actively change in pursuit of 
devolved powers. For example, although it is easy to employ the necessarily 
level of technical expertise, if a local authority lacks temporal synchronicity 
with national government little can be done to instigate change. Similarly, 
where ambition exists but is crowded out by, say, a concern with overall 
housing provision and affordability, it can be difficult for even the most skilled 
actors to create political room where otherwise it wouldn’t exist. In another 
example, the extent to which local authorities were able to introduce Code 
policies was influenced by the pre-existing nature of its housing stock and 
local economy, and the institutional rules that structure supplementary 
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standard setting which prioritize the economic concerns of developers over 
the ecological concerns of residents and local decision makers.  
 
Nevertheless, we can talk in terms of a broad checklist for success to 
consider when devolving powers in this way. We can say that an ‘ideal type’ 
scenario is one in which, when national government devolves supplementary 
powers, it finds that the:  
 - Local government is temporally and normatively in sync with the national 
government.  - The political agenda has room for a focus on sustainability (related to 
normative synchronicity) - High levels of championship exist, driven by an engaged civil society 
movement.  - Economic conditions both allow for policy to be introduced (whether through 
direct or indirect costs) but do not dominate political discussions such that the 
agenda becomes too crowded with policies designed to respond to those 
conditions.  
 
 
Where these are the case it is much more likely that a local government will 
be willing and able to embrace supplementary powers. Where they don’t then 
the response is less certain.  
 
This doesn’t mean that the model is without its limitations. There are 
constraints with any research that only become apparent towards the end of 
the research process which do not undermine the study but instead point 
towards further avenues for future research. Whilst the study focused on a 
new, fifth type of local supplementary contributions to climate governance, as 
discussed in section 6.3, it would be interesting to apply the model to the four 
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more traditional types of contribution. Doing so would subject it to greater 
exposure in a broader range of empirical areas.  
 
Additionally, this study has focused on only one policy area, so the most 
apparent future direction would be to look at others, perhaps in a comparative 
manner. Transport or waste policy, areas over which local authorities have 
traditionally had relatively high levels of autonomy and which have undergone 
national-level reforms in recent years, would be likely candidates. There 
would likely also be gains and oortunities to refine the model further if it were 
applied in political systems that are not as centralized as that in England in 
order to understand how the two levels interact when local governments have 
greater autonomy and independence. These faults do little to undermine this 
study though, they merely point towards areas for further research.  
 
There are also questions about the impact of local involvement on the 
ecological modernisation process. The most pressing concern comes from the 
interaction of economic strength and environmental protection. As we saw, 
there is a tendency within the existing literature on EM to assume that the 
implementation of policy directed at environmental reform is implemented 
‘problem free’, yet there is now a second concern: local authorities may only 
be able to make contributions to processes of ecological modernisation 
(processes that the state advocates for because, as we saw in sections 2.1. 
and 2.2.1, they can foster economic growth) where a baseline level of 
economic strength prevails. Here we reach a paradox, for the state has to be 
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considerate of the economic effects of ecological measures it tries to induce; 
a sensitivity to the economic impacts of policy prevails, especially at a time of 
austerity and global financial uncertainty. Thus, the extent to which economic 
growth and environmental protection can exist in a positive sum relationship 
and the extent to which we can ‘have it all’ is diminished.  
 
It may be the case that ecological modernisation can be good for economic 
growth, but as this thesis has shown, greater emphasis is needed on the role 
of the state in inducing such behaviour. It was argued earlier that greater 
emphasis is needed on explaining the role that local levels of government play 
in implementing and contributing to the EM agenda, but the findings 
presented in this thesis – particularly the realization that only those local 
authorities that are in a financially advantageous position are in a position to 
contribute to this debate – seem to undermine the ‘win-win’ nature of the EM 
debate. In the context of local contributions to the ecological modernisation of 
housing is contingent upon a sound economic position in the first instance. 
Despite claims that EM would itself lead to further economic growth in the 
future, a key factor affecting the extent to which EM takes place here is an 
advantageous financial position. There is a ‘win-win’ between economic 
growth and ecological protection, but only for those who are already winning 
financially in the first place.   
 
This points towards a common criticism of EMT; that is, it is only rich, highly 
developed industrial nations that can ‘afford’ to transition to an ecological 
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phase of modernity (Toke 2011). Indeed, Jänicke and Weidner consider this 
in the construction of the national level model of environmental policy 
capacity, where it is said that ‘the structure of [environmental problems] as 
well as the capacity to respond to them is strongly influenced by economic 
performance’ (Janicke 1997, p. 4) and when Mol talks about the dominance of 
economic over ecological spheres of rationality as a basis of decision making 
in processes of EM. 
 
Typically this criticism has focussed on the ‘cost’ implied in transitioning to 
EM, but here we might add that this would seem to be because of the 
economic contingency that often underpins policy decisions. In a political 
system dominated by processes of networked-governance, where 
stakeholders have input into the policy process, economically 
disadvantageous policy faces considerably greater opposition. Thus, policies 
directed at shifting behaviour within an industry along ecologically modern 
lines, whether done directly through central-government regulation, or more 
indirectly through the devolution of – in this case – supplementary standard 
setting powers, are likely to reflect extant economic conditions. For example, 
we can point not just to the contingencies that were placed on local authorities 
when setting supplementary standards (i.e. the need to respect housing 
supply), but the difficulties central government faced when negotiating terms 
and conditions with stakeholders in the Zero-Carbon Hub (particularly over 
definitions of zero-carbon and allowable solutions).  
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It is difficult to say without further research the extent to which this paradox is 
prevalent within industry-led processes of EM (of the sort discussed by, for 
example, Mol (1996)), but the findings presented here do nevertheless 
suggest that within state-led processes of EM (which, as we saw in Section 
2.3., are often overlooked in discussions on EM), action may only be possible 
where economic strength already prevails, regardless of the future economic 
benefits that such action may have. Two questions need asking: first, to what 
extent do local contributions to processes of ecological modernisation depend 
on sufficient levels of economic strength; second, to what extent does this 
trend exist at the national level? If it is shown in either case that extant levels 
of economic strength are a necessary condition (as has been the case in this 
study), then this undermines the theory central proposition of ecological 
modernisation theory discussed in Section 2.1. that growth and ecological 
protection and co-supporting.  
 
Alongside this, other questions remain. At the outset of this research it wasn’t 
known that the zero-carbon agenda would be wound down, nor that local 
authorities would have their discretionary powers revoked. However, given the 
developments that took place as the research was being conducted an 
interesting question emerged: what effect have local contributions had on the 
trajectory of the national legislative agenda? It would appear from peripheral 
evidence that a motivating factor in the winding down of the agenda was the 
fact that local authorities could set their own standards. We saw in section 
3.2. that the CSH and the ZCH were both subject to criticism, from a range of 
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parties. Developers frequently complained of an ‘uneven playing field’ of 
standards across the country, or regulatory ‘burden’ as more stringent 
requirements for sustainability sat alongside the existing infrastructure and 
affordable homes requirements accompanying development. It would be 
interesting in future research to investigate more fully the way in which this 
emerged as a restrictive factor together with how and why private developers 
responded in the way they did.  
 
Similarly, efforts can be made in the future to quantify the impact of local 
authority involvement. We have inferred in previous chapters that this kind of 
standard setting helps to lower technological costs, increase knowledge and 
expertise amongst a range of stakeholders and lead to the emergence of a 
new planning culture. However, it would be interesting to see more specifically 
the impact that they have had. What affect did local involvement have on the 
costs of sustainable homes, or the level of expertise, for example? Given that 
this kind of institutionalization of ecological concern is an important factor in 
processes of ecological modernisation it would be useful to more thoroughly 
quantify the impact they had.   
 
	347	
References 	
 Agyeman,	J.,	Evans,	B.,	and	Kates,	R.W.,	1998.	Greenhouse	gases	special:	Thinking	locally	in	science,	practice	and	policy.	Local	Environment,	3	(3),	245–246.	Allman,	L.,	Fleming,	P.,	and	Wallace,	A.,	2004.	The	Progress	of	English	and	Welsh	Local	Authorities	in	Addressing	Climate	Change.	Local	Environment,	9	(3),	271–283.	Angel,	D.P.,	Attoh,	S.,	Kromm,	D.,	Dehart,	J.,	Slocum,	R.,	and	White,	S.,	1998.	The	drivers	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	What	do	we	learn	from	local	case	studies?	Local	Environment,	3	(3),	263–277.	Ansell,	C.,	2009.	Network	Institutionalism.	In:	S.	Binder,	R.A.W.	Rhodes,	and	B.	Rockman,	eds.	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Political	Institutions.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Argyriou,	I.,	Fleming,	P.,	and	Wright,	A.,	2012a.	Local	climate	policy:	Lessons	from	a	case	study	of	transfer	of	expertise	between	UK	local	authorities.	
Sustainable	Cities	and	Society,	5,	87–95.	Argyriou,	I.,	Fleming,	P.,	and	Wright,	A.,	2012b.	Local	climate	policy:	Lessons	from	a	case	study	of	transfer	of	expertise	between	UK	local	authorities.	
Sustainable	Cities	and	Society,	5,	87–95.	Barry,	J.,	2005.	Ecological	Modernisation.	In:	J.	Dryzek	and	D.	Schlosberg,	eds.	
Debating	the	Earth:	the	environmental	politics	reader.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	303–321.	Bartlett,	D.	and	Dibben,	P.,	2002.	Public	Sector	Innovation	and	Entrepreneurship:	Case	Studies	from	Local	Government.	Local	Government	Studies,	28	(4),	107–121.	Baumgartner,	F.R.	and	Jones,	B.D.,	1993.	Agendas	and	Instability	in	American	
Politics.	University	of	Chicago	Press.	Berry,	F.S.	and	Berry,	W.D.,	1990.	State	Lottery	Adoptions	as	Policy	Innovations:	An	Event	History	Analysis.	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	84	(2),	395.	Betsill,	M.	and	Bulkeley,	H.,	2007.	Looking	Back	and	Thinking	Ahead:	A	Decade	of	Cities	and	Climate	Change	Research.	Local	Environment,	12	(5),	447–456.	Boddy,	M.	and	Hickman,	H.,	2013.	The	demise	of	strategic	planning?	The	impact	of	the	abolition	of	Regional	Spatial	Strategy	in	a	growth	region.	Town	
Planning	Review,	84	(6),	743–768.	Borzel,	T.A.,	1998.	Organizing	Babylon	-	On	the	Different	Conceptions	of	Policy	Networks.	Public	Administration,	76	(2),	253–273.	Brindley,	T.,	Rydin,	Y.,	and	Stoker,	G.,	1996.	Remaking	planning:	the	politics	of	
urban	change.	2.	ed.	London:	Routledge.	Brody,	S.D.,	Zahran,	S.,	Grover,	H.,	and	Vedlitz,	A.,	2008.	A	spatial	analysis	of	local	climate	change	policy	in	the	United	States:	Risk,	stress,	and	opportunity.	
Landscape	and	Urban	Planning,	87	(1),	33–41.	Bryman,	A.,	2006.	Integrating	quantitative	and	qualitative	research:	how	is	it	done?	Qualitative	Research,	6	(97),	97–113.	Bryman,	A.,	2008.	Social	research	methods.	Oxford;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
	348	
Bulkeley,	H.,	2013.	Cities	and	Climate	Change.	Routledge.	Bulkeley,	H.	and	Betsill,	M.,	2005.	Rethinking	Sustainable	Cities:	Multilevel	Governance	and	the	‘Urban’	Politics	of	Climate	Change.	Environmental	
Politics,	14	(1),	42–63.	Bulkeley,	H.	and	Kern,	K.,	2006.	Local	Government	and	the	Governing	of	Climate	Change	in	Germany	and	the	UK.	Urban	Studies,	43	(12),	2237–2259.	Bulkeley,	H.,	schroeder,	H.,	Janda,	K.,	Zhao,	J.,	Armstrong,	A.,	Shu,	Y.C.,	and	Ghosh,	S.,	2009.	Cities	and	Climate	Change:	The	Role	of	institutions,	governance	
and	urban	planning.	The	World	Bank,	Report	prepared	for	the	World	Bank	Urban	Symposium	on	Climate	Change.	Burch,	S.,	2010.	In	Pursuit	of	resilient,	low	carbon	communities:	An	examination	of	barriers	to	action	in	three	Canadian	cities.	Energy	Policy,	38,	7575–7585.	Burnham,	P.,	ed.,	1997.	Surviving	the	research	process	in	politics.	London ;	Washington	[D.C.]:	Pinter.	Buttel,	F.,	2000.	Classical	theory	and	contemporary	environmental	sociology.	In:	G.	Spaargaren,	A.	Mol,	and	F.	Buttel,	eds.	London:	Sage,	17–41.	Cabinet	Office,	2014.	Oxfordshire	Growth	Deal.	Cabinet	Office,	2015.	£9.9m	Expansion	of	Growth	Deal	Boosts	Local	Plan	for	
Oxfordshire	Economy.	Cairney,	P.,	2012.	Understanding	public	policy:	theories	and	issues.	Houndmills,	Basingstoke,	Hampshire ;	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Cairney,	P.,	2013.	Standing	on	the	Shoulders	of	Giants:	How	Do	We	Combine	the	Insights	of	Multiple	Theories	in	Public	Policy	Studies?:	Combining	the	Insights	of	Multiple	Theories.	Policy	Studies	Journal,	41	(1),	1–21.	Cambridge	City	Council,	2006.	Cambridge	Local	Plan.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	City	Council.	Cambridge	City	Council,	2007.	Sustainable	Design	and	Construction	
Supplementary	Planning	Document.	Cambridge	City	Council,	2012.	Cambridge	City	Council	Carbon	Management	Plan	2011-2016.	Cambridge	City	Council,	2013.	Cambridge	Local	Plan	2014:	Proposed	Submission.	Cambridge	City	Council,	2015.	Greater	Cambridge	City	Deal.	Cambridge	City	Council	and	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Council,	n.d.	
Cambridge	City	&	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Councils	-	North	West	
Cambridge	Area	Action	Plan	Submission	Draft	-	Local	Evidence	Base	for	
Climate	Change	and	Sustainable	Design	and	Construction	policy	
Requirements.	Cambridge	City	&	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Councils,	2008.	Cambridge	City	
&	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Council	-	North	West	Cambridge	Area	
Action	Plan	Submission	Draft	-	Local	Evidence	Base	for	Climate	Change	and	
Sustainable	Design	&	Construction	Policy	Requirements.	Cambridgeshire	County	Council,	2003.	Cambridgeshire	&	Peterborough	Structure	Plan	2003.	Cambridgeshire	Horizons,	2010.	Cambridgeshire	Quality	Charter	for	Growth.	Carson,	R.,	2000.	Silent	spring.	Reprinted.	London:	Penguin.	Cherry,	C.,	Hopfe,	C.,	MacGillivray,	B.,	and	Pidgeon,	N.,	2015.	Media	discourses	of	low	carbon	housing:	The	marginalization	of	social	and	behavioral	
	349	
dimensions	within	the	British	broadsheet	press.	Public	Understanding	of	
Science,	24	(3),	302–310.	Christoff,	P.,	2006.	Ecological	modernisation,	ecological	modernities.	In:	S.	Piers,	ed.	London:	Routledge,	179–200.	Christopoulos,	D.,	2006.	Relational	Attributes	of	Political	Entrepreneurs:	A	Network	Perspective.	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	13	(5),	757–778.	Cohen,	M.,	2000.	Ecological	modernisation,	environmental	knowledge	and	national	character:	A	preliminary	analysis	of	the	Netherlands.	
Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	77–106.	Collier,	D.,	2011.	Understanding	Process	Tracing.	PS:	Political	Science	and	Politics,	44	(4),	823–30.	Collier,	U.,	1997.	Local	authorities	and	climate	protection	in	the	European	union:	Putting	subsidiarity	into	practice?	Local	Environment,	2	(1),	39–57.	Committee	on	Climate	Change,	2012.	How	local	authorities	can	reduce	emissions	
and	manage	climate	risk.	Commoner,	B.,	1971.	The	closing	circle;	nature,	man,	and	technology.	1st	ed.	New	York:	Knopf.	Compston,	H.,	2009a.	Policy	Networks	and	Policy	Change:	Putting	Policy	Network	
Theory	to	the	Test.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Compston,	H.,	2009b.	Networks,	resources,	political	strategy	and	climate	policy.	
Environmental	Politics,	18	(5),	727–746.	Congreve,	A.,	2003.	Ecological	Modernisation	and	New	Rural	Housing.	Ph.D.	Thesis.	King’s	College	London,	London.	Crouch,	C.	and	Farrell,	H.,	2004.	Breaking	the	Path	of	Institutional	Development?	Alternatives	to	the	New	Determinism.	Rationality	and	Society,	16	(1),	5–43.	Cullingworth,	J.B.,	2015.	Town	and	country	planning	in	the	UK.	15th	ed.	London:	Routledge.	Cullingworth,	J.B.	and	Nadin,	V.,	2006.	Town	and	country	planning	in	the	UK.	14th	ed.	London ;	New	York:	Routledge,	Taylor	&	Francis	Group.	Daly,	H.E.,	ed.,	1973.	Toward	a	Steady-state	Economy.	illustrated	edition.	San	Francisco:	W.H.Freeman	&	Co	Ltd.	DCLG,	2006.	Code	for	Sustainable	Homes:	A	Step-Change	in	Sustainable	Home	
Building	Practice.	London:	Department	for	communities	and	Local	Government.	DCLG,	2007a.	Building	A	Greener	Future:	Policy	Statement.	DCLG,	2007b.	Planning	Policy	Statement:	Planning	and	Climate	Change	
Supplement	to	Planning	Policy	Statement	1.	Department	of	Communities	and	Local	Government.	DCLG,	2008.	Cost	Analysis	of	the	Code	for	Sustainable	Homes:	Final	Report.	DCLG,	2009.	Definition	of	zero	carbon	homes	-	impact	assessment	(July	2009).	London:	Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government.	DCLG,	2011.	Cost	of	building	to	the	Code	for	Sustainable	Homes:	Updated	Cost	
Review.	London:	Department	of	Communities	and	Local	Government.	DCLG,	2012a.	National	Planning	Policy	Framework.	London:	Department	of	Communities	and	Local	Government.	DCLG,	2012b.	Live	tables	on	housing	market	and	house	prices	[online].	Available	from:	https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-housing-market-and-house-prices	[Accessed	18	Sep	2015].	
	350	
DCLG,	2012c.	Ratio	of	median	house	price	to	median	earnings	by	district,	from	1997	[online].	Available	from:	http://opendatacommunities.org/data/housing-market/ratio/house-prices-ratio/med-house-price-to-earnings	[Accessed	28	Sep	2015].	DCLG,	2013.	Housing	Standards	Review:	Consultation.	DCLG,	2014a.	Housing	Standards	Review:	Written	Ministerial	Statement.	DCLG,	2014b.	Code	for	Sustainable	Homes	[online].	Available	from:	https://data.gov.uk/dataset/code_for_sustainable_homes	[Accessed	15	Sep	2015].	Deangelo,	B.J.	and	Harvey,	L.D.D.,	1998.	The	jurisdictional	framework	for	municipal	action	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	Case	studies	from	Canada,	the	USA	and	Germany.	Local	Environment,	3	(2),	111–136.	Della	Porta,	D.,	2008.	Comparative	analysis:	case-oriented	versus	variable-oriented	research.	In:	D.	Della	Porta	and	M.	Keating,	eds.	Approaches	and	
Methodologies	in	the	Social	Sciences.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	223–239.	Dryzek,	J.S.,	2002.	Deliberative	Democracy	and	Beyond.	Oxford	University	Press.	Dryzek,	J.	and	Schlosberg,	D.,	eds.,	2005.	Ecological	Modernisation.	In:	Debating	
the	Earth:	the	environmental	politics	reader.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	DTI,	2000.	Sustainable	Development	Strategy.	London:	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry.	Duit,	A.,	2007.	PATH	DEPENDENCY	AND	INSTITUTIONAL	CHANGE:	THE	CASE	OF	INDUSTRIAL	EMISSION	CONTROL	IN	SWEDEN.	Public	Administration,	85	(4),	1097–1118.	Easterling,	W.E.,	Polsky,	C.,	Goodin,	D.,	Mayfield,	M.W.,	Muraco,	W.A.,	and	Yarnal,	B.,	1998.	Changing	places,	changing	emissions:	The	cross‐scale	reliability	of	greenhouse	gas	emission	inventories	in	the	US.	Local	
Environment,	3	(3),	247–262.	ElementEnergy,	2010.	Decarbonising	Cambridge:	A	Renewable	and	Low	Carbon	
Energy	Study	for	Cambridge	City	Council.	ElementEnergy.	Evans,	B.,	Joas,	M.,	Sundback,	S.,	and	Theobald,	K.,	2004.	Governing	Sustainable	
Cities.	London ;	Sterling,	VA:	Routledge.	Finnemore,	M.	and	Sikkink,	K.,	1998.	International	Norm	Dynamics	and	Political	Change.	International	Organization,	52	(4),	887–917.	Fisher,	D.	and	Freudenburg,	W.,	2001.	Ecological	modernization	and	it’s	critics:	Assessthe	past	and	looking	toward	the	future.	Society	and	Natural	
Resources,	14,	701–709.	Flyvbjerg,	B.,	2006.	Five	Misunderstandings	About	Case-Study	Research.	
Qualitative	Inquiry,	12	(2),	219–245.	Frijns,	J.,	Phuong,	P.T.,	and	Mol,	A.P.J.,	2000.	Ecological	modernisation	theory	and	industrialising	economies:	the	case	of	Viet	Nam.	Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	257–292.	George,	A.L.	and	Bennett,	A.,	2005.	Case	studies	and	theory	development	in	the	
social	sciences.	Cambridge,	Mass.:	MIT	Press.	Gibbs,	D.,	2000.	Ecological	modernisation,	regional	economic	development	and	regional	development	agencies.	Geoforum,	31	(1),	9–19.	Gibbs,	D.	and	O’Neill,	K.,	2015.	Building	a	green	economy?	Sustainability	transitions	in	the	UK	building	sector.	Geoforum,	59,	133–141.	
	351	
Gille,	Z.,	2000.	Legacy	of	waste	or	wasted	legacy?	The	end	of	industrial	ecology	in	postsocialist	Hungary.	Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	203–231.	Glaser,	B.G.	and	Strauss,	A.L.,	2012.	The	discovery	of	grounded	theory:	strategies	
for	qualitative	research.	New	Brunswick,	N.J.:	Aldine	Transaction.	GL	Hearn,	2014.	Oxfordshire	Strategic	Housing	Market	Assessment	-	Summary	-	
Key	Findings	on	Housing	Need.	Goodchild,	B.,	2010.	Conservative	Party	policy	for	planning:	caught	between	the	market	and	local	communities.	People,	Place	&	Policy	Online,	4	(1),	19–23.	Goodchild,	B.	and	Walshaw,	A.,	2011.	Towards	Zero	Carbon	Homes	in	England?	From	Inception	to	Partial	Implementation.	Housing	Studies,	26	(6),	933–949.	Government	Office	for	the	East	of	England,	2000.	Regional	Planning	Guidance	for	East	Anglia	to	2016.	Government	Office	for	the	South	East,	2009.	The	South	East	Plan:	Regional	Spatial	Strategy	for	the	South	East	of	England.	Grant	Thornton,	2013.	OxFutures	Fund	-	Initial	Review:	A	report	to	Oxfordshire	
County	Council	and	Oxford	City	Council.	Greenwood,	D.,	2012.	The	challenge	of	policy	coordination	for	sustainable	sociotechnical	transitions:	the	case	of	the	zero-carbon	homes	agenda	in	England.	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy,	30	(1),	162–179.	Greenwood,	D.,	2015.	In	Search	of	Green	Political	Economy:	Steering	Markets,	Innovation,	and	the	Zero-Carbon	Homes	Agenda	in	England.	
Environmental	Politics,	24	(3),	423–441.	Greenwood,	D.,	2016.	Governance,	Coordination,	and	Evaluation:	The	Case	for	an	Epistemological	Focus	and	a	Return	to	C.	E.	Lindblom.	Political	Research	
Quarterly,	69	(1),	30–42.	Greenwood,	D.	and	Congreve,	A.,	2016.	The	Future	of	Policy	and	Standards	for	
Low	and	Zero	Carbon	Homes.	London:	Royal	Institute	of	Chartered	Surveyors.	Haggett,	C.	and	Toke,	D.,	2006.	Crossing	the	Great	Divide	-	Using	Multi-method	Analysis	to	Understand	Opposition	to	Windfarms.	Public	Administration,	84	(1),	103–120.	Hajer,	M.A.,	1995.	The	politics	of	environmental	discourse:	ecological	
modernization	and	the	policy	process.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Hall,	P.A.	and	Taylor,	R.C.R.,	1996.	Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms*.	Political	Studies,	44	(5),	936–957.	Hannigan,	J.A.,	2006.	Environmental	sociology.	2nd	ed.	London ;	New	York:	Routledge.	Hartley,	J.,	2005.	Innovation	in	Governance	and	Public	Services:	Past	and	Present.	
Public	Money	&	Management,	1	(1),	27–34.	Hartley,	J.,	Butler,	M.,	and	Benington,	J.,	2004.	Local	Government	Modernization:	
UK	and	Comparative	Analysis	from	an	Organizational	Perspective.	Rochester,	NY:	Social	Science	Research	Network,	SSRN	Scholarly	Paper	No.	ID	600743.	Hay,	C.,	2002.	Political	analysis.	Houndmills,	Basingstoke,	Hampshire ;	New	York:	Palgrave.	Hay,	C.	and	Jessop,	B.,	1995.	The	Governance	of	Local	Economic	Development	and	the	Development	of	Economic	Governance.	Presented	at	the	‘While	
	352	
highly	unlikely	to	achieve	all	they	set	out	to	do,	attempts	at	institutional	design	are	inevitable	as	political	actors	seek	to	make	their	values	“stick”	through	institutional	mechanisms.	Such	action	does	not	only	include	heroic	foundational	moments	(new	constitutions,	for	instance)	or	fundamentally	reform	programmes,	but	also	many	disparate	small	actors	of	adjustment	undertaken	by	strategic	actors	on	the	ground’	(Lowndes	and	Roberts	2013,	171),	Chicago.	Hay,	C.	and	Wincott,	D.,	1998.	Structure,	Agency	and	Historical	Institutionalism.	
Political	Studies,	46	(5),	951–957.	Heffernan,	E.,	Pan,	W.,	Liang,	X.,	and	de	Wilde,	P.,	2015.	Zero	carbon	homes:	Perceptions	from	the	UK	construction	industry.	Energy	Policy,	79,	23–36.	HM	Treasury,	ed.,	2007.	Budget	2007:	regulatory	impact	assessments.	London:	HM	Revenue	&	Customs.	HM	Treasury,	2015.	Fixing	the	Foundation:	Creating	A	More	Prosperous	Nation.	Holford,	W.	and	Wright,	H.M.,	1950.	Cambridge	Planning	Proposals	Volume	I:	A	
Report	to	the	Cambridge	County	Council.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Hometrack,	2015.	UK	Cities	House	Price	Index	[online].	UK	Cities	House	Price	
Index.	Available	from:	https://www.hometrack.com/uk/insight/uk-cities-house-price-index/	[Accessed	4	Dec	2015].	House	of	Commons	Library,	2015.	Local	Enterprise	Partnerships.	London:	House	of	Commons,	Briefing	Paper	No.	5651.	Huber,	J.,	1985.	Die	Regenbogen	-	Gesellschaft.	Ökologie	und	Sozialpolitik.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Fischer	S.	Verlag	GmbH.	Huber,	J.,	2004.	Technologies	and	Environmental	Innovation.	Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgard	Publishing.	Janicke,	M.,	1988.	Ökologische	Modernisierung.	Optionen	und	Restriktionen	präventiver	Umweltpolitik’	(Ecological	Modernisation.	Options	for	and	Restrictions	on	a	Preventive	Environmental	Policy),	in	Simonis,	U.E.	(ed.),	Präventive	Umweltpolitik	(Preventive	Environmental	Policy).	Frankfurt/Main:	Campus.	In:	Präventive	Umweltpolitik	(Preventive	
Environmental	Policy).	Frankfurt:	Main	Campus.	Janicke,	M.,	1997.	The	Political	System’s	Capacity	for	Envionrmental	Policy.	In:	M.	Janicke	and	H.	Weidnar,	eds.	New	York:	Springer.	Janicke,	M.,	Monch,	H.,	Ranneberg,	T.,	and	Simonis,	U.E.,	1989.	Structural	change	and	environmental	impact:	Empirical	evidence	on	thirty-one	countries	in	east	and	west.	Environmental	Monitoring	and	Assessment,	12	(2),	99–114.	Janicke,	M.,	Monch,	H.,	Ranneburg,	T.,	and	SImonis,	U.,	1989.	Economic	structure	and	environmental	impacts:	east	west	comparisons.	The	Environmentalist,	9	(3).	Janicke,	M.	and	Weidner,	H.,	1997.	National	environmental	policies:	a	comparative	
study	of	capacity-building :	with	a	data	appendix,	international	profiles	of	
change	since	1970.	New	York:	Springer.	Joas,	A.,	While,	A.,	and	Gibbs,	D.,	2004.	State	modernisation	and	local	strategic	selectivity	after	Local	Agenda	21:	evidence	from	three	northern	English	localities.	Policy	&	Politics,	32	(2),	151–168.	John,	P.,	2012.	Analyzing	public	policy.	2nd	ed.	Abingdon,	Oxon ;	New	York:	Routledge.	
	353	
Jollands,	N.,	2008.	Cities	and	Energy	-	a	discussion	paper.	In:	Competitive	Cities	
and	Climate	Change.	Presented	at	the	2nd	Annual	Meeting	of	the	OECD	Roundtable	Strategy	for	Urban	Development,	Milan:	OECD.	Kates,	R.W.,	Mayfield,	M.W.,	Torrie,	R.D.,	and	Witcher,	B.,	1998.	Methods	for	estimating	greenhouse	gases	from	local	places.	Local	Environment,	3	(3),	279–297.	Kingdon,	J.,	1984.	Agendas,	Alternative	and	Public	Policies.	2nd	ed.	New	York:	Longman.	King	Sturge,	2011.	Affordable	Housing	Viability	Study:	Oxford	City	Council.	Kitschelt,	H.,	1986.	Political	Opportunity	Structures	and	Political	Protest:	Anti-Nuclear	Movements	in	Four	Democracies.	British	Journal	of	Political	
Science,	16,	57–85.	Krasner,	S.D.,	1984.	Approaches	to	the	State:	Alternative	Conceptions	and	Historical	Dynamics.	Comparative	Politics,	16	(2),	223.	Lawton	Smith,	H.,	Glasson,	J.,	Romeo,	S.,	Waters,	R.,	and	Chadwick,	A.,	2013.	Entrepreneurial	regions:	Evidence	from	Oxfordshire	and	Cambridgeshire.	
Social	Science	Information,	52	(4),	653–673.	Layder,	D.,	1998.	Sociological	practice:	linking	theory	and	social	research.	London;	Thousand	Oaks,	Calif.:	Sage.	Lempriere,	M.,	in	press.	Using	Ecological	Modernization	Theory	To	Account	for	the	Evolution	of	the	Zero-Carbon	Homes	Agenda	in	England.	
Environmental	Politics.	Leroy,	P.	and	van	Tatenhove,	J.,	2000.	Political	Modernization	Theory	and	Environmental	Politics.	In:	G.	Spaargaren,	A.	Mol,	and	H.	Buttel,	eds.	
Environment	and	Global	modernity.	London:	Sage.	Lorenzoni,	I.,	O’Riordan,	T.,	and	Pigdeon,	N.,	2008.	Hot	Air	and	Cold	Feet:	The	UK	Response	to	Climate	Change.	In:	Turning	Down	The	Heat:	The	Politics	of	
Climate	Policy	in	Affluent	Democracies.	Basingstok:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Loring,	J.,	2007.	Wind	Energy	Planning	in	England,	Wales	and	Denmark:	Factors	Influencing	Project	Success.	Energy	Policy,	35,	2648–2660.	Lovell,	H.,	2004.	Framing	sustainable	housing	as	a	solution	to	climate	change.	
Journal	of	Environmental	Policy	&	Planning,	6	(1),	35–55.	Lovell,	H.,	2005.	Supply	and	Demand	for	Low	Energy	Housing	in	the	UK:	Insights	from	a	Science	and	Technology	Studies	Approach.	Housing	Studies,	20	(5),	815–829.	Lovell,	H.,	2009.	The	role	of	individuals	in	policy	change:	the	case	of	UK	low-energy	housing.	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy,	27	(3),	491–511.	Lovelock,	J.,	2000.	Gaia:	a	new	look	at	life	on	earth.	Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	Lowndes,	V.,	2005.	Something	Old,	Something	New,	Something	Borrowed...	Policy	
Studies,	26	(3),	291–309.	Lowndes,	V.	and	Gardner,	A.,	2016.	Local	governance	under	the	Conservatives:	super-austerity,	devolution	and	the	‘smarter	state’.	Local	Government	
Studies,	42	(3),	357–375.	Lowndes,	V.	and	Roberts,	M.,	2013.	Why	Institutions	Matter:	The	New	
Institutionalism	in	Political	Science.	Houndmills,	Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	LUC,	2015.	Oxford	Green	Belt	Study:	Final	Report	for	Cherwell	District	Council.	
	354	
Lundqvist,	L.J.,	2000.	Capacity-building	or	social	construction?	Explaining	Sweden’s	shift	towards	ecological	modernisation.	Geoforum,	31	(1),	21–32.	Mann,	S.,	Briant,	R.M.,	and	Gibin,	M.,	2014.	Spatial	determinants	of	local	government	action	on	climate	change:	an	analysis	of	local	authorities	in	England.	Local	Environment,	19	(8),	837–867.	March,	J.G.	and	Olsen,	J.P.,	1984.	The	New	Institutionalism:	Organizational	Factors	in	Political	Life.	American	Political	Science	Review,	78	(03),	734–749.	March,	J.G.	and	Olsen,	J.P.,	1989.	Rediscovering	institutions:	the	organizational	
basis	of	politics.	New	York	[etc.]:	The	Free	press.	March,	J.	and	Olsen,	J.,	2004.	The	Logic	of	Appropriateness.	Marsh,	D.	and	Rhodes,	R.A.W.,	eds.,	1992.	Policy	Networks	in	Britain:	A	Critique	of	Existing	Approaches.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1–26.	Marsh,	D.	and	Smith,	M.,	2000.	Understanding	Policy	Networks:	towards	a	Dialectical	Approach.	Political	Studies,	48	(1),	4–21.	McEvoy,	D.,	Gibbs,	D.C.,	and	Longhurst,	J.W.S.,	1998.	Urban	sustainability:	problems	facing	the	‘local’	approach	to	carbon-reduction	strategies.	
Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy,	16	(4),	423	–	432.	McLaughlin,	P.,	2012.	Ecological	modernization	in	evolutionary	perspective.	
Organization	&	Environment,	25	(2),	178–196.	McManus,	A.,	Gaterell,	M.R.,	and	Coates,	L.E.,	2010.	The	potential	of	the	Code	for	Sustainable	Homes	to	deliver	genuine	‘sustainable	energy’	in	the	UK	social	housing	sector.	Energy	Policy,	38	(4),	2013–2019.	Meadows,	D.H.	and	Club	of	Rome,	eds.,	1972.	The	Limits	to	growth;	a	report	for	
the	Club	of	Rome’s	project	on	the	predicament	of	mankind.	New	York:	Universe	Books.	Middlemiss,	L.	and	Parrish,	B.,	2010.	Building	capacity	for	low-carbon	communities:	The	role	of	grassroots	initiatives.	Energy	Policy,	38,	7559–7566.	Mintrom,	M.	and	Norman,	P.,	2009.	Policy	Entrepreneurship	and	Policy	Change.	
Policy	Studies	Journal,	37	(4),	649–667.	Mol,	A.,	1995.	The	Refinement	of	Production:	Ecological	Modernization	Theory	and	
the	Chemical	Industry.	Utrecht:	Van	Arkel.	Mol,	A.,	1996.	Ecological	modernity	and	institutional	reflexivity:	Environmental	reform	in	the	late	modern	age.	Environmental	Politics,	5	(2),	302–323.	Mol,	A.,	2000.	The	environmental	movement	in	an	era	of	ecological	modernization.	Geoforum,	31	(1),	45–56.	Mol,	A.P.J.	and	Janicke,	M.,	2009.	The	origins	and	theoretical	foundations	of	ecological	modernisation	theory.	In:	The	Ecological	Modernisation	Reader:	
Environmental	Reform	in	Theory	and	Practice.	New	York:	Routledge,	17–27.	Mol,	A.	and	Sonnonfeld,	D.,	2000.	Ecological	Modernization	Around	the	World:	An	Introduction.	Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	1–14.	Mol,	A.,	Spaargaren,	G.,	and	Sonnonfeld,	D.,	2014.	Ecological	Modernization	Theory:	Taking	Stock,	Moving	Forward.	In:	Routledge	International	
Handbook	of	Social	and	Environmental	Change.	London:	Routledge,	15–30.	Murphy,	J.,	2000.	Editorial.	Geoforum,	31	(1),	1–18.	
	355	
National	Audit	Office,	2015.	Devolving	responsibility	to	cities	in	England:	Wave	1	
City	Deals.	Report	by	the	Comptroller	and	Auditor	General.	Newman,	J.,	Raine,	J.,	and	Skelcher,	C.,	2000.	Innovation	and	Best	Practice	in	Local	
Government:	A	Research	Report.	Department	for	Environment,	Transport	and	Regions.	Newman,	J.,	Raine,	J.,	and	Skelcher,	C.,	2001.	Transforming	Local	Government:	Innovation	and	Modernization.	Public	Money	&	Management,	21	(2),	61–68.	Newton,	R.,	2012.	The	handy	guide	to	planning	2012.	Urban	Forum.	North,	D.C.,	1990.	Institutions,	institutional	change,	and	economic	performance.	Cambridge;	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.	ONS,	2013.	Annual	Mid	year	Population	Estimates:	2013	[online].	Available	from:	http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/2014-06-26	[Accessed	1	Sep	2015].	ONS,	2014.	Construction	Statistics:	No.	15,	2014	Edition	[online].	Available	from:	http://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/constructionindustry/articles/constructionstatistics/2014-09-02	[Accessed	2	Jan	2015].	Osborne,	S.P.,	1998.	Voluntary	organizations	and	innovation	in	public	services.	London:	Routledge.	Osborne,	Stephen	&	Brown,	L.,	2011.	Innovation,	Public	Policy	and	Public	Service	Delivery	in	the	UK:	The	Word	That	Would	Be	King?	Public	Administration,	89	(4),	1335–1350.	Osborne,	D.	and	Gaebler,	T.,	1993.	Reinventing	government:	how	the	
entrepreneurial	spirit	is	transforming	the	public	sector.	New	York,	N.Y.:	Plume.	Osmani,	M.	and	O’Reilly,	A.,	2009.	Feasibility	of	zero	carbon	homes	in	England	by	2016:	A	house	builder’s	perspective.	Building	and	Environment,	44	(9),	1917–1924.	Ostrom,	E.,	1999.	Institutional	Rational	Choice:	An	Assessment	of	The	Institutional	Analysis	and	Development	Framework.	In:	Theories	of	the	
Public	Policy	Process.	Oxford:	Westview	Press.	Oxford	City	Council,	2004.	Oxford	City	Council:	City	Council	Election.	Oxford	City	Council,	2005.	Oxford	Local	Plan	2001-2016.	Oxford	City	Council,	2006a.	Natural	Resource	Impact	Analysis	Supplementary	Planning	Document.	Oxford	City	Council,	2006b.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2005-March	2006.	Oxford	City	Council,	2008.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	March	2007-April	2008.	Oxford	City	Council,	2009.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2008-March	2009.	Oxford	City	Council,	2010a.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2009-March	2010.	Oxford	City	Council,	2010b.	Approval	of	Energy	saving	Trust	121	Action	Plan.	Head	of	Environmental	Development.	Oxford	City	Council,	2011a.	Sites	and	Housing	DPD	Background	Paper	9:	Energy	Efficiency	and	Natural	Resources.	Oxford	City	Council,	2011b.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2010-March	2011.	Oxford	City	Council,	2011c.	Sites	and	Housing	DPD	Background	paper	11:	Affordable	Housing.	Oxford	City	Council,	2011d.	Sites	and	Housing	Development	Plan	Document:	Preferred	Options	Consultation	Document.	
	356	
Oxford	City	Council,	2011e.	Oxford	Core	Strategy	2026.	Oxford	City	Council,	2011f.	Sites	and	Housing	DPD:	Pre-Options:	Report	on	public	consultation.	Oxford	City	Council,	2012a.	Oxford	City	Council	Carbon	Management	Plan:	2012-2017.	Oxford	City	Council,	2012b.	Housing	Strategy	2012-2015:	Action	Plan.	Oxford	City	Council,	2012c.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2011-March	2012.	Oxford	City	Council,	2013a.	Low	Emission	Strategy.	Oxford	City	Council,	2013b.	Technical	Advice	Note	2:	Energy	Statements.	Technical	advice	to	assist	decision	makers	and	applicants	in	applying	Policy	HP11	of	the	Sites	and	Housing	Plan.	Oxford	City	Council,	2013c.	Annual	Monitoring	Report:	April	2012-March	2013.	Oxford	City	Council,	2013d.	Strategic	Housing	Land	Availability	Assessment.	Oxford	City	Council,	2013e.	Affordable	Housing	and	Planning	Obligations:	
Supplementary	Planning	Document.	Oxford	City	Council,	2014a.	Northern	Gateway	Area	Action	Plan:	Proposed	Submission.	Oxford	City	Council,	2014b.	Northern	Gateway	Area	Action	Plan.	Oxford	Civic	Society,	2014a.	Oxford	Futures:	A	Call	to	action	on	the	development	of	
Central	Oxfordshire.	Oxford	Civic	Society,	2014b.	Oxford	Future:	Achieving	Smarter	Growth	in	Central	
Oxfordshire.	Oxfordshire	County	Council,	1996.	Oxfordshire	Structure	Plan	1996.	Oxfordshire	County	Council,	2005.	Oxfordshire	Structure	Plan.	Oxfordshire	County	Council.	Oxfordshire	Local	Enterprise	Partnership,	2014a.	Oxford	and	Oxfordshire	City	
Deal.	Oxfordshire	Local	Enterprise	Partnership,	2014b.	Oxfordshire	LEP	Strategic	
Economic	Plan.	OxLEP,	2015a.	Our	Board	[online].	Available	from:	http://www.oxfordshirelep.org.uk/content/our-board	[Accessed	5	Nov	2015].	OxLEP,	2015b.	Strategic	Economic	Plan:	Executive	Summary.	Oxfordshire	Local	Economic	Partnership.	Pan,	W.	and	Garmston,	H.,	2012.	Compliance	with	building	energy	regulations	for	new-build	dwellings.	Energy,	48	(1),	11–22.	Paul,	L.,	2013.	Zero	Carbon	Homes.	London:	House	of	Commons	Library,	Standard	Note	No.	SN/SC/06678.	Pellow,	D.N.,	Schnaiberg,	A.,	and	Weinberg,	A.S.,	2000.	Putting	the	Ecological	Modernisation	Thesis	to	the	Test:	The	Promises	and	Performances	of	Urban	Recycling.	ENVIRONMENTAL	POLITICS,	9,	109–137.	Peters,	B.G.,	2012.	Institutional	theory	in	political	science:	the	new	institutionalism.	3rd	ed.	New	York:	Continuum.	Peters,	G.	and	Pierre,	J.,	2006.	Governance,	Government	and	the	State.	In:	C.	Hay,	M.	Lister,	and	D.	Marsh,	eds.	The	State:	Theories	and	Issues.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	209–222.	Pickvance,	C.,	2009.	The	construction	of	UK	sustainable	housing	policy	and	the	role	of	pressure	groups.	Local	Environment,	14	(4),	329–345.	
	357	
Pierson,	P.,	2000.	Increasing	Returns,	Path	Dependence,	and	The	Study	of	Politcs.	
The	American	Political	Science	Review,	94	(2),	251–267.	Pierson,	P.	and	Skocpol,	T.,	2002.	Historical	Institutionalism	in	Contemporary	Political	Science.	In:	I.	Katznelson	and	H.	Milner,	eds.	London:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	693–722.	Pitt,	D.,	2010.	The	impact	of	internal	and	external	characteristics	on	the	adoption	of	climate	mitigation	policies	by	US	municipalities.	Environment	and	
Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy,	28	(5),	851–871.	Press,	D.,	1998.	Local	environmental	policy	capacity:	a	framework	for	research.	
Natural	Resources	Journal,	38,	29–52.	Revell,	A.,	2005.	Ecological	modernization	in	the	UK:	rhetoric	or	reality?	
European	Environment,	15	(6),	344–361.	Revell,	A.,	2007.	The	ecological	modernization	of	SMEs	in	the	UK	construction	industry.	Geoforum,	38,	114–126.	Rhodes,	R.A.W.,	1985.	Power-dependence,	policy	communities	and	intergovernmental	networks.	Public	Administration	Bulletin,	49	(1),	4–31.	Rhodes,	R.A.W.,	1997.	Understanding	governance:	policy	networks,	governance,	
reflexivity,	and	accountability.	Buckingham ;	Philadelphia:	Open	University	Press.	Roberts,	N.C.	and	King,	P.J.,	1991.	Policy	Entrepreneurs:	Their	Activity	Structure	and	Function	in	the	Policy	Process.	Journal	of	Public	Administration	
Research	and	Theory:	J-PART,	1	(2),	147–175.	RSA,	2012.	A	collaborative	approach	to	policy	A	case	study	on	the	Zero	Carbon	Hub.	Ruddin,	L.P.,	2006.	You	Can	Generalize	Stupid!	Social	Scientists,	Bent	Flyvbjerg,	and	Case	Study	Methodology.	Qualitative	Inquiry,	12	(4),	797–812.	Rydin,	Y.,	1998.	Urban	and	environmental	planning	in	the	UK.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Rydin,	Y.,	2011.	The	purpose	of	planning:	creating	sustainable	towns	and	cities.	Bristol:	Policy	Press.	Rydin,	Y.,	2013a.	The	future	of	planning:	beyond	growth	dependence.	Bristol:	Policy	Press.	Rydin,	Y.,	2013b.	The	issue	network	of	zero-carbon	built	environments:	a	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis.	Environmental	Politics,	22	(3),	496–517.	Sabatier,	P.A.,	1988.	An	advocacy	coalition	framework	of	policy	change	and	the	role	of	policy-oriented	learning	therein.	Policy	Sciences,	21	(2-3),	129–168.	Sabatier,	P.A.,	ed.,	2007.	Theories	of	the	policy	process.	2nd	ed.	Boulder,	Colo:	Westview	Press.	Scheinberg,	A.,	2003.	The	proof	of	the	pudding:	urban	recycling	in	North	America	as	a	process	of	ecological	modernisation.	Environmental	Politics,	12	(4),	49–75.	Schmidt,	V.,	2006.	Institutionalism.	In:	The	State:	Theories	and	Issues.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Schmidt,	V.A.,	2010.	Taking	ideas	and	discourse	seriously:	explaining	change	through	discursive	institutionalism	as	the	fourth	‘new	institutionalism’.	
European	Political	Science	Review,	2	(01),	1.	
	358	
Scott,	F.L.,	Jones,	C.R.,	and	Webb,	T.L.,	2014.	What	do	people	living	in	deprived	communities	in	the	UK	think	about	household	energy	efficiency	interventions?	Energy	Policy,	66,	335–349.	Segal	Quince	Wicksteed,	2000a.	The	Cambridge	Phenomenon	Revisited:	Part	Two.	London:	Segal	Quince	Wicksteed.	Segal	Quince	Wicksteed,	2000b.	The	Cambridge	Phenomenon	Revisited:	Part	One.	London:	Segal	Quince	Wicksteed.	Shipan,	C.R.	and	Volden,	C.,	2008.	The	Mechanisms	of	Policy	Diffusion.	American	
Journal	of	Political	Science,	52	(4),	840–857.	Skelcher,	C.	and	Smith,	S.R.,	2014.	THEORIZING	HYBRIDITY:	INSTITUTIONAL	LOGICS,	COMPLEX	ORGANIZATIONS,	AND	ACTOR	IDENTITIES:	THE	CASE	OF	NONPROFITS:	Theorizing	Hybridity.	Public	Administration,	n/a–n/a.	Smith,	A.,	2007.	Translating	Sustainabilities	between	Green	Niches	and	Socio-Technical	Regimes.	Technology	Analysis	&	Strategic	Management,	19	(4),	427–450.	Sonnenfeld,	D.A.	and	Mol,	A.,	2006.	Environmental	Reform	in	Asia:	Comparisons,	Challenges,	Next	Steps.	The	Journal	of	Environment	&	Development,	15	(2),	112–137.	Sonnonfeld,	D.,	2000.	Contradictions	of	ecological	modernization:	Pulp	&	paper	manufacturing	in	south-east	Asia.	Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	235–256.	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Council,	2002.	Cambridge	Green	Belt	Study:	A	
Vision	of	the	Future	for	Cambridge	in	its	Green	Belt	Setting.	Landscape	Design	Associates.	Spaargaren,	G.,	1997.	The	ecological	modernization	of	production	and	consumption:	essays	in	environmental	sociology.	[publisher	not	identified],	[Wageningen].	Spaargaren,	G.	and	Van	Vliet,	B.,	2000.	Lifestyles,	consumption	and	the	environment:	The	ecological	modernization	of	domestic	consumption.	
Environmental	Politics,	9	(1),	50–76.	SQW,	2013.	The	Oxfordshire	Innovation	Engine:	Realising	the	Growth	Potential.	Steinmo,	S.,	2008.	What	is	Historical	Institutionalism?	In:	M.	Della	Porta,	Donnatella	&	Keating,	ed.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Pres,	150–178.	Steinmo,	S.	and	Thelen,	K.,	1992.	Historical	Institutionalism	in	Comparative	Perspective.	In:	K.	Thelen,	S.	Steinmo,	and	F.	Longstreth,	eds.	Structuring	
Politics:	Historical	Institutionalism	in	Comparative	Analysis.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Streeck,	W.	and	Thelen,	K.A.,	eds.,	2005.	Beyond	continuity:	institutional	change	in	
advanced	political	economies.	Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	van	Tatenhove,	J.P.M.	and	Leroy,	P.,	2003.	Environment	and	Participation	in	a	Context	of	Political	Modernisation.	Environmental	Values,	12	(2),	155–174.	The	Conservative	Party,	2009.	Open	Source	Planning	Green	Paper:	Policy	Green	
Paper	No.	14.	The	Economist,	2015.	Oxford	v.	Cambridge:	Trailing	in	its	wake	[online].	Oxford	v.	
Cambridge:	Trailing	in	its	wake.	Available	from:	http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21639495-how-and-why-fortunes-englands-two-ancient-university-towns-diverged-trailing-its-wake	[Accessed	20	Jan	2015].	
	359	
The	Planning	Inspectorate,	2009.	Report	to	Cambridge	City	Council	and	South	
Cambridgeshire	District	Council:	Report	on	the	Examination	Into	The	North	
West	Cambridge	Area	Action	Plan	Development	Plan	Document.	The	Planning	Inspectorate,	2010.	Report	on	the	Examination	Into	The	Oxford	Core	
Strategy	Development	Plan	Document.	The	Planning	Inspectorate,	2015a.	Cambridge	City	Local	Plan	Examination	and	South	Cambridgeshire	District	Local	Plan	Examination.	The	Planning	Inspectorate,	2015b.	Report	on	the	Examination	Into	the	Northern	
Gateway	Area	Action	Plan.	The	Planning	Inspectorate,	2015c.	Report	on	the	Examination	Into	The	Cherwell	
Local	Plan.	Toke,	D.,	2001.	Ecological	modernisation:	A	reformist	view.	New	Political	
Economy,	6	(2),	279–290.	Toke,	D.,	2010.	Politics	By	Heuristics:	Policy	Networks	With	A	Focus	on	Actor	Resources,	As	Illustrated	By	The	Case	of	Renewable	Energy	Under	New	Labour.	Public	Administration,	3,	764–781.	Toke,	D.,	2011a.	Ecological	modernization	and	renewable	energy.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Toke,	D.,	2011b.	Ecological	modernization,	social	movements	and	renewable	energy.	Environmental	Politics,	20	(1),	60–79.	Turley,	2014.	Cherwell	Local	Plan	2006-2031:	Housing	Deliverability	Report	(May	2014).	Valler,	D.	and	Phelps,	N.,	forthcoming.	Urban	Development	and	the	Politics	of	Dissonance.	Valler,	D.	and	Phelps,	N.A.,	2016.	Delivering	growth?	Evaluating	economic	governance	in	England’s	South	East	subregions.	Town	Planning	Review,	87	(1),	5–30.	Van	Bueren,	E.	and	De	Jong,	J.,	2007.	Establishing	sustainability:	policy	successes	and	failures.	Building	Research	&	Information,	35	(5),	543–556.	Vennesson,	P.,	2008.	Case	studies	and	process	tracing:	theories	and	practices.	In:	D.	Della	Porta	and	M.	Keating,	eds.	Approaches	and	Methodologies	in	the	
Social	Sciences.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	223–239.	Walker,	J.L.,	2012.	The	Diffusion	of	Innovations	among	the	American	States.	
American	Political	Science	Review,	63	(03),	880–899.	Weale,	A.,	1992.	The	new	politics	of	pollution.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press.	Weidner,	H.	and	Jänicke,	M.,	2002a.	Capacity	Building	in	National	Environmental	
Policy	A	Comparative	Study	of	17	Countries.	Berlin,	Heidelberg:	Springer	Berlin	Heidelberg.	Weidner,	H.	and	Jänicke,	M.,	2002b.	Capacity	Building	in	National	Environmental	
Policy	A	Comparative	Study	of	17	Countries.	Berlin,	Heidelberg:	Springer	Berlin	Heidelberg.	While,	A.,	Jonas,	A.E.G.,	and	Gibbs,	D.C.,	2004.	Unblocking	the	city?	Growth	pressures,	collective	provision,	and	the	search	for	new	spaces	of	governance	in	Greater	Cambridge,	England.	Environment	and	Planning	A,	36	(2),	279–304.	Williams,	K.	and	Dair,	C.,	2007.	What	is	stopping	sustainable	building	in	England?	Barriers	experienced	by	stakeholders	in	delivering	sustainable	developments.	Sustainable	Development,	15	(3),	135–147.	
	360	
Williams,	P.,	2002.	The	Competent	Boundary	Spanner.	Public	Administration,	80	(1),	103–124.	Wilson,	D.J.	and	Game,	C.,	2006.	Local	government	in	the	United	Kingdom.	Houndmills,	Balsingstoke,	Hampshire;	New	York:	Palgrave.	WWF,	2011.	WWF-UK	resigns	from	Zero	Carbon	Taskforce	-	WWF	UK	[online].	Available	from:	http://www.wwf.org.uk/about_wwf/press_centre/?unewsid=4799	[Accessed	18	Feb	2015].	Yin,	R.K.,	2003.	Case	study	research:	design	and	methods.	Thousand	Oaks,	Calif.:	Sage	Publications.	Zahran,	S.,	Brody,	S.D.,	Vedlitz,	A.,	Grover,	H.,	and	Miller,	C.,	2008.	Vulnerability	and	capacity:	explaining	local	commitment	to	climate-change	policy.	
Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy,	26	(3),	544–562.	Zero	Carbon	Hub,	n.d.	Board	Members	[online].	Board	Members.	Available	from:	http://www.zerocarbonhub.org/board-members	[Accessed	10	Jan	2015].	Zero	Carbon	Hub,	2014.	Cost	analysis:	Meeting	the	zero	carbon	standard.	London:	Zero	Carbon	Hub.	Zhang,	L.,	Mol,	A.P.J.,	and	Sonnenfeld,	D.A.,	2007.	The	interpretation	of	ecological	modernisation	in	China.	Environmental	Politics,	16	(4),	659–668.	
 	
	361	
Appendixes					
Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
Title of study 
 
 
The Local Politics of Ecological Modernisation: The Case of Sustainable 
Homes Policy in English Local Authorities 
 
Background of the Study 
 
Local government has made significant inroads in recent years in legislating 
for the construction of sustainable homes. Powers to set local sustainable 
construction targets granted by central government in 2006 through Planning 
Policy Statement 1 have been embraced by almost 50% of local authorities in 
England, making them significant players in the way that the policy debate 
plays out at the national level – for better or worse. Unusually, then, two levels 
of sustainable construction standards exist: national level standards 
incorporated into Building Regulations and supplementary local level 
standards incorporated into Local Plans.  
  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
As political scientists we know little about the politics that govern the decision 
to adopt these kinds of supplementary standards. As such, the research 
project that you have been invited to take part in asks what barriers and 
enablers stand in the way of local authorities embracing these kinds of 
powers. The first half of the study asks how sustainable homes policy has 
developed in a national and local context. The second half relies upon in-
depth case studies of English local authorities to uncover barriers and 
enablers that both encourage and inhibit the adoption of supplementary 
sustainable construction standards.  
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited because you are, or have been, well placed within your 
organisation to answer questions on the capacity of the local authority to 
legislate in this way. You may have had little direct involvement in the 
adoption of the Local Plan but that is a deliberate design feature of the 
research. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
Your involvement is entirely voluntary, although given your knowledge of the 
policy area your contribution would greatly enhance the coherence and 
findings of the project.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you do choose to take part you will be asked to commit to an interview, 
which should typically last between one and one and a half hours. This can be 
changed depending on your schedule however. It is typical that these 
interviews take place face-to-face, and this will be at a location convenient to 
you such as your office or a coffee shop. However it may be possible to 
arrange a Skype interview or telephone interview if a face-to-face interview is 
not possible. Interviews are likely to take place on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th of 
February 2015. 
 
During the interview you will be asked questions that reflect your current 
position within your organization and, if relevant, the role you played in the 
development of the Local Plan. Questions will focus on the: key individuals 
and organisations involved; the political context and the capacity of the Local 
Authority to respond to environmental issues.  
 
There is no prior preparation required on your part, although you may find it 
useful to refer to notes, diaries or records from the time (if relevant) to aid your 
memory. If you choose to cooperate a more detailed list of discussion topics 
will be forwarded to you before the interview.  
 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
The information that you supply and that which may be collected as part of the 
research project will be entered into a filing system or database. The 
information will be retained by the University of Birmingham and will only be 
used for the purpose of research, and statistical and audit purposes. By 
supplying this information you are consenting to the University storing your 
information for the purposes stated above. The University of Birmingham in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 will process 
the information. Your contributions will be anonymized, and no personally 
identifiable information will be included in the research report.  
 
How is the project being funded? 
 
The project is being funded by the College of Social Sciences, University of 
Birmingham 
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What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of the study will form the basis of two chapters of a Ph.D. thesis, 
due for submission in 2016. In addition it is likely that results will be 
disseminated through the scientific literature in the form of peer-reviewed 
journal articles and single author monographs.  
 
How can I opt-in/out of the study? 
 
You will be contacted in a week or so by e-mail to confirm your involvement. It 
is at that stage that logistical details can be discussed. 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please 
contact Max Lempriere - the principal investigator – using the following 
contact details:  
 
 
 
Max Lempriere 
Department of Political Science and International Studies 
10th Floor West, Muirhead Tower 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking 
part in this research. 
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Case Study Protocol 
 
 ‘The protocol is more than a questionnaire or instrument…The protocol is a 
major way of increasing the reliability of the case study research and is 
intended to guide the investigator in carrying out the data collection. (Yin 
2003: 67).  
 
Overarching Case Study Questions 
 
Which actors were in the network? 
What resources did they possess? 
How did these resources flow across the network? 
In what ways were they depended on by, particularly, councillors and officers? 
What was the situative context and how was this exploited? 
What institutional conditions existed? 
What economic conditions existed? 
What cognitive-informational conditions existed? 
How was the problem framed? 
 
Actors/Resource Exchanges/Resource Dependencies 	
Which actors comprised the network? 
Which of those actors were the most important? 
What resources did they possess? 
How did councillors and officers depend upon those resources? 
(How) were these resources exchanged? 
What concessions were made? 
Which governance strategy was employed by the local authority in the policy 
making process? 
 
Situative Context: 
 
What was the situational context in which policy was being made? 
Were there any natural weather events that raised the issue of sustainability 
on the agenda in the previous years? 
Were there any pollution crises?  
Did policy-cycles between local and national level align? 
Was there a sudden change in government/elected member for planning, or 
other ‘constitutional’ crisis? 
How high was the issue of sustainability on the LA’s agenda? 
How well formed was the strategy to design, adopt and implement a 
sustainable construction policy prior to one of these windows opening?  
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Political Institutional Factors 
 
Participative Capacity 	
Does local governments have high levels of participation from non-state 
actors? 
What is the nature of this interaction? 
What role do non-state actors play in the policy making process? 
 
Integrative Capacity  
 
Does local government have high levels of both horizontal and vertical 
integration between different levels of government: i.e. between junior 
and senior officer and between officers and elected Councillors (particularly 
those with responsibility for planning and the environment)? 
What is the nature of this interaction? 
 
Economic Conditions 
 
What economic position does the construction sector hold in the local 
authority? Is it a big provider of jobs, etc? 
What is the state of the existing housing stock? Is it already highly 
sustainable? 
How does the local economy fare compared to its regional neighbours and 
those nationally?  
What opportunities/scope for future development is there in the local 
authority? Are future projections indicating a high level of construction? 
 
Cognitive-Informational Factors 
 
What is the leading paradigm on environmental protection and is that 
compatible with the principles of ecological modernisation?   
 
What efforts were made to increase the environmental awareness of 
councillors, officers, network actors and the general public? 
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Breakdown of Interviewees 
 
 
    Industry representative/consultant 9 
Councillor 
  
7 
Officials 
  
6 
Academics 
  
2 
Civil society representatives 3 				 	
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